Vinod
K. Chawla Vs. Union of India & Ors [2006] INSC 505 (18 August 2006)
K.G.
Balakrishnan & G.P. Mathur G. P. Mathur, J.
1
This
appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the judgment and order
dated 27.1.1999 of High Court of Delhi by which the writ petition filed by the
appellant challenging the detention order passed against him on 12.2.1997 under
Section 3(1) of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling
Activities Act, 1974 (for short 'COFEPOSA') by the Joint Secretary, Government
of India, was dismissed.
2
Though
the detention order was passed on 12.2.1997 but the same could be served upon
the appellant after more than a year on 12.3.1998 when he was taken into
custody as he was absconding. The appellant filed the writ petition under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution soon thereafter before the Delhi High
Court which was dismissed on 27.1.1999.
The
appellant has already undergone the entire period of detention but he is
pursuing the present appeal as he is threatened with proceedings under
Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976.
3
The
grounds of detention mention that the Director of Revenue Intelligence, New
Delhi (for short 'DRI') had received information that the appellant was indulging
in large scale evasion of customs duty by importing consumer electronic goods
at grossly under-invoiced prices and by circumventing Import and Export Policy
and remitting payments for the same through illegal channels. The goods were
imported through various firms and concerns owned by the appellant. On the
basis of the said information, the officers of the DRI conducted simultaneous
searches on 20.12.1996 at seven residential/business/factory premises of the
appellant, wherein many incriminating articles and documents were recovered.
Further searches were also made on 30th December, 1996 and some more goods of foreign origin were recovered which established evasion of excise duty. His
statement was recorded on 19th and 20th December, 1996 and 30th January, 1997. On the basis of the material collected, the Joint Secretary to the Government
of India passed the impugned order under Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA on 12.2.1997.
The appellant evaded service of the detention order and absconded. After great
efforts had been made and proceedings had been initiated under Section 7 of
COFEPOSA, the appellant was served with the copy of the detention order on
12.3.1998 when he was taken into custody. The representation made by the
appellant was rejected by the detaining authority and also by the Central
Government after the Advisory Board had recorded an opinion that there was
sufficient cause for his detention.
The
appellant challenged the detention order by filing the writ petition before the
High Court of Delhi raising several pleas but the same was dismissed on
27.1.1999.
4
Learned
counsel for the appellant has submitted that the grounds of detention make
reference to the statement made by the appellant's son, Asheesh Chawla before
the officers of DRI on 7.1.1997 and 8.1.1997.
However,
when he was produced before the ACMM, New Delhi, on 8.1.1997 he specifically
retracted the statement allegedly made by him before the officers of DRI. The
said statement of Asheesh Chawla made on 8.1.1997, whereby he specifically retracted
from the statement made before the officers of DRI, was not placed by
sponsoring authority before the detaining authority and, therefore, a vital
document which could affect the opinion of the detaining authority one way or
the other was suppressed and was not placed before him (detaining authority)
and thus the detention order passed against the appellant is illegal. In
support of this submission reliance is placed on Ashadevi v. K. Shivraj, Addl.
Chief Secretary to the Govt. of Gujarat (1979) 1 SCC 222, wherein it has been
held as under :
"If
material or vital facts which would influence the mind of the detaining
authority one way or the other on the question whether or not to make the
detention order are not placed before or are not considered by the detaining
authority, it would vitiate its subjective satisfaction rendering the detention
order illegal." Reliance is also placed on Ayya v. State of U.P. (1989) 1 SCC 374, wherein it was held :
"There
would be vitiation of the detention on grounds of non-application of mind if a
piece of evidence, which was relevant though not binding, had not been
considered at all. If a piece of evidence which might reasonably have affected
the decision whether or not to pass an order of detention is excluded from consideration,
there would be a failure of application of mind which, in turn, vitiates the
detention. The detaining authority might very well have come to the same
conclusion after considering the material; but in the facts of the case the
omission to consider the material assumes materiality." Substantiating his
argument learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon Sita Ram Somani
v. State of Rajasthan (1986) 2 SCC 86, wherein it was observed that it was for
the detaining authority to consider the relevant material before taking a
decision whether it was necessary to detain the appellant under COFEPOSA and
that having not been done, there was a clear non-application of mind by the
detaining authority to relevant material.
5
In
order to examine the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant, it
is necessary to refer to the detention order dated 12.2.1997 and the relevant
part thereof which has a bearing on the controversy in dispute, is being
reproduced below :
"The
Directorate of revenue Intelligence, D Block, I.P. Bhawan, I.P. Estate, New Delhi received information that you i.e. named Mr. Vinod Kumar Chawla, resident of
E-526, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi were indulging in large scale evasion of
Customs Duty by way of importing consumer electronic goods at grossly under
invoiced prices and by way of circumventing Import and Export Policy and
remitting payment through illegal channels through your business of computer
accessories, connectors and cables. These goods are being imported through
various firms owned by you namely
i
M/s
Connectronics and Cables Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi
ii
M/s
Life Electronics Pvt. Ltd., Noida,
iii
M/s
WINGS Electronics, Noida,
iv
M/s
MOBICON Enterprises, New Delhi.
Pursuant
to the said information, the officers of the Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence conduced simultaneous searches on 10.12.1996 at the
residential/business/factory premises of the various firms owned by you as
detailed below :
1.
Business
premises of M/s Connectronics and Cables Pvt. Ltd., G-3, Osian Buildings, 12, Nehru Place, New Delhi.
2.
Residential
premises of Mr. J.C. Malhotra, Director of M/s Connectronics and Cables Pvt.
Ltd.
3.
Business
premises of M/s Wings Electronics and M/s Mobicon Enterprises situated at 309,
Lajpat Rai Market, Delhi 6.
4.
Your
residential premises situated at K-526, Greater Kailash-II, New Delhi.
5.
Factory
premises of M/s Wings Electronics situated at A-62, Sector 16, NOIDA, Distt. Ghaziabad (U.P.)
6.
Factory
premises of M/s Life Electronics Pvt. Ltd. situated at E-3, Sector VIII, NOIDA,
Distt. Ghaziabad (U.P.)
7.
The
godown of M/s Connectronics and Cables situated at 7-1/147, Chittaranjan Park, New Delhi. The said premises is also the residential premises of Mr. Puran
Chand Joshi, Sales Assistant of M/s Connectronics and Cables.
3
As
a result of the searches, several incriminating documents were recovered from
the premises listed at Sr. No.1, 3 and 6 which are resumed by the officers for
further investigation. In the premises listed at Sr. No.7 above imported goods
of foreign origin valued at Rs.14.83 lakhs were recovered which were detained
pending further enquiries as the functionaries present could not produce any
documents for lawful importation and acquisition of the said goods. In a
subsequent search carried out on 11.12.97, at the premises listed at Sr. No.6,
several goods viz. speakers, cabinets, connectors and AT & T Cables, all
the foreign origin valued at Rs.35 lakhs approximately were also recovered from
the basement of the said premises. These were also detained pending further enquiry,
and were subsequently seized on 17.12.1996 under Section 110 of the Customs
Act, 1962 as no person, including you could produce any documents for legal
import depicting their correct and true value.
..................................................................................................
..................................................................................................
5
In
your statement recorded on 19.12.96 under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962
you inter alia stated that initially you started doing business in purchase and
sale of electronic components under a firm named M/s WINGS Electronics, 309,
Lajpat Rai Market, Delhi 6; that at the same place you opened another firm,
M/s LIFE Electronics (P) Ltd. in 1984-85 of which you were the Managing
Director.
..................................................................................
....................................................... that in addition to
this, you also had a trading centre in the name and style of M/s CONNECTRONICS
AND CABLES Pvt. Ltd. G-3, Osian Building, 12, Nehru Place, New Delhi since
1991, in which you were dealing in stock and trade of connectors, cables,
switches, wires and other electronic components which were being imported from
Hongkong/Taiwan. Your son Asheesh Chawla, was the Managing Director of this
firm.
6
You
further stated that you were importing components such as plastic molded items,
wires and cables, connectors, hardware switches etc.
through
your firms and that this work of imports was being looked after by you; that
you yourself used to negotiate prices and finalize the orders on behalf of M/s
LIFE Electronics and M/s WINGS Electronics, Noida, that you were looking after
the business interest of M/s CONNECTORS AND CABLES including the imports, that
their main overseas suppliers were
i
M/s
Pearl Industrial Co., Hongkong.
ii
M/s
Mirtex Enterprises (HK) Ltd., Taiwan and Hongkong,
iii
M/s
RAFS Enterprises, Singapore
iv
M/s
Phillips, Holland. You further stated that before importing, you used to ask
for a proforma invoice from the foreign supplies for the items to be imported,
followed by a sales confirmation in certain cases in writing; that for regular
items you simply used to get a proforma invoice and then place the order over
phone. ..................................................................................................
....................
11
In
view of the admissions made by you in various statements in connection with the
import of juice extractors VCRs and cables the officers of the Directorate
again visited the factory premises of M/s WINGS Electronics on 30.12.1996 and
conducted further search of the said premises. As a result, 2460 pieces of car
audio speaker "made in Korea" and 254 nos. of Spectra Strap Planar
Cables valued at Rs.20 lakhs (approx) were recovered which were detained
pending further enquiries which were subsequently seized on 15.01.97 as no
person including you could produce the documents for legal importation and
acquisition of the said
goods.................................................................................
...........................
12
Further
the officers of DRI scrutinized the documents which were recovered from your
various premises, as a result of searches conducted on 10.12.96. Scrutiny of
records resumed from the business premises of M/s CONNECTRONICS AND CABLES Pvt.
Ltd. revealed gross under valuation of the items viz. connectors imported by
the company from Taiwan. It was found that all the goods imported by the said
company since 1994 were supplied by a single supplier, namely, M/s MIRTEX
ENTERPRISES (HK) LTD., Taiwan. Investigations revealed that this was a branch
office with the main office at Hongkong.
13
On
correlating the price of the items shown in the invoices of M/s MIRTEX which
were declared to customs for duty purposes, with their quotation/proforma
invoice, it was observed that the goods were under valued to the extent of approx
1/5th of the actual quoted price. From the respective bills of entry 9, in
number regarding which the exercise of correlation has been carried out so far
it was found that the firm had evaded customs duty to the tune of Rs.25 lakhs
approx by way of such under invoicing.
14
Mr.
Asheesh Chawla, your son and Managing Director of the said firm, was summoned
on 07.01.97 to tender his statement. In his written statement, he stated that
for the last one year he had been placing orders with M/s MIRTEX though previously
you had been placing the orders; that the method of placing the orders is that
the firm first calls for quotations from manufacturers and suppliers in Taiwan,
and on the basis of these quotations they place the order with MIRTEX
Enterprises, Taiwan on fax.
..................................................................................................
........................
28
Thus,
from the statements of various persons, including yours, from the
investigations conducted by the Directorate so far, the scrutiny of the
documents recovered, it is clear that you are involved in the following
offences :
i
Large
scale evasion of customs duty to the tune of over Rs.1.35 crores in the import
of connectors, cables and other electronic items, through massive under
valuation of the goods.
ii
Remitting
the differential amount to foreign suppliers through illegal channels, seized
document show that you have remitted US$ 2,92,256.62 equivalent to Rs.85 lakhs
approximately during the period June, 1995 to September, 1996 through illegal
channels.
iii
Importing
various cables through his firm M/s WINGS Electronics and showing the same as
being used in the manufacture and assembly of various consumer electronic goods
such as car cassette players, music systems etc. taking MODVAT credit on the
same, but diverting these cables for sale through your trading establishment
M/s CONNECTRONICS AND CABLES thus flouting rules relating to MODVAT in the
Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944.
iv
Importing
ready to assembly kits in SKD condition 890 VCR's and 1560 juicers by
deliberately splitting the consignment showing the import under OGL and showing
part of the consignment as having been imported by a third party whereas import
of consumer electronics goods in SKD form requires special import
licence."
6
The
statement of Asheesh Chawla made in the Court of ACMM, New Delhi on 8.1.1997
which, according to the appellant amounts to retraction of the statement made
by him (Asheesh Chawla) before the officers of DRI, is being reproduced below
:- "I have been in the custody of the Officers of the department since 2.30 p.m. on 7.1.97. The Officers have made me write false and incorrect statements on
their dictation and sign several documents under threat and coercion and after
being given a beating. I have been maltreated and subjected to deep
humiliation. I have not been provided anything to eat for the last one day. I
was not permitted to sleep or drink any water.
Sd/-
( Ashish Chawla ) 8.1.97"
7
The
grounds of detention are very detailed and long and run into 35 paragraphs and
several pages. They refer to the documents recovered from business premises of
M/s Connectronics and Cables Pvt. Ltd., M/s Wings Electronics and M/s Mobicon
and factory premises of M/s Life Electronics Pvt. Ltd. situate in Noida and
also the godown of M/s Connectronics and Cables Pvt. Ltd. at Chittaranjan Park, New Delhi.
They
extensively refer to the statement of the appellant recorded on 19.12.1996
wherein he admitted that he was doing business through two firms owned by him,
viz., M/s Wings Electronics and M/s Life Electronics Pvt. Ltd. and that he had
started trading centre in the name and style of M/s Connectronics and Cables
Pvt. Ltd. and also the fact that his son Asheesh Chawla was the Managing
Director of this firm. The detention order refers to the several other
statements of the appellant himself which were recorded on different dates and
the admissions made by him. The statement of Asheesh Chawla, who is the son of
the appellant, has been referred to in para 14 of the detention order, wherein
it is mentioned that in his written statement he stated that for the last one
year he had been placing orders with M/s MIRTEX though previously the appellant
had been placing the orders. In para 15 of the detention order it is stated
that Asheesh Chawla was shown several invoices and corresponding
quotations/proforma invoices wherein difference in prices was evident in each
and every case to which he agreed, but could not explain the difference. A
reading of the whole of the detention order clearly shows that the detaining
authority had placed reliance entirely upon the statement of the appellant
Vinod K. Chawla himself and the documents and material recovered from the
business premises and godowns of the firms which were admittedly owned by the
appellant.
There
was only a passing reference to the statement of Asheesh Chawla, wherein he had
stated that for the last one year he had been placing orders with M/s MIRTEX
though previously the orders had been placed by the appellant. The detention
order is not at all based upon the statement of Asheesh Chawla nor any real
support is taken by the detaining authority from his statement in order to come
to the conclusion that the appellant was the owner of the firms which placed
orders for import of various items and invoices whereof were deliberately
grossly undervalued in order to evade customs duty and huge sum of money was
remitted through illegal channels. Another fact which deserves notice is that
Asheesh Chawla had merely stated that orders with M/s MIRTEX used to be placed
by the appellant till one year earlier to the recording of his statement. It is
important to note that the alleged retraction of statement has not been made by
the appellant but by his son Asheesh Chawla. As mentioned earlier, the
detention order is not based upon the statement of Asheesh Chawla but merely
makes a passing reference to the same. Had the appellant retracted from his
statement and the said retraction had not been placed before the detaining
authority, the position may have been different as in such a case it could be
urged that the formation of opinion by the detaining authority and his
subjective satisfaction in that regard had been affected. But such is not the
case here. The retraction of the statement by Asheesh Chawla has no bearing at
all as it in no way could affect the formation of opinion and the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority. Therefore, the contention raised by
the learned counsel for the appellant has no substance and is liable to be
rejected.
8
We
would like to clarify here that the law does not require that every document or
material in possession of sponsoring authority must necessarily be placed by
him before the detaining authority and in every case where any such document or
material is not placed by the sponsoring authority before the detaining
authority, the formation of opinion and the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority would get vitiated. This view has been taken in several
decisions of this Court. In Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India &
Ors. AIR 1991 SC 2261, it was held as under :
"If
the detenu has moved for bail then the application and the order thereon
refusing bail even if not placed before the detaining authority it does not
amount to suppression of relevant material. The question of non- application of
mind and satisfaction being impaired does not arise as long as the detaining
authority was aware of the fact that the detenu was in actual custody." In
K. Varadharaj v. State of T.N. & Anr. (2002) 6 SCC 735, the detenu was
arrested for indulging in the trade of bootlegging. He was granted bail in the
said case by the Court of Principal District and Sessions Judge on 19.10.2001.
Subsequently, a detention order was made under Tamil Nadu Prevention of
Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas,
Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 on 8.11.2001. The
detaining authority did not have before him the application for grant of bail
nor the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge granting bail. On the
contrary, the detaining authority took into consideration a remand order made
by the Court to note the fact that the appellant was in custody. The detenu
challenged the detention order on the ground that the subjective satisfaction
of the detaining authority was vitiated by the fact that the relevant document
ought to have been considered by the detaining authority before coming to the
conclusion that the appellant should be detained, viz., his application for
bail as well as the order of Sessions Judge made thereon were not placed before
the detaining authority. This Court after referring to M. Ahamedkutty v. Union
of India (1990) 2 SCC 1 and Abdul Sathar Ibrahim Manik v. Union of India &
Ors. 1992 (1) SCC 1 observed that placing of the application for bail and the
order made thereon are not always mandatory and such requirement would depend
upon the facts of each case and ultimately rejected the contention raised by
the detenu in this regard. This view has been reiterated in a recent decision
of this Court in Sunila Jain v. Union of India & Anr. 2006 (3) SCC 321. We
are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the mere fact that the sponsoring
authority did not place the statement made by Asheesh Chawla on 8.1.1997 in the
Court of ACMM, New Delhi, before the detaining authority, cannot lead to an
inference that the formation of opinion and the subjective satisfaction of the
detaining authority was vitiated in any manner.
9
Learned
counsel for the appellant has next submitted that the appellant had made a
representation against his detention on 24.3.1998, which was rejected by the
detaining authority on 21.4.1998 and by the Central Government on 29.4.1998 and
in view of this inordinate delay in the disposal of the representation, the
continued detention of the appellant was rendered illegal. Some decisions of
this Court were cited where emphasis has been laid on expeditious disposal of the
representation made by the detenu and it was also observed that unexplained
delay in disposal of the representation renders the continued detention
illegal.
10
The
contention raised cannot be judged by any straight jacket formula divorced from
facts. This has to be examined with reference to the facts of each case having
regard to the volume and contents of the grounds of detention, the documents
supplied along with the grounds, the inquiry to be made by the officers of
different departments, the nature of the inquiry, the time required for
examining the various pleas raised, the time required in recording the comments
by the authorities of the department concerned, and so on.
11
In
L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral & Anr. AIR 1981 SC 1191 it was held
that there can be no doubt that the representation made by the detenu has to be
considered by the detaining authority with the utmost expedition but as
observed in Francis Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra AIR 1980 SC 849, "The
time imperative can never be absolute or obsessive." In Madan Lal Anand v.
Union of India & Ors. AIR 1990 SC 176, the representation dated 17.1.1989
of the detenu who was detained under COFEPOSA was rejected after more than a
month on 20.2.1989. After referring to L.M.S. Ummu Saleema (supra) it was held
that the detaining authority had explained the delay in disposal of the
representation and accordingly the order of detention cannot be faulted on that
ground. In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 1991 SC 1640, the
representation made by the detenu on 18.12.1989 was rejected on 30.1.1990 and
it was contended that there was inordinate delay in consideration of the
representation. In the explanation given in the counter affidavit filed in
reply, it was submitted that considerable period of time was taken by the
sponsoring authority in forwarding its comments.
It
was contended on behalf of the detenu that the views of the sponsoring
authority were totally unnecessary and the time taken by that authority could
not be taken into consideration. The contention was repelled by this Court and
it was observed that consulting the authority which initiated the proposal can
never be said to be an unwarranted exercise. It was further emphasized that
whether the delay in considering the representation has been properly explained
or not would depend upon the facts of each case and cannot be judged in vacuum.
Similarly, in Birendra Kumar Rai v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1993 SC 962,
the petitioner made a representation against his detention on 22.12.1990 which
was rejected by the Central Government after a month on 25.1.1991. It was
observed that the explanation offered for the delay in consideration of the
representation was not such from which an inference of inaction or callousness
on the part of the authorities could be inferred and accordingly the challenge
on the ground of delay was rejected. The subsequent decisions of this Court are
also on the same lines and we do not consider it necessary to refer to them as
the principle is well settled that there should be no inaction or lethargy in
consideration of the representation and where there is a proper explanation for
the time taken in disposal of representation even though it may be long, the
continued detention of the detenu would not be rendered illegal in any manner.
12
The
grounds of detention in the present case are a long one running into 35
paragraphs which were accompanied by 82 documents running into 447 pages. The
representation made by the appellant was also a fairly long one. The
representation made by the appellant on 24.3.1998 was received in the Ministry
on 27.3.1998. The comments of the sponsoring authority were called on 30.3.1998
which were received on 17.4.1998. The comments were placed before the Secretary
(R) through the A.D.G. on 22.4.1998 (18th and 19th being holidays). The
decision of the Central Government was taken and communicated on 29.4.1998
(25th and 26th being holidays). The representation was also considered by the
detaining authority in the meantime and was rejected on 21.4.1998. In the
additional affidavit filed on behalf of the sponsoring authority before the
High Court, it was stated that the representation was received by them on
2.4.1998 and the comments were dispatched on 17.4.1998. During this period,
there were holidays on 4th, 5th, 8th to 12th April, and only seven working days
were available. Again there were holidays on 18th, 19th, 25th and 26th April.
Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are clearly of the
opinion that the entire time taken in consideration and disposal of the
representation made by the appellant has been fully explained and it cannot be
said by any stretch of imagination that there was any inordinate delay or
unexplained delay in considering the representation made by the appellant. The
challenge to the detention order made on the ground of delay in consideration
of the representation made by the appellant has no substance and deserves to be
rejected.
13
It
was lastly urged that the searches of the premises of the appellant were
conducted on 20.12.1996 and 30.12.1996 and his statement was also recorded
between 19.12.1996 and 30.1.1997, but he was taken into custody after more than
a year on 12.3.1998 and on account of this long delay the live and proximate
link in the alleged activities of the appellant and the date of his actual
detention was snapped and there was no reasonable cause for detaining the
appellant. The argument raised is wholly misconceived. The detention order was
passed on 12.2.1997 soon after searches were conducted and his statement had
been recorded but as the appellant was evading arrest and was absconding, it
could only be served on 12.3.1998 when he was taken into custody. In the
counter affidavit filed in the High Court on behalf of the respondents it was averred
that continuous efforts were made both by the police authorities as well as the
officers of DRI to arrest the appellant. A notice under Section 7(1)(b) of
COFEPOSA was published in Official Gazette on 23.3.1997 and also in leading
English and Hindi newspapers on 4.10.1997. An application under Section 7(1)(a)
of the Act was also moved before the Court of ACMM for initiating proceedings
under Section 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. where proclamation was made on 3.12.1997 to
appear on 9.1.1998. An order of attachment under Section 83 Cr.P.C. was also
issued which was brought to the notice of his family members and only then the
appellant could be apprehended and detained on 12.3.1998. Reference has also
been made to three letters dated 28.2.1997, 17.7.1997 and 5.9.1997 from the
Police Headquarters regarding the efforts made to serve the detenu and copies
of those letters were placed on record. Every time the family members of the
appellant reported before the police that the appellant had left the house on
12.3.1997 to an unknown place and that his whereabouts were not known. An
additional affidavit of Assistant Director of Revenue Intelligence was also
filed before the High Court wherein it was averred that 11 summons were issued
to the appellant during 20.2.1997 and 26.11.1997 and a red alert was also
issued by the DRI on 5.3.1997. These facts conclusively establish that the
detention order which was passed on 12.2.1997 soon after the searches had been
made and the statement of the appellant had been recorded, could not be served
in spite of every possible attempt had been made to serve him as the appellant
was absconding. Where a person himself evades service of detention order, it is
not open to him to contend that in view of the long period which has elapsed
between the offending activities and the actual arrest and detention, the vital
link had snapped and there was no ground for actually detaining him. An
otherwise valid detention order cannot be rendered invalid on account of the
own act of the detenu of evading arrest and making himself scarce. The
contention thus raised has absolutely no merit and has to be rejected.
14
In
view of the discussions made, we are in complete agreement with the view taken
by the High Court. The appeal being wholly devoid of merit is hereby dismissed.
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