U.P.
State Industrial Development Corporation Vs. Rishabh Ispat Ltd. & Ors [2006]
Insc 975 (15 December
2006)
B.P.
Singh & Altamas Kabir
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1332 - 1382 OF 1997 U.P. State Industrial Development
Corporation .Appellant Versus Pitalu and others .Respondents WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1383 OF 1997 Rishabh Ispat Limited .Appellant Versus State of
Uttar Pradesh .Respondent WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1384 - 1515 OF 1997 U.P. State Industrial Development
Corporation .Appellant Versus Tikkam Singh and others .Respondents WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1516 - 1535 OF 1997 Bikhu Ram Jain and others .Appellants
Versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others .Respondents WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1331 OF 1997 Sharda Jain .Appellant Versus State of Uttar
Pradesh and another .Respondents B.P. SINGH, J.
This
batch of appeals has been preferred against the common judgment and order of
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated April 2,
1996 whereby a large
number of appeals preferred by the U.P. State Industrial Development
Corporation (UPSIDC) as well as the claimants have been decided.
The
lands acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act measuring about
900 acres under three Notifications are located in two adjacent villages,
namely Village Habibpur and village Gulsitapur. In respect of Habibpur a
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') was issued on 25th August, 1981 in respect of 225.75 acres of land.
Another Notification under Section 4 was issued on 14th September, 1981 which related to 173.5 acres of land in village Gulsitapur.
The third notification was issued on May 30, 1985 which related to 501.48 acres of
land of village Gulsitapur.
Civil
Appeals Nos. 1330 of 1997, 1332 to 1382 of 1997 have been preferred by UPSIDC
and relate to village Habibpur.
Similarly
Civil Appeal Nos. 1384 to 1515 of 1997 have been preferred by the UPSIDC. The
remaining appeals are by the land- owners/claimants.
Pursuant
to the Notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 25th August, 1981 the lands in village Habibpur were
sought to be acquired for a public purpose. The possession of the lands in
question was taken on 25th
September, 1981. The
Special Land Acquisition Officer offered compensation to the land owners on the
basis of circle rates of the lands in question and accordingly for the lands of
which the circle rate was Rs.3.05 ps. the compensation was fixed @ Rs.6,486.49 ps.
per bigha. Similarly the lands which had the circle rate of Rs.6.25 per sq.
yard, the compensation offered was Rs.11,583.02 ps. The land- owners were not
satisfied with the offer of the Special Land Acquisition Office, hence a
reference was sought and made under Section 18 of the Act. The reference court
enhanced the compensation offered by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and
it allowed compensation @ Rs.11/- per sq. yard for the lands abutting the road
and a compensation of Rs.6/- per sq. yards for the other lands. The High Court
on appeal by its impugned judgment and order has maintained the compensation
awarded in respect of the lands abutting the road @ Rs.11/- per sq. yard and
enhanced the compensation in respect of other lands from Rs.6/- to Rs.9/- per
sq. yard. It cannot be disputed that the lands in question are valuable lands
and have become even more valuable on account of the development that has taken
place in the area. The lands are in the vicinity of the city of Delhi and within 8-9 kilometers of Noida
on Dadri Noida Delhi main road. It is not in dispute that villages Habibpur
and Gulsitapur are adjacent villages. Having regard to the location of these
villages compensation for lands acquired have been awarded on the same basis
and at the same rates by the High Court.
The
High Court has undertaken a very detailed and meticulous examination of the
evidence on record to determine the compensation payable to the land-owners. It
is well settled that having regard to the principles laid down in the Act the
Court must determine the compensation payable to the land-owners, but all said
and done as assessment of compensation to be awarded does involve some rational
guess work, having regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case.
We
have carefully perused the judgment of the High Court and so far the quantum of
compensation is concerned, we have not found any illegality or irrationality in
the reasoning of the High Court. On a very careful consideration of the
evidence on record, the High Court has recorded its finding and we, therefore,
do not find any reason to interfere with the order of the High Court.
We may
however notice that counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant UPSIDC
submitted that in the instant case there was a sale deed wherein land was
purchased by Shri A.P. Sarin @ 0.72 ps. per sq. yard. He, therefore, submitted
that there could be no better evidence to prove that the value of the land was
much less, particularly when the aforesaid sale deed was executed only 4 days
before the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act. The
submission appears to be attractive, but having regard to the fact that the
Land Acquisition Collector himself offered compensation @ Rs.3.92 ps. and
Rs.2.14 per sq. yard, the compensation could not have been reduced to 0.72 ps.
per sq. yard in view of the provision of Section 25 of the Act. Moreover the
sale deed does not appear to correctly represent the value of land in that
locality because the other exemplars gave a different picture.
On the
other hand, the claimants had also produced a sale deed dated 19th August, 1981 which related to the sale of 0.5 bigha
of land in village Habibpur @ Rs.43,801/- per bigha. This exemplar was rejected
by the Reference Court observing that there was only one
such sale deed which disclosed such high value for the lands of village Habibpur.
The Reference Court relied upon a sale deed executed on
25th July, 1981 which related to the sale of 2 bighas
of land of village Habibpur @ Rs.21,600/- per bigha. This sale deed was
executed on 25th July,
1981 whereas the
Notification under Section 4 was issued on 25th August, 1981. The Reference Court found this exemplar to be a reliable piece of evidence and
accordingly determined compensation @ Rs.11/- per sq. yard for the lands
abutting the road and Rs.6/- for the lands away from the road. The High Court
has affirmed the finding of the Reference Court. We find no reason to interfere with the finding which is
based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and the proper
application of the principles relating to determination of compensation under
the Act.
Mr.
Reddy then submitted that the claimants having accepted the compensation
offered to them without demur or protest, they were not entitled to claim a
reference under Section 18 of the Act. On the other hand learned counsel for
the claimants contended that this submission was not founded on correct factual
basis since the claimants had filed their objections within time and,
therefore, there was no question of their accepting the compensation without
protest. The question as to whether the compensation offered was accepted
without protest is essentially a question of fact to be determined on the basis
of the evidence on record. We have perused the material on record and the
finding recorded by the High Court in this regard. The High Court found that
the Collector made his Award on 27th June, 1985 and an application for making a reference was filed within
time on 6th August,
1985. The claimants
examined themselves on oath, and it was not even suggested to them that they
had accepted the compensation without protest. No evidence was brought on
record to establish that the compensation was accepted by the claimants without
protest. On the other hand the fact that the claimants promptly filed their
objections and sought reference under Section 18 of the Act established that
the claimants had not accepted the compensation without protest, but their
acceptance was subject to the order that the Reference Court or any other superior court may pass. The High Court was, therefore,
justified in holding that there was no material to substantiate the contention
that the compensation had been accepted without protest by the claimants.
Shri
Reddy also contended that the claimants were not entitled to be paid any
compensation for lands which they possessed in violation of Section 154(1) read
with Section 167(1) and (2) of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act (U.P. Act No. 1
of 1951) since such lands vested in the State Government and claimants had no
right to claim compensation for such lands.
It
appears from the record that the plea urged on behalf of the Land Acquisition
Officer was initially upheld by the Reference Court, but later that judgment was reviewed and it was held that
there was no evidence on record to prove that the claimants had acquired any
land in violation of the aforesaid provisions. The High Court considered the
provisions on which reliance was placed by the State particularly, Sections 154
and 167 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act. Section 167 of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition Act in terms provides that where any land has vested in the State
Government, it shall be lawful for the Collector to take possession of such
land and to direct that any person occupying such land be evicted from such
land. The Collector is also authorized to use or cause to be used such force as
may be necessary for the purpose of taking over such possession or evicting
such unauthorized persons. The High Court found that there was no evidence
whatsoever to substantiate the plea that the claimants were in illegal and
unauthorized possession of lands which had vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh. It was not shown that at any stage
any action was taken to evict and dispossess the unauthorized occupants of such
lands which had vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh. On the contrary it was not disputed that the claimants
were in possession till the date the possession of the land was taken from them
pursuant to the Notifications issued under Section 4(1) and Section 6 of the
Act. Till that time they were in possession and their possession was not
disturbed by any action taken by the Collector or the Gaon Sabha under any law.
Thus the High Court held that there was no evidence to substantiate the
contention of the State that the claimants/land-owners were in unauthorized
possession of Government lands for which they could not be compensated. The
High Court also noticed, and in our view rightly, that such a plea could not be
raised in a proceeding under Section 18 of the Act. It is also not in dispute
that the Special Land Acquisition Officer offered compensation to the
claimants.
That
obviously was on the basis that the State recognized the claimants as the
owners of the lands which were sought to be acquired. Having done so, and
having made a reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Act, it could not
be contended by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in the proceedings under
Section 18 of the Act or in any proceedings arising therefrom that the
claimants, to whom he had himself offered compensation, were not owners of the
lands. The State ought to have taken appropriate proceedings, if any,
permissible in law, to deny compensation to such claimants, who according to
the State were in occupation of lands which had vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Having considered the material on
record and the reasoning of the High Court we are satisfied that the High Court
was right in holding that there was no material on record to prove that some of
the claimants were unauthorized occupants of Government lands and, therefore,
not entitled to compensation for such lands. The High Court was also right in
holding that in a reference under Section 18 of the Act such a contention could
not be raised because matters that may be considered by a court in a reference
under Section 18 of the Act are matters enumerated in Section 18 itself as also
the following sections. This was not a case where two claimants had claimed
compensation in respect of the same land, or there was any dispute as to the
apportionment. The State wanted the Court to hold that the persons to whom the
compensation had been offered, and who the Collector had reasons to believe
were interested in the land, should not be granted any compensation on the
ground that they had no interest in the lands and were in unauthorized
possession of Government lands.
We
shall now consider the submissions urged by the claimants in the appeals
preferred by them relating to acquisition of lands in village Habibpur.
According
to the claimants a Notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of
the Act was published on 25th
August, 1981. By the
aforesaid Notification an inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act was dispensed
with. Thereafter a declaration under Section 6 was also issued. The aforesaid
Notification was challenged by the claimants in Civil Misc. Writ Petition
No.11872 of 1981 which was decided on May 23, 1983. While deciding the writ petition,
the High Court held :- "The result of the discussion is that the
notification issued under Section 6 of the Act without affording opportunity to
the petitioners to file objections and without an inquiry under Section 5A is
invalid. The decision to obviate the inquiry under that provisions was wholly
without authority of law. The recital to that effect in the Notification under
Section 4 is invalid too. The Notification dated August 25, 1981 is quashed. The respondents are directed to permit the
petitioners to file objections and enquire into them under Section 5A before
making a fresh declaration, if any, under Section 6 of the Act in regard to
their land." The State preferred a special leave petition before this
Court but during the pendency of the special leave petition issued a
Notification on July
11, 1983 inviting
objections from the claimants pursuant to the Notification earlier issued under
Section 4 of the Act. After considering the objections a Notification under
Section 6 of the Act was issued on October 7, 1983. The submission urged on behalf of
the claimants before the High Court was that since the original Notifications
under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were quashed and a fresh Notification was
issued on July 11, 1983 inviting objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the
compensation to be awarded must be determined by reckoning the Notification issued
on July 11, 1983 as the Notification under Section 4 of the Act.
The
High Court negatived the contention and held that the Notification under
Section 4 of the Act issued on August 25, 1981
was in two parts. While the first part declared the need for acquisition of the
lands in question for a public purpose, the second part dispensed with the
inquiry under Sections 5-A of the Act. The High Court had quashed only that
part of the Notification which dispensed with the inquiry under Section 5-A of
the Act because there was no material on record to establish any urgency which
could justify dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. On a
reading of the judgment and order of the High Court it was held that the first
part of the Notification which was a Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act
was not quashed.
Adverting
to the Notification issued on July 11, 1983
inviting objections under Section 5-A of the Act the High Court observed that
the Notification did not even whisper that it was a Notification under Section
4 of the Act. It only recited the earlier history which led to the issuance of
the Notification inviting objections.
Thereafter
on October 7, 1983, after considering the objections,
a Notification under Section 6 was issued. No doubt this Notification makes a
reference to the Notification dated July 11, 1983 as Notification issued under
sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. The High Court, however, did not
attach much importance to this recital in the Notification issued under Section
6 of the Act because the Notification issued on July 11, 1983 did not purport to be a Notification under Section 4(1) of
the Act. The Notification clearly mentioned that it was a Notification inviting
objections under Section 5-A of the Act in continuation of the Notification
dated August 25, 1981 issued under Section 4(1) of the
Act. It further held that the High Court in the earlier writ petition did not
quash the first part of the Notification dated August 25, 1981 which remained intact. Mere wrong mention of the Section in
the subsequent Notification did not make the Notification inviting objections
under Section 5-A of the Act a Notification issued under Section 4(1) of the
Act.
Before
us the same submission was urged by the counsel appearing in the appeals
preferred by the claimants. Shri P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the claimants, submitted that the Notification issued on July 11, 1983 inviting objections gave only 21
days time for filing of objections instead of 30 days. In any event he
submitted that even if the aforesaid Notification was not invalidated in toto,
it must be treated as the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The same
submission was reiterated by the other counsel appearing for the claimants in the
other appeals. Mr. Tankha, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of some
of the claimants, placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in
(1988) 3 SCC 294 : Raghunath and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others and
submitted that once a Section 6 Notification is issued, the Notification under
Section 4 is exhausted. Therefore, in the instant case the first Notification
issued under Section 6 of the Act having been quashed, the Notification under
Section 4 issued earlier got exhausted and, therefore, it became necessary for
the State to issue another Notification under Section 4 of the Act. There was
no question of issuing a notification in continuation of the earlier Section 4
notification. According to him the second Notification cannot be said to be in
continuation of the first Notification. He also relied upon the judgment of
this Court in (1990) 1 SCC 59 :
Hindustan
Oil Mills Ltd. and another vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition).
In
reply Shri Reddy, learned senior counsel, submitted that the question of
validity of a Notification could not be gone into in a proceeding under Section
18 of the Act. He also relied on the decision in Raghunath and distinguished
the decision in Hindustan Oil Mills.
We
have carefully considered these two decisions cited at the bar and on a careful
consideration of the principles laid down therein, it must be held that the
claimants are not right in their contention. The submissions urged on their
behalf proceed on the assumption that the Notification issued under Section 4
of the Act got exhausted after a Notification under Section 6 of the Act was
issued, which was later struck down by the High Court as invalid.
Reliance
placed on the decision in Raghunath and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) is misplaced. In
that case a similar submission was advanced on the basis of the decision of
this Court in (1966) 3 SCR 437 : Girdharilal Amratlal vs. State of Gujarat
wherein the question for consideration of the Court was whether there could be
successive declarations in respect of various parcels of land covered by a
Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and whether once a declaration under
Section 6 particularising the area in the locality specified in the
Notification under Section 4(1) was issued, the remaining non-particularised
area stood automatically released. It was in that context that it was observed
that once a valid declaration under Section 6 is made, the scope of the
Notification under Section 4 will get exhausted. This Court in Raghunath,
therefore, held that the aforesaid principles did not apply to a case where the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act was proved to be invalid, ineffective or
infructuous for some reason. This Court referred to three earlier decisions of
this Court reported in (1966) 3 SCR 437 = AIR 1966 SC 1408 : Girdhari Lal Amratlal
vs. State of Gujarat ; (1976) 3 SCC 536 : State of Gujarat vs. Haider Bux Razvi
and (1980) 1 SCC 308 : State vs Bhogilal Keshavlal and held that where a
Notification under Section 6 is invalid, the government may treat it as
ineffective and issue in its place a fresh Notification under Section 6 and
that there is nothing in Section 48 of the Act to preclude the government from
doing so. The decisions referred to by this Court clearly point out the
distinction between a case where there is an effective declaration under
Section 6 and a case where, for some reason the declaration under Section 6 is
invalid. It further observed that in principle there was no distinction between
a case where a declaration under Section 6 is declared invalid by the Court and
a case in which the government itself withdraws the declaration under Section 6
when some obvious illegality is pointed out. The Court, therefore, upheld the
order of the High Court and held that the issuance of a fresh declaration under
Section 6 of the Act after withdrawing the earlier one issued under Section 6
of the Act did not have the effect of rendering the Notification under Section
4 ineffective and infructuous. In the case of Raghunath a Notification had been
issued under Section 4 of the Act followed by a declaration under Section 6 of
the Act, but realizing that the declaration was not valid since the objections
filed by the petitioners had not been heard before making the declaration, the
Government itself withdrew the Notification under Section 6 of the Act and made
another declaration after hearing objections under Section 5-A of the Act. We
have no doubt that the same principle applies to the facts of this case.
Reliance placed on Hindustan Oil Mills Ltd. and another vs. Special Deputy
Collector (Land Acquisition) (supra) is also of no avail to the claimants
because that case was decided on its own facts. The first two Notifications
under Section 4 of the Act did not clearly indicate the land that was proposed
to be acquired. That became clear only when the third Notification was issued.
This Court found that there were vital defects in the first two Notifications
and it was really the third Notification which was effective under Section 4 of
the Act. This Court observed that when there is a Notification which purports
to be by way of an amendment, the question whether it is really one rectifying
certain errors in the earlier one or whether its nature is such as to totally
change the entire complexion of the matter would have to be considered on the
terms of the relevant notifications.
This
Court, therefore, based its conclusion entirely on the language of the
Notification. It was also observed that this did not mean that wherever there
are notifications by way of amendments, it is only the last of them that can be
taken as the effective notification under Section 4 of the Act. The authority,
therefore, is of no assistance to the claimants. The principles laid down in Raghunath
clearly apply to the facts of the instant case and, therefore, the submission
urged on behalf of the claimants must be rejected.
We,
therefore, find no merit in any of these appeals and all the appeals are,
therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.
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