Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Ors  Insc 60 (3 February 2006)
B. N. Srikrishna & R. V. Raveendran R.V. Raveendran, J.
undated letter from the petitioner, received by this Court on 19.11.1998,
alleging illegal detention, custodial torture and harassment to family members
was registered as a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India. The State of Haryana and its Director General of Police,
were arrayed as respondents 1 and 2 and the six Police Officers referred to in
the letter-petition were arrayed as respondent Nos.3 to 8.
On 10.3.1998, at
about 10 a.m. Dharam Singh ASI, Police Post Dhamtan Saheb (Narwana Tehsil, Jind
District), along with Police constables (Ramesh Chand, Jaldhir Singh and Baljit
Singh), while patrolling near Dhamtan Saheb Bus Stand, received information
that one Joginder Singh (son of petitioner) and his associates were conspiring
in his house, to apply pressure on some tender-bidders. When the police party
proceeded towards Joginder Singh's house, they saw two young men coming from
the opposite side, on a motorcycle. On seeing the Police party, the motorcycle
suddenly turned back. On suspicion, the Police party gave chase and stopped the
motorcycle near a petrol-pump. The ASI asked the motorcyclist and the
pillion-rider to identify themselves. The motorcyclist gave his name as Amrik
Singh. The pillion-rider gave his name as Joginder Singh, a Palledar at Tohana.
When the ASI asked Joginder Singh as to whether he was the same Joginder who
had jumped parole in a case, Joginder Singh started running. When the Police
party chased him, Joginder Singh turned back, whipped out a pistol and fired at
them. Baljit Singh, one of the Constables, was hit and collapsed. In the
ensuing confusion, both Amrik Singh and Joginder Singh escaped. The injured
Constable succumbed to the bullet injuries. In this connection, FIR No.112
dated 10.3.1998 under Section 302/307/352/186 IPC was registered in P.S., Garhi,
against Joginder Singh and Amrik Singh. On receiving information of the death
of constable, the SP and the DSP rushed to the hospital and later, went to the Dhamtan
Saheb Police Post. In the meantime, the Police party which had gone to the
house of Joginder, in search of him, did not find him and brought his father Sube
Singh (Petitioner) to the Police Station. According to police, the SDM and the
Chairman of Zila Parishad, Jind, were also present at the Police Post at that
time. The petitioner denied any knowledge of the whereabouts of his son Joginder.
The SP made some enquiries with the petitioner and left. After inquiries, the
petitioner was released.
petitioner along with his brother-in-law Rattan Singh filed W.P. (Crl.)
No.416/1998 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court on 24.3.1998 alleging harassment,
torture and illegal detention for three days (from 10.3.1998 to 13.3.1998) and
again for a day (15.3.1998 to 16.3.1998) and prayed for action against the
concerned Police Officers and for a judicial enquiry. The High Court by order
dated 27.4.1998 disposed of the petition with an observation that petitioners
may file a criminal complaint in a competent court.
petitioner went underground for a few months. Further enquiries by the police
revealed that several cases had been registered against the petitioner and his
son Joginder Singh. Joginder was declared as 'proclaimed offender' by order
dated 12.6.1998 of S.D.J.M., Narwana. The petitioner published a notice in 'Dainik
Tribune' dated 6.8.1998 that he had disowned his son Joginder and was not
responsible for his actions.
Police continued with their inquiries and in July, 1998, ASI Satya Narayan and
other Police Officers of Dhamtan Saheb Police Post again tried to ascertain his
whereabouts by making enquiries with the petitioner and his relatives/friends.
The Letter (re : alleged torture and illegal detention)
sent an undated letter to this Court (received on 19.11.1998) wherein he
alleged that ASI Dharam Singh, In- charge of Dhamtan Saheb Police Post, along
with some Police Officers, came to his house on 10.3.1998 at about 11 a.m, to
enquire about the whereabouts of his son Joginder; and that when he informed
them that he was not aware of it, they started beating him. Thereafter, the
Police took him, his wife and two minor daughters forcibly to the Police Post,
through the bazaar. He was beaten with sticks on the way. When they reached the
Police Post, K.P. Singh, Superintendent of Police as also the Deputy
Superintendent of Police, Narwana, were present. When ASI Dharam Singh informed
them that the persons brought were the father, mother and sisters of Joginder,
the S.P. directed that they may be brought to 'correct mental attitude'. The
ASI took him inside and beat him for about 10 minutes and brought him back
before the SP again. By then, his wife and daughters were made to sit in an
uncomfortable posture (as students are made to sit in schools by way of
punishment). When the petitioner stated that he was not aware of his son's
whereabouts, the S.P. became furious and ordered his men to remove his
moustache, whereupon Dharam Singh sat on his chest (with three policemen
pressing his hands and feet) and plucked his moustache. Again, they started
beating him, searched his pockets and took away Rs.2,350 which he was carrying.
Then the police took him back to his house and ransacked the house. ASI Dharam
Singh broke open the lock of his trunk and seized his licensed gun, some
cartridges and Arms licence, as also some jewellery found in the trunk.
Thereafter, the petitioner was taken back to the Police Post. Though his wife
and daughters were sent back to the house, he was illegally detained in Police
custody for a day and then taken to P.S. Garhi where he was kept for 10 days
and during the first 5 days of such detention, he was regularly beaten. Because
of such police harassment and torture, when he was released he and his younger
son Gurmail Singh fled from his house.
On 8.7.1998, the
petitioner returned to his house. Satya Narayan, ASI, (who had succeeded Dharam
Singh) and Munshi (HC) of Dhamtan Police Post, came to his house, with four
other policemen, handcuffed him and took him to the Police Post. He was tortured
in the Police Post by the ASI and Head Constable Munshi by thrashing him thrice,
each time continuously for 15 minutes.
he requested for water, he was forced to drink hot water with salt. The Munshi,
Dhamtan Police Post kept him in a wooden Shikanza for 5 days and he was not
allowed to sleep. Then he was taken to Jind. He also alleged that the Police
forced him to bring money for the vehicles to conduct raids (to catch his son, Joginder)
and he was forced to accompany them on such raids and was put in wooden Shikanza
at Tulvan Thana. When he begged that he should be released, he was informed
that he was being taken for the raids on the instructions of Ranbir Sharma,
S.P., Jind, and that without the permission of the S.P., he could not be
released. After three days he was again taken back to Dhamtan Post and kept
there for 2 days. Thereafter, he was released with a condition to visit the
Police Post everyday in the morning and evening.
alleged that his friends and relatives who wanted to meet him, when he was being
illegally detained, were not permitted to meet him and they were also tortured.
He also alleged that Munshi (HC) of Dhamtan Police Post was demanding money from
He alleged that
in view of such torture, he was forced to leave his house and remain outside. He
prayed for a direction to the Police to stop the atrocities and torture. He
sought compensation for himself and his wife and daughters for the social,
physical and financial loss, and return of his licensed gun, gold ornaments and
other belongings. He also prayed for a thorough inquiry into the atrocities and
torture committed by the Police and imposition of punishment to those who were
The letter of the
petitioner was registered as a writ petition and Rule was issued on 11.1.1999.
On 13.9.2000, this Court appointed Mr. S. Muralidhar, Advocate, as Amicus
Curiae, to assist the Court.
alleged Second Round of Harassment :
arrested in June, 1999 by Punjab Police. Before his arrest, he was allegedly
involved in two robberies (registered on 19.3.1999 with PS, City Yamunanagar,
and on 21.3.1999 with PS, Indri, Karnal District). On 25.1.2001, when he was
being taken to Ferozepur
Court from Ambala
jail, Joginder escaped from police custody. It is further alleged by the police
that on 13.2.2001, Joginder and his associates murdered two residents of Tohana.
Police, on 29.1.2001, the SHO, Police Station, Garhi along with other police
officials visited the house of petitioner in search of Joginder who had escaped
from custody. Again in February, 2001 after the double murder, the S.I. of
Police Station, Tohana along with the ASI in charge of Dhamtan Saheb Police
Post, and other Police officials visited petitioner's house in search of
Joginder. In that connection, petitioner and his brother were taken to Police
Station Tohana on 14.2.2001 for inquiries and were released on the same day.
They were again called for inquiries on the next day. On 22.6.2001, the Officer
in Charge of Police Post, Patiala Chowk, Jind, searched the house of Minti Devi
(sister of Joginder), to find out whether Joginder was hiding there. On
24.6.2001, petitioner's younger son Gurmail Singh was arrested for possessing
filed an affidavit dated 22.2.2001 before this Court on 3.3.2001 alleging
interrogation by Police on 26.1.2001 and 29.1.2001 in regard to escape of his
son Joginder from Police custody. He also alleged that on 14.2.2001 he and his
brother Narsi were handcuffed and taken to Tohana Police Station and
interrogated and released on 15.2.2001. The S.P. Jind filed a detailed reply
affidavit dated 11.8.2001. A further affidavit was filed by the petitioner on
1.10.2001 wherein he alleged that his younger son Gurmail Singh was forcibly
taken from his sister's house on 22.6.2001 and tortured. This brought forth a
further affidavit dated 20.11.2001 from the S.P., Jind, by way of reply denying
IN THIS COURT :
satisfied with the reply-affidavit filed on behalf of the State, in regard to
the letter-petition, this Court on 9.11.2000 directed the Chief Secretary of
the State of Haryana to file a detailed affidavit in
regard to the steps taken on the allegations made by the petitioner. In view of
it, the State got the matter inquired into by Dr. John V. George, Inspector
General of Police, (Law & Order), Haryana. He submitted a report dated
10.3.2001 stating that the allegations of the petitioner relating to police
torture, illegal detention, harassment to wife and daughters, and removal of
cash/licensed weapon/jewellery were not substantiated.
said report, however, confirmed that petitioner and his brother were called to
the Police Station couple of times for interrogation regarding the whereabouts
of Joginder. Not being satisfied with the said report, this Court on 17.10.2001
directed the CBI to inquire into the matter with reference to the allegations
made in the letter as also the subsequent affidavits filed by the petitioner
and his relatives and the reply affidavits filed by the respondents.
The CBI held a
preliminary inquiry and submitted the report of the Inquiry Officer (A.K. Ohri,
ASP) under cover of its letter dated 22.7.2002. The findings in the said report
are arrived at, on the basis of the allegations made in the affidavits filed
before this Court, and the statements made by the petitioner, his family members
and others (nearly 100 witnesses) before the Inquiry Officer. The CBI has
concluded that some of the allegations of the petitioner were substantiated
while several others were not substantiated.
this Court directed that the State Government to take appropriate action on the
report of the CBI. In pursuance of it, an FIR was lodged in Garhi Police
Station, Jind District, (FIR No.152 dated 17.10.2002 under Sections 323, 342,
343, 365 and 384 IPC) on the basis of the CBI report, naming the following 10
ASI Dharam Singh
(by then S.I.)
HC Om Parkash No.102/Jind (by then ASI)
HC Balbir Singh
Const. Mohinder Singh 825/Jind (by
then HC) The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Narwana, filed an affidavit dated
1.11.2002 confirming that FIR was lodged and that he was investigating into the
this Court noted that the FIR was registered and an appropriate chargesheet
would be filed by the State in due course, and that the officers concerned have
been suspended/posted outside the district. This Court also took note of the
submission of the amicus curiae that in such cases, apart from CBI inquiry and
criminal prosecution, compensation has to be awarded to the victims, and the
submission of the State that having regard to the facts of the case and having
regard to the registration of the FIR, the matter may have to await the result
of the prosecution. While adjourning the case, this Court observed that the
question of awarding any compensation at that stage, did not arise.
The SP, Jind, by
affidavit dated 9.6.2003 informed this Court that the charge-sheet was filed in
the Court of Ilaka Magistrate, Narwana, and that the case was fixed for
18.7.2003 for framing of charge. Thereafter, when the matter came up on
4.8.2003, the amicus curiae again submitted that compensation should be awarded.
This Court directed hearing on the limited question as to whether compensation
should be awarded or not. The criminal court was also directed to expedite the
trial. The criminal case against the Police officers, we are informed, is under
arguments on the question as to whether compensation should be awarded or not
were heard on 6.10.2005 and written arguments were submitted by the Amicus
Curiae and the State on 19.10.2005 and 16.11.2005 respectively
Inquiry Report of CBI :
contained in the report of CBI are summarized below :- Allegations by
Petitioner (and his relatives) Finding by C.B.I.
Incident on 10.3.1998 1.1. Petitioner was tortured at Dhamtan
Saheb Police Post on 10.3.1998 on the directions of Mr. K. P. Singh,
Superintendent of Police, Jind and Mr. Praveen Kumar Mehta, DSP, Jind.
Dharam Singh ASI took cash of Rs.2,350/- from the pocket of the petitioner and
Rs.4,700/- from the pocket of his friend Narender Singh.
Dharam Singh, ASI,
took away the licensed gun, cartridges and jewellery from the house of
petitioner, on 10.3.1998. Not substantiated by any independent witness.
Dharam Singh, ASI,
Incharge of Dhamtan Saheb Police Post along with other Police officials picked
up the Petitioner and his friend Sardar Narender Singh on 10.3.1998 and took
them to the Police Post and beat them on the way.
Om Prakash (H.C.,
PS, Garhi) and Dilbag Singh, Sentry, beat petitioner on 11.3.1998.
Substantiated (But no injury
report or medical report is available.) 2. Illegal detention.
arrested on 10.3.1998 and taken to Police Station Garhi on 11.3.1998 where he
was illegally detained for 10 days and beaten during first 5 days.
of petitioner at P.S. Garhi for some days was substantiated by an oral evidence
of accused in an Excise Case (Amarinder Singh).
alias Ratna (brother in law of petitioner) was picket up on 10.3.1998 and kept
illegally at P.S. Garhi and tortured for 2 days. He was again arrested on
16.3.1998, tortured for 4 days and released on 20.3.1998.
up of Rattan Singh a few days after 10.3.1998 is established. However, alleged
torture and wrongful confinement is supported only by his self statement and
not by any medical or other evidence.
However, in the writ petition filed by Rattan Singh and petitioner on 24.3.1998
in the Punjab & Haryana High Court, it is alleged that petitioner and
Rattan Singh were kept in illegal confinement from 10.3.1998 to 13.3.1998 and
again from 15.3.1998 to 16.3.1998. There is no allegation of any torture at
all. They only alleged that they apprehended harassment and torture by Police.)
between 8.7.1998 and 7.11.1998
in-charge of Dhamtan Saheb Police Post handcuffed petitioner and took the
petitioner to Police Post on 8.7.1998.
ASI, harassed petitioner between 8.7.1998 and 7.11.1998.
ASI, demanded money from the petitioner and took money from petitioner, for fuel
for the vehicle used to conduct raids.
Satya Narayan ASI
took 10 kg. of Desi Ghee from petitioner's brother Narsi.
ASI, had detained Shamsher Singh in police custody.
ASI, tortured Shamsher Singh and took Rs.500/- to release him.
Re : Incidents
in the year 2001
Station, Garhi along with other police officials raided the petitioner's house
in January, 2001 and intentionally flashed a torch light on the faces of his
is established is that SHO, PS, Garhi raided the petitioner's house on the
night of 31.1.01 to check whether Joginder who had escaped from police custody
was at the house. A torch light was used as there was no electricity.)
On 14.2.01, SHO,
Tohana along with other police officials had handcuffed the petitioner and his
brother Narsi and detained for a day.
what is established is that the petitioner and his brother were taken to PS
City Tohana on 14.2.01, for inquiries in connection with the report that
petitioner's son Joginder Singh and his associates had committed a double
murder on 14.2.01. After a few hours of interrogation they were released).
Gurmel Singh, younger son of petitioner was picked up (by Constables Mukesh
Kumar and Dhup Singh in a vehicle driven by Constable Dharampal). He was
confined at PS City, Jind and tortured. Substantiated only to the extent that
Gurmel Singh was picked up on 22.6.01 by police party and wrongfully confined at
PS City, Jind. (In regard to alleged torture, the statement of Gurmel Singh
alone is available without corroboration).
Inspector, when he was SHO, PS Alewa forcibly picked up one Ramphal on 26.7.01
and harassed him when Ramphal's house was raided on 29.7.01.
is established is Yad Ram had taken Ramphal on the instructions of ASP, Jind
and examined him for an hour).
further shows that petitioner was involved in several criminal cases from 1972
and his son Joginder was involved in more number of criminal cases from the
year 1991, as detailed below :- Cases in respect of petitioner :
FIR No. 275 dt.
13.10.72 u/s 61/1/14 Excise Act P.S. Sadar Kaithal.
FIR No.59 dt.
13.2.78 u/s 379 IPC PS Sadar Kaithal.
FIR No.231 dt.
22.7.85 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act P.S. Sadar Kaithal.
FIR No.141 dt.
20.7.86 u/s 61/1/14 Excise Act P.S. Sadar Narwana.
FIR No.142 dt.
25.4.91 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act read with section 5 TADA Act P.S. Sadar Kaithal.
FIR No.147 dt.
25.4.91 u/s 285/336 I.P.C. P.S. Sadar Kaithal.
FIR No.219 dt.
17.7.91 u/s 324/323/506/34 IPC PS Sadar Kaithal.
FIR No.367 dt.
23.11.94 u/s 323/324/148/149 IPC PS Garhi.
FIR No.277 dt.
25.6.2001 u/s 332/353/225/186/511 IPC PS City, Jind.
The petitioner was convicted only in the first case. He was acquitted in all
other cases.) Cases in respect of Joginder Singh :
FIR No.219 dated
17.7.91 u/s 323/324/506/34 IPC PS Sadar, Kaithal.
FIR No.395 dated
5.7.97 u/s 324/34 IPC PS Civil Lines, Hissar.
FIR No.242 dated
7.9.96 u/s 307/120-B IPC & 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Tohana.
FIR No.245 dated
8.9.96 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Tohana.
FIR No.112 dated
10.3.98 u/s 302/307/353/86/34 IPC & 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Garhi..
FIR No.57 dated
31.3.99 u/s 392/395 IPC & 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Indri, Karnal.
FIR No.99 dated
19.3.99 u/s 393/394/397/307/452 IPC, PS City, Yamunanagar.
FIR No.94 dated
21.6.99 u/s 399/401 IPC, 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Malanwala, Distt. Firozepur, Punjab.
FIR No.8 dated
26.1.2001 u/s 223/224 IPC, PS GRP, Ludhiana, Punjab.
FIR NO.48 dated
14.2.2001 u/s 302/307/34 IPC and 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Tohana.
FIR No.100 dated
16.2.2001 u/s 307/332/353/216 IPC and 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Sadar, Fatehabad.
FIR No.38 dated
21.2.2001 u/s399/307/402 IPC and 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Narwana.
FIR No.29 dated
16.3.2001 u/s 307, 120-B IPC and 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS City, Firozepur, Punjab.
FIR NO.149 dated
23.8.2001 u/s 25/54/59 Arms Act, PS Sadar, Kapurthala, Punjab.
: Joginder was convicted in regard to FIR 242/1996 and FIR No.245/1996. Sl. No.
(c) and (d) above on 31.1.2002 and sentenced to undergo RI for six years and
two years respectively) Position emerging from the records/CBI
examination of the facts, lead to the following inferences :
(relating to petitioner and his family members being taken to Police
Stations/Police Posts and being questioned/beaten up/tortured) are in
connection with the effort of Police to find the whereabouts of Joginder Singh,
whenever he was involved in a serious incident, that is
10.3.1998 when Joginder was suspected of killing a Police constable,
25.1.2001 when Joginder escaped from Police custody when he was being taken to
13/14.2.2001 when Joginder was suspected of killing two persons at Tohana.
Though there is
some evidence of illegal detention and beating of petitioner and his relatives,
the allegations of custodial torture are exaggerated and to a certain extent false.
There is no
medical evidence nor any visible scars/ marks/disability resulting from the
alleged torture, either in the case of petitioner or his family
of petitioner and his relatives are against different police officers of
different police stations (totally unconnected with each other) in regard to
incidents at different points of time, in March, 1998, April, 1998, July, 1998,
January, 2001, February, 2001 and June, 2001.
The case of
Petitioner is that he and/or his relatives were harassed, illegally confined,
or tortured, to find out the whereabouts of Joginder. The police contend that
the allegations by petitioner and his relatives, are by way of a well conceived
plot to prevent police investigation in regard to misdeeds by Joginder and his
associates and to pre-empt any action by the police against Joginder or his
We will next
refer to the factors which indicate that petitioner and his relatives have made
false and exaggerated claims in regard to illegal detention, torture etc.,
apart from suppressing material facts.
his letter to this Court, petitioner has alleged that he was illegally confined
by the Police for 11 days from 10.3.1998 (one day at Dhamtan Saheb Police Post
and 10 days at Police Station, Garhi). Rattan Singh (brother in law of
petitioner) in his affidavit dated 13.5.1999 alleges that he was illegally
detained for 2 days and again for 4 days. But in the writ petition filed by
petitioner and Rattan Singh in the
Punjab and Haryana High Court on 24.3.1998, it is alleged
that the petitioner and Rattan Singh were confined by Police between 10.3.1998
and 13.3.1998 (three days) and again for a day between 15.3.1998 and 16.3.1998.
the letter to this Court, alleges beating and torture at Dhamtan Saheb Police
Post on 10.3.1998 and at Police Station, Garhi for five days in Police custody
between 11.3.1998 and 16.3.1998. Rattan Singh alleges torture for 2 days (from
10.3.1998 to 12.3.1998) and again for four days (from 16.3.1998 to 20.3.1998).
But in the writ petition filed in Punjab & Haryana High Court on 24.3.1998 by
petitioner and Rattan Singh, there is no allegation of beating or torture, but
only expression of an apprehension that they may be arrested, harassed and
tortured (Note : Petitioner blames his counsel for not mentioning the facts
properly in the writ petition filed before the High Court).
In the letter
petition, petitioner completely suppressed the fact that he (along with Rattan
Singh) had filed a writ petition on 24.3.1998 in the Punjab & Haryana High Court
in regard to the said incident (between 10.3.1998 to 21.3.1998) and the fact
that the said writ petition was disposed of on 27.4.1998 by the High Court
reserving liberty to file a criminal complaint.
In the letter
petition, the petitioner has alleged four 'misdeeds' of police on 10.3.1998 :
His torture at
the police post at the Dhamtan Saheb Police Post by Dharam Singh, ASI at the
instance of Superintendent of Police and DSP,
wife and daughters of the petitioner at the Dhamtan Saheb Police Post,
taken from his pocket by ASI Dharam Singh, and
cartridges, arms licence and gold ornaments being illegally taken by ASI Dharam
Singh on 10.3.1998. The CBI report finds that none of these four allegations is
In the letter
petition, the petitioner alleged that he had told police that he was not on good
terms with his son Joginder Singh, that he had already disowned him and the
family was having no connection with Joginder. He even published a notice in 'Dainik
Tribune' in August, 1998 stating that he has no connection with his son Joginder.
In his affidavit dated 31.8.2001 (filed in this case on 1.10.2001), petitioner
reiterates that he has disowned his son Joginder and alleges that he did not
have any contact with him; and that in spite of it, the police were continuously
harassing him and his family members seeking information about the whereabouts
of Joginder and raiding his house and his relatives' houses to find out whether
Joginder was hiding there. But the CBI inquiry has categorically found that
petitioner and his family members had not disowned Joginder. They were regularly
meeting Joginder when he was in custody. Petitioner was traveling to meet his
son Joginder whenever he was being produced in courts, in respect of different
cases. In fact petitioner received money from the All India Food & Allied
Workers Palledar Union, Tohana (Kacchi Union) of which he was a member, to meet
the expenses of the travel (to meet his son) on 25.10.2000, 25.11.2000,
21.12.2000, 13.1.2001, 16.1.2001, 23.1.2001, 9.10.2001, 10.10.2001, 11.10.2001,
15.10.2001, 25.10.2001, 7.11.2001, 17.11.2001 and 20.11.2001. Further, the jail
records showed that Joginder was met by petitioner's wife on 26.8.1999,
petitioner's brother Narsi on 17.11.1999, 18.11.1999 and 1.3.2002, petitioner's
uncle Rama on 20.11.1999, and petitioner's brother-in-law Rattan Singh on
There was thus reasonable cause for
the Police to think that the family members of Joginder might know about his
whereabouts. The repeated questioning of the family members of Joginder in the
year 1998 and 2001, either at their houses or by calling them to the Police
Station/Post was part of investigation process and cannot, per se, be
considered as harassment or violation of Article 21. Whether the police
exceeded their limits in questioning the petitioner or his relatives is of
course a different aspect. The report of the CBI shows that there is prima
facie evidence about petitioner and some of his relatives being illegally
detained in Police Station/Post and subjected possibly to some third degree
methods, to extract information regarding the whereabouts of Joginder Singh. At
the same time, the report makes it clear that neither the illegal detention nor
the alleged torture (if true) was of an extent, alleged by the petitioner and
his relatives. The claims were clearly exaggerated and many a time false also.
It is quite probable that the allegations against Police were levelled and/or
exaggerated to avoid enquiries by the Police in regard to Joginder.
This leads us to the question
whether, in addition to directing CBI inquiry and prosecution of the officers
concerned, on the facts and circumstances of this case, compensation should be
awarded to petitioner and his family members, as a public law remedy for the
violation of their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution.
as a public law remedy :
Though illegal detention and
custodial torture were recognized as violations of the fundamental rights of
life and liberty guaranteed under Article 21, to begin with, only the following
reliefs were being granted in writ petitions under Article 32 or 226 :
direction to set
at liberty the person detained, if the complaint was one of illegal detention.
direction to the
concerned Government to hold an inquiry and take action against the officers
responsible for the violation.
If the enquiry
or action taken by the concerned department was found to be not satisfactory,
to direct an inquiry by an independent agency, usually the Central Bureau of
of compensation as a public law remedy for violation of the fundamental rights
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution, in addition to the private law
remedy under the Law of Torts, was evolved in the last two and half decades.
In the Bhagalpur Blinding case, [Khatri
(II) vs State of Bihar 1981 (1) SCC 627], Bhagwati J., (as he then was),
speaking for the Bench, posed the following question while considering the
relief that could be given by a court for violation of constitutional rights
guaranteed in Article 21 of the Constitution :- "... but if life or
personal liberty is violated otherwise than in accordance with such procedure,
is the Court helpless to grant relief to the person who has suffered such
deprivation? Why should the court not be prepared to forge new tools and devise
new remedies for the purpose of vindicating the most precious of the precious
fundamental right to life and personal liberty." The question was expanded
in a subsequent order in Bhagalpur Blinding case [Khatri (IV) vs State of Bihar
1981 (2) SCC 493), thus :- "If an officer of the State acting in his
official capacity threatens to deprive a person of his life or personal liberty
without the authority of law, can such person not approach the court for injuncting
the State from acting through such officer in violation of his fundamental
right under Article 21 ? Can the State urge in defence in such a case that it
is not infringing the fundamental right of the petitioner under Article 21,
because the officer who is threatening to do so is acting outside the law and
therefore beyond the scope of his authority and hence the State is not responsible
for his action ? Would this not make a mockery of Article 21 and reduce it to
nullity, a mere rope of sand, for, on this view, if the officer is acting
according to law there would ex concessionis be no breach of Article 21 and if
he is acting without the authority of law, the State would be able to contend
that it is not responsible for his action and therefore there is no violation
of Article 21. So also if there is any threatened invasion by the State of the
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21, the petitioner who is aggrieved
can move the court under Article 32 for a writ injuncting such threatened
invasion and if there is any continuing action of the State which is violative
of the fundamental right under Article 21, the petitioner can approach the
court under Article 32and ask for a writ striking down the continuance of such
action, but where the action taken by the State has already resulted in breach
of the fundamental right under Article 21 by deprivation of some limb of the
petitioner, would the petitioner have no remedy under Article 32 for breach of
the fundamental right guaranteed to him ? Would the court permit itself to
become helpless spectator of the violation of the fundamental right of the
petitioner by the State and tell the petitioner that though the Constitution
has guaranteed the fundamental right to him and has also given him the
fundamental right of moving the court for enforcement of his fundamental right,
the court cannot give him any relief." Answering the said questions, it
was held that when a court trying the writ petition proceeds to inquire into
the violation of any right to life or personal liberty, while in police
custody, it does so, not for the purpose of adjudicating upon the guilt of any
particular officer with a view to punishing him but for the purpose of deciding
whether the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 21 has been
violated and the State is liable to pay compensation to them for such
violation. This Court clarified that the nature and object of the inquiry is
altogether different from that in a criminal case and any decision arrived at
in the writ petition on this issue cannot have any relevance much less any
binding effect, in any criminal proceeding which may be taken against a particular
police officer. This Court further clarified that in a given case, if the
investigation is still proceeding, the Court may even defer the inquiry before
it until the investigation is completed or if the Court considered it necessary
in the interests of Justice, it may postpone its inquiry until after the
prosecution was terminated, but that is a matter entirely for the exercise of
the discretion of the Court and there is no bar precluding the Court from
proceeding with the inquiry before it, even if the investigation or prosecution
In Rudul Sah vs. State of Bihar
[1983 (4) SCC 141], the petitioner therein approached this Court under Article
32 of the Constitution alleging that though he was acquitted by the Sessions
Court on 3.6.1968, he was released from jail only on 6.10.1982, after 14 years,
and sought compensation for his illegal detention.
Court while recognizing that Article 32 cannot be used as a substitute for the
enforcement of rights and obligations which can be enforced efficaciously
through the ordinary processes of courts, civil and criminal, raised for
consideration the important question as to whether in the exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 32, this Court can pass an order for payment of
money, as compensation for the deprivation of a fundamental right. This Court
answered the question thus while awarding compensation:- "Article 21 which
guarantees the right to life and liberty will be denuded of its significant
content if the power of this Court were limited to passing orders of release
from illegal detention. One of the telling ways in which the violation of that
right can reasonably be prevented and due compliance with the mandate of
Article 21 secured, is to mulct its violators in the payment of monetary compensation.
sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements of fundamental rights cannot be
corrected by any other method open to the judiciary to adopt. The right to
compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which
act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the
powers of the State as a shield. If civilisation is not to perish in this
country as it has perished in some others too well-known to suffer mention, it
is necessary to educate ourselves into accepting that, respect for the rights
of individuals is the true bastion of democracy. Therefore, the State must
repair the damage done by its officers to the petitioner's rights. It may have
recourse against those officers." Rudul Sah was followed in Bhim Singh vs.
State of J&K [1985 (4) SCC 677] and Peoples' Union for Democratic Rights vs. Police Commissioner, Delhi Police
Headquarters [1989 (4) SCC 730].
The law was crystallized in Nilabati
Behera vs. State of Orissa [1993 (2) SCC 746]. In that case,
the deceased was arrested by the police, handcuffed and kept in a police
custody. The next day, his dead-body was found on a railway track. This Court
awarded compensation to the mother of the deceased. J.S. Verma J., (as he then
was) spelt out the following principles :- "Award of compensation in a
proceeding under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article
226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict
liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of
sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence
in private law in an action based on tort.
of the constitutional right and grant of redress embraces award of compensation
as part of the legal consequences of its contravention.
claim in public law for compensation for contravention of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the protection of which is guaranteed in the
Constitution, is an acknowledged remedy for enforcement and protection of such
rights, and such a claim based on strict liability made by resorting to a
constitutional remedy provided for the enforcement of a fundamental right is
'distinct from, and in addition to, the remedy in private law for damages for
the tort' resulting from the contravention of the fundamental right. The defence
of sovereign immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept of guarantee
of fundamental rights, there can be no question of such a defence being
available in the constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies
award of monetary compensation for contravention of fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode of
redress available for the contravention made by the State or its servants in
the purported exercise of their powers, and enforcement of the fundamental
right is claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under the Constitution
by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution." [Emphasis
supplied] Dr. A.S. Anand J., (as he then was) in his concurring judgment
elaborated the principle thus :- "... Convicts, prisoners or under-trials
are not denuded of their fundamental rights under Article 21 and it is only
such restrictions, as are permitted by law, which can be imposed on the
enjoyment of the fundamental rights by such persons. It is an obligation of the
State to ensure that there is no infringement of the indefeasible rights of a
citizen to life, except in accordance with law, while the citizen is in its
public law proceedings serve a different purpose than the private law
proceedings. The relief of monetary compensation, as exemplary damages, in
proceedings under Article 32 by the Supreme Court or under Article 226 by the
High Courts, for established infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed
under Article 21 is a remedy available in public law and is based on the strict
liability for contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible rights of
the citizen. The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public power but
also to assure the citizen that they live under a legal system which aims to
protect their interests and preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court
moulds the relief by granting 'compensation' in proceedings under Article 32 or
226 seeking enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does so under
the public law by way of penalizing the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for
the public wrong on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect
the fundamental rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in such
cases is not to be understood, as it is generally understood in a civil action
for damages under the private law but in the broader sense of providing relief
by an order of making 'monetary amends' under the public law for the wrong done
due to breach of public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of the
citizen. The compensation is in the nature of 'exemplary damages' awarded
against the wrongdoer for the breach of its public law duty and is independent
of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim compensation under the
private law in an action based on tort, through a suit instituted in a court of
competent jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal law. "
In D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997 (1) SCC 416), this Court
again considered exhaustively the question and held that monetary compensation
should be awarded for established infringement of fundamental rights guaranteed
under Article 21. This Court held :- "Custodial violence, including
torture and death in the lock ups strikes a blow at the Rule of Law, which
demands that the powers of the executive should not only be derived from law
but also that the same should be limited by law.
violence is a matter of concern. It is aggravated by the fact that it is
committed by persons who are supposed to be the protectors of the citizens. It
is committed under the shield of uniform and authority in the four walls of a
police station or lock-up, the victim being totally helpless. The protection of
an individual from torture and abuse by the police and other law enforcing
officers is a matter of deep concern in a free society.
form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the
inhibition of Article 21 of the Constitution, whether it occurs during
investigation, interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the
Government become law-breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would
encourage lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto
himself thereby leading to anarchy. No civilized nation can permit that to
happen. Does a citizen shed off his fundamental right to life, the moment a
policeman arrests him ? Can the right to life of a citizen be put in abeyance
on his arrest. ... The answer, indeed, has to be an emphatic 'No'. Police is,
no doubt, under a legal duty and has legitimate right to arrest a criminal and
to interrogate him during the investigation of an offence but it must be
remembered that the law does not permit use of third degree methods or torture
of accused in custody during interrogation and investigation with a view to
solve the crime. End cannot justify the means. The interrogation and
investigation into a crime should be in true sense purposeful to make the
investigation effective. By torturing a person and using third degree methods,
the police would be accomplishing behind the closed doors what the demands of
our legal order forbid. No society can permit it."
It is thus now well settled that
award of compensation against the State is an appropriate and effective remedy
for redress of an established infringement of a fundamental right under Article
21, by a public servant. The quantum of compensation will, however, depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case.
of such compensation (by way of public law remedy) will not come in the way of
the aggrieved person claiming additional compensation in a civil court, in
enforcement of the private law remedy in tort, nor come in the way of the
criminal court ordering compensation under section 357 of Code of Civil
This takes us to the next question
as to whether compensation should be awarded under Article 32/226, for every
violation of Article 21 where illegal detention or custodial violence is
compensation should be awarded for every violation of Article 21
In M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India
[1987 (1) SCC 395], a Constitution Bench of this Court while considering the
question whether compensation can be awarded in a petition under Article 32,
observed thus :- "We must, therefore, hold that Article 32 is not
powerless to assist a person when he finds that his fundamental right has been
violated. He can in that event seek remedial assistance under Article 32. The
power of the court to grant such remedial relief may include the power to award
compensation in appropriate cases. We are deliberately using the words "in
appropriate cases" because we must make it clear that it is not in every
case where there is a breach of a fundamental right committed by the violator
that compensation would be awarded by the court in a petition under Article 32.
The infringement of the fundamental right must be gross and patent, that is,
incontrovertible and ex facie glaring and either such infringement should be on
a large scale affecting the fundamental rights of a large number of persons, or
it should appear unjust or unduly harsh or oppressive on account of their
poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position to
require the person or persons affected by such infringement to initiate and
pursue act in the civil courts. Ordinarily, of course, a petition under Article
32 should not be used as a substitute for enforcement of the right to claim
compensation for infringement of a fundamental right through the ordinary
process of civil court. It is only in exceptional cases of the nature indicated
by us above, that compensation may be awarded in a petition under Article 32.
If we make
a fact analysis of the cases where compensation has been awarded by this Court,
we will find that in all the cases, the fact of infringement was patent and
incontrovertible, the violation was gross and its magnitude was such as to
shock the conscience of the court and it would have been gravely unjust to the
person whose fundamental right was violated, to require him to go to the civil
court for claiming compensation." (emphasis supplied) In Nilabati Behera
(supra), this Court put in a word of caution thus:- "Of course, relief in
exercise of the power under Article 32 or 226 would be granted only (when) it
is established that there has been an infringement of the fundamental rights of
the citizen and no other form of appropriate redressal by the court in the
facts and circumstances of the case, is possible. ....Law is in the process of
development and the process necessitates developing separate public law
procedures as also public law principles. It may be necessary to identify the
situations to which separate proceedings and principles apply and the courts
have to act firmly but with certain amount of circumspection and
self-restraint, lest proceedings under Article 32 or 226 are misused as a
disguised substitute for civil action in private law." (emphasis supplied)
In D. K. Basu (supra), this Court repeatedly stressed that compensation can be
awarded only for redressal of an established violation of Article 21. This
Court also drew attention to the following aspect :
is one other aspect also which needs our consideration. We are conscious of the
fact that the police in India have to perform a difficult and
delicate task, particularly in view of the deteriorating law and order
situation, communal riots, political turmoil, student unrest, terrorist
activities, and among others the increasing number of underworld and armed
gangs and criminals. Many hard core criminals like extremists, the terrorists,
drug peddlers, smugglers who have organized, gangs, have taken strong roots in
the society. It is being said in certain quarters that with more and more
liberalization and enforcement of fundamental rights, it would lead to
difficulties in the detection of crimes committed by such categories of
hardened criminals by soft peddling interrogation, it is felt in those quarters
that if we lay too much of emphasis on protection of their fundamental rights
and human rights, such criminals may go scot-free without exposing any element
or iota of criminality with the result, the crime would go unpunished and in the
ultimate analysis the society would suffer. The concern is genuine and the
problem is real. To deal with such a situation, a balanced approach is needed
to meet the ends of justice. This is all the more so, in view of the
expectation of the society that police must deal with the criminals in an
efficient and effective manner and bring to book those who are involved in the
crime. The cure cannot, however, be worst than the disease itself."
[Emphasis supplied] In Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan v. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble
[2003 (7) SCC 749] and Munshi Singh Gautam v. State of M.P. [2005 (9) SCC 631], this Court warned against
at the same time there seems to be a disturbing trend of increase in cases
where false accusations of custodial torture are made, trying to take advantage
of the serious concern shown and the stern attitude reflected by the courts
while dealing with custodial violence. It needs to be carefully examined
whether the allegations of custodial violence are genuine or are sham attempts
to gain undeserved benefit masquerading as victims of custodial violence."
In Dhananjay Sharma vs. State of Haryana [1995 (3) SCC 757], this Court refused compensation where the
petitioner had exaggerated the incident and had indulged in falsehood. This
Court held :
from the report of the CBI and our own independent appraisal of the evidence
recorded by the CBI. we have come to the conclusion that Shri Dhananjay Sharma
and Sushil Kumar had been illegally detained by respondents 3 to 5 from the
afternoon of 15.1.94 to 17.1.94, the State must be held responsible for the
unlawful acts of its officers and it must repair the damage done to the
citizens by its officers for violating their indivisible fundamental right of
personal liberty without any authority of law in an absolutely high-handed
manner. We would have been, therefore, inclined to direct the State Government
of Haryana to compensate Dhananjay Sharma and Sushil Kumar but since Sushil
Kumar has indulged in false-hood in this Court and Shri Dhananjay Sharma, has
also exaggerated the incident by stating that on 15.1.94 when he was way laid
along with Sushil Kumar and Shri S.C. Puri, Advocate, two employees of
respondents 6 and 7 were also present with the police party, which version has not
been found to be correct by the CBI, they both have disentitled themselves from
receiving any compensation, as monetary amends for the wrong done by
respondents 3 to 5, in detaining them. We, therefore do not direct the payment
of any compensation to them." [Emphasis supplied]
Cases where violation of Article 21
involving custodial death or torture is established or is incontrovertible
stand on a different footing when compared to cases where such violation is
doubtful or not established. Where there is no independent evidence of
custodial torture and where there is neither medical evidence about any injury
or disability, resulting from custodial torture, nor any mark/scar, it may not
be prudent to accept claims of human right violation, by persons having
criminal records in a routine manner for awarding compensation. That may open
the floodgates for false claims, either to mulct money from the State or as to
prevent or thwart further investigation.
should, therefore, while jealously protecting the fundamental rights of those
who are illegally detained or subjected to custodial violence, should also
stand guard against false, motivated and frivolous claims in the interests of
the society and to enable Police to discharge their duties fearlessly and
effectively. While custodial torture is not infrequent, it should be borne in
mind that every arrest and detention does not lead to custodial torture.
In cases where custodial death or
custodial torture or other violation of the rights guaranteed under Article 21
is established, courts may award compensation in a proceeding under Article 32
or 226. However, before awarding compensation, the Court will have to pose to
itself the following questions :
violation of Article 21 is patent and incontrovertible,
violation is gross and of a magnitude to shock the conscience of the court,
custodial torture alleged has resulted in death or whether custodial torture is
supported by medical report or visible marks or scars or disability. Where
there is no evidence of custodial torture of a person except his own statement,
and where such allegation is not supported by any medical report or other
corroboration evidence, or where there are clear indications that the
allegations are false or exaggerated fully or in part, courts may not award
compensation as a public law remedy under Article 32 or 226, but relegate the
aggrieved party to the traditional remedies by way of appropriate
We should not, however, be understood
as holding that harassment and custodial violence is not serious or worthy of
consideration, where there is no medical report or visible marks or independent
evidence. We are conscious of the fact that harassment or custodial violence
cannot always be supported by a medical report or independent evidence or
proved by marks or scars. Every illegal detention irrespective of its duration,
and every custodial violence, irrespective of its degree or magnitude, is
outright condemnable and per se actionable. Remedy for such violation is
available in civil law and criminal law. The public law remedy is additionally
available where the conditions mentioned in the earlier para are satisfied. We
may also note that this Court has softened the degree of proof required in
criminal prosecution relating to such matters. In State of MP vs. Shyamsunder Trivedi
- 1995 (4) SCC 262, reiterated in ABDUL GAFAR KHAN and MUNSHI SINGH GAUTAM
(supra),this Court observed :- "Rerely in cases of police torture or
custodial death, direct ocular evidence of the complicity of the police
personnel would be available...... Bound as they are by the ties of
brotherhood, it is not unknown that the police personnel prefer to remain
silent and more often than not even pervert the truth to save their
colleagues.......... The exaggerated adherence to and insistence upon the
establishment of proof beyond every reasonable doubt, by the prosecution,
ignoring the ground realities, the fact-situations and the peculiar
circumstances of a given case....., often results in miscarriage of justice and
makes the justice delivery system a suspect. In the ultimate analysis the
society suffers and a criminal gets encouraged. Tortures in police custody,
which of late are on the increase, receive encouragement by this type of an
unrealistic approach of the Courts because it reinforces the belief in the mind
of the police that no harm would come to them, if an odd prisoner dies in the
lock-up, because there would hardly be any evidence available to the prosecution
to directly implicate them with the torture." Improving the present
Unfortunately, police in the country
have given room for an impression in the minds of public, that whenever there
is a crime, investigation usually means rounding up all persons concerned (say
all servants in the event of a theft in the employer's house, or all
acquaintances of the deceased, in the event of a murder) and subjecting them to
third-degree interrogation in the hope that someone will spill the beans. This
impression may not be correct, but instances are not wanting where police have
resorted to such a practice. Lack of training in scientific investigative
methods, lack of modern equipment, lack of adequate personnel, and lack of a
mindset respecting human rights, are generally the reasons for such illegal
action. One other main reason is that the public (and men in power) expect
results from police in too short a span of time, forgetting that methodical and
scientific investigation is a time consuming and lengthy process. Police are
branded as inefficient even when there is a short delay in catching the
culprits in serious crimes.
expectation of quick results in high-profile or heinous crimes builds enormous
pressure on the police to somehow 'catch' the 'offender'. The need to have
quick results tempts them to resort to third degree methods. They also tend to
arrest "someone" in a hurry on the basis of incomplete investigation,
just to ease the pressure. Time has come for an attitudinal change not only in
the minds of the police, but also on the part of the public. Difficulties in
criminal investigation and the time required for such investigation should be
recognized, and police should be allowed to function methodically without
interferences or unnecessary pressures. If police are to perform better, the
public should support them, government should strengthen and equip them, and
men in power should not interfere or belittle them. The three wings of the
Government should encourage, insist and ensure thorough scientific
investigation under proper legal procedures, followed by prompt and efficient
prosecution. Be that as it may.
Custodial violence requires to be
tackled from two ends, that is, by taking measures that are remedial and
of compensation is one of the remedial measures after the event. Effort should
be made to remove the very causes, which lead to custodial violence, so as to
prevent such occurances. Following steps, if taken, may prove to be effective
should be re-oriented, to bring in a change in the mindset and attitude of the
Police personnel in regard to investigations, so that they will recognize and
respect human rights, and adopt thorough and scientific investigation methods.
of lower level Police Officers should be continuously monitored and supervised
by their superiors to prevent custodial violence and adherence to lawful
standard methods of investigation.
the eleven requirements enumerated in D.K. Basu (supra) should be ensured in
all cases of arrest and detention.
fool-proof procedures should be introduced for prompt registration of first
information reports relating to all crimes.
video-recording, and modern methods of records maintenance should be introduced
to avoid manipulations, insertions, substitutions and ante-dating in regard to FIRs,
Mahazars, inquest proceedings, Port-mortem Reports and Statements of witnesses
etc. and to bring in transparency in action.
investigating agency (preferably the respective Human Rights Commissions or
CBI) may be entrusted with adequate power, to investigate complaints of
custodial violence against Police personnel and take stern and speedy action
followed by prosecution, wherever necessary.
should be to achieve a balanced level of functioning, where police respect
human rights, adhere to law, and take confidence building measures (CBMs), and
at the same time, firmly deal with organized crime, terrorism, white-collared
crime, deteriorating law and order situation etc.
In this case, there is no clear or
incontrovertible evidence about custodial torture, nor any medical report of
any injury or disability. The grievance of the petitioner and his relatives is
against different officers in different Police Stations at different points of
time. More importantly, several of the allegations are proved to be exaggerated
and false. We, therefore, do not consider this to be a fit case for award of
compensation. All reliefs which should be granted in such a case, have already
been granted by ordering an inquiry by the CBI and ensuring that the Police
Officers named are prosecuted. The law will have to take own course.
This order will not come in the way
of any civil court awarding compensation in an action in tort or the criminal
court awarding compensation under section 357 CPC in the pending prosecution
against any of the officers, if the charges are established. With the said
observations, we dispose of this petition, as no further reliefs/directions are
We record our appreciation for the
effort put in by Shri S. Muralidhar, Amicus Curiae, in presenting the matter.