Raj
Kumar Yadav Vs. Samir Kumar Mahaseth & Ors [2005] Insc 164 (11 March 2005)
Cji
R.C. Lahoti, D.M. Dharmadhikari & P.K. Balasubramanyan R.C. Lahoti, Cji
An
election petition presented under Section 81 of the Representation of the
People Act, 1951 (hereinafter "the Act", for short) has been directed
to be dismissed as barred by time.
Feeling
aggrieved, the election petitioner has filed this appeal under Section 116A of
the Act.
Shorn
of all details, suffice it to state that the last date of limitation for
presenting the election petition was 28.8.2003.
What
transpired in the High Court at the presentation may be described in the words
of the learned designated Election Judge himself from the impugned judgment of
the High Court. The relevant part is extracted and reproduced hereunder:
"..The
admitted position is that the period of limitation of forty five days expired
on 27.8.2003 on which date the designated Judge was sitting in court till 4.15 P.M. The court hours having expired, the designated election
Judge retired into the chambers where at 4.45 P.M. Sri P.K. Verma, the learned counsel for the appellant came and wanted
to file this election petition. Since under High Court Rules the election
petitions could be filed only in the open court, I, as the designated election
Judge refused to accept the petition beyond court hours. Learned counsel said
that though petition was made ready that very day for presentation, because of
some delay in finalizing it, he had gone to the court after court hours but by
that time the Judge had retired to his chambers. Learned Counsel also requested
in chambers that the Court Officer might be directed to accept that by making
an initial over the petition noting the time of presentation so that the
petition might be presented on the next working day. Since High Court Rules did
not permit that, I refused that prayer also.
This
was how the learned counsel presented the petition in the open court on
28.8.2003" The question arising for decision is : whether an election petition
presented at 4.25 p.m. on 27.8.2003, the last date of limitation, admittedly 10
minutes after the Judge had risen from the open court but was available in
chambers within the court premises can be said to be a valid presentation so as
to be within the period of limitation? Article 329 of the Constitution provides
inter alia that no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or
either House of the Legislature of a State shall be called in question except
by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may
be provided for, by or under any law made by the appropriate Legislature. Under
Section 80 of the Act, no election shall be called in question except by an
election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Part VI of the
Act.
Under
Section 80-A, the High Court has been conferred with jurisdiction to try an
election petition. Such jurisdiction shall be exercised ordinarily by a single
Judge of the High Court assigned for that purpose by the Chief Justice. Under
Section 81 of the Act, an election petition may be presented within forty five
days from the date of election. The rule making power for carrying out the
purpose of the Act has been conferred on the Central Government under Section
169. The Act does not confer power on the High Court to make any rules.
However, the rule making power vests in the High Court under Article 225 of the
Constitution.
The
present matter arises from the High Court of Patna.
Chapter
XXI-E of the High Court Rules framed by the Patna High Court incorporates the
rules for the disposal of election petition filed under Section 81 of the Act.
Rules 6 and 7, relevant for our purpose, are reproduced hereunder :
"6.
Subject always to the orders of the Judge, before a formal presentation of the
election petition is made to the Judge in open Court, it shall be presented to
the Stamp Reporter of the Court, who shall certify thereon if it is in time and
in conformity with the requirements of the Act and the rules in this behalf, or
is defective and shall thereafter return the petition to the petitioner for
making the formal presentation after removing the defects, if any :
Provided
that if on any Court day the Judge is not available on account of temporary
absence or otherwise, the petition may be presented before the Bench hearing
civil applications and motions.
7. (1)
The date of presentation to the Judge or the Bench as mentioned in the proviso
to Rule 6 shall be deemed to be the date of the filing of the election petition
for the purposes of limitation.
(2)
Immediately after it is presented, the petition shall be entered in a special
register maintained for the registration of election petitions."
The
limitation provided by Section 81 of the Act expires on 45th day from the date
of election. The word 'day' is not defined in the Act. It shall have to be
assigned its ordinary meaning as understood in law. The word 'day' as per
English calendar begins at midnight and covers a period of 24 hours thereafter,
in the absence of there being anything to the contrary in the context (See: Ramkrishan
Onkarmal Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1994 Bom 87, 94; The Municipal
Council of Cuddalore v. S. Subrahmanya Aiyar 16 MLJ 101; The Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha
Aiyar, pp. 470, 471). Thus, the election petition could have been presented upto
the midnight falling between 27th and 28th of
August, 2003.
The
statutory period of limitation as provided by the Act cannot be taken away by
the Rules framed by the High Court governing its procedure. The rules framed in
exercise of the power conferred by Article 225 relate to procedural matters and
cannot make nor curtail any substantive law. (See : Prabhu Narayan v. A.K. Srivastava
(1979) 3 SCC 788, para 5). In S.A. Ganny v. I.M. Russell (1930) ILR 8 Rangoon
380 Carr J. said, "I am very clearly of opinion, independently of the
authorities to that effect, that a High Court has no power to alter by rule any
period of limitation prescribed in the Limitation Act.
I am,
however, also of opinion that when the High Court by rule gives a right of
application for which no period of limitation is already prescribed the Court
may also fix the period within that right must be exercised." And, Cunliffe
J. said, "High Court Rules approximate very closely to Bye-laws. They can
be altered at will. They can be canvassed. They are subordinate and domestic
enactments. They must be intra vires of the power from which they derive and
any other power in pari materia." In our opinion, the length of any period
of limitation provided by a statute cannot be curtailed by rules of procedure
framed by High Court. When the statute prescribes a particular day or date as
the last day for any act being performed, it can be so done upto as late as the
midnight immediately preceding the commencement
of the next day.
We are
also of the opinion that the High Court has not correctly interpreted Rules 6
and 7 of the High Court Rules. The rules are not meticulously well-drafted
rules taking care of myriad situations which may arise. They appear to be more
in the nature of directions aiming at convenient and smooth functioning of the
High Court dealing with election petitions as also streamlining the procedure
and practice of presentation.
The
designated Election Judge can always issue such orders as it may deem fit in
the matter of presentation of the election petition. If the court is open, it
is desirable that a formal presentation of the election petition is made to the
Judge while sitting in open court. As the Judge himself is not expected to
scrutinize the defects in the election petition presented to him, Rule 6
expects the election petition to be presented first to the Stamp Reporter of
the court and then carried to the Judge for formal presentation. While
presentation to the Stamp Reporter of the court is a presentation, the
presentation before Judge in open court is a formal presentation. There would
be nothing wrong if the election petitioner presents the election petition to
the Stamp Reporter whereafter the election petition is carried to the Judge in
open court either by the election petitioner or his counsel or by the Stamp
Reporter or any official of the Registry under his directions. The Rule
contemplates such presentation before the Stamp Reporter and the formal
presentation to the Judge taking place on the same day and almost
simultaneously as two steps of one transaction and in this background the date
of presentation to the Judge or the Bench as described in Rule 6 is deemed to
be the date of filing of the election petition. The process can also be
reverse. If Stamp Reporter is not available, the election petition may be
presented to the Judge who may then send it for scrutiny to the Stamp Reporter
or any other official of the Registry. At the time of presentation, the Judge
may not be sitting in open court, but that does not mean that the Judge cannot
receive the election petition. He can receive it and then send it to the Stamp
Reporter of the court.
In
Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin and another (2003) 4 SCC 257, this Court
has held that receiving an election petition presented under Section 81 of the
Act is certainly not a judicial function which necessarily needs to be
performed by a Judge alone; it is a ministerial function which may be performed
by a Judge himself or be left to be performed by one of the administrative or
ministerial staff of the High Court which is as much a part of the High Court.
As
held by this Court in The State of Punjab and Another vs. Shamlal Murari and
Another (1976) 1 SCC 719, "processual law is not to be a tyrant but a
servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are
the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the
administration of justice." The election petition, in the present case, could
have been presented at any time upto the midnight falling between 27th and 28th August, 2003 and it would be treated as filed within the period of
limitation.
Confining
the filing time to the working hours of the court is not what is specifically
spelt out by Rules 6 and 7 of the Patna High Court Rules. The High Court, in
its impugned judgment, seems to have thought that the election petition could
have been presented only to the Judge and that too in the open court. The Judge
would ordinarily sit in open court upto 4.15 p.m. of the day as per the rules or practice of the High Court but that time
is not the end of that day. The availability of time falling within the meaning
of the word 'day', as provided by Section 81 of the Act, cannot be curtailed by
making a provision in the rules contrary to the Act itself. Ordinarily, no
litigant and lawyer would like to delay the presentation till the fag end of
the day and then present it at an odd time to the inconvenience of the Judge
wherever he may be. However, exceptional situations cannot be completely ruled
out. It would be better if the ministerial act of receiving the election
petition presented to the High Court is left to the administrative or
ministerial staff of the High Court either by clarifying or by making a
suitable amendment in the Rules of the Patna High Court.
In Hukumdev
Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133, Election Petition Rules
framed by Patna High Court came up for the consideration of the court and it
was held that it may be that the presentation to the Judge will be the date of
filing for the purpose of limitation, but that does not exclude a different
procedure for filing in a case where limitation is about to expire and the
conditions prescribed by Rule 6 in the matter of presentation cannot be
complied with. Under the general rules governing the practice as to
presentation of pleadings and documents in the High Court, an election petition
can be presented on the last day of limitation, when the judges are not sitting
to receive or entertain an election petition, to the Registrar or in his
absence to some other officer in the Registry authorized to receive such
presentation.
In
Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and others (1999) 8 SCC 266, a different
fact situation arose and the observation made by this Court therein, have to be
read and understood in the light of the fact situation, which the Court was
called upon to deal with. The question whether an election petition can be
presented to the Judge only in open court and not elsewhere did not arise for
decision. At a few places the reference made to 'presentation in open court' is
simply by way of reproducing the language of the Rule and not a finding of this
Court or the ratio of the decision. However, the Court did hold that the
applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to Section 81 of
the Act was not excluded. If it was not possible for the election petitioner to
have presented the election petition to the designated Election Judge or in his
absence to the Bench (as provided by the proviso to Rule 6) on the last day of
the prescribed period of limitation then the presentation of the election
petition on the very next day in the open court would be valid. Law does not
expect a party to do the impossible impossibilium nulla obligatio est.
Reverting
back to the facts of the present case, we find that the election petition was
handed over to the designated Election Judge on the last day of limitation at
4.25 p.m. when the learned Judge was still available within the court premises
though he was not sitting in the open court, as the prescribed time of 4.15
p.m. ordinarily meant for transacting judicial work was over. The learned Judge
did not himself receive the presentation nor did make any other order such as
the one directing any official of the Registry to receive the same. The
election petitioner had done all that was within his power to do for the
purpose of presentation but he failed. He made the presentation on the next day
when the Judge was available and sitting in the open court. The presentation
would be deemed to be within limitation and valid.
The
learned designated Election Judge of the High Court has erred in holding the
presentation to be barred by limitation.
The
view so taken cannot be countenanced.
The
appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 10.9.2003 is
set aside. The election petition is held to have been filed within prescribed
period of limitation. The High Court shall now proceed to deal with the petition
in accordance with law.
No
order as to the costs in this appeal.
Parties
through their respective counsel are directed to appear in the High Court on
4.4.2005.
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