ICICI
Bank & Anr Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors [2005] Insc
385 (4 August 2005)
P. Venkatarama
Reddi & P.P. Naolekar
(Arising
out of SLP (Civil) No. 24215 of 2002) P.P. Naolekar, J.
Leave
granted.
In the
present appeal the appellants ICICI Bank Limited has challenged the order of
the Bombay High Court whereby the High Court has dismissed the writ petition
filed by the appellant holding that the sign boards fixed above the ATM Centers
of the ICICI Bank do amount to an advertisement and therefore the action taken
by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay by issuance of notice is in
accordance with the law. The facts, in brief are that:
Sometime
up to the year 2000 the appellant No.1, ICICI Bank has installed ATM Centers
and Extension counters, Bank Branches at 64 locations in the city of Bombay for the convenience of its
depositors. Certain signboards were fixed above the entry of the ATM centers
and extension counters indicating their location.
They
are illuminated to indicate the locations of the ATM centers. The Municipal
Corporation did not approve of putting up of the illuminated signboards of ATM
centers and therefore issued notice to the appellant under Section 328 and
328-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 (hereinafter to be referred
to as `The Act'). The contents of the notice are that the appellant has
displayed at its premises sky sign/Glow Sign/Neon Sign/Illuminated Boards
without the permission of the Bombay Municipal Corporation.
It was
incumbent upon the appellant before putting up such signboards etc., to have
taken the permission and made the required payment. The notice required the
appellant to make certain payment towards by filling the prescribed form within
three days of the receipt of the notice, failing which BMC would take necessary
action, including defacing/removal of the boards at appellant's cost. The
notice was replied by the appellant contending therein that the appellant does
not admit any of the allegations mentioned in the notice and requested the BMC
not to take any action as contemplated in the said notice. Thereafter in the
month of August 2003 the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of
Bombay alleging that the impugned notices which were served on the appellant
bank are wholly without jurisdiction and without the authority of law and that
the same violated the fundamental and other rights of the appellant bank and
therefore the same are illegal, null and void.
According
to the appellant the signboards fixed over the ATM Centers or Extension
counters does not amount to advertisement as specified in Section 328A of the
Act nor do they come under the definition of sky- sign as defined in Section
328 of the Act.. They merely tell the existing account holder about the
location of the ATM booth. The said signboards are only for the guidance of the
public and that the services rendered by the appellant bank are not advertised.
The signboards are essential for the working and business of the appellant bank
and does not amount to advertisement and therefore the notices issued by the
Bombay Municipal Corporation, requiring the appellant to make the payment of
the amount is illegal. The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the
appellant on the ground that the controversy involved in the case is squarely
covered by the judgment of the Apex Court Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. JT
2002 (3) SC 452 and held that the signboards fixed above the ATM Centers of the
appellant Bank do amount to an advertisement. The impugned notices, therefore,
cannot be faulted. In consequence thereof the writ petition filed by the
appellant was dismissed.
The
learned senior counsel Shri R.F. Nariman has urged that the illuminated signboards
of the appellant Bank does not fall within the definition of sky-sign in
Section 328 of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 and therefore Section
328 of the Act has no application. Hence, the High Court committed an error in
applying the ratio laid down by this Court in the matter of Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay's case (supra). The signboards fixed on the ATM
Centers of the Bank and its Extension Counters only indicates to its customers
about the location of the Bank/ATM Centers to facilitate them to carry out the
banking transaction at any time of the day or night and is in the nature of the
in-house facility provided to the customers of the bank and does not in any way
convey message of commercial or business activities of the appellant bank. The
illuminated signboard does not relate to the business or commercial activities
of the bank nor does it propagate the ideas with regard to the goods or
services rendered by the party. It merely displays as to where the ATM Center is
located and therefore the action of the bank putting up the illuminated signboards
does not fall within the ambit of Section 328A of the Act. To counter this
argument, Mr. V.R. Reddy, learned senior counsel submitted that in the facts of
the case, the decision given by this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation
of Greater Bombay (supra) is directly on point and the ratio decided covers the
case. In any case, the illuminated signboards at the entry of the ATM Center
and Extension Counter does not indicate their locations alone but attract the
prospective customers also to open their accounts with the ICICI Bank and in
that manner it propagates ideas with regard to the goods or the services
rendered by Bank and therefore would be covered under Section 328A of the Act.
Before
we consider the respective submissions made by the counsel, it would be
fruitful to read the relevant provisions of Section 328 and 328A of the Act.
The
necessary extracts of the relevant provisions for adjudicating the question
involved in this care are as under:
328.
(1) No person shall, without the written permission of the Commissioner, erect,
fix or retain any sky-sign, whether now existing or not, [where a sky-sign is a
poster depicting any scene from a cinematographic film, stage play or other
stage performance, such permission shall not be granted, unless prior scrutiny
of such poster is made by the Commissioner and he is satisfied that the
erection or fixing of such poster is not likely to offend against decency or
morality. No permission under this section shall be granted, or renewed, for
any period exceeding two years from the date of each such permission or
renewal].
(3)
If any sky sign be erected, fixed or retained contrary to the provisions of
this section, or after permission for the erection, fixing or retention thereof
for any period shall have expired or become void the Commissioner may, by
written notice, require the owner or occupier of the land, building or
structure, upon or over which the sky- sign is erected, fixed or retained, to
take down and remove such sky-sign.
The expression
'sky sign' shall in this section mean any word, letter, model, sign, device or
representation in the nature of an advertisement, announcement or direction,
supported on or attached to any post, pole standard frame-work or other support
wholly or in part upon or over any land, building or structure which, or any
part of which sky-sign, shall be visible against the sky from some point in any
street and includes all and every part of any such post, pole, standard
framework or other support. The expression ' sky-sign' shall also include any
balloon, parachute, or other similar device employed wholly or in part for the
purposes of any advertisement, announcement or direction upon or over any land,
building or structure or upon or over any street, but shall not include:
(a) any
flagstaff, pole, vane or weathercock, unless adapted or used wholly or in part
for the purpose of any advertisement, announcement or direction;
(b) any
sign, or any board, frame or other contrivance securely fixed to or on the top
of the wall or parapet of any building, or on the cornice or blocking course of
any wall, or to the ridge of a roof.
328A.
(1) No person shall, without the written permission of the Commissioner erect,
exhibit, fix or retain any advertisement whether now existing or not, upon any
land, building, wall, hoarding or structure. [Where an advertisement depicts
any scene from a cinematographic film, stage play or other stage performance,
such permission shall not be granted, unless prior scrutiny of such advertisement
is made by the Commissioner and he is satisfied that the erection or exhibition
of such advertisement is not likely to offend against decency or morality;] .
.
(3) If
any advertisement be erected, exhibited, fixed or retained contrary to the
provisions of this section after the written permission for the erection,
exhibition, fixing or retention thereof for any period shall have expired or
become void, the Commissioner may, by notice in writing, require the owner or
occupier of the land, building wall, hoarding or structure upon which the same
is erected, exhibited, fixed or retained, to take down or remove such
advertisement By virtue of Section 328 of the Act, no person is permitted
without the written permission of the Commissioner to erect, fix or retain any
sky-sign, and the permission granted by the Commissioner or the renewal thereof
shall be for any period exceeding two yeas from the date of each such
permission or renewal.
Sub-s.(3)
authorizes the Commissioner by written notice to direct the owner or occupier
of the land, building or structure upon or over which the sky-sign is erected,
fixed or retained to take down and remove such sky-sign, if such sky-sign is
fixed, erected or retained contrary to the provisions of Section 328 of the
Act. According to Sub-s.(3) "Sky-sign" shall mean any word, letter,
model, sign deice or representation in the nature of an advertisement,
announcement or direction, supported on or attached to any post, pole, standard
frame-work or other support wholly or in part upon or over any land, building
or structure which, or any part of which sky-sign, shall be visible against the
sky from some point in any street and includes all and every part of any such
post, pole, standard framework or other support. The expression
"sky-sign" shall also include any balloon, parachute, or other
similar device employed wholly or in part for the purpose of any advertisement,
announcement or direction upon or over any land, building or structure or upon
or over any street. Sub-clause (a) and sub-clause (b) has a reference to what
shall not be included to be the sky- sign. The reading of this section gives a
clear cut indication that the sky-sign shall not be erected, fixed or retained
unless written permission to that effect is obtained from the Commissioner and
the sky-sign shall mean any word, letter, model, sign, device or representation
balloon parachute or other similar device which is in the nature of an
advertisement, announcement or direction or employed for the purpose of
advertisement, announcement or direction, that is to say, if it is in the
nature of advertisement, announcement or direction, it would be a sky-sign,
provided the sign is visible against the sky from some point in any street
which shall include part of any such post, pole, standard frame-work or other
support upon which the sky-sign rest. For any advertisement, announcement or
direction to be a `sky-sign', it is not necessary that the sign-boards are
illuminated. The necessary ingredient of the sky-sign are that it should be in
the nature of advertisement, announcement or direction, and should be visible
against sky from some point in any street. So far as Section 328A is concerned,
no person is permitted to erect, exhibit, fix or retain any advertisement upon
any land, building, wall, hoarding or structure without the written permission
of the Commissioner. Second proviso to sub-s.(1) exempts the person from taking
permission if the advertisement is not illuminated or a sky-sign and which is
exhibited within the window of any building or is related to the trade or
business carried on within the land or building upon which such advertisement
is exhibited or to any sale or letting of such land or building or any effects
therein or to any sale, entertainment or meeting to be held upon or in the same
building or to any trade or business carried on by the owner of any tram-car,
omnibus or other vehicle upon which such advertisement is exhibited.
Therefore,
if the advertisement is not illuminated advertisement nor is a sky-sign and is
being put at a place provided under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 328A of the
Act, permission of the Commissioner is not required. The moment the
advertisement is illuminated or is a sky-sign, even if it is exhibited or rested
on the place mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 328A of the Act, the
permission of the Commissioner is necessary. Sub-clause (3) authorizes the
Commissioner to direct any person in breach of Section 328A to take down and
remove such advertisement.
For
application of Section 328, it is necessary that the word, model, sign or
device or representation is in the nature of advertisement, announcement or
direction. If it does not fall within the exception provided under the proviso,
the permission of the Commissioner is necessary. It may be noted that under
Section 328 it is not merely the advertisement but even something which is in
the nature of advertisement is comprehended whereas under Section 328A, it is
the advertisement alone which would attract the provisions of Section 328A of
the Act. The language used in both the provisions make it explicitly clear that
these provisions operate in somewhat different fields and the phrase
`advertisement' used in both Sections in its context pronounces a different
meaning of the word. The application of these Sections depends upon the kind of
the sign-boards or the illuminated boards etc.
Both
the counsel have extensively argued the question of applicability of the
decision rendered by this Court in the matter of Municipal Corporation of
Greater Bombay (supra), as decision of the High Court is based on this
decision. It is obvious from the decision in the case that the Court has
adjudicated and decided mainly the scope of sub-s.(3) of Section 328 of the
Act. The Court has not decided on the applicability, scope and ambit of Section
328A of the Act. The definition of `sky-sign' came up for consideration before
the Court. This Court laid emphasis on the expression "in the nature of an
advertisement" in the definition of sky-sign in Paragraph 10 of the
Judgment which expression is not found in Section 328A of the Act.
The
decision in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra) has
no relevance to the facts involved in the case before us for more than one
reason. In Paragraph 6 of the Judgment, the Court says that although the
relevant statutory provisions are Section 328/328A of the Act, the issues
raised have to be considered and decided mainly on the scope of sub-section (3)
of Section 328 of the Act. The paragraph makes it clear that the Court has
considered the scope and reach of Section 328 of the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act 1888. That apart, in Paragraph 10 of the Judgment the Court
held that "the indication given by emphasis supplied to some of the words
used in the provision in question as well as the words "in the
nature" of an advertisement, announcement or direction' would go to show
that it is not a must to be that but is enough if it is `in the nature of' that
which is specified. The three words required to be construed cannot be said to
admit of any one particular meaning alone but capable of being understood by
their general or interrelated meaning suitable for the context". Thus,
much emphasis was placed on the expression "in the nature of." The
Court in Paragraph 9 of course has said that in common parlance `advertisement'
means to make publicly known an information by some device and to draw or
attract attention of public/individual concerned to such information. It need
not necessarily be to sell only or solely for commercial exploitation. Thus, it
was pointed out that the advertisement would not necessarily mean the
information supplied to the public or an individual solely for commercial
exploitation. As it appears to us, the observation of the Court is made in the
context of Section 328 of the Act where the phrase 'advertisement' is used in
limited sense in as much as it includes information to the public and is in the
nature of advertisement, although not an advertisement pure and simple.
In the
present case we are not considering the scope and ambit of Section 328 of the
Act, as, admittedly the advertisement in question is not sky sign within the
meaning of Section 328 of the Act. The ratio and effect of the judgment is required
to be ascertained with reference to the question of law as decided by the
Court. The ratio of the judgment or the principle upon which the question
before the Court is decided is alone binding as a precedent. The decision of
the Supreme Court upon a question of law is considered to be a binding
precedent, and this must be ascertained and determined by analyzing all the
material facts and issues involved in the case.
In the
matter of Paisner versus Goodrich (1955) 2 All ER 330,332, Lord Denning in his
Judgment has held:
"When
the judges of this Court give a decision on the interpretation of an Act of
Parliament, the decision itself is binding on them and their successors (see
Cull v. Inland Revenue Commissioners), Morelle, Ltd. v. Wakeling. But the words
which the Judges used in giving the decision are not binding. This is often a
very fine distinction, which will best be only be expressed in words.
Nevertheless, it is a real distinction, which will best be appreciated by
remembering that, when interpreting a statute, the sole function of the Court
is to apply the words of the statute to a given situation. Once a decision has
been reached on that situation, the doctrine of precedent requires us to apply
the statute in the same way in any similar situation; but not in a different
situation.
Whenever
a new situation emerges, not covered by previous decisions, the courts must be
governed by the statute and not by the words of the judges." AIR 1971 S.C.
530 , this Court said that it is not proper to regard a word, a clause or a
sentence occurring in a judgment of the Supreme Court, divorced from its
context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the
question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment.
works
(P) Ltd, (1992) 4 S.C.C. 363 (Page 363), Justice Anand (As His Lordship then
was), speaking for the Court, has said that it is neither desirable nor
permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the Judgment of the Court,
divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to
be the complete `law' declared by the Supreme Court. The judgment must be read
as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the
light of the questions which were before the Supreme Court. The decision on the
question involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the
decision to the later case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true
principle laid down by the decision and not to pick out words or sentence from
the judgment divorced from the context of the question under consideration by
the Court.
In the
case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (supra), Section 328A was not
at all interpreted by this Court. For the case to be a binding precedent,
fundamental requirement would be, that the law pronounced should result from
the issues raised before the Court between the parties and argued on both
sides. In the matter of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay the definition
of `sky-sign' under Section 328 came up for consideration. In reaching the
conclusion that the huge metallic board exhibited by BPC Petrol Bunk on a pole
with the name of the Company and its symbol (Shell symbol) was a sky-sign, this
Court laid emphasis on the expression "in the nature of an advertisement"
occurring in the definition of `sky-sign' in Paragraph 10 which expression is
not to be found in Section 328-A. While interpreting Section 328 and construing
the words `in the nature of an advertisement, announcement and direction', this
Court held that the advertisement need not necessarily be only or solely for
commercial exploitation whereas Section 328A of the Act speaks about
`advertisement' alone and not `in the nature of an advertisement'.
Normally
the ratio of the case shall be deduced from the facts involved in the case and
the particular provision of law which the Court has interpreted and the
decision shall be read with reference to and in the context of particular
statutory provisions involved in the matter.
In our
considered opinion the decision rendered in the matter of Municipal Corporation
of Greater Bombay (supra) is not a decision on the question of interpretation
of Section 328A of the Act, particularly the phrase `advertisement' used
therein.
The
next question that arises for consideration is whether notices issued by the
Corporation to the appellant-ICICI Bank are per se illegal or without authority
of law as putting up the sign boards of ATM centers at different places by the
bank could out-rightly be said not to be an advertisement and thus does not
attract the provision of Section 328A of the Corporation Act. To consider this
aspect we have to see what shall be an advertisement for the purposes of
Section 328A of the Act. The dictionary definitions of the word 'advertisement'
are as under :- BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,8TH EDITION Advertising :
1..The
action of drawing the public's attention to something to promote its sale.
2. The
business of producing and circulating advertisements LAW AND COMMERCIAL
DICTIONARY Advertisement : Notice given in a manner designed to attract public
attention. Edwards v. Lubbock Country, Tex Civ. App., 33, S.W.2d 482, 482. Information
communicated to the public, or to an individual concerned, as by handbills,
newspaper, television, bill-boards, radio. First Nat. Corporation v. Perrine, 99 Mont 454, 43 P.2d 1073, 1077.
THE
NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITTANICA VOLUME-I
Advertising,
the techniques used to bring products, services, opinions, or causes to public
notice for the purpose of persuading the public to respond in a certain way
toward what is advertised. Most advertising involves promoting a good that is
for sale, but similar methods are used to encourage people to drive safely, to
support various charities, or to vote for political candidates, among many
other examples.
COLLINS
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
Advertisement
any public notice, as a printed display in a newspaper, short film on
television, announcement on radio, etc., designed to sell goods, publicize an
event, etc.
Advertising
1) the
action or practice of drawing public attention to goods, services, events etc.,
as by the distribution of printed notices, broadcasting, etc.
2) the
business that specializes in creating such publicity,
3) advertisements
collectively; publicity.
THE
CHAMBERS DICTIONARY
Advertisement
- the act of advertising; a public notice with the purpose of informing and /
or changing public attitudes and behaviour; a short performance recorded for
radio, T.V. etc. to advertise goods or services; news.
An advertisement
is a matter that draws attention of the public or segment of public to a
product, service, person, organization or line of conduct in a manner
calculated to promote or oppose directly or indirectly that product, service,
person, organization or line of conduct intended to promote sale or use of
product or range of products. An advertisement is an information that producer
provides about its products or services.
An
advertisement tries to get consumers to buy a product or a service. An advertisement
is generally of goods and services and is an information intended for the
potential customers and not a mere display of the name of the company unless
the same happens to be a trade mark or trade name.
It is
well settled that ordinarily the words used in the statute are to be understood
in their natural, ordinary and popular sense. The broad principles underlying
the construction and interpretation of the word or phrase in the statute is
succinctly extracted from the leading authorities and work of authors and
compiled in the book "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" (9th) Edn.
2004 by Justice G.P. Singh, Chapter 2, page 86 which reads :- "When it is
said that words are to be understood first in their natural, ordinary or
popular sense, what is meant is that the words must be ascribes that natural,
ordinary or popular meaning which they have in relation to the subject-matter
with reference to which and the context in which they have bee used in the
statue. BRETT, M.R. called it a 'cardinal rule' that "Whenever you have to
construe a statute or document you do not construe it according to the mere
ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of
the words as applied to the subject-matter with regard to which they are used".
"No word", says PROFESSOR H.A. SMITH "has an absolute meaning,
for no words can be defined in vacuo , or without reference to some
context". According to SUTHERLAND there is a "basic fallacy" in
saying "that words have meaning in and of themselves", and
"reference to the abstract meaning of words", states CRAIES, "if
there be any such thing, is of little value in interpreting statutes". In
the words of JUSTICE HOLMES : "A word is not a crystal transparent and
unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in colour
and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is
used." Shorn of the context, the words by themselves are "slippery
customers". Therefore, in determining the meaning of any word or phrase in
a statute the first question to be asked is "What is the natural or
ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute? It is
only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed
to have been the intention of the Legislature, that it is proper to look for
some possible meaning of the word or phrase".
Section
328A prohibits without prior permission of Commissioner, erection, exhibition
of advertisement.
The
advertiser need not ask for permission if the advertisement is not illuminated
or is not a sky sign, provided it is exhibited in window of any building, or
relates to trade or business carried on within that land or building or when it
relates to sale or letting of that property or in reference to any sale, entertainment
or meeting organized therein, or it relates to business of railway company. Exceptions
referred in the provision clearly has nexus and relevance to the business or
trade or commercial activities.
The
context in which the word advertisement has been used in Section 328A of the
Corporation Act and in the commercial and ordinary parlance it must have direct
or indirect connection with the business, trade or commerce carried out by the
advertiser. It must have some commercial exposition. The advertisement would be
for the purpose of directing or soliciting customers to the product or service
prominently shown in the advertisement. If ordinary parlance meaning is not
given to the word advertisement in Section 328A it will create anomalous
position, in as much as a simple name board put on the house to indicate who is
residing in the premises, would also be an advertisement; a name board or sign
board of a trader visible to the public or identifying the place of business
would also be an advertisement. In our considered opinion advertisement within
the meaning of Section 328A of the Corporation Act must primarily have the
commercial purpose and should be indicative of business activity of the
displayer with a view to attract the attention of people to its business.
In the
present case the appellant has put up an illuminated ATM board at various sites
and as per the appellant it has been put only to tell the existing customers
and others about the location of the ATM centers, which in itself is in the
interest of public at large and not to attract new customers for opening the
bank account. Normally, the ATM centers enable the customers to carry out the
banking activities or transactions at any time , day or night and even on gazetted
holidays. They are in the nature of public service as they enable the customers
to do away with the need to keep large sum of cash in their house ;
they
are able to have access to the money in their account even on holidays and
emergency. The ATM centers have a sign board over them that are illuminated and
tell about the fact that there lies the ATM
Center of the bank in that premises. The
fact that there is an ATM center in the premises tells that the appellant bank
is providing Automatic Teller Machine service there and hence the service
provider is clearly identified. The communication in this is direct to the
account holders and also the prospective account holders. The kind of
information supplied of the location of the service provided may also be
construed of commercial exploitation indirectly, as the sign boards may not aim
at the existing customers only but they may also affect the decisions of the
prospective customers. They tell the prospective customers that the service of
the ATM round the clock is being made available by the appellant bank which
would influence the prospective customers to make a decision about which
service provider he or she has to choose. The sign board also helps the people
to find out which bank is offering better services as compared to the other bank.
The fact that a Bank has more ATM centers than the other banks, in the
competitive trade and business, provides the incentive to the people to choose
that Bank. The fact that one bank has an ATM center in the given location helps
them to get more account holders in that area. This also serves the commercial
interest of the bank. Whether particular action is an advertisement or not
would depend on whether the person wants to promote directly or indirectly his
product or service. If by any communication, the communicator tries to
influence the people to buy his product or service or attract towards his
product or service then it would be a guiding factor to identify whether a
particular communication of the communicator tantamounts to be an
advertisement.
From
the aforesaid analysis, in all fact situation and circumstances, at the outset
it cannot be said that the sign boards indicating ATM centers cannot have
commercial interest but would only tell about the location of the ATM centers
to the existing account holders only. Whether signboard of ATM Centre tantamounts
to be an advertisement or not would depend upon the facts of each case,
depending on the number of ATM centers established by a particular bank in a
particular locality or place or even city, to have the flavour of commercial or
business interest of the service provider. In the present case no exercise was
undertaken by the municipal authorities or the Bombay High Court before the
High Court had reached to the conclusion that the sign boards of the ATM center
put up by the ICICI bank at different locations would be an advertisement
within the meaning of Section 328A of the Corporation Act. In fact the notices
issued by the bank to the appellant are under Section 328, 328A of the
Corporation Act. The reach, ambit and scope of these sections are quite
different and they operate in different fields. They do not completely overlap.
In the circumstances, it was appropriate for the Corporation to issue notices
to the appellant either under Section 328 or under Section 328A of the
Corporation Act and notice should not have been issued under both Sections for
the same sign board. The Bombay Municipal Corporation Authorities seem to be in
a state of doubt and hence the notices clearly do not specify under which
section they propose to take action. As we have made it clear that in the
present case the sign boards of ATM centers, which are not sky signs, are not
covered under the provisions of Section 328 of the Corporation Act, the notices
issued shall be deemed to have been issued under Section 328 A of the
Corporation Act and the Corporation shall decide the question of advertisement
under Section 328A of the Act after indicating the bank a fresh date of
hearing.
For
the reasons stated above the appeal is allowed and judgment and order of the
High Court is set aside. Fresh steps can be taken in the light of the
observations in this judgment. In the circumstances of the case we do not
impose any cost and the parties shall bear their own costs.
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