K.C.
Sharma Vs. Delhi Stock Exchange & Ors [2005] Insc
215 (1 April 2005)
K.G.
Balakrishnan & B.N. Srikrishna Srikrishna, J.
This
appeal by special leave impugns the judgment of the Delhi High Court in Letters
Patent Appeal No.331/1999.
The
appellant joined the service in Delhi Stock Exchange the First Respondent in
this appeal - as General Manager with effect from 5.5.1992.
Initially,
he was in-charge of the Market Division and later on made in- charge of
Investor Grievances Cell. He is highly qualified academically, holding two
first class Masters Degrees in Commerce and Arts, and three core professional
Degrees of Chartered Accountant, Company Secretary and Cost Accountant. In the
initial stages, the appellant's service was very much appreciated by the First
Respondent as a result of which he was granted accelerated increments. While he
was in charge of the Investors Grievances Cell, he took strict action against
certain members of the Respondent Stock Exchange. This caused some
dissatisfaction in the minds of some of the brokers. On 9th June 1995 there was a murderous assault on
the appellant and an FIR was lodged with the police. It is the case of the
appellant that till about October 1995 the Executive Director, in-charge of the
First Respondent appreciated the appellant's merits and was supportive.
Thereafter,
there was a period of time when there was no Executive Director between 25th October, 1995 and 13th December 1995. During this Period the First Respondent's affairs were
managed by elected member-directors. The appellant contends that, because of
strict action taken by him against some of the member-Directors, the
member-Directors were waiting for an opportunity to get rid of him. The
appellant claims that during the period 26th October 1995 to 12th December 1995 he was subjected to continuous humiliation and
victimization. In the meanwhile, the Delhi Police after investigation gave out
a press release on 7th
March, 1996 naming one
of the brokers, Shiv Charandass Aggarwal, as having engineered the assault on
the appellant by paying money to some hooligans. The said Shiv Charandass Aggarwal
was arrested by the Delhi Police and during interrogation he admitted that he
was involved in the incident, as the appellant had been harsh against him and imposed
a penalty of Rs. 2 lakhs in a public grievance appeal filed against him. On
7.3.1996 the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Police issued a press release
stating these facts. According to the appellant, despite periodic notes put up
by him indicating how some of the brokers were acting contrary to the rules of
the Exchange and of legal provisions, no action was either proposed or taken
against such erring brokers by the First Respondent. After the press release
was published, the member-Directors felt that the appellant was responsible for
maligning one of the members. In the meanwhile, on 22.5.1996, the appellant, in
accordance with the guidelines of the Ministry of Finance, issued notices to
various brokers including the President, Vice-President and senior Directors of
the Stock Exchange. This, perhaps, was the last straw on the camel's back. On
23.5.1996 the First Respondent issued a notice to the appellant terminating his
service with immediate effect on payment of three months salary. The termination
was purportedly in exercise of the power vested in the Board of Directors, vide
Para 4 of the appointment letter of the
appellant dated 12.11.1993.
The
appellant challenged the termination of his service by a writ petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution before the Delhi High Court.
The
learned single Judge allowed the writ petition on 7.7.1999 holding that the
First Respondent is 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution; and that the termination of the services of the appellant was malafide
and illegal. In this view of the matter, the learned single Judge quashed and
set aside the order of termination of the appellant's service and declared that
the appellant shall be continued in the service of the First Respondent with all
consequential benefits. The First Respondent challenged this order of the
learned single judge by a Letters Patent Appeal. It was argued before the
Division Bench in appeal that the termination of the contract of employment of
the appellant was on account of loss of confidence and that the learned single
Judge had failed to address himself to this issue despite the material on
record being pointed out. The Division Bench remitted the matter to the learned
single Judge to give his finding on the following two issues:
i)
Whether the termination of the contract of employment of the General Manager of
Delhi Stock Exchange by the Board of Directors after taking into account the
material on record which leads to loss of confidence is not valid in law ?
ii) Whether
in a case where the Stock Exchange has lost confidence in its General Manager
who was holding the post of trust should be reimposed on the Stock Exchange or
is it not appropriate to grant him compensation in lieu of reinstatement as per
the ratio of judgment of Supreme Court in the case of O.P. Bhandari v. ITDC,
AIR 1987 SC 111."
By
judgment dated 1.3.01 the learned single Judge held that the two issues had not
been argued before him at all. Referring in detail to what transpired before
him, he held :
"When
the point had not been taken in the counter- affidavit and when leave was
sought to file an additional- affidavit and the point is mentioned only in the
written arguments, which are submitted after the judgment was reserved, it is
too much for the litigant to say, especially before any court, that the point
argued was not considered. It is in the above backdrop that I am driven to the
conclusion that the two questions would not arise for consideration." The
Division Bench finally heard the Letters Patent Appeal and raised the following
questions which arose for its consideration in the appeal:
1.
Whether the Delhi Stock Exchange is State under Article 12 of the Constitution
of India and is amenable to writ jurisdiction ?
2.
Whether the issue relating to the termination of service of the General Manager
is purely in the realm of contract and, therefore, not amenable to writ jurisdiction
?
3.
Whether the termination of contract of employment of the General Manager of
Delhi Stock Exchange by the Board of Directors after taking into account the
material on record which leads to loss of confidence is not valid in law ?
4.
Whether in case where the Stock Exchange has lost confidence in its General
Manager who was holding the post of trust should be reinstated on the Stock
Exchange or is it not appropriate to grant him compensation in lieu of
reinstatement as per the ratio of judgment of Supreme Court in the case of O.P.
Bhandari v. ITDC, AIR 1987 SC 111 ?
5.
Whether the Writ Court committed an error of jurisdiction
in not considering one of the fundamental contentions as was pressed that being
a case of loss of confidence and the employee having the post of trust ?
Answering
question no.1, the Division Bench held that the Delhi Stock Exchange satisfied the
conditions laid down by this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International
Airport Authority of India (AIR 1979 SC 1628), and therefore, the First
Respondent was 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 and amenable to the
writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
On the
second question, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that the appellant
was a permanent employee. Having regard to the fact that the provision
corresponding to clause (4) of his letter of appointment has been held ultra vires
in a series of judgments of this Court, the Division Bench was of the opinion
that the appellant's service could not have been dispensed with by relying on
or on the basis of the provisions contained in paragraph 4 of the letter of
appointment.
Question
Nos. 3 to 5 were considered together by the Division Bench, which did not
disagree with the findings of the learned single Judge that the termination of
the services of the appellant was illegal and arbitrary. In fact, the Division
Bench observed: "the fact, however, remains that loss of confidence was
not a ground for termination of service. The order terminating the service, ex
facie, was not stigmatic. From a statement made in the counter-affidavit, as
also the additional affidavit, it is evident that there were serious charges
against the writ petitioner".
The
Division Bench was of the view that, on the one hand the appellant had made
serious allegations on the member-Directors of the Stock Exchange including its
President, Vice-President and other senior members, while on the other there
were serious allegations made against him of using his office for unauthorisedly
making correspondence with the authorities. The Division Bench concluded that
such allegations and counter allegations of serious nature were themselves a
pointer to the fact that there was bad blood between the parties and hence it
would not be advisable to direct reinstatement irrespective of the fact that
loss of confidence had not been pleaded or proved. The Division Bench placed
heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in O.P. Bhandari v. ITDC (supra).
The
Division Bench partly allowed the appeal of the First Respondent Delhi Stock
Exchange and directed as under :
"In
that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that payment of compensation for
a sum of Rs.12 lakhs shall meet the ends of justice. Out of the aforementioned
amount of Rs.12 lakhs, the amount which has already been paid to the respondent
by the appellant shall be adjusted. Such balance amount should be paid to the
appellant within a period of three months from date.
Mr. Shanti
Bhushan admitted that the writ petitioner had tried to obtain employment but
did not succeed so far. It is, therefore, not ruled out that he has a chance of
getting re-employment. As agreed to by the learned counsel for the parties, the
writ petitioner may be technically reinstated in service for a period of three
months.
However,
as the writ petitioner would neither join in his service, nor he shall be
assigned with the duties and the functions as agreed to by the learned counsel
for the writ petitioner. He would not claim any salary for the said period but
he would during the afore-mentioned period, try to obtain an alternative job.
The appellant, however, shall issue a formal letter of reinstatement on the
aforementioned terms which Dr. Singhvi, learned counsel for the appellant
agreed." (italics ours) Mr. Shanti Bhushan, learned counsel for the
appellant strenuously urged that the High Court's judgment was self
contradictory. He contended that having come to the conclusion that paragraph
(4) of the letter of appointment gave no authority to the First Respondent to
terminate the service of the appellant, and further having found that the
action of the First Respondent was illegal and malafide there was no
justification whatsoever for the High Court to have refused the normal relief
of reinstatement with full back wages and consequential benefits. He relied on
the same authorities that were cited before the Division Bench of the High
Court and referred to in the judgment under appeal.
Mr. Mukul
Rohtagi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, reiterated the arguments
which were made before the High Court and supported the judgment of the High
Court.
We are
in agreement with the conclusions of the Division Bench that the respondent
no.1 is amenable to the writ jurisdiction, that the termination of services of
the appellant in purported exercise of powers vested under paragraph (4) of
letter of appointment dated 12.11.1993 is illegal and that, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the removal of the appellant from the service was
both malafide and unjustified.
This
takes us to the question of relief to be granted to the appellant.
From a
reading of the judgment it appears to us that the Division Bench of the High
Court decided that compensation in lieu of reinstatement was the better option
and moulded the relief according to what the parties had agreed. It is not
possible for us, therefore, to accept that the judgment of the High Court is wholly
erroneous, as urged by the learned counsel for the appellant.
Taking
into consideration all circumstances, we are of the view that, although the
termination of the appellant's service was illegal and unjustified, the totality
of the circumstances of the case render it improper and unjust to direct the
relief of reinstatement with full back wages. The High Court, even while moulding
the relief on agreement of the parties, directed a sum of Rs. 12 lakhs to be
paid to the appellant as compensation from which the amounts already paid from
time to time under orders of the High Court were to be adjusted.
In our
view, the impugned judgment needs to be upheld with a slight modification on
the issue of compensation. The compensation payable in lieu of reinstatement
and back wages shall be increased to Rupees Fifteen lakhs (Rs. 15,00,000/-).
We
partly allow the appeal and modify the impugned judgment as under:- The
compensation payable in lieu of reinstatement and back wages shall be Rupees
Fifteen lakhs. The amount, if any, already paid under the directions of the
High Court shall be liable to be set off therefrom.
The
appellant shall be given terminal benefits, if any, admissible under the terms
of service.
The
appellant shall be paid Rupees One lakh towards costs in the High Court and in
this Court.
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