Govt. of A.P. & Anr Vs.
Syed Akbar  Insc 702 (19 November 2004)
Shivaraj V. Patil & B.N.
Srikrishna W I T H Civil Appeal No. 4110 Of 2000 Shivaraj V. Patil J.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6546 OF 1999 The State of Andhra Pradesh is in appeal
questioning the validity and correctness of the impugned order made by the
Division Bench of the High Court in Writ Appeal No. 411 of 1998.
The few facts which are relevant and necessary for the disposal of this
appeal are the following:
An extent of 1573 sq. yds. in survey No. 54/2 of Kakaguda village in Hyderabad
district was acquired by the State for improvement of Hyderabad-Karimnagar-
Ramagundam Road which included the land of the respondent to the extent of 8
guntas (968 sq. yds.). After completing the acquisition proceedings, the
possession of the said land was taken. Aggrieved by the amount of compensation
determined @ Rs. 1400 per sq. yds., the respondent sought reference under
Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 (for short 'the Land Acquisition
Act) seeking enhancement of compensation amount and the reference is pending
disposal before the Reference Court.
Out of the land so acquired, only 424 sq. yds., of land was utilized and the
rest of the land remained vacant. The Resident Engineer (Roads & Buildings)
addressed a letter dated 27.12.1996 to the Land Acquisition Officer (Special
Collector) informing him that it was difficult to protect the unused land from
future encroachment. Having come to know about this letter, the respondent made
representations to the District Collector to re-assign unused land to him and
that he was prepared to reimburse the compensation that had been received by
him along with interest. He also indicated that he was prepared to give up his
claim for enhancement of compensation to that extent of land. There was no
response from the collector. The respondent filed a writ petition No. 14062/97
in the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus to the authorities to re- assign
the unused land to him. He based his claim on the Standing Order No. 90 (32) of
the A.P. Board of Revenue.
A learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the writ petition on
4.7.1997 directing the District Collector to consider the request of the
respondent for re-assigning of the unused land in the light of the order of the
Board of Revenue aforementioned having regard to the letter of the Resident
Engineer dated 27.12.1996 and by collecting the amount of compensation already
paid with 12% interest.
Pursuant to the directions given in Writ Petition No. 14062 of 1997 the
respondent made representation to the authorities seeking re-assignment of
unused land. The District Collector by his order dated 18.10.1997 rejected the
said representation, holding that the said land was suitable for construction
of Mandal Office. In this order the District Collector referred to the
judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala and others vs. M. Bhaskaran
Pillai and another [(1997) 5 SCC 432], and Sri Gulam Mustafa and others vs.
State of Maharashtra and others [AIR 1977 SC 448]. As against this order of the
District Collector the respondent filed another writ petition No. 33171 of 1997
in the High Court. The learned single Judge, after considering the contentions
of the parties, by order dated 2.1.1998, allowed the writ petition directing
the authorities to hand over the unused portion of the land to the respondent
by collecting the amount of compensation already paid with interest at the rate
of 12%. It may be added here itself that para 32 of the Board's Standing Order
No. 90 was amended by the Government Order dated 9.10.1998 to the effect that
in case the land acquired remains unused for any reason, it could be utilized
for any other public purpose as deemed fit. Aggrieved by the order of the
learned Single Judge, the State filed a writ appeal before the High Court. By
the impugned appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court held that apart from
the Board's standing order 90(32), Section 54-A of the Andhra Pradesh
(Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act (for short `the Act') also supported the case
of the respondent. The Division Bench also took the view that the proposal to
construct Mandal Revenue Office building in the unused land was an
after-thought and was made with a view to circumvent the order passed by the
learned Single Judge and even otherwise, the unused land in question was so
small that it would not be sufficient to construct any building. Having held
so, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the writ appeal by the
judgment which is under challenge in this appeal.
The facts are not in dispute. The questions that arise for consideration are
whether direction could be given to the appellants to re-assign unused land to
the respondent which was duly acquired by the authorities and the acquisition
proceedings had become final except that the reference is pending before the
Reference Court only with regard to enhancement of compensation and whether the
Board's Standing Order No. 90(32) and Section 54-A of the Act can be applied
for reassignment of the unused land in favour of the respondent.
Learned counsel for the appellants contended that once the land is acquired
in accordance with law which vests in the Government free from all
encumbrances, no direction could be given to re-convey the unutilized land
which is part of the acquired land; Section 54-A of the Act is not at all
applicable to the facts of the present case; the Standing Order No. 90(32) of
the Board of Revenue has no statutory force and at any rate it cannot override
the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and that the Division Bench of the
High Court was not correct in observing that the unused land was not sufficient
for the purpose of construction of the Mandal Revenue Officer; it was for the
concerned authorities to examine the sufficiency or otherwise of the available
In opposition, the learned counsel for the respondent made submissions
supporting the impugned order for the very reasons stated in it. In his
argument, he reiterated the submissions that were made before the High Court.
According to him, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case,
this Court may not interfere with the impugned order exercising jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution.
In order to appreciate the respective contentions advanced on behalf of the
parties, it would be useful to notice relevant portion of the Standing Order
No. 90(32) of Board of Revenue and Section 54-A of the Act.
The Board's standing order "32. Disposal of land which is no longer
required for the public purpose for which it was acquired.
Notes (1) No land shall be disposed of, under this paragraph, to any person
other than the citizen of India, except by the Collector or the Board and with
the previous permission of State Government, every grant made under this paragraph
shall be subject to the condition that, if the land is alienated without the
sanction of Government in favour of any person other than a citizen of India,
the grant shall thereupon become null and void.
When land acquired for a public purpose, is subsequently relinquished, it
should be disposed of as follows:- (i) If the land relinquished is likely to be
again required for public purposes, it should be merely leased out for such
term as may be considered, desirable in each case.
(iv) If the land is not declared unfit for permanent occupation under clause
(i) or (ii) above and was agricultural or pastoral land at the time of the
acquisition, it should be disposed of in accordance with the following
instructions which should not be deviated from without the previous sanction of
State Government: - Such lands should be notified for sale in public auction by
giving wide publicity in respect of the sales in the villages by beat or
tom-tom and affixing notice of sales in conspicuous places in the villages
concerned. The date of sale should be fixed allowing an interval of thirty days
between the date of publicity and the date of sale. The land should be sold by
public auction subject to the annual assessment.
There shall be no upset price except in the case of railway relinquished
lands where a minimum or upset price should be fixed in consultation with
Railway Administration before auction. If at the time of sale anybody puts
forth his claim in respect of any field either as an adjacent owner, or as an
original owner or as heir of the original owner, the sale of that field should
be stopped and his claim investigated and disposed of in the manner specified
in sub- clause (2) and (3). If it is found that his claim is not proved, the
field should be sold by public auction." The amendment to paragraph 32 of
Board's Standing Order No. 90(32) brought about by G.O.Ms. No. 783 dated
"For paragraph 32 of B.S.O. 90, the following paragraph shall be
substituted, namely:- PARA 32 Utilisation of acquired lands for any other
"The land acquired for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 shall be utilized for the same purpose for which it was acquired as far as
possible. In case, the land is not required for the purpose for which it is
acquired due to any reason, the land shall be utilized for any other public
purpose, as deemed it, including afforestation." Section 54-A of the Act
"Procedure in respect of land acquired for purpose of public benefit
and no more required When agricultural or pasturage land acquired for public
benefit is no longer required, the patta thereof shall be made in the name of
the person or his successor from whom such land was acquired, provided he
consents to refund the compensation originally paid to him. If such person or
his successor does not take the land, it may be given on patta under Section
54." It is neither debated nor disputed as regards the valid acquisition
of the land in question under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and
the possession of the land had been taken. By virtue of Section 16 of the Land
Acquisition Act, the acquired land has vested absolutely in the Government free
from all encumbrances. Under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, Government
could withdraw from the acquisition of any land of which possession has not
been taken. In the instant case, even under Section 48, the Government could
not withdraw from acquisition or to re-convey the said land to the respondent
as the possession of the land had already been taken. The position of law is
Bhaskaran Pillai & Anr. [(1997) 5 SCC 432], para 4 of the said judgment
reads:- "4. In view of the admitted position that the land in question was
acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by operation of Section 16 of the
Land Acquisition Act, it stood vested in the State free from all encumbrances.
The question emerges whether the Government can assign the land to the
erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public
purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be
used for any other public purpose. In case there is not other public purpose
for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the
erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount
fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose
envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case,
what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the
provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the
Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid.
Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the
land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that
the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value." In that case,
an extent of 1.94 acres of land was acquired in 1952 for construction of
National Highway and the construction was completed in 1955 in 80 cents of land
and the balance of land remained unused. The remaining land was sought to be
sold to the land owner at the same rate at which the compensation was awarded
11. This again was challenged in the writ petitions. The Government tried to
sustain the action on the basis of the executive order issued by the Government
for permission for alienation of the land. On these facts, the position of law
was made clear in para 4 extracted above. Thus, it is clear that under Section
16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land should vest in the State free
from all encumbrances and that any executive order inconsistent with the
provisions of Land Acquisition Act was invalid.
Further that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public
purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public
purpose. In our view, this decision supports the case of the appellants fully.
In the case Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil & Anr.
vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. [(1996) 6 SCC 405], claim of the
petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to
the resolution of the State Government was rejected. In para 2, this Court
observed thus:- "2........ We do not think that this Court would be
justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile
owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free
from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the
notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land
acquired for a public purpose would be utilized for any other public purpose,
though use of it was intended for the original public purpose.
It is not intended that any land which remained unutilized, should be
restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid
according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these
circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in
both the writ petitions." Yet in another recent decision, this Court in
Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh & Ors.
[(2003) 1 SCC 335] referring to the case of Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil
(supra) and other cases held that "if the land was not used for the
purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take
action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution
of the land". Paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus:- "10.
In Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil vs. State of Maharashtra [(1996) 6 SCC 405] it
is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilized was not intended to be
restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid
according to the market value as on the date of notification.
Govt. of T.N. [(1997) 2 SCC 627], it is held that acquired land having
vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was
not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original
public purpose had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for
other purpose." From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned
decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act,
the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all
encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilized for
any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the
Government free from all encumbrances cannot be re-assigned or re-conveyed to
the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order.
At the hearing, we specifically asked learned counsel for the respondent
whether the Board's Standing Order 90(32) was issued under any particular
statute, the learned counsel was not able to point out to any provision of law
under which it was issued. He was not in a position to show that the said order
bears any statutory force. Even otherwise, as per para 32 of the said order,
the land acquired, no longer required for the public purpose for which it was
acquired, could not be disposed of in favour of any person other than the
citizen of India and that too without the sanction of the Government . If the
land acquired for the public purpose is specifically relinquished, such land
could be disposed of as stated in the said paragraph. If the land relinquished
is likely to be again required for public purposes, it should be merely leased
out for such term as may be considered desirable in each case.
If the acquired land was an agricultural land at the time of acquisition, it
should be disposed of inviting for sale in public auction by giving wide
publicity in respect of sale. If at the time of sale, anybody puts forth his
claim in respect of any field either as an adjacent owner or as an original
owner, the sale of that field should be stopped and his claim investigated and
disposed of in the manner specified in sub- clauses (i) and (iv) of Note (2) of
the Board's order 90(32).
If it is found that his claim is not proved, the field should be sold by
public auction. In the case on hand, there is nothing on record to show that
the part of the acquired land which remained unused was relinquished by the
Government. A letter of Resident Engineer stated that the unused land was no
more required cannot amount to relinquishment of the said land by the competent
In order to make a claim under para 32 of the said Board's Standing Order in
the first place, it was necessary that the competent authority had subsequently
relinquished the unused land. After such relinquishment of the land, the land
had to be notified for sale in public auction. If at the time of sale of such
land, the original owner made a claim, sale could be stopped and his claim
could be investigated and thereafter the land was to be disposed of in the
manner specified under the said paragraph. Added to this, by virtue of the
amendment to para 32 brought about by G.O.Ms. No.
783 dated 9.10.1998, the land for the public purpose shall be utilized for
the same purpose for which it was acquired as far as possible and in case the
land is not used for the purpose for which it was acquired due to any reason,
the land shall be utilized for any other public purpose as deemed fit. It
appears this amendment was not brought to the notice of the High Court.
Chapter V of the Act deals with occupation of khalsa land and right of
occupant. Under Section 54, procedure is prescribed for acquiring unoccupied land.
This Section enables a person to submit a petition to Tehsildar if he is
desirous of taking unoccupied land. On such application, the Tehsildar may in
accordance with the rules made by the Government give permission in writing for
Section 54-A indicates the procedure in respect of land acquired for the
purpose of public benefit and which is no more required. It is clear from plain
and clear language of the said Section that when an agricultural land acquired
for public benefit is no longer required, the patta thereof shall be made in
the name of the person or his successor from whom such land was acquired
provided he consents to refund the compensation originally paid to him. This
Section does not say that the agricultural land acquired for public benefit is
no longer required for the purpose for which it is acquired. This Section can
be attracted only in a case where agricultural land acquired for public benefit
is no longer required not necessarily for the specific purpose for which it was
acquired. Added to this, that the land is no more required is a decision
required to be made by the competent authority. As in the present case, mere
letter of Resident Engineer that the unused land is no more required is not
enough. When the land is acquired under the Land Acquisition Act which is
vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances, the question of
reconveying the land as claimed by the respondent could not be accepted in view
of the clear position of law stated in the decisions of this Court
aforementioned. Whether the unused remaining land out of the acquired land was
sufficient or not for the purpose of construction of Mandal Revenue Office
could not be decided by the High Court. It was for the competent authorities to
decide about the same. The High Court, in our view, was not right in saying
that the proposal to construct the Mandal Revenue Office in the unused land
acquired was an after-thought. No material was placed on record to attribute
any mala fides on the part of the authorities or to support the case that the
proposal to build a Mandal Revenue Office was an after- thought.
Thus viewed from any angle, we find it difficult to sustain the impugned
order. Consequently, it is set aside and the writ petition filed by the respondent
The appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4110 OF 2000 The building bearing No. 21/1/683 situated at
Kokarwadi, Rikabgunj, Hyderabad belonging to respondent no. 1 was acquired by
erstwhile Hyderabad Government for Kokarwadi Scheme of the then City
The award was passed under the Land Acquisition Act on 25.7.1953 and
compensation was paid to the respondent no. 1. In 1956, the Andhra Pradesh
Housing Board was established and all the properties of the then City
Improvement Board stood transferred and vested in the Andhra Pradesh Housing
Board, the appellant herein. Since the Kokarwadi Scheme was abandoned, the
building in question was leased out to the respondent no. 2. The respondent no.
1 made representation to the appellant seeking reconveyance of the building on
payment of compensation amount with interest relying on Standing Order No.
90(32) of the Board of Revenue. On 28.9.1979, appellant passed resolution for
disposing of the property and similar other properties to the tenants. On
6.2.1989, the appellant rejected the representation of the respondent no. 1.
Under the circumstances, the respondent no. 1- erstwhile owner of the building
filed a original suit in City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking a mandatory
injunction for re-conveyance of the building and possession of the same.
The appellant contested the suit. The trial court decreed the suit in favour
of the respondent no. 1 relying on the Standing Order No. 90(32) of the Board
of Revenue. The respondent no. 2 here who was in occupation of the property as
a tenant was defendant no. 2 in the suit. The appellant filed first appeal
before the 4th Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. The second
respondent did not prefer any appeal against the decree made by the trial
court. The Addl. Chief Judge dismissed the first appeal affirming the decree
made by the trial court. The appellant filed the second appeal before the High
Court which was also dismissed. Hence, this appeal.
Learned counsel for the parties in this appeal also made similar submissions
that were made in Civil Appeal 6546 of 1999 bringing to our notice facts of
In the view we have taken in Civil Appeal No.
6546/1999 dealing with the Board's Standing Order No.
90(32) and Section 54-A of the Act and keeping in view the settled position
of law, this appeal is also entitled to succeed. Under the circumstances it is
unnecessary to deal with other contentions. Accordingly, this appeal is
The impugned judgment is set aside and the suit filed by respondent no. 1
(plaintiff) is dismissed with no order as to costs.