Vellikannu
Vs. R. Singaperumal & Anr [2005] Insc 321 (6 May 2005)
Ashok
Bhan & A.K. Mathur A.K. Mathur, J.
This
appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of
Judicature at Madras whereby the learned Single Judge by
his order dated 6th
March, 1997 has
allowed the Second Appeal No. 773 of 1983 filed by the respondent-1st Defendant
herein.
Brief
facts which are necessary for disposal of this appeal are;
That
an Original Suit NO. 87/1978 was filed in the Court of the District Munsif, Melur
by the plaintiff-appellant (herein).
The
schedule properties are the self-acquired properties of late Ramasami Konar and
the first defendant was the only son of Ramasami Konar and the plaintiff is the
wife of the first defendant. Wife of Ramasami Konar was already divorced and
married with some other person and was residing separately. It is alleged that
the first defendant in the suit married the plaintiff- appellant and both were
residing as husband and wife. On 10th October, 1972 the first defendant murdered his
father, Ramasami Konar and was convicted under Section 302 IPC for life
imprisonment. The conviction of the first defendant was confirmed by the High
Court but the High Court recommended the Government to reduce the sentence to
the period already undergone. The first defendant was released in July, 1975.
Since
the first defendant murdered his father, he was not entitled to succeed to the
estate of his deceased father and as such the claim of the plaintiff was that
she alone was entitled to all the properties left by the deceased Ramasami Konar.
According to the plaintiff, the first defendant must be deemed to have
predeceased as provided under Section 25 read with Section 27 of the Hindu
Succession Act. She claimed to be the widow of the first defendant and claimed
to be the owner of all the properties left by Ramasami Konar as coparcener.
After the release of the first defendant from the prison, first defendant lived
with the plaintiff for some time but after some time she was driven out of the
house. Second defendant is already impleaded in the suit as tenant claiming
under first defendant. Plaintiff, therefore, prayed that she may be granted the
relief of declaration as she is entitled to inherit the entire estate of the
deceased Ramasami Konar. As against this it was contended by the first
defendant that the suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff is not the legal
heir of Ramasami Konar. It was alleged that all the properties acquired by the Ramasami,
were joint family properties and the first defendant has acquired the same by
survivorship. The Trial Court by Order dated 31st March, 1980 held that all the properties are
joint family properties of the deceased Ramasami Konar and first defendant. The
second defendant is a cultivating tenant. The first defendant having murdered
his father is not entitled to claim any right under Section 6 read with
Sections 25 & 27 of the Act but as per proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu
Succession Act plaintiff is entitled to a decree for half share and accordingly
it was granted to the plaintiff. This matter was taken up in appeal by
defendant No. 1. The Lower Appellate Court also confirmed the finding of the
Trial Court but modified the decree that it may be treated as preliminary
decree. The Lower Court also held that first defendant must
be treated as non- existent. The plaintiff became a Class I heir under Schedule
1 of the Hindu Succession Act and she was entitled to a share in the property.
The appeal was dismissed.
Aggrieved
against this, the first defendant preferred a second appeal before the High
Court.
The
High Court at the time of admission of the Second Appeal, framed following
substantial questions of law.
"1.
Whether Ex.A.2 judgment in the Criminal case is conclusive on the question of
exclusion from inheritance in the present proceedings? and
2.
Whether the exclusion from inheritance would cover enlargement of interest by
survivorship, in the light of Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act ?"
So far
as the question No. 1 is concerned, the High Court held that the judgment of
the Criminal Court can be taken into consideration. But the main question which
was addressed by the High Court was whether the plaintiff can inherit the
properties from the estate of her deceased father-in-law, Ramasami Konar and
what is the effect of Section 25, Section 27 read with Section 6 and Section 8
of the Hindu Succession Act.
It was
not disputed that the properties of the Ramasami Konar were joint family
properties in which the defendant No. 1 was also one of the member and the
parties are governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law.
The
learned Single Judge of the High Court after hearing the parties and
considering the relevant law on the subject in detail, came to the conclusion
that the view taken by both the Courts below cannot be sustained. It was held
by the learned Single Judge that plaintiff cannot claim as a widow of the son
of Ramasamy Konar. It was observed that plaintiff cannot claim one half share
in the property being coparcenary property under Proviso to Section 6 of the
Hindu Succession Act . It was also observed that she is entitled to half share
so long as the deceased father and son had not partitioned the property. The
first defendant/ respondent No 1 herein cannot be said to have inherited any
share from the victim (Ramasamy Konar) and the Plaintiff can claim as a widow
only if there is a succession to the estate of the victim. If there is no
succession, the deeming provision that the first defendant shall be deemed to
have died before the victim (his father) also will not apply and she cannot
claim as a widow of his pre-deceased son. It was also held that Section 6 of
the Hindu Succession Act will also not apply. The principle of justice, equity
and public policy will apply and the plaintiff cannot be treated as a fresh
stock of descent and defendant No.1 shall be treated as a non-existent as if he
never existed. Therefore, the plaintiff also cannot claim as his widow. It was
also observed that since plaintiff claims as a widow of the defendant No. 1 and
he is disqualified, same disqualification equally applies to her for she cannot
claim through murderer husband.
Learned
single Judge allowed the appeal of the defendant No. 1/respondent No. 1
(herein) and judgment and decree of the Courts below were set aside. The suit
was dismissed. Hence the present appeal.
Learned
counsel for the appellant tried to persuade us that appellant being the sole
female survivor of the Joint Hindu Property as her husband stands disqualified,
she under proviso to Section 6 of the Act, is entitled to the whole of the
estate as a sole survive member of the coparcenary property read with Section 8
of the Act as a Class I heir. As against this, learned counsel for the
respondent-defendant has submitted that this disqualification which was
attached to the son equally applies in the case of the wife as she is claiming
the estate because of her marriage with the respondent and if he is
disqualified, then she is also equally disqualified to claim any property being
a coparcener from the estate of her deceased father in law.
In
order to appreciate the rival contention, it would be relevant to reproduce
provisions of the Hindu Succession Act.
Sections
6, 8, 25 and 27 of the Act which read as under:
"Section
6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property- When a male Hindu dies after
the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara
coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by
survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in
accordance with this Act:
Provided
that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in
Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims
through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary
property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may
be, under this Act and not by survivorship.
Explanation
1.- For the
purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall
be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him
if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death,
irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not..
Explanation
2.- Nothing
contained in ;the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a
person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the
deceased of any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest
referred to therein." Section 8.- General rules of succession in the case
of males.- The property of a male Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according
to the provisions of this Chapter :-
(a) firstly,
upon the heirs, being the relatives specified in class I of the Schedule;
(b) secondly,
if there is no heir of class I, then upon the heirs, being the relatives
specified in class II of the Schedule;
(c) thirdly,
if there is no heir of any of the two classes, then upon the agnates of the
deceased; and
(d) lastly,
if there is no agnate, then upon the cognates of the deceased.
Section
25.- Murderer disqualified. A person who commits murder or abets the
commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the
person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to
which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.
Section
27.- Succession when heir disqualified - If any person is disqualified from
inheriting any property under this Act, it shall devolve as if such person had
died before the intestate." As per Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act,
if a male Hindu dies after commencement of this Act, an interest in a Mitakshara
coparcenary property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of
the coparcenary and not in accordance with the Act. So far as the present case
is concerned, the concurrent finding of the fact is that the deceased Ramasamy Konar
was governed by Mitakshara Law and the property was the coparcenary property.
But he died iintestate. Therefore, as per Section 6, the property shall devolve
by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not by
Section 6 of the Act and at the same time there is proviso to Section which
qualifies the main Section that if deceased left a surviving female relative
specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class
who claims through such female, the interest of deceased in Mitakshara coparcenary
property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may
be and not by survivorship.
So far
as the property in question is concerned, there is a finding of the Courts
below that the property is a coparcenary property and if that being so, if the
defendant No. 1 had not murdered his father then perhaps a thing would have
taken a different shape. But what is the effect on the succession of the
property of the deceased father when son has murdered him. If he had not
murdered his father he would have along with his wife would have succeed in the
matter. So far as the rights of coparceners in the Mitakshara Law are
concerned, son acquires by birth or adoption a vested interest in all coparcenery
property whether ancestral or not and whether acquired before or after his
birth or adoption, as the case may be, as a member of a joint family. This is
the view which has been accepted by all the Authors of the Hindu Law. The
famous principles of Mulla , 15th Edition (1982) at pages 284 and 285, the
learned Author has stated thus:
"The
essence of a coparcenary under the Mitakshara Law is unity of ownership. The
ownership of the coparcenary property is in the whole body of coparceners.
According to the true notion of an undivided family governed by the Mitakshara
Law, no individual members of that family, whilst it remains un-divided, can
predicate, of the joint and undivided property, that he that particular member,
has a definite share, one third or one-fourth. His interest is a fluctuating
interest, capable or being enlarged by deaths in the family, and liable to be
diminished by births in the family. It is only on a partition that he becomes
entitled to a definite share. The most appropriate term to describe the
interest of coparcener in coparcenary property is "undivided coparcenary
interest".
The nature
and extent of that interest is defined in Section 235. The rights of each
coparcener until a partition takes place consist in a common possession and
common enjoyment of the coparcenary property. As observed by the privy council
of Katama Natchiar versus The Rajah of Shivagunga, " there is community of
interest and unity of possession between all the members of the family, and
upon the death of any one of them the others may well take by survivorship that
in which they had during the deceased's lifetime a common interest and a common
possession." Likewise, S.V. Gupta, author of Hindu Law, Vol. 1, Third
Edition (1981) at page 162, the learned author deals with the rights of a
coparcener. He says thus:- "Until partition, coparcener is entitled to:-
(1) join
possession and enjoyment of joint family property
(2) the
right to take the joint family property by survivorship, and
(3) the
right to demand partition of the joint family property" At page 164, the
learned author deals with the right of survivorship. He says;
"while
the family remains joint, its property continues to devolve upon the coparcener
for the time being by survivorship and not by succession. Consequently, on the
death of a coparcener the surviving coparceners take his undivided interest in
the joint family property by survivorship. There is community of interest and
unity of possession between all the members of the family, and upon the death
of any of them, the others may well take by survivorship that in which they had
during the deceased's life time a common interest and a common
possession." The learned Author further says :-
A
coparcener who is disqualified by reason of a disability (such as insanity)
from taking a share on partition may nevertheless take the whole property by
survivorship." At page 165, the learned Author has further said thus:
By
survivorship a coparcener does not obtain the share of a deceased coparcener as
his representative;
strictly
speaking it does not pass to him the effect if merely to enlarge his share in what
he already owns in the aggregate. Surviving coparceners are not therefore, the
legal representatives of a deceased coparcener".
In
N.R. Raghavachariar's Hindu Law Principles and precedents " 8th Edition
(1987) at page 230 under the heading 'Rights of Coparceners' it is said thus:-
"The following are the rights of a coparcener :-
(1)
Right by birth
(2)
Right by survivorship,
(3)
Right to partition,
(4)
Right to joint possession and enjoyment,
(5)
Right to restrain unauthorized acts
(6)
Right of alienation,
(7)
Right to accounts and
(8)
Right to make self-acquisition".
While
dealing with "Right by birth' learned Author says thus:- "Every
coparcener gets an interest by birth in the coparcenary property. This right by
birth relates back to the date of conception. This, however, must not be held
to negative the position that coparcenary property may itself come into
existence after the birth of the coparcener concerned " While dealing with
Right of survivorship, it is said thus:-
"The
system of a joint family with its incident of succession by survivorship is a
peculiarity of the Hindu Law. In such a family no member has any definite share
and his death of somehow ceasing to be a member of the family causes no change
in the joint status of the family. Where a coparcener dies without male issue
his interest in the joint family property passes to the other coparceners by
survivorship and not be succession to his own heir. Even where a coparcener
becomes afflicted with Lunacy subsequent to his birth, he does not lose his
status as a coparcener which he has acquired by his birth, and although his
lunacy may under the Hindu Law disqualify him from demanding a share in a
partition in his family. Yet where all the other coparceners die and he becomes
the sole surviving member of the coparcenary, he takes the whole joint family
property by survivorship, and becomes a fresh stock of descent to the exclusion
of the daughter of the last pre-deceased coparcener, a case of leprosy of the
last surviving coparcener. The beneficial interest of each coparcener is liable
to fluctuation, increasing by the death of another coparcener and decreasing by
the birth of a new coparcener" Therefore, it is now settled that a member
of coparceners acquires a right in the property by birth. His share may
fluctuate from time to time but his right by way of survivorship in copracenary
property in Mitakshara Law is a settled proposition.
In
this connection, a reference may be made in the case 1969 SC 1333, it was held
thus:- "According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property
of a Hindu Joint Family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners
in the quasi-corporate copacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshara Lays
down in express terms that the joint famil;y property is held in trust from the
joint family members then living and thereafter to be both ( See Mitakshara, Chaper
I, 1-27) The incidents of coparcernership under the Mitakshara Law are: first
the lineal male descendants of a person upto the third generation, acquire on
birth ownership in the ancestral properties of such person; Secondly that such
descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition;
thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the
entire property co- jointly with the rest; forthly, that as a result of such
co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common fifthly
that no alienation of the property is possible unless it before necessity,
without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly; that the interest of a
deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. A coparcenary under the Mitakshara
School is a creature of law and cannot arise by act of parties except in so far
that on adoption the adopted son becomes a co-parcener with his adoptive father
as regards the ancestral properties of the letter." The concept of
coparcener as given in the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law as already mentioned
above, is that of a joint family property wherein all the members of the
coparceners share equally. In this connection a reference may be made to a
decision of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Narayan Rao Sham Rao Deshmukh & Ors. reported in
(1985) 2 SCC 321 in which Their Lordships have held as follows:
"A
Hindu coparcenary is however, a narrower body than the joint family. Only males
who acquire by birth an interest in the joint or coparcenary property can be
members of the coparcenary or coparceners. A male member of a joint family and
his sons, grandsons and great grandsons constitute a coparcenary. A coparcener
acquires right in the coparcenary property by birth but his right can be
definitely ascertained only when a partition takes place. When the family is joint,
the extent of the share of a coparcener cannot be definitely predicated since
it is always capable of fluctuating." Therefore, in view of various
decisions of this Court it appears that Defendant No.1 and the plaintiff who
was married to Defendant No.1 were members of joint Hindu family. If the
defendant- appellant had not incurred the disqualification, then they would
have inherited the property as per Mitakshara School of Hindu Law. But the
question is that when the sole male survivor had incurred the disqualification
can he still claim the property by virtue of Mitakshara School of Hindu Law ?
If he cannot get the property by way of survivorship, then the question is
whether his wife who succeeds through the husband can succeed to the property?
Our answer to this question is in negative. In fact, prior to the amendment of
the Hindu Succession Act, Sections like 25 & 27 were not there but the
murderer of his own father was disqualified on the principle of justice, equity
and good conscience and as a measure of public policy. This position of law was
enunciated by the Privy Council way back in 1924 in the case of Kenchava Kom Sanyellappa
Hosmani & Anr. vs. Girimallappa Channappa Somasagar reported in AIR 1924 PC
209 wherein Their Lordships have held as follows:
"In
their Lordships' view it was rightly held by the two Courts below that the
murderer was disqualified ; and with regard to the question whether he is
disqualified wholly or only as to the beneficial interest which the Subordinate
Judge discussed, founding upon the distinction between the beneficial and legal
estate which was made by the Subordinate Judge and by the High Court of Madras
in the case of Vedanayaga Mudaliar v. Vedammal , their Lordships reject, as did
the High Court here, any such distinction. The theory of legal and equitable
estates is no part of Hindu law, and should not be introduced into discussion.
The
second question to be decided is whether the title can be claimed through the
murderer. If this were so, the defendants as the murderer's sisters, would take
precedence of the plaintiff, his cousin. In this matter also, their Lordships
are of opinion that the Courts below were right. The murderer should be treated
as non- existent and not as one who forms the stock for a fresh line of
descent.
It may
be pointed out that this view was also taken in the Madras case just
cited." Their Lordships also explained the decision in the case of Gangu
vs. Chandrabhagabai reported in (1908) 32 Bom. 275 and held as follows :
"It
was contended that a different ruling was to be extracted from the decision of
the Bombay High Court in Gangu v. Chandrabnagabai. This is not so. In that
case, the wife of a murderer was held entitled to succeed to the estate of the
murdered man but that was not because the wife deduced title through her
husband, but because of the principle of Hindu family law that a wife becomes a
member of her husband's gotra, an actual relation of her husband's relations in
her own right, as it is called in Hindu law a gotraja-sapinda. The decision
therefore has no bearing on the present case. "Therefore, the principle
which has been enunciated by their Lordships is in no uncertain terms totally disinherit
the son who has murdered his father. Their Lordships have observed as follows:
"
A murderer must for the purpose of the inheritance, be treated as if he were
dead when the inheritance opened and as not being a fresh stock of descent; the
exclusion extends to the legal as well as beneficial estate, so that neither he
can himself succeed nor can the succession be claimed through him." This
Privy Council decision made reference to the decisions of the High Courts of
Madras and Bombay and their Lordships have approved the ratio contained in
those decisions that a murderer should be totally disinherited because of the
felony committed by him. This decision of the Privy Council was subsequently
followed in the following cases :
i. AIR
(29) 1942 Madras 277 (K.Stanumurthiayya & Ors.
v. K.Ramappa & Ors.)
ii.
AIR 1953 All. 759 ( Nakchhed Singh & Ors. vs. Bijai Bahadur Singh & Anr.)
iii.
AIR 1956 All. 707 (Mata Badal Singh & Ors. vs. Bijay Bahadur Singh &
Ors.)
iv.
AIR 1982 Bomb. 68 ( Minoti vs. Sushil Mohansingh Malik & Anr.).
This
position of law was incorporated by way of Section 25 of the Hindu Succession
Act, 1956 as quoted above, which clearly enunciates that a person who commits
murder or abates the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting
the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of
the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the
murder. In fact, the objects and reasons also makes a reference to the Privy
Council judgment (supra). The objects and reasons for enacting Section 25 read
as under :
"A
murderer, even if not disqualified under Hindu Law from succeeding to the
estate of the person whom he has murdered, is so disqualified upon principles
of justice, equity and good conscience. The murdered is not to be regarded as
the stock of a fresh line of descent but should be regarded as non- existent
when the succession opens." Therefore, once it is held that a person who
has murdered his father or a person from whom he wants to inherit, stands
totally disqualified. Section 27 of the Hindu Succession Act makes it further
clear that if any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under
this Act, it shall be deemed as if such person had died before the intestate.
That shows that a person who has murdered a person through whom he wants to
inherit the property stands disqualified on that account. That means he will be
deemed to have predeceased him. The effect of Section 25 read with Section 27
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is that a murderer is totally disqualified to
succeed to the estate of deceased. The framers of the Act in the objects and
reasons have made a reference to the decision of the Privy Council that the
murderer is not to be regarded as the stock of a fresh line of descent but
should be regarded as non-existent.
That
means that a person who is guilty of committing the murder cannot be treated to
have any relationship whatsoever with deceased's estate.
Now,
adverting to the facts of the present case, the effect of Sections 25 and 27 is
that the respondent No.1 cannot inherit any property of his father as he has
murdered him on the principle of justice, equity and good conscience and the
fresh stock of his line of descent ceased to exist in that case. Once the son
is totally disinherited then his whole stock stands disinherited i.e. wife or
son. The defendant-respondent No.1 son himself is totally disqualified by
virtue of Sections 25 and 27 of the Hindu Succession Act and as such the wife
can have no better claim in the property of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar.
Therefore,
as a result of our above discussion, we are of opinion that the view taken by
the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Madras is correct that the
plaintiff is not entitled to inherit the estate of the deceased, Ramasamy Konar
and the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the orders of the two courts
below. Since we cannot decide this appeal without deciding the right of the
respondent No.1 as the right of the appellant flows therefrom as his wife i.e.
the plaintiff. Therefore, it was necessary for us to first decide whether the
respondent No.1 could succeed or inherit the estate of his deceased father.
When
son cannot succeed then the wife who succeeds to the property through the
husband cannot also lay a claim to the property of her father-in -law. The
appeal is thus dismissed. No order as to costs.
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