Life
Insurance Corporation of India Vs. R. Dhandapani [2005] Insc 672 (25 November
2005)
Arijit Pasayat & R.V. Raveendran Arijit Pasayat, J.
The Life Insurance Corporation of India (in short the 'LIC') calls in
question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division bench of the Madras
High Court, in a writ appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent
holding that even if the penalty of removal from service is held to be in
order, the respondent-employee nevertheless would be entitled to pension to
which he would be entitled "but for his removal".
Background facts in a nutshell are as under:
Respondent was employed as an Assistant in the LIC in the year, 1962. He
worked in the Coimbatore Branch of the LIC from 1967 onwards. Prior to that he
had worked at Erode for a period of 2 years i.e. from 1965 to 1967. On
14.12.1983 he was transferred to Attur and therefore relieved from the
Coimbatore Branch. However, the respondent did not join duty at Attur and
sought for privileged leave. Thereafter he claimed leave on medical grounds. He
did not appear before the doctor designated by the LIC to substantiate his
claim of leave on medical grounds. Thereafter he continued to remain absent
till the time the charge sheet was issued to him on 16.8.1984. As the period of
absence from duty was about 233 days, LIC asked the respondent to appear before
the doctor designated by it pursuant to the powers under applicable Regulation
30(8) of LIC which inter alia provided that in the case of sickness or accident
an employee shall not absent himself without submitting "a medical
certificate satisfactory to the competent authority". He failed to do so.
After the charge sheet setting out his misconduct of disobedience to lawful
order, insubordination and unauthorized absence from duty was issued, he
submitted a reply but did not take part in the enquiry by asserting that no
enquiry was needed. The enquiry officer after completing the enquiry found the
charges levelled against the employee had been proved. The disciplinary authority
after taking note of that report held that in view of charge of insubordination
and disobedience which were charges of serious nature and which had been
proved, it was not in the interest of the appellant - LIC to continue him in
service and directed his removal from service. Respondent raised an industrial
dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the 'Act') before the
Industrial Tribunal, Madras. In the counter affidavit to the claim made by the
respondent, the past conduct of the respondent-employee was highlighted and it
was pointed out that he had been issued charge sheets earlier in a span of 6
years on seven occasions. It was also pointed out that he had been penalised
pursuant to the charge sheets on more than one occasion. The Industrial
Tribunal after examining the claim and the counter and the records of enquiry
concluded that the enquiry had been properly held, the respondent was stubborn
and adamant and there was not justifiable reason for not reporting for duty to
Attur.
Tribunal held that even in spite of all the lapses highlighted, punishment
of removal from service was harsh.
Instead of imposing of any specific punishment, directions were given that
the workman was to be deprived of three fourth of the back wages from 17.12.1983
(the date when he was relieved on transfer) till 15.4.1987 (date of reference)
and order for reinstatement in service with full back wages from 16.4.1987 and
all other benefits including continuity of service.
A writ petition was filed by LIC before the High Court. A learned Single
Judge dismissed it. Thereafter the Letters Patent Appeal was filed. Stand of
LIC before the Division Bench was that in view of the provisions of Section
11-A of the Act it was not open for the Industrial Tribunal, however wide the
provision may be construed, to substitute its view solely on the ground that it
felt that the penalty was excessive without demonstrating as to how the penalty
which had been imposed was grossly disproportionate.
Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in CMC Hospital Employees'
Union v. CMC Vellore Association (1987 (4) SCC 691) The High Court held that on
the facts of the case, the conduct of the respondent disclosed gross
disobedience and the proved misconduct was one of deliberate disobedience to
the orders of the superiors compounded by adamant attitude in remaining absent
for a period of 233 days. He did not even appear before the doctor which the
employer had required him to do. The Appeal was therefore allowed and the Award
of the Tribunal directing reinstatement with back wages was set aside. After
doing so, the High Court granted some reliefs which form the subject matter of
challenge in this Appeal. The reliefs granted are contained in Paragraphs 20
and 21 of the impugned order which read as follows :
"20: The employee had put in twenty two years of service before he was
removed. We do not think that it is just to deprive of the benefit of those
twenty two years of service and permit the employer to withhold from him the pension
which he was, but for his removal, qualified to receive on the basis of his
service. In the circumstances, we feel it appropriate and just to direct the
employer to grant him the pension for the period of service that he had put in
before his removal. The employer shall make the necessary computation and shall
disburse the amount due to him as early as possible.
21. During the pendency of the matter in this Court, the employee had been
paid his last drawn wages under Section 17 B of the I.D. Act. The respondent
shall not be liable to refund all or any of the sums so received by him."
Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court was not
justified in granting the relief as noted above after having found the conduct
of the respondent to be obnoxious and holding that his acts amounted to gross
insubordination. It was pointed out after coming into force of Life Insurance
Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (in short the 'Pension
Rules') as notified by the Central Government, the employees who retired after
1986 were alone eligible for pension. Under the said Rules, for the employees
who had retired prior to 1.1.1986 and were living as on 1.11.1997 a scheme was
framed for grant of ex-gratia relief. Such ex-gratia amount was to be paid from
1.11.1997 at a specified monthly rate with dearness relief etc. The said scheme
for ex-gratia relief specifically provided that the same was not applicable to
those who were removed, dismissed or terminated from service of the Corporation
and those who had resigned from the Corporation or to those who are on daily
wage employment of the Corporation. Therefore the High Court could not have
granted relief of proportionate pension since the question of payment of
pension to the respondent would not arise as he was removed from service on
25.3.1985.
In response, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that certain
calculations were filed by the appellant before the High Court indicating as to
what would be the amount of pension payable and the same was filed during the
course of hearing of a review application. It was, therefore, submitted that
there was implied acceptance of the direction and the question whether the
Pension Rules will apply or not, did not arise.
Learned counsel for the appellant by way of reply submitted that the
calculations on which reliance is placed by the respondent was to show to the
High Court, the quantum of pension that would have been payable if the High
Court's directions were to be implemented and it did not come in the way of
appellant challenging that part of the order, in regard to which it had a
grievance.
It is not necessary to go into in detail regarding the power exercisable
under Section 11-A of the Act. The power under said Section 11- A has to be exercised
judiciously and the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may
be, is expected to interfere with the decision of a management under Section
11-A of the Act only when it is satisfied that punishment imposed by the
management is wholly and shockingly disproportionate to the degree of guilt of
the workman concerned. To support its conclusion the Industrial Tribunal or the
Labour Court, as the case may be, has to give reasons in support of its
decision. The power has to be exercised judiciously and mere use of the words
'disproportionate' or 'grossly disproportionate' by itself will not be
sufficient.
In recent times, there is an increasing evidence of this, perhaps well-meant
but wholly unsustainable, tendency towards a denudation of the legitimacy of
judicial reasoning and process. The reliefs granted by the Courts must be seen
to be logical and tenable within the framework of the law and should not incur
and justify the criticism that the jurisdiction of the Courts tends to
degenerate into misplaced sympathy, generosity and private benevolence. It is
essential to maintain the integrity of legal reasoning and the legitimacy of
the conclusions. They must emanate logically from the legal findings and the
judicial results must be seen to be principled and supportable on those
findings. Expansive judicial mood of mistaken and misplaced compassion at the
expense of the legitimacy of the process will eventually lead to mutually
irreconcilable situations and denude the judicial process of its dignity,
authority, predictability and respectability. [See: Kerala Solvent Extractions
Ltd. v. A. Unnikrishnan and Anr. [1994 (1) SCALE 631)].
Though under Section 11-A, the Tribunal has the power to reduce the quantum
of punishment it has to be done within the parameters of law. Possession of
power is itself not sufficient; it has to be exercised in accordance with law.
The High Court found that the Industrial Tribunal had not indicated any
reason to justify variations of the penalty imposed. Though learned counsel for
the respondent tried to justify the Award of the Tribunal and submitted that
the Tribunal and the learned Single Judge have considered the case in its
proper perspective, we do not find any substance in the plea. Industrial
Tribunals and Labour Courts are not forums whose task is to dole out private
benevolence to workmen found by Labour Court/Tribunal to be guilty of
misconduct. The Tribunal and the High Court, in this case, have found a pattern
of defiance and proved misconduct on not one but on several occasions. The
compassion which was shown by the Tribunal and unfortunately endorsed by
learned single Judge was fully misplaced.
In the aforesaid background the Division Bench of the High Court was wholly
unjustified in giving directions contained in paragraph 20 of its order, having
set aside the award of the Tribunal as affirmed by learned Single Judge.
The High Court has not even indicated as to under what provision of law
and/or statutory enactment or Regulation or Scheme, pension was payable to the
respondent. On the contrary, the Pension Rules and the Scheme referred to above
clearly justified the stand of the appellant that the respondent was not
entitled to receive any pension or benefit under the scheme.
However direction given in Para 21 relating to payment under Section 17-B of
the Act needs no interference.
The appeal is accordingly allowed in part and we set aside the directions
contained in para 20 of the order of the Division Bench of the High Court.
Costs made easy.
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