IP, Vigilance
& Anti-Corruption, Tiruchirapalli Vs. V. Jayapaul [2004] Insc 183 (22 March 2004)
Ruma
Pal & P. Venkatarama Reddi.
(arising
out of SLP (Crl.) No. 426 of 2002) P.VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.
Leave
granted.
Whether
the High Court was justified in quashing the criminal proceedings on the ground
that the police officer, who laid/recorded the FIR regarding the suspected
commission of certain cognizable offences by the respondent should not have
investigated the case and submitted the final report? That is the question
which arises for consideration in this appeal filed by the State.
On
9.9.1996, the Inspector of Police (Vigilance & Anti- Corruption), Tirucharapalli
on the basis of the information received that the respondent-accused was
indulging in corrupt practices by extracting money from the drivers and owners
of the motor vehicles while conducting check of the vehicles and making use of
certain bogus notice forms in the process, prepared the First Information
Report, registered the crime under Sections 420, 201 IPC and Section 13(2) read
with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. A copy of the FIR
was submitted to the Court of CJM- cum-Special Judge, Tirucharapalli. He then
proceeded to take up investigation, gathered information, examined the
witnesses and filed the charge-sheet in the Court together with a list of
documents including the police notice books and hand-writing experts' reports.
The respondent was implicated for the offences under Sections 465, 468 IPC and
Section 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of P.C. Act. The respondent-accused then
moved the High Court of Madras to quash the proceedings. The learned Judge of
the High Court, relying on the decision of this Court in Megha Singh vs. State
of Haryana [(1996) 11 SCC 709] and two other decisions of the Madras High
Court, allowed the application and quashed the proceedings. This is what the
learned Judge observed:
"In
view of the consistent rulings of the Supreme Court and of this Court, I am
obliged to hold that the very same police officer who registered the case by
lodging a first information ought not to have investigated the case and that
itself had caused prejudice to the accused. " We have no hesitation in
holding that the approach of the High Court is erroneous and its conclusion
legally unsustainable. There is nothing in the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code which precluded the appellant (Inspector of Police, Vigilance)
from taking up the investigation. The fact that the said police officer
prepared the FIR on the basis of the information received by him and registered
the suspected crime does not, in our view, disqualify him from taking up the
investigation of the cognizable offence. A suo motu move on the part of the
police officer to investigate a cognizable offence impelled by the information
received from some sources is not outside the purview of the provisions
contained in Sections 154 to 157 of the Code or any other provisions of the
Code. The scheme of Sections 154,156 and 157 was clarified thus by Subba Rao,
J. speaking for the Court in State of U.P.
vs. Bhagwant Kishore [AIR 1964 SC 221].
"Section
154 of the Code prescribes the mode of recording the information received
orally or in writing by an officer in charge of a police station in respect of
the commission of a cognizable offence. Section 156 thereof authorizes such an
officer to investigate any cognizable offence prescribed therein.
Though
ordinarily investigation is undertaken on information received by a police
officer, the receipt of information is not a condition precedent for
investigation. Section 157 prescribes the procedure in the matter of such an
investigation which can be initiated either on information or otherwise. It is
clear from the said provisions that an officer in charge of a police station
can start investigation either on information or otherwise." In fact,
neither the High Court found nor any argument was addressed to the effect that
there is a statutory bar against the police officer who registered the FIR on
the basis of the information received taking up the investigation.
Though
there is no such statutory bar, the premise on which the High Court quashed the
proceedings was that the investigation by the same officer who 'lodged' the FIR
would prejudice the accused inasmuch as the investigating officer cannot be
expected to act fairly and objectively. We find no principle or binding
authority to hold that the moment the competent police officer, on the basis of
information received, makes out an FIR incorporating his name as the informant,
he forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such investigation could only
be assailed on the ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the part of the
investigating officer.
The
question of bias would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and
it is not proper to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition, in the manner
in which it has been done by the High Court, that whenever a police officer
proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR on his own, the investigation
would necessarily be unfair or biased. In the present case, the police officer
received certain discreet information, which, according to his assessment,
warranted a probe and therefore made up his mind to investigate. The formality
of preparing the FIR in which he records the factum of having received the
information about the suspected commission of the offence and then taking up
the investigation after registering the crime, does not, by any semblance of
reasoning, vitiate the investigation on the ground of bias or the like factor.
If the reason which weighed with the High Court could be a ground to quash the
prosecution, the powers of investigation conferred on the police officers would
be unduly hampered for no good reason. What is expected to be done by the
police officers in the normal course of discharge of their official duties will
then be vulnerable to attack.
There
are two decisions of this Court from which support was drawn in this case and
in some other cases referred to by the High Court. We would like to refer to
these two decisions in some detail. The first one is the case 985). There, the
Head Constable to whom the offer of bribe was allegedly made, seized the
currency notes and gave the first information report. Thereafter, he himself
took up the investigation. But, later on, when it came to his notice that he
was not authorized to do so, he forwarded the papers to the Deputy
Superintendent of Police. The DSP then reinvestigated the case and filed the
charge sheet against the accused. The Head Constable and the accompanying
Constables were the only witnesses in that case. This Court found several
circumstances which cast a doubt on the veracity of the version of the Head
Constable and his colleagues. This Court observed that "the entire story
sounds unnatural". While so holding, this Court referred to "a rather
disturbing feature of the case" and it was pointed out that "Head
Constable Ram Singh was the person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to
have been made by the appellant and he was the informant or complainant who
lodged the first information report for taking action against the appellant. It
is difficult to understand how in these circumstances, Head Constable Ram Singh
could undertake investigation?.. This is an infirmity which is bound to reflect
on the credibility of the prosecution case".
It is
not clear as to why the Court was called upon to make the comments against the
propriety of the Head Constableinformant investigating the case when the
reinvestigation was done by the Deputy Superintendent of Police. Be that as it
may, it is possible to hold on the basis of the facts noted above, that the so
called investigation by the Head Constable himself would be a mere ritual. The
crime itself was directed towards the Head Constable which made him lodge the
FIR. It is well nigh impossible to expect an objective and undetached
investigation from the Head Constable who is called upon to check his own
version on which the prosecution case solely rests. It was under those circumstances
the Court observed that the said infirmity "is bound to reflect on the
credibility of the prosecution case".
There
can be no doubt that the facts of the present case are entirely different and
the dicta laid down therein does not fit into the facts of this case.
Now,
we may turn our attention to the case of Megha which reliance was placed by the
High Court.
In Megha
Singh's case, PW3, the Head Constable, found a country-made pistol and live
cartridges on search of the person of the accused. Then, he seized the
articles, prepared a recovery memo and a 'rukka' on the basis of which FIR was
recorded by the S.I. of police. However, P.W.3the Head Constable himself, for
reasons unexplained, proceeded to investigate and record the statements of
witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The substratum of the prosecution case was
sought to be proved by the Head Constable. In the appeal against conviction
under Section 25 of the Arms Act and Section 6(1) of the TADA Act, this Court
found that the evidence of PWs 2 & 3 was discrepant and unreliable and in
the absence of independent corroboration, the prosecution case cannot be
believed. Towards the end, the Court noted "another disturbing feature in
the case". The Court then observed:
"PW
3, Siri Chand, Head Constable arrested the accused and on search being
conducted by him a pistol and the cartridges were recovered from the accused.
It was on his complaint a formal first information report was lodged and the
case was initiated. He being complainant should not have proceeded with the
investigation of the case. But it appears to us that he was not only the
complainant in the case but he carried on with the investigation and examined
witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such practice, to say the least, should not
be resorted to so that there may not be any occasion to suspect fair and
impartial investigation".
The
conviction was set aside by this Court for the above reasons.
At
first blush, the observations quoted above might convey the impression that the
Court laid down a proposition that a Police Officer who in the course of
discharge of his duties finds certain incriminating material to connect a
person to the crime, shall not undertake further investigation if the FIR was
recorded on the basis of the information furnished by him. On closer analysis
of the decision, we do not think that any such broad proposition was laid down
in that case. While appreciating the evidence of the main witness, i.e., the
Head Constable (PW3), this Court referred to this additional factornamely, the
Head Constable turning out to be the investigator. In fact, there was no
apparent reason why the Head Constable proceeded to investigate the case
bypassing the Sub-Inspector who recorded the FIR. The fact situation in the
present case is entirely different. The appellantInspector of Police, after
receiving information from some sources, proceeded to investigate and unearth
the crime. Before he did so, he did not have personal knowledge of the
suspected offences nor did he participate in any operations connected with the
offences. His role was that of investigatorpure and simple.
That
is the obvious distinction in this case. That apart, the question of testing
the veracity of the evidence of any witness, as was done in Megha Singh's case,
does not arise in the instant case as the trial is yet to take place. The High
Court has quashed the proceedings even before the trial commenced.
Viewed
from any angle, we see no illegality in the process of investigation set in
motion by the Inspector of Police (appellant) and his action in submitting the
final report to the Court of Special Judge.
In the
written submissions filed after the conclusion of hearing, it is contended that
the Inspector of Police had no jurisdiction to investigate the offence under
the Prevention of Corruption Act without the order of a Magistrate of 1st Class
and it was only the Deputy Superintendent of Police who was competent to
investigate. Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 has been
adverted to in this connection. That is not the ground which was urged before
the High Court or even in the SLP or in the arguments advanced at the time of
hearing. It is not even the case of the Respondent-accused that the Inspector
of Police (Vigilance & Anti-Corruption) has not been authorized under the
proviso to Section 17. We are therefore not inclined to deal with that question
in this appeal.
In the
result the impugned order of the High Court is set aside and the appeal is
allowed. No costs.
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