Hasham
Abbas Sayyad Vs. Usman Abbas Sayyad & Ors [2006] Insc 941 (12 December 2006)
S.B.
Sinha & Markandey Katju
[Arising
out of SLP (Civil) No.15035 of 2006] S.B. SINHA, J:
Leave
granted.
Appellant,
Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2 are brothers. A suit for partition was
filed by Respondent No.1. A preliminary decree was passed on 16.03.1999. An
application purported to be a Special Darkhast was filed by him on 29.11.1999.
An Advocate Commissioner was appointed. He was of the opinion that the property
was impartible. A proposal was mooted that the property be put on sale in
between the co- sharers. Appellant accepted the Commissioner's report. He
however filed an application for putting the said suit property on auction sale
and for equal distribution of the proceeds thereof amongst the co-sharers. An
objection to the report of the said Advocate Commissioner was filed by the
appellant.
The
court allowed the appellant to appoint an architect at his own cost. He,
however, failed to comply with the said order. A sale proclamation was issued.
The appellant expressed his intention to buy the said property at the valuation
made by the Government Valuer. A valuation report was filed by the appellant on
04.05.2005 against which Respondent No.1 filed an objection. The appellant was
called upon to deposit 2/3rd of the amount stated in the valuation report. He
failed to do so. On or about 21.11.2005, he filed an application expressing his
willingness to deposit shares of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. He also sought for permission
to deposit an amount of Rs.2.5 lakhs. By an order dated 22.11.2005, the Trial
Court held that since the property was put on auction sale, the highest bid
would be treated to be the best price of the suit property and there was no
need for appointment of any valuer to ascertain the market price thereof.
Another objection was filed by the appellant stating that in view of the facts
and circumstances of the case, he should be allowed to buy the shares of other
so-sharers. The said application was rejected by an order dated 14.12.2005.
By an
order dated 15.04.2006, the learned Trial Judge held that it was not necessary
to initiate a final decree proceeding and the said purported Special Darkhast
filed by Respondent No.1 was treated to be an application therefor.
A writ
petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court by reason of
the impugned order.
The
short question which, inter alia, arises for consideration is as to whether the
property in suit could be put on auction sale without initiating a formal final
decree proceeding.
"Decree"
has been defined in Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to mean :
"Decree"
means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the
Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with
regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be
either preliminary or final, it shall be deemed to include the rejection of a
plaint and the determination of any question within section 144, but shall not
include (a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an
order, or (b) any order of dismissal for default.
Explanation.- A decree is preliminary when
further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed
of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may
be partly preliminary and partly final;" We may also notice Section 54 of
the Code of Civil Procedure which is in the following terms :
"54.
Partition of estate or separation of share.- Where the decree is for the
partition of an undivided estate assessed to the payment of revenue to the
Government, or for the separate possession of a share of such an estate the
partition of the estate or the separation of the share shall be made by the
Collector or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by him in this
behalf, in accordance with the law (if any) for the time being in force
relating to the partition, or the separate possession of shares, of such
estates." Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as to when a
judgment is said to be pronounced. Rule 7 thereof provides that a decree
although prepared at a later date shall relate back to the date of the
judgment.
A
Civil Court, in a
suit for partition, may pass a preliminary decree in terms of Order XX Rule 18
of the Civil Procedure Code, which reads as under:
"18.
Decree in suit for partition of property or separate possession of a share
therein.- Where the Court passes a decree for the partition of property or for
the separate possession of a share therein, then, -
(1) if
in so far as the decree relates to an estate assessed to the payment of revenue
to the Government, the decree shall declare the rights of the several parties
interested in the property, but shall direct such partition or separation to be
made by the Collector, or any gazetted subordinate of the Collector deputed by
him in this behalf, in accordance with such declaration and with the provisions
of section 54.
(2) if
and in so far as such decree relates to any other immoveable property or to
movable property, the Court may, if the partition or separation cannot be
conveniently made without further inquiry, pass a preliminary decree declaring
the rights of the several parties, interested in the property and giving such
further directions as may be required." Preliminary decree declares the
rights and liabilities of the parties.
However,
in a given case a decree may be both preliminary and final.
There
can be more than one final decrees. A decree may be partly preliminary and
partly final. [See Rachakonda Venkat Rao and Others v. R. Satya Bai (Dead) by L.Rs.
and Another (2003) 7 SCC 452] A final decree proceeding may be initiated at
any point of time. No limitation is provided therefor. However, what can be
executed is a final decree, and not a preliminary decree, unless and until
final decree is a part of the preliminary decree.
Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, inter alia, provides that a property can be
put to sale only in execution of a decree.
Rules
13 and 14 of Order XXVI, which are also relevant for the purpose, read as under:
"13.
Commission to make partition of immovable property.- Where a preliminary decree
for partition has been passed, the Court may, in any case not provided for by
section 54, issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit to make the
partition or separation according to the rights as declared in such decree.
14.
Procedure of Commissioner.-
(1)
The Commissioner shall, after such inquiry as may be necessary, divide the
property into as many shares as may be directed by the order under which the
commission was issued, and shall allot such shares to the parties, and may, if
authorized thereto by the said order, award sums to be p-aid for the purpose of
equalizing the value of the shares.
(2)
The Commissioner shall then prepare and sign a report or the Commissioners
(where the commission was issued to more than one person and they cannot agree)
shall prepare and sign separate reports appointing the share of each party and
distinguishing each share (if so directed by the said order) by metes and
bounds. Such report or reports shall be annexed to the commission and
transmitted to the Court; and the Court, after hearing any objections which the
parties may make to the report or reports, shall confirm, vary or set aside the
same.
(3)
Where the Court confirms or varies the report it shall pass a decree in
accordance with the same as confirmed or varied; but where the Court sets aside
the report or reports it shall either issue a new commission or make such other
order as it shall think it." The question came up for consideration before
this Court in Shankar Balwant Lokhande (Dead) v. Chandrakant Shankar Lokhande
and Another (1995) 3 SCC 413], wherein it was opined:
"Both
the decrees are in the same suit. Final decree may be said to become final in
two ways:
(i) when
the time for appeal has expired without any appeal being filed against the
preliminary decree or the matter has been decided by the highest court;
(ii) when,
as regards the court passing the decree, the same stands completely disposed
of. It is in the latter sense the word "decree" is used in Section
2(2) of CPC. The ap-pealability of the decree will, therefore, not affect its
character as a final decree. The final decree merely carries into fulfilment
the preliminary decree." Taking note of the fact that a final decree
proceeding is required to be drawn upon a stamped paper, it was observed:
"The
crucial question for consideration is as to when the limitation begins to run
for filing an application to pass final decree on stamped papers. There is no
direct decision of this Court on this point. Therefore, after hearing counsel
at length, we reserve the judgment in the appeal and independently made
detailed examination.
There
is divergence of opinion in the High Courts on this question." We are not
oblivious of the fact that a somewhat different view as regards period of
limitation provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 was taken in
W.B. Essential Commodities Supply Corpn. v. Swadesh Agro Farming & Storage
Pvt. Ltd. and Another [(1999) 8 SCC 315], wherein, inter alia, it was held that
the aforementioned observations do not apply to a money decree.
In Hameed
Joharan (Dead) and Others v. Abdul Salam (Dead) by Lrs. and Others [(2001) 7
SCC 573], Shankar Balwant Lokhande (supra) was distinguished, inter alia,
stating:
"23.
Significantly, the contextual facts itself in Lokhande's case (supra) has
prompted this Court to pass the order as it has (noticed above) and as would
appear from the recording in the order to wit: "Therefore, executing court
cannot receive the preliminary decree unless final decree is passed as
envisaged under Order 20 Rule 18 (2)."
24. In
that view of the matter, reliance on the decision of Lokhande's case (supra) by
Mr. Mani appearing for the appellants herein cannot thus but be said to be
totally misplaced more so by reason of the fact that the issue pertaining to
furnishing of stamp paper and subsequent engrossment of the final decree
thereon did not fall for consideration neither the observations contained in
the judgment could be said to be germane to the issue involved therein. The
factual score as noticed in paragraph 10 of the Report makes the situation clear
enough to indicate that the Court was not called upon to adjudicate the issue
as raised presently. The observations thus cannot, with due deference to the
learned Judge, but be termed to be an obiter dictum." Yet again in Mool Chand
and Others v. Dy. Director, Consolidation and Others [(1995) 5 SCC 631], a
distinction was drawn between a case where an appeal against a preliminary
decree was filed and a case where a preliminary decree had not been appealed
against.
Recently
in Dr. Chiranji Lal (D) by LRs. v. Hari Das (D) by LRs. [(2005) 10 SCC 746], it
was held that the period of limitation for execution of a partition decree
would not be made contingent upon the engrossment of the decree on the stamp
paper.
We
have referred to the aforementioned decisions to clear the air in relation to
one aspect of the matter, namely, although final decree may be required to be
duly stamped, or the same may not have anything to do for the purpose of
computing the period of limitation, the preliminary decree as such cannot be
put to execution.
Although
in regard to the period of limitation in execution of the final decree
proceeding there are somewhat different views, but all decisions of this Court
clearly state that it is the final decree proceeding which would be executable
in nature. Without drawing a final decree proceeding, the court could not have
put the property on auction sale.
It is
true that the house property was found to be an impartible one; but a
preliminary decree having been passed, the valuation thereof and final
allotment of the property could have been done only in a final decree
proceeding. Only when final allotments were made or a determination is made
that the property should be put on auction sale, a final decree in respect
thereof should have been passed. It is appealable. Only a final decree could be
put to execution.
A
contention was raised that having regard to the conduct of the appellant, we
should not interfere, but the appellant herein has raised a jurisdictional
question. However, the appellant can be put to terms.
The
core question is as to whether an order passed by a person lacking inherent
jurisdiction would be a nullity. It will be so. The principles of estoppel,
waiver and acquiescence or even res judicata which are procedural in nature
would have no application in a case where an order has been passed by the
Tribunal/Court which has no authority in that behalf.
Any
order passed by a court without jurisdiction would be coram non judice being a nullity,
the same ordinarily should not be given effect to. [See Chief Justice of Andhra
Pradesh and Another v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu and Others - AIR 1979 SC 193 & MD
Army Welfare Housing Organisation v. Sumangal Services (P) Ltd. (2004) 8 SCC
619].
This
aspect of the matter has recently been considered by this Court in Harshad Chiman
Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. and Another [(2005) 7 SCC 791], in the following
terms :
"We
are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction of a court may be
classified into several categories. The important categories are
(i)
Territorial or local jurisdiction;
(ii)
Pecuniary jurisdiction; and
(iii)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter.
So far
as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such
jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any
case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point
that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be
taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject matter, however, is
totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit by reason of any limitation
imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or
matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is nullity."
[See also Zila Sahakari Kendrya Bank Maryadit v. Shahjadi Begum & Ors. 2006
(9) SCALE 675 and Shahbad Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Special Secretary to Govt.
of Haryana & Ors. 2006 (11) SCALE 674 para 29] We may, however hasten to
add that a distinction must be made between a decree passed by a court which
has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction
in regard to the subject matter of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the
appellate court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown,
ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with.
We are
also not oblivious of some decisions of this Court where a property that had
been put to auction and despite setting aside of the decree, the court had not
interfered with. [See Bombay Dyeing and Mfg. Co. Ltd.. v. Bombay Environmental
Action Group and Others (2006) 3 SCC 459 para 329].
But in
this case possession of the property has not been delivered to the auction
purchaser.
The
suit property is a residential house. The auction sale was wholly illegal. The
auction purchaser can otherwise be compensated on monetary terms.
We,
therefore, are of the opinion that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case, and with a view to do complete justice to the parties, the appellant
should be directed to deposit a sum of Rs.18 lakhs within four weeks from date
before the learned Trial Judge, who shall immediately allow Respondent Nos.1
and 2 to withdraw a sum of Rs.9 lakhs each towards their shares in the
property.
The
appellant furthermore shall deposit such amount in the court within the
aforementioned period towards payment of interest by way of compensation @ 9%
p.a. from the date of deposit till the actual payment is made, which would be
payable to the auction purchaser, which in our opinion is just and reasonable.
The
principle that such direction can be issued by this Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India would appear from a
decision of this Court in Kishori Lal v. Sales Officer, District Land
Development Bank and Ors. [2006 (8) SCALE 521], wherein it was directed:
"However,
with a view to do complete justice between the parties, in our considered
opinion, the appellant should be directed to deposit the entire auction money
with interest thereupon @6% per annum. This order is being passed by us under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Such amount should be deposited
within eight weeks from this date before respondent No.1, Sales Officer. On
such deposit being made, the auction shall stand set aside and the possession
of the property shall be restored to the appellant herein.
However,
in the event the appellant fails and/or neglects to deposit the said amount
within the aforementioned period, these appeals shall stand dismissed."
Following the said decision, herein also we would direct that in the event of compliance
of the aforementioned directions, the auction shall stand set aside and the
decree for partition shall stand satisfied. The appeal is allowed subject to
the aforementioned observations and directions. However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
Back
