Chain Singh Vs. Mata
Vaishno Devi Shrine Board & Anr  Insc 593 (28 September 2004)
Shivaraj V. Patil & B.N.
Srikrishna with Civil Appeal Nos. 4597-4598 of 1999 and Civil Appeal No. 6334 of
2004 @ Special Leave Petition(C) No. 8192 of 2001 B.N.Srikrishna, J.
These civil appeals and the special leave petition arise out of and impugn
the same judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Jammu &
Kashmir which allowed the Letters Patent Appeals of the respondents.
A popular Hindu Shrine in Jammu thronged by devotees all round the year,
Mata Vaishno Devi is situated on the Trikuta Hills, approximately 45 kilometers
from Jammu city. The Shrine was originally managed by a trust known as
'Dharmarth Trust', which managed, not only the affairs of the shrine, but also
looked after the welfare of the pilgrims. The actual duties of performance of
Pooja and protection of the Shrine were carried out by Baridars, who belonged
to the two villages in the vicinity of the Shrine.
With the popularity of the Shrine increasing, there was an exponential
increase in the number of pilgrims visiting the Shrine. When the number of
devotees visiting the Shrine became unmanageable, there were complaints with
regard to administration and management of the temple, and the facilities made
available for the pilgrims. This led to the enactment of 'The Jammu and Kashmir
Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1986' (Governor's Act No. XXXIII of 1986)
which was replaced by an Act of Legislature, passed in 1988, (Act No. XVI of
1988) called 'The Jammu and Kashmir Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988
(hereinafter referred to as the '1988 Act').
A statutory Board is constituted under Section 5 of the 1988 Act, of which
the Governor of Jammu & Kashmir is the ex-officio Chairman. The administration,
management and governance of Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine and the Shrine Fund
vest in the Board, which comprises a Chairman and not more than ten members.
Under Section 6 of the 1988 Act, the Board is deemed to be a body corporate and
shall have perpetual succession and a common seal and by the said name the
Board can sue and be sued. Under Section 14 of the 1988 Act, the Board is
empowered to appoint a Chief Executive Officer and such other officers and
servants as it considers necessary with such designations, pay, allowances and
other conditions of service as determined from time to time. Section 15 of the
1988 Act provides that the employees of the Board are deemed to be public
servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the State Ranbir Penal Code (which
corresponds to the Indian Penal Code) as applicable in Jammu & Kashmir
One of the drastic change brought about by the 1988 Act was that by reason
of Section 19, all rights of Baridars stood extinguished.
Section 20 provides that no suit or other proceedings shall lie in any court
against the Board or its officers for anything done or purported to be done in
good faith under the Act.
Section 24 empowers the Board to make bye-laws 'not inconsistent with the
Act' for carrying out its duties.
Civil Appeal No. 4596 of 1999:
The appellant, Chain Singh, is an ex-service man who claims that in the year
1983, he became the tenant of a shop premises let out to him by Shri Mata
Vaishno Devi Dharmarth Trust at an annual rent of Rs. 15,000/-.
The appellant was carrying on the business of selling petty items for use of
the pilgrims in his shop and had obtained licences from the different
authorities, including the Assistant Director, Tourism, for carrying on his
trade. After the Jammu & Kashmir Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1986 Act
came into force (later replaced by the '1988 Act'), the appellant claims that,
by reason of Section 19(3), he became the tenant of the Board. It is his case
that he thereafter continued as a tenant of the Board. Upon the Board coming
into existence, the appellant was shifted from the original shop allotted to
him by the Dharmarth Trust to a new shop constructed by the Board. According to
the appellant, the new shop premises were smaller in area and there was also
interference in his day to day business by the officers of the Board, who were
bent upon throwing him out therefrom, so that they could extract higher rent
from a new tenant.
The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir
being OWP No. 184/94, which was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the
High Court with the direction that the Board shall consider an appropriate
representation of the petitioner with regard to his grievance.
Soon thereafter, on 10.7.1995, the Board gave a notice informing him that he
had failed to file a representation, as directed by the High Court, and, that
unless he signs an agreement with the Board within three days, he would be
subjected to further action as deemed appropriate. The petitioner protested against
this notice and followed it up by another writ petition OWP No.
523/95 before the High Court by which he asked for various reliefs,
including the relief of quashing the notice issued to him and a mandamus to the
officers of the Board to refrain from interfering with his business activities.
This writ petition came to be dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High
Court on 8.2.1999 holding that the writ petition was not maintainable in view
of the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in LPA No. 182 of 1992
decided on 27.1.1999. Hence, this appeal.
Civil Appeal Nos. 4597-98 of 1999:
The appellants in these two appeals were employees of the Board, who were
holding different posts under the Board. It is the case of the appellants that,
their conditions of service were unsatisfactory and they formed a trade union
for collective bargaining so as to improve their conditions of service.
Their trade union was registered with the Registrar of Trade Union, Jammu
and Kashmir Government under registration No. 705 dated 11.12.1990. On
15.1.1991, the Registrar of Trade Union, J&K, Jammu addressed a letter to
the President, Shrine Board Employees Union, Panthal Road, Katra informing him
that they could not form themselves into a trade union since the Shrine Board,
the employer, was not a Trade or Industry. He further said, "the terms of
employment of all the servants of the Board are governed by the J&K Mata
Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1988 and since its employees have duly been declared
as 'Public Servants' under Section 15 of the aforementioned Act and, as such,
its employees are not registerable as a Union under the Trade Unions Act,
1926 and cannot be said to be in employment in any Trade or Industry."
He, therefore, informed the trade union that he felt satisfied that the
registration issued under the aforementioned number had been obtained by
mistake which should be deemed to have been withdrawn from 10th day of March,
Undaunted by the withdrawal of the registration granted to them, the
appellants and other employees carried on with their trade union activities.
According to the appellants, these trade union activities brought them into
disfavour with the officers of the Board, who started victimising them for the
legitimate trade union activities. Victimisation comprised systematic action
taken against the activists of the trade union, some of whom were even removed
from service. The aggrieved employees filed writ petition WP No. 497 of 1992
before the High Court challenging the termination of their services and sought
a writ of mandamus and a direction to the Board to reinstate them with full
back wages and all consequential benefits. This writ petition was opposed by
the first Respondent Board. A learned Single Judge partly allowed the writ
petition and granted reliefs to some of the employees and rejected reliefs to
the other employees. The employees who were refused reliefs filed LPA No. 182
of 1992 before the High Court. The Board filed LPA No. 183 of 1992 challenging
the reliefs granted to some of the employees. By a common judgment dated
27.1.1999 the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the LPAs. by holding:
"The Board does not satisfy the tests laid down by the Supreme Court
referred to in the preceding part of this judgment. It is not State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, writ petition is
not maintainable. Having said so, we need not examine merits of impugned orders
of termination passed against the petitioners. Preliminary objections raised by
the Appellant succeeds." The aggrieved employees are before this Court by
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 8192 of 2001:
The petitioner was appointed as a Chowkidar on 6.10.1978 in the Dharmarth
Trust and claims to have become an employee of the Shrine Board after coming
into force of the Jammu & Kashmir Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Act, 1986.
It is the case of the petitioner that he was employed as a Receptionist when
the Board came into existence. It is his grievance that he was not being paid
due salary by the Board. The petitioner filed writ petition SWP No. 663/1993
before the High Court for appropriate reliefs, which is stated to be pending.
On 2.3.1998 the petitioner was served with a charge sheet levelling
allegations of misconduct against him for alleged misappropriation of Rs.20/-.
An enquiry was held and a show cause notice dated 21.3.1998 was served on the
petitioner to show cause why his service should not be terminated. Finally,
after considering the reply, the petitioner was dismissed from service on
30.3.1998. The petitioner filed the writ petition before the High Court
challenging termination of his service. The learned Single Judge referred the writ
petition to a larger bench in view of the important question of law arising
therein. Finally, a Division Bench of the High Court by its judgment dated
23.1.2001, following the earlier Division Bench judgment in LPA No. 182/92 and
183/92 dated 27.1.1999, held that the writ petition was not maintainable and
dismissed the writ petition. The petitioner seeks special leave to appeal
against the judgment of the High Court.
C.A. Nos. 4596/99, 4597-4598/99 and SLP(C) No. 8192/2001:
Leave granted in the special leave petition.
At the outset, we asked the learned counsel appearing for the appellants as
to why they did not seek relief before an appropriate forum-Civil Court in the
case of the dispute with regard to licence/tenancy, and Labour Court, with
regard to the dispute pertaining to the service matter. Learned counsel replied
that the appellants have been placed in a very unenviable predicament, being
treated neither as fowl nor fish.
According to the appellants, Section 20 of the 1988 Act bars the civil court
from entertaining a suit or proceeding against the Board or its officers for
anything done or purported to be done in good faith under the 1988 Act.
Learned counsel contended that the section is so widely worded that it
conceivably bars all proceedings in Civil Courts as also before Labour
Courts/Tribunals. On this understanding of the provision of Section 20, the
appellants in this case chose to move the High Court by their writ petitions
under Article 103 read with Article 10 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir
(corresponding to Article 226 of the Constitution of India).
Counsel urge that it is unfortunate that the High Court has erroneously held
that the Shrine Board is not even amenable to the writ jurisdiction, as it is
not "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of
India. In the submission of the learned counsel, the High Court has fallen into
error on two counts. First, in considering itself bound by certain
pronouncements of the decision of this Court in Bhuri Nath and Ors. v. State of
J & K and Ors. although, the observations were made in a totally different
context, wholly distinguishable, and do not lay down the proposition of law as
understood by the High Court. Secondly, for deciding the issue as to whether the
Shrine Board was "State", the High Court has applied certain tests
which are erroneous, and failed to apply other tests which have now been held
necessary in view of the judgment of a Bench of Seven learned Judges of this
Court rendered in Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology
and Ors. . The High Court has relied on the tests prescribed in Sabhajit Tewary
v. Union of India , which has been specifically overruled in Pradeep Kumar
The learned counsel for the respondents, however, maintained that the
observations made in Bhuri Nath (supra) were directly relevant and applicable.
On the second issue, however, learned counsel for the respondents contended
that if this Court comes to the conclusion that the present appeals are not
concluded by the decision in Bhuri Nath (supra) then the matters may be
remitted to the High Court for deciding the tenability of the writ petitions in
the light of the law laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra).
The facts in Bhuri Nath (supra) and the background in which the relevant
observations in Paragraph 33 were made need to be considered in detail.
As already recounted, the direct result of the 1988 Act coming into force
was the extinction of the rights of the Baridars by reason of sub section (1)
of Section 19 of the 1988 Act. Sub section (1) of Section 19 provides,
"all rights of Baridars shall stand extinguished from the date of
commencement of this Act." There is a proviso thereto under which the
Governor is empowered to appoint a Tribunal which could recommend the
compensation to be paid by the Board in lieu of extinction of the rights of the
Baridars, after having due regard to the income which the Baridar had been
deriving as Baridars. The Board is, thereafter, required to examine the recommendations
forwarded to it by the Tribunal and take such decision as it may deem
appropriate and its decision shall be final. Where a Baridar surrenders his
rights and offers himself for employment to the Board, there is certain
preferential right of appointment, subject to suitability. Section 19 deals
with three kinds of persons: (i) Baridars -- their rights stand extinguished on
the coming into force of the 1988 Act, (ii) Employees of the Dharmarth Trust --
they become employees of the Board on the commencement of the 1988 Act, (iii)
Shopkeepers and other lease holders, who were tenants -- they become the
tenants of the Board.
Some of the Baridars, whose rights stood extinguished by reason of the 1988
Act, challenged the constitutional validity of the 1988 Act, as infringing
Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution of India, which continue to apply
to the Jammu & Kashmir area.
Bhuri Nath (supra) examined the scheme of the 1988 Act and noticed that
under sub section (1) of Section 19, all rights of Baridars stood extinguished.
It was contended on behalf of the Baridars that repeal of Articles 19(1)(f) and
31 of the Constitution of India by the Constitution (Forty-fourth) Amendment
Act, 1978, w.e.f. 20.6.1979, does not apply to the State of Jammu & Kashmir;
the right to property continued to be a fundamental right of the residents of
Jammu & Kashmir; the 1988 Act made no provision for payment of compensation
or guidelines for determination of compensation to Baridars, whose rights are
extinguished; the Board being a controlled Corporation, is an arm of the
Government; all the properties of the Shrine stand vested in the Government.
They relied on several provisions of the 1988 Act with regard to the
constitution of the Board in order to contend that the Board is a
"State-controlled Corporation". The Baridars further contended that,
offerings and other properties were acquired under the 1988 Act and got vested
in the controlled Corporation, viz., the Board. For their abolition, the
Baridars were entitled to compensation and inasmuch as Section 19 makes no
provision for compensation, the 1988 Act was unconstitutional and ultra vires
the powers of the legislature.
On behalf of the Board, clause (2-A) of Article 31 of the Constitution of
India was emphasised, which reads as under:
"(2-A) Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership
or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned
or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the
compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, notwithstanding that it
deprives any person of his property." It was contended that the Shrine
Board is not a 'controlled Corporation' and the properties and offerings vested
in it are not owned or controlled by the State or their ownership is not
transferred to any State controlled Corporation. It was also contended that the
Board is a statutory authority under the 1988 Act set up for better management,
administration and governance of the Shrine and its endowments including the
lands and buildings attached, or appurtenant to the Shrine within the premises
specified in the preamble of the 1988 Act. Relying on the judgments of Punjab
& Haryana High Court in Hardwari Lal v. G.D. Tapase and Andhra Pradesh High
Court in Kiran Babu v. Govt. of A.P. , it was urged that when the Governor
exercises his power under the Act in the capacity of ex-officio Chairman, he
does not exercise power as the executive head of the State and his role is
limited to the traditional role to ensure proper management and responsible
administration of the religious institutions or endowments and of their
properties and nothing more. Hence, it was contended by the counsel of the
Shrine Board as well as the counsel for the State that, though the properties
of the Shrine and funds are under the control of the State, the properties were
not vested in the State and so the 1988 Act was a valid law. They distinguished
between acquisition and deprivation. While the 1988 Act deprives Baridars of
their right to receive offerings, there was no acquisition by the State, since
mere deprivation does not amount to acquisition. Hence, it was urged that the
1988 Act was not ultra vires the Constitution.
This Court in Bhuri Nath (supra) accepted the distinction drawn between the
executive power of the Governor as executive head of the State and power
exercised under the Act by his role as ex officio Chairman. The Division Bench
of two learned Judges raised the question, "when the Governor discharged
this function under the Act as executive head of the State, is it with the aid
and advise under the Council of Ministers or in his official capacity as the
Governor?" The Division Bench answered the question and said, "the
exercise of power and functions under the Act is distinct and different from
those exercises formally in his name with Council of Ministers headed by the
Chief Minister." Finally, taking up the question whether the Board is a
"Controlled Corporation" within the meaning of clause (2-A) of
Article 31, after examining the provisions of the 1988 Act in detail, and
noticing the judgments in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. A.P. SRTC and Union of
India v. Sudhansu Mazumdar , it was observed thus in Paragraph 33:
"33. In Constitutional Law of India by H.M. Seervai (3rd Edn.), Vol.II,
at p. 1109 in para 30, it is stated that distinction between ordinary
acquisitions where law provides full compensation and large schemes of social
engineering or reform which would have to be located at from the point of view
of justice to the individual as well as to the community, is harmonised by the
legal view. In the afterlight of Bela Banerjee case , it is clear that the
eminent lawyers (Founding Fathers of the Constitution) committed a grave error
in leaving to implication what they could have clearly expressed in Article
31(2). Bela Banerjee case showed that the intention of the framers failed
because it was not expressly embodied in Article 31(2). Obviously, an amendment
of the Constitution is meant to change the existing law, and the 4th Amendment
by excluding the challenge on the ground of adequacy of compensation was meant
to change the law laid down in Bela Banerjee case that compensation under
Article 31(2) meant a full and fair money equivalent. After the 4th Amendment,
the word "compensation", could not mean a full and fair money
equivalent, for if it did, the law would have remained unchanged and the 4th
Amendment would have failed in its purpose. By excluding a challenge on the
ground that the compensation provided by the law was not adequate, the 4th
Amendment removed the restriction on legislative power in the sense that for
the law to be valid it was no longer obligatory to provide for the payment of
full and fair money equivalent. After the 4th Amendment a law which fixed
compensation which amounted to 80 per cent of full and fair money equivalent
would not violate Article 31(2) and was a valid law. The 4th Amendment achieved
this result by introducing the concept of inadequate compensation. On
consideration of above provisions, we have, therefore, no hesitation to hold
that the Board is not a controlled Corporation within the meaning of Article 12
of the Constitution. By operation of clause (2-A) of Article 31 of the
Constitution the Board or the properties of the Shrine did not vest in the
State. The right to collection of the offerings or the divestment of the
properties, if any, of the Baridars or the right to collection or a share in
the offerings do not vest in the State. Consequently, Section 19(1) of the Act
is not ultra vires Article 19(1)(f) or Article 31(2) of the Constitution."
It became necessary for us to make an indepth examination of the ratio in Bhuri
Nath (supra), as it is strongly contended by the respondents, and accepted by
the High Court, that Bhuri Nath clinches the argument against the appellants
and holds that the Shrine Board is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of
High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
In our view, the contention has no merit. Bhuri Nath was not concerned with
the issue as to whether the sweep of Article 226 could extend to the Shrine
Board. As already pointed out, the question before the court was whether the
right to property of the Baridars had merely been extinguished or it had been
transferred to a 'State controlled Corporation', which would determine whether
the Baridars had a right to compensation or not. This, in turn, would determine
the constitutional validity of the 1988 Act, which prescribed no principles or
guidelines on which compensation was to be paid to the Baridars, whose rights
were extinguished. None of these issues touched the question whether the Shrine
Board was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. All that was
decided is that the Shrine Board is not a 'State controlled Corporation'. This
issue, per se, is not determinative of the issue as to whether the Shrine Board
is amenable to the writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The sweep of Article 226 of the Constitution is much
wider. It can be exercised against "any person or authority",
including in appropriate cases "any Government".
Article 12 finds its place in Part III, and reads as under:
12. Definition.- In this part, unless the context otherwise requires,
"the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the
Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other
authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the
Government of India." Its purpose is to define the word 'State' where it
occurs in Part III relating to fundamental rights. Here also, the inclusive
definition takes within its fold, apart from the Government, Parliament of
India and the Legislature of the States, "all local or other
authorities". It is in this context, that the theory of 'instrumentality'
or 'agency of State' was developed in Ajay Hasia v.
Khalid Mujib , and Ramanna v. International Airport Authority of India ,
wherein detailed tests were laid down. Notwithstanding the tests laid down,
certain institutions, which were incorporated as Societies, were held to fall
outside the purview of Article 12 in Sabhajit Tewary's case (supra). The
apparent inconsistencies which had developed in the law were reconciled by the
larger Bench of Seven learned Judges in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra) which has
laid down the correct tests to be applied to decide whether any entity is an
instrumentality or agency of the State, and therefore, amenable to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court.
Perhaps, in some respects, the correctness of some of the observations in
Bhuri Nath (supra) are open to debate in the light of the principles laid down
in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case (supra). Since, however, the High Court had no
occasion or benefit of considering the law laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas
(supra), it would be inappropriate for us to express any opinion thereupon.
Suffice it for us to say that, Bhuri Nath does not, in any way, lay down the
law as understood by the High Court, namely, that the Shrine Board is not
amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.
We are inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the respondents, Shri
P.P. Rao, that the matter should be remitted to the High Court for
consideration of the issue of the amenability of the Board to the writ
jurisdiction of the High Court in the light of the law laid down in Pradeep
Kumar Biswas (supra). The High Court has also not gone into the merits of the
cases before it in view of its decision on the maintainability of the writ
Taking all these circumstances into consideration, we are of the view that
the impugned judgments of the High Court are required to be set aside.
Hence, the following order:
We allow the appeals and setting aside the impugned judgments of the High
Court, remit LPA No. 182 of 1992, LPA No. 183 of 1993, writ petition, OWP No.
523 of 1995 and writ petition, SWP No. 930 of 1998 to the High Court for
hearing and decision in accordance with the law laid down by this Court in
Pradeep Kumar Biswas case (supra).
We have refrained from expressing any view on the apprehension voiced by the
learned counsel for the appellants that Section 20 of the 1988 Act bars civil
suits and adjudications under labour laws. The High Court shall, therefore,
first consider the maintainability of the writ petitions under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India by examining whether the Shrine Board is amenable to
the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, by applying the principles and tests
laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case (supra).
The High Court shall also consider whether any alternative remedy is
available to the writ petitioners by way of civil suit or industrial
adjudication. It shall be open to the High Court to take an appropriate
decision thereupon, including the relegation of the parties to the appropriate
remedy, if the High Court upon interpretation of the provision of Section 20 of
the 1988 Act comes to the conclusion that such alternative remedy is available
to the writ petitioners before it.
In case the High Court takes the view that writ petitions are tenable, and
that no other equally efficacious alternative remedy is available to the writ
petitioners, then the High Court shall decide the writ petitions on their
Although, learned counsel have cited before us a large number of
authorities, we consider it unnecessary to refer to them in the view we are
inclined to take.
All contentions of the parties are kept open to be canvassed before the High
Considering that the writ petitions have been pending for quite some time,
and that they also pertain to cases of termination of services of employees, it
is preferable that the hearing of the writ petitions is expedited.
The High Court is requested to dispose of the writ petitions, preferably,
within a period of six months from the receipt of this judgment.