Daroga
Singh & Ors Vs. B.K. Pandey [2004] Insc 260 (13 April 2004)
R.C.
Lahoti & Bhan.
With
Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 1998, Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1998, Criminal
Appeal No. 332 of 1998 & Criminal Appeal No. 396 of 1998 BHAN, J.
The
instant criminal appeals arising from a common judgment relating to the same
incident, depict a rare, unfortunate and condemnable act of the police
officials who contrary to the duty enjoined upon them to protect and maintain
law and order, indulged in the act of attacking in a pre-planned and calculated
manner Shri D.N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, in his
court room and Chambers on 18th November, 1997 at Bhagalpur in the State of
Bihar.
Facts
of the present case:
In
Sessions trial No. 592 of 1992, the Investigating Officer (Jokhu Singh) was
examined as a witness on 7th
May, 1997 in the Court
of Shri D.N. Barai, Ist Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur. As the cross-examination could not
be concluded the case was adjourned to 26th May, 1997. Thereafter the case was adjourned
to several dates but this witness did not appear for the cross-examination. A
show cause notice was issued against Jokhu Singh through Superintendent of
Police, Madhepura, requiring him to appear on 11th June, 1997. In spite of that Jokhu Singh did not appear. On 14th July, 1997, a wireless message was sent to him
through Superintendent of Police to appear in the court on 5th August, 1997. Once again the witness did not
turn up. The Court, therefore, having no other option issued a notice to Jokhu
Singh to show cause why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') be not initiated against him.
Ultimately, on 27th
August, 1997 the case
was adjourned to 20th
September, 1997 and to
procure his presence, non-bailable warrant was issued. On this date also the
witness did not turn up. He did not file reply to the show cause notice either.
On 17th November, 1997, Jokhu Singh appeared in the court
in the afternoon. Having regard to the previous order of non-bailable warrant
of arrest, he was remanded to judicial custody. A petition for bail was filed
on his behalf after the court hours. It was directed that the same be placed
for hearing on the next date.
Shri
K.D. Choudhary, one of the appellants who was an office bearer of the
Policemen's Association at District Level and was posted as SHO of the Police
Station in the evening of the same day went to the Chambers of Shri Barai for
release of Shri Jokhu Singh on execution of a personal bond.
Shri Barai
did not agree. Thereafter he approached the District Magistrate and on the
basis of his advice he met the District Judge and renewed his demand for
release of Jokhu Singh, which was declined.
On 18th November, 1997, when the bail petition of Jokhu
Singh was taken up, the learned counsel appearing on his behalf made a prayer
seeking withdrawal of the bail application. Accordingly, the bail application
was dismissed as withdrawn. Soon thereater, a large number of police officers
(without uniform), armed with lathis and other weapons and shouting slogans
against Shri Barai, barged into his court room. The court peon Shri Bishundeo
Sharma who tried to shut the door was brutally assaulted. Shri Barai
apprehending danger to his life, rushed to his Chambers and managed to bolt the
door. Unruly mob forcibly broke open the door, overpowered the bodyguard and
assaulted Shri Barai. They reiterated their demand for unconditional release of
Jokhu Singh. Due to the manhandling Shri Barai felt dizziness and became
unconscious. It was due to timely arrival of a team of doctors that his life
was saved.
The
police personnel after assaulting Shri Barai and his court staff, took away
certain records and damaged the doors and grills of the gate.
They
also assaulted some of the lawyers and damaged their furniture and motor
vehicles parked inside the court compound. Since at the relevant time the
District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur had
gone to Banka for holding camp court and Shri Barai
was not in a position to send any report, the 5th Additional District &
Sessions Judge sent a report to the High Court narrating the incident. On the
next day, on return from Banka, District & Sessions Judge also
enquired into the matter and submitted a detailed report.
In the
report the names of police officials who were identified by the court staff, Shri
Barai and the lawyers were also disclosed. They are
(i) A.
Natarajan, the then Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur
(ii) Harihar
Prasad Choudhary, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bhagalpur,
(iii)
K.D. Choudhary, the then Inspector of Police, Kotwali P.S.,
(iv)
Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I.,
(v) Daroga
singh, the then S.I.
(vi)
P.K. Singh, the then S.I.,
(vii)Rajib
Rajan Dayal alias Bhagat, the then S.I.,
(viii)
Gurubachan Singh, the then S.I.,
(ix)
Krishna Ram, the then Inspector of Police,
(x)
C.D. Jha, the then A.S.I.,
(xi)
K.N. Singh, the then Officer Incharge of Harijan P.S. Bhagalpur and
(xii) Ranjit
Pandey, the then Sergeant Major, Police Line, Bhagalpur.
On 19th November, 1997, on the basis of the report sent by
the 5th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur dated 18th November, 1997, Original Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 24 of 1997 was registered and
placed before a Bench of the High Court for admission. Along with the said case
Civil Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 10625 of 1997 filed on behalf of the Young
Lawyers' Association was also listed. On perusal of the report and after
hearing the three Presidents of the High Court Associations and the Advocate
General, the Court arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case of
criminal contempt was made out against the contemners. Accordingly proceedings
under the Contempt of Courts Act were initiated and a direction was issued to
the Registry to issue notices to the above referred persons along with a copy
of the report, containing allegations against the concerned persons, calling
upon them to show cause as to why suitable action be not taken against them for
the alleged misconduct. The show cause was made returnable by 25th November, 1997. The Chief Secretary and the
Director General of Police were directed to affirm on affidavits regarding the
steps taken by the State Government in the matter relating to the incident.
On 25th November, 1997, all the contemners appeared
through their respective advocates. On a request made the hearing was postponed
to 10th December, 1997 to enable them to file their
detailed replies to the show cause notice. Chief Secretary filed his affidavit
indicating that the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police after
holding a detailed inquiry, had in his report, disclosed names of nine police
officials namely
(i)
K.D. Choudhary, the then Officer Incharge, Kotwali,
(ii) Ranjit
Pandey, the then Sergeant Major, Bhagalpur,
(iii)
Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I.,
(iv)
K.B. Singh, the then Thana Incharge, Harijan P.S. Bhagalpur,
(v) Gurubachan
singh, the then S.I.,
(vi) Daroga
Singh, the then S.I.,
(vii) Prem
Kumar Singh, the then S.I. (Officer Incharge Kajraili),
(viii)
Rajeev Ranjan Bhagar, the then S.I., and
(ix)
C.D. Jha, the then ASI Bhagalpur.
The
Director General of Police found the officers, named above, guilty for the
alleged incident and condemned the police officials for their act. It was also
mentioned in the affidavit that the State Government, acting on the basis of
the report of the Director General of Police, had issued different orders,
suspending all such officials from service. Keeping in view the gravity of the
situation, a Commission of Inquiry was also set up under the provisions of the
Commission of Inquiries Act, 1952.
Besides
the departmental proceedings, different criminal cases were also lodged against
them.
On
behalf of some of the contemners a request was made to keep the contempt matter
in abeyance until the conclusion of the proceedings initiated under various
provisions of the Indian Penal Code, the departmental proceedings and the
report of the Commission constituted under the Commission of Inquiry Act. The
request was declined by the High Court. It was held that the pendency of a
criminal case or judicial inquiry could not constitute a bar to the
continuation of the contempt proceedings. But before adjourning the proceedings
to the next date and having noticed that all the contemners and their advocates
were present and every body was condemning the occurrence, the Court expressed
the desire that some of the responsible officers like Superintendent of Police,
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Inspector of Police Kotwali Shri K.D. Choudhary
and Sub-Inspector of Police Ms. Shashi Lata Singh and Sergeant Major of Police
Line Ranjit Pandey should disclose details of the occurrence which had taken
place in the court premises on 18th November, 1997 and if possible, identify
more names of such persons, who, according to them, had taken part at the time
of occurrence. On the adjourned date of hearing, the Court recorded the
statement of
(i) A.
Natarajan, the then S.P.,
(ii) Harihar
Choudhary, the then DSP,
(iii)
K.D. Choudhary, the then Inspector of Police, Kotwali P.S.,
(iv)
Ms. Shashi Lata Singh, the then S.I., and
(v) Ranjit
Pandey, the then Sergeat Major, Bhagalpur.
The
Superintendent of Police in his statement fairly narrated a part of the
incident and identified certain more names, like Awadhesh Singh, Subodh Kumar Yadav
and Aswan, Vice-President of the Association
who, according to him, had also taken part in the alleged assault.
The
court issued notices to these three persons also calling upon them to show
cause why they be also not proceeded for the criminal contempt. The officials
whose statements had been recorded were directed to file their additional or
supplementary replies to the show cause on the next date of hearing.
On 10th December, 1997, all the contemners appeared and
filed additional or supplementary replies to show cause notice. The
Superintendent of Police in his supplementary reply disclosed names of 14 more
police officials and constables, who, as per his inquiry, had also taken part
along with the main persons named earlier. They are
(i)
Ram suresh Singh 'Nirala', SI,
(ii) Sriram
Singh, ASI,
(iii)
Ram Rekha Pandey, SI,
(iv) Shivji
Singh, SI,
(v)
B.N. Singh, ASI, Kotwali,
(vi) Sukh
Narain Sharma, SI,
(vii)
D.D. Singh Officer Incharge, Tatarpur P.S.,
(viii)
Gopalji Prasad, SI,
(ix) Madhusudhan
Sharma O/c Sultanganj P.S.,
(x) Awadesh
Singh, Constable,
(xi) Subodh
Kumar Yadav, Constable,
(xii)
Ram Prakash Paswan, Constable,
(xiii)
Dilip Ojha, Treasure, Policemen's Association, Bhagalpur, and
(xiv)
Anil Kumar Soren, General Secretary, Policemen's Association.
Notices
were issued to the above-named persons as well along with copies of the report
calling upon them to show cause by 8th January, 1998 as to why they be also not
proceeded with the criminal contempt. On 9th January, 1998 all the contemners
including those fourteen against whom notices were issued on 10th December,
1997 appeared and filed their replies to the show cause notice.
At the
same time, affidavits were also filed on behalf of Shri Barai, Ist Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Bhagalpur and his staff namely R. Das and B.Sharma
and some of the lawyers of the Bhagalpur Court namely Shri M.P.Singh, President
Bar Association, Bhagalpur, Shri Y.K. Rai, Secretary, Advocate Assiciation and
S/Shri N.K. Choudhary, J.K.,Gupta (Secretary, Bar Association), B.N. Mishra and
S.C.Pandey, Advocates.
Copies
of the affidavits filed were served on their opposites on 16th January, 1998
all the learned advocates appearing for different parties fairly accepted that
copies of all the material brought on the record so far was properly served on
the advocates appearing for the contemners and those who were appearing in
support of the contempt proceedings.
In
response to the show cause all the contemners in their affidavits condemned the
incident of assault on Shri Barai and the lawlessness created in the civil
court campus, Bhagalpur. It would be relevant to notice that some of the contemners
like Harihar Choudhary, DSP, K.D. Choudhary, Inspector of Police and few others
have tried to justify the act by saying that there was a resentment amongst the
police personnels for the arrest of Jokhu Singh and removal of stars from his
uniform in the court. The reply of the Superintendent of Police also indicated
that because of such steps taken by Shri Barai the Police Officers Association
led by Shri K.D. Choudhary on 17th December, 1997 met the Inspector General
(Prosecution) and the Zonal I.G. and protested against the arrest of Jokhu
Singh and the removal of stars.
After
showing their resentment these contemners also criticised the unfortunate
incident and assault on Shri Barai, and his staff but they denied their
presence at the time of incident in the court premises on 18th November, 1997.
Show cause notice had been issued to 26 persons. Except for one or two the
remaining asserted that they were not involved in the incident and were on duty
elsewhere at the relevant time. In proof of such defence they attached their
duty chart etc.
After
considering the relevant evidence on the record, and after taking due care and
caution to see that innocent persons are not punished the High Court dropped
the proceedings against the contemners other than Shri K.D. Choudhary, Ms. Shashi
Lata Singh, Daroga Singh, P.K. Singh, Rajib Ranjan Bhagat (Dayal), Gurubachan
Singh, C.D. Jha, K.N. Singh and Ranjit Pandey. Shri K.D. Choudhary was found to
be the ring leader of the contemners and was imposed with the punishment of
undergoing simple imprisonment for a period of three months and the remaining
eight to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of two months. It was made
clear that the discharge of rule of contempt notice of the proceedings against
the other seventeen would not absolve them of their misconduct and guilt for their
respective offences, if any. In other words, the departmental proceedings
initiated by the State Government and the criminal cases registered against
them would not be affected by the disposal of the proceedings in the criminal
contempt.
Learned
counsel appearing for the State of Bihar, has fairly stated that neither the
departmental proceedings nor the criminal cases nor the Commission of Inquiry
have been concluded so far. The plea taken is that they are awaiting the result
of the present appeals.
Appellants
who were convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act and visited with the
punishment of simple imprisonment have filed five different appeals. S/Shri Daroga
Singh, Chakradhar Jha, Shashi Lata Singh and P.K. Singh have filed Criminal
Appeal No. 316 of 1998, Shri K.D. Choudhary has filed Criminal Appeal No. 332
of 1998, Shri Kedar Nath Singh has filed Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1998, Shri Ranjeet
Pandey has filed Criminal Appeal No. 317 of 1998 and Shri Gurbachan Singh and Rajib
Ranjan Dayal have filed Criminal Appeal No. 396 of 1998. Daroga Singh, P.K.
Singh, C.D. Jha have already retired from service. The remaining are still in
service and posted at different places.
Learned
counsels appearing for the appellants in different appeals, apart from the merits
in individual appeals, which we shall deal with later, have raised some common
points challenging the correctness of the impugned judgment. The same are:
(i)
the alleged contempt is that of a court subordinate to the High Court and the
allegations made constitute an offence under Section 228 IPC, and therefore the
jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of such a case is expressly
barred under proviso to Section 10 of the Act;
(ii) that
the High Court cannot take suo motu notice of the contempt of a court
subordinate to it. The procedure given in the High Court Rules and Orders for
initiation of proceedings for contempt of subordinate court having not been
followed the entire proceedings are vitiated and liable to be quashed;
(iii) the
standard of proof required in the criminal contempt is the same as in a
criminal charge and therefore the charge of criminal contempt has to be proved
by holding a trial as in a criminal case. The appellants could not be convicted
on the basis of evidence by way of affidavits only. The witnesses should have
been examined in Court and in any case the appellants should have been given an
opportunity to cross- examine the persons who had deposed against them on
affidavits to verify the version of the incident as according to them there
were conflicting versions of the incident;
(iv) reasonable
and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the appellants either to defend
themselves or put forward their case; and
(v) affidavits
of independent witnesses which were on record have not been dealt with by the
High Court.
Answer
to the first point would depend upon the interpretation to be put on Section 10
of the Act. Section 10 which deals with the power of the High Court to punish
for the contempt of subordinate courts reads:
"10.
Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts.- Every High
Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in
accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of
courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of
itself:
Provided
that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been
committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an
offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)." According to
the learned counsels appearing for the appellants the proviso to Section 10
means that if the act by which a party is alleged to have committed contempt of
a subordinate court constitutes offence of any description whatsoever
punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court is precluded from taking
cognizance of it. According to them in the present case the allegations made
amounts to an offence under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code and consequently
the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred.
We do
not find any force in this submission. The point raised is concluded against
the appellants by a judgment of the Constitution Bench of 1952 SCR 425. In that
case, sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 which is
similar to proviso to Section 10 of the Act was under consideration. Section
2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 provided that no High Court shall take
cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court
subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian
Penal Code. Interpreting this Section, it was held that sub-section (3)
excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognizance of a contempt
alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it only in
cases where the acts alleged to constitute contempt are punishable as contempt
under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code, but not where these acts
merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been
provided in the Indian Penal Code.
This
judgment was analyzed and followed by a Bench of three Judges 1367. In this
case as well the point arose regarding the interpretation to be put to a
similar provision and it was held:
"The
sub-section was considered in two decisions of this Court, Bathina Ramakrishna
Reddy v. The State of Madras ([1952] S.C.R. 425) and Brahma Prakash
Sharma v. The State of Uttar
Pradesh ([1953]
S.C.R. 1169). In the earlier case of Ramakrishna Reddy ([1952] S.C.R. 425) the
appellant was the publisher and managing editor of a Telugu Weekly known as
"Praja Rajyam". In an issue of the said paper dated February 10,
1949, an article appeared which contained defamatory statements about the stationary
Sub- Magistrate, Kovvur, and the point for consideration was if the
jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of such a case was expressly
barred under section 2(3) of the earlier Contempt of Courts Act, when the
allegations made in the article in question constituted an offence under
section 499, Indian Penal Code. On behalf of the appellant it was argued that
what the sub-section meant was that if the act by which the party was alleged
to have committed contempt of a subordinate court constituted offence of any
description whatsoever punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the High Court
was precluded from taking cognizance of it. This argument was repelled and this
Court said (at page 429) :- "In our opinion, the sub-section referred to above
excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases where the acts alleged to
constitute contempt of a subordinate court are punishable as contempt under
specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts merely
amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided
for in the Indian Penal Code. This would be clear from the language of the
sub-section which uses the words "where such contempt is an offence"
and does not say "where the act alleged to constitute such contempt is an
offence." On an examination of the decisions of several High Courts in
India it was laid down that the High Court had the right to protect subordinate
courts against contempt but subject to this restriction, that cases of contempt
which have already been provided for in the Indian Penal Code should not be
taken cognizance of by the High Court. This, it was stated, was the principle
underlying section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. This Court then
observed that it was not necessary to determine exhaustively what were the
cases of contempt which had been already provided for in the Indian Penal Code;
it was pointed out, however, that some light was thrown on the matter by the
provision of section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which empowers any
civil, criminal or revenue court to punish summarily a person who is found
guilty of committing any offence under sections 175, 178, 179, 180 or section
228 of the Indian Penal Code in the view or presence of the court. The later
decision of Brahma Prakash Sharma ([1953] S.C.R. 1169) explained the true
object of contempt proceedings. Mukherjea J. who delivered the judgment of the
Court said (at page 1176) :
"It
would be only repeating what has been said so often by various Judges that the
object of contempt proceedings is not to afford protection to Judges personally
from imputations to which they may be exposed as individuals; it is intended to
be a protection to the public whose interests would be very much affected if by
the act or conduct of any party, the authority of the court is lowered and the
sense of confidence which people have in the administration of justice by it is
weakened." It was also pointed out that there were innumerable ways by
which attempts could be made to hinder or obstruct the due administration of
justice in courts and one type of such interference was found in cases where
there was an act which amounted to "scandalising the court itself" :
this scandalising might manifest itself in various ways but in substance it was
an attack on individual Judges or the court as a whole with or without
reference to particular cases, causing unwarranted and defamatory aspersions
upon the character and ability of the Judges. Such conduct is punished as
contempt for the reason that it tends to create distrust in the popular mind
and impair the confidence of the people in the courts which are of prime
importance to the litigants in the protection of their rights and
liberties." These two judgments have been followed recently in Arun Paswan,
S.I. vs. State of Bihar & Others [2003 (10) SCALE 658]. We respectfully
agree with the reasoning and the conclusions arrived at in these cases.
"Criminal
contempt" is defined in Section 2 (c) of the Act, to mean:
"(c)
"criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken
or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any
matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which –
(i) scandalises
or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any
court; or
(ii) prejudices,
or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial
proceeding; or
(iii) interferes
or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other manner;" Section 228 of the Indian
Penal Code provides:
"228.
Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial
proceeding.- Whoever intentionally offers any insult, or causes any
interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is sitting in any
stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for
a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both." What is made publishable under Section 228,
IPC is the offence of intentional insult to a Judge or interruption of court
proceedings but not as a contempt of Court. The definition of criminal contempt
is wide enough to include any act by a person which would either scandalize the
court or which would tend to interfere with the administration of justice. It
would also include any act which lowers the authority of the Court or
prejudices or interferes with the due course of any judicial proceedings. It is
not limited to the offering of intentional insult to the Judge or interruption
of the judicial proceedings. This Court observed in Delhi Judicial Service
Association "...The public have a vital stake in effective and orderly
administration of justice. The Court has the duty of protecting the interest of
the community in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted
with the power to commit for contempt of court, not to protect the dignity of
the Court against insult or injury, but, to protect and vindicate the right of
the public so that the administration of justice is not perverted, prejudiced,
obstructed or interfered with. The power to punish for contempt is thus for the
protection of public justice, whose interest requires that decency and decorum
is preserved in Courts of Justice. Those who have to discharge duty in a Court
of Justice are protected by the law, and shielded in the discharge of their
duties. Any deliberate interference with the discharge of such duties either in
court or outside the court by attacking the presiding officers of the court,
would amount to criminal contempt and the courts must take serious cognizance
of such conduct."
In the
present case, a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge was attacked in
a pre-planned and calculated manner in his court room and when he tried to
protect himself from physical harm by retiring to his chambers, by chasing him
there and causing injuries to him. The raising of slogans and demanding
unconditional bail for Jokhu Singh further compounded the offence. The Courts
cannot be compelled to give "command orders". The act committed
amounts to deliberate interference with the discharge of duty of a judicial
officer by intimidation apart from scandalizing and lowering the dignity of the
Court and interference with the administration of justice.The effect of such an
act is not confined to a particular court or a district, or the State, it has
the tendency to effect the entire judiciary in the country. It is a dangerous
trend. Such a trend has to be curbed. If for passing judicial orders to the
annoyance of the police the presiding officers of the Courts are to be
assaulted and humiliated the judicial system in the country would collapse.
The
second contention raised on behalf of the appellants is that the High Court
cannot on its own motion take action of a criminal contempt of a subordinate
court. According to the learned counsels the High Court can take cognizance of
a criminal contempt under Section 15 (2) of the Act of a subordinate court only
on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the
Advocate General. Since the procedure as laid down in the High Court Rules and
Orders had not been followed the very initiation of proceedings for contempt
was vitiated and therefore liable to be quashed. We do not find any force in
this submission as well. This point also stands concluded against the
appellants by a decision of this Court in Chandra Misra, [1981 (1) SCC 436]. In
this case an advocate filed a petition before the High Court under the Contempt
of Courts Act alleging that the appellant therein as a Member of Revenue Board
made certain contemptuous remarks, viz., nalayak gadhe saale ko jail bhijwa dunga;
kis idiot ne advocate bana diya hai and acted in a manner which amounted to
criminal contempt of the Court of Revenue Board, in which he (the advocate) was
the counsel for one of the parties. The advocate requested the High Court to
take suo motu action under the Contempt of Court Act against the member of the
Revenue Board or pass such orders as it deemed fit. The question for
determination was whether the High Court was competent to take cognizance of
contempt of a subordinate court when it was moved by a private petitioner and
not in accordance with either of the two motions mentioned in Section 15 (2).
Analyzing Section 15 (2) of the Act and in reading it in harmony with Section
10 of the Act it was held:
"16.
Section 2(c) of the Act defines "criminal contempt". Section 9
emphasizes that "nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as
implying that any disobedience, breach, publication or other act is punishable
as contempt of court which would not be so punishable apart from this
Act". Section 10 runs as under :
Every
High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority,
in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of
courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself
:
Then,
there is a proviso which is not material for our purpose. The provision in
Section 10 is but a replica of Section 3 of the 1952 Act. The phrase
"courts subordinate to it" used in Section 10 is wide enough to
include all courts which are judicially subordinate to the High Court, even
though administrative control over them under Article 235 of the Constitution
does not vest in the High Court. Under Article 227 of the Constitution the High
Court has the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout
the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Court of
Revenue Board, therefore, in the instant case, is a court "subordinate to
the High Court" within the contemplation of Section 10 of the Act.
17.
Section 14 provides for the procedure where contempts is committed in the face
of the Supreme Court or a High Court. Section 15 is very material for our
purpose. It provides in regard to cognizance of "criminal contempt"
in cases other than those falling under Section 14. The material portion of
Section 15 reads thus :
15.
(1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in
Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own
motion or on a motion made by –
(a) the
Advocate General, or
(b) any
other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General.
(2) In
the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court may
take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a motion
made by the Advocate General or, in relation to a union territory, by such law
officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify in this behalf ...
The
operation of sub-section (1) appears to be confined to cases of "criminal
contempt" of the Supreme Court or the High Court, itself. Criminal
contempt of a subordinate court is dealt with in sub-section (2).
18. A
comparison between the two sub-sections would show that whereas in sub-section
(1) one of the three alternative modes for taking cognizance, mentioned is
"on its own motion", no such mode is expressly provided in
sub-section (2). The only two modes of taking cognizance by the High Court
mentioned in sub-section (2) are :
(i) on
a reference made to it by a subordinate court; or
(ii) on
a motion made by the Advocate General, or in relation to a union territory by
the notified Law Officer.
Does
the omission in Section 15(2) of the mode of taking suo motu cognizance
indicate a legislative intention to debar the High Court from taking congnizance
in that mode of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court ? If this question
is answered in the affirmative, then, such a construction of sub-section (2)
will be inconsistent with Section 10 which makes the powers of the High court
to punish for contempt of a subordinate court, coextensive and congruent with its
power to punish for its own contempt not only in regard to quantum or
prerequisites for punishment, but also in the matter of procedure and practice.
Such a construction which will bring Section 15(2) in conflict with Section 10,
has to be avoided, and the other interpretation which will be in harmony with
Section 10 is to be accepted. Harmoniously construed, sub-section (2) of
Section 15 does not deprive the High Court of the power of taking cognizance of
criminal contempt of a subordinate court, on its own motion, also. If the
intention of the legislature was to take away the power of the High Court to
take suo motu cognizance of such contempt, there was no difficulty in saying so
in unequivocal language, or by wording the sub- section in a negative form. We
have, therefore, no hesitation in holding in agreement with the High Court,
that sub-section (2) of Section 15, properly construed, does not restrict the
power of the High Court to take cognizance of and punish contempt of a
subordinate court, on its own motion." [Emphasis supplied] We respectfully
agree with the view taken in this judgment and hold that the High Court could
initiate proceedings on its own motion under the Contempt of Courts Act against
the appellants. On the facts of this case apart from the report sent by the 5th
Additional District & Sessions Judge of the incident, Young Lawyers
Association had also filed a writ petition. The Presidents of the three Bar
Associations and the Advocate General were present and heard before initiating
the proceedings for the criminal contempt. It has been noted by the High Court
that "all the three Presidents of the High Court Associations and the
Advocate General arrived at the conclusion that a prima facie case of criminal
contempt was made out against the contemners". This shows that the
Advocate General of the State was also of the opinion that prima facie a case
for initiation of proceedings for criminal contempt was made out and he was a
consenting party to the initiation of the proceedings.
The
third contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the
standard of proof required in the criminal contempt is the same as in a
criminal charge and therefore the charge of criminal contempt has to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. That the appellants could not be convicted on the
basis of the affidavits filed. That the witnesses should have been examined in
Court and in any case the appellants should have been given an opportunity to
cross-examine the persons who had deposed against them on affidavits to verify
the version of the incident as according to them there were conflicting
versions of the incident. It was emphasized that justice must not only be done,
but must be seen to be done by all concerned to establish confidence that the contemners
will receive a fair, just and impartial trial. We do not find any substance in
this submission as well.
High
Court in its order has noted that the learned counsels appearing for both the
parties have taken a stand that all possible fair and proper opportunities were
extended to them. In view of the statements made by the counsels for the
parties it will not be open to the counsels for the parties at this stage to
take the stand that in the absence of cross-examination of the concerned
persons, reliance could not be placed on the statements which were made on
oath. Learned counsel who had appeared for the contemners before the High Court
did not claim the right of cross-examination. Only at the stage of arguments a
submission was made that opportunity to cross- examine the concerned persons
was not given which vitiated the trial. High Court rejected this contention by
holding that such a stand could not be taken at that stage of the proceedings.
It has been held in Arun Paswan case (supra) that a party which fails to avail
of the opportunity to cross- examine at the appropriate stage is precluded from
taking the plea of non- observance of principles of natural justice at a later
stage. Such a plea would not be tenable.
It has
repeatedly been held by this Court (Ref: 1995 (2) SCC 584) that the procedure
prescribed either under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the Evidence
Act is not attracted to the proceedings initiated under Section 15 of the
Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court can deal with such matters summarily and
adopt its own procedure. The only caution that has to be observed by the Court
in exercising this inherent power of summary procedure is that the procedure
followed must be fair and the contemners are made aware of the charges levelled
against them and given a fair and reasonable opportunity. Having regard to the
fact that contempt proceedings are to be decided expeditiously in a summary
manner the convictions have been recorded without extending the opportunity to
the contemners to cross examine those who had deposed against them on
affidavits. Though the procedure adopted in this case was summary but adequate
safeguards were taken to protect the contemners' interest. The contemners were
issued notices apprising them of the specific allegations made against them.
They were given an opportunity to counter the allegations by filing their
counter affidavits and additional counter/supplementary affidavits as per their
request. They were also given opportunity to file affidavits of any other
persons which they did. They were given opportunities to produce any other
material in their defence which they did not do. Most of the contemners had
taken the plea that at the relevant time they were on duty in their respective
Police Stations though in the same town. They also attached copies of station
diaries and duty chart in support of their alibi. The High Court did not accept
the plea of alibi as all these papers had been prepared by the contemners
themselves and none of the superior officer had supported such a plea. The
evidence produced by the respondents was rejected in the face of the reports
made by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Director General of Police
coupled with affidavits of Mr. Barasi, the Additional District and Sessions
Judge, two court's officials and affidavits of some of the lawyers who had
witnessed the occurrence.
The
contempt proceedings have to be decided in a summary manner.
The
Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of the case and immediate
action is required to be taken to make it effective and deterrent.
Immediate
steps are required to be taken to restore order as early and quickly as
possible. Dragging the proceedings unnecessarily would impede the speed and
efficiency with which justice has to be administered. This Court while
considering all these aspects held in In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemner),
1995 (2) SCC 584, that the criminal contempt no doubt amounts to an offence but
it is an offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the procedure adopted
both under the common law and the statute law in the country has always been
summary. It was observed that the need was for taking speedy action and to put
the Judge in full control of the hearing. It was emphasised that immediate
steps were required to be taken to restore order in the court proceedings as
quickly as possible. To quote from the above-referred to case "However,
the fact that the process is summary does not mean that the procedural
requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is denied to the contemner.
The degree of precision with which the charge may be stated depends upon the
circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allegations is made clear or
otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is not always
necessary to formulate the charge in a specific allegation. The consensus of
opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike is that despite the objection
that the Judge deals with the contempt himself and the contemner has little
opportunity to defend himself, there is a residue of cases where not only it is
justifiable to punish on the spot but it is the only realistic way of dealing
with certain offenders. This procedure does not offend against the principle of
natural justice, viz., nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is not
aimed at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration of
justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent
against misconduct. The Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of
the case and he must be able to take steps to restore order as early and
quickly as possible. The time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt
proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which
paralyses the court for a time and indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency
with which justice is administered. Instant justice can never be completely
satisfactory yet it does provide the simplest, most effective and least unsatisfactory
method of dealing with disruptive conduct in court. So long as the contemner's
interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity of being
heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the case of contempt in the
face of the court is commended and not faulted."
In the
present case the High Court had decided to proceed with the contempt
proceedings in a summary manner. Due opportunity was afforded to all the contemners
and after verifying and cross checking the material available before it, coming
from different reliable sources the High Court convicted only nine persons out
of twenty six persons arrayed as contemners before it. The High Court took due
care to ascertain the identity of the contemners by cross-checking with the
affidavits filed by the different persons. It is also based on the independent
reports submitted by the Director General of Police and Superintendent of
Police. We do not find any fault in the procedure adopted by the High Court in
conducting the proceedings in the present case. For the survival of the rule of
law the orders of the courts have to be obeyed and continue to be obeyed unless
overturned, modified or stayed by the appellate or revisional courts. The court
does not have any agency of its own to enforce its orders. The executive
authority of the State has to come to the aid of the party seeking
implementation of the court orders. The might of the State must stand behind
the Court orders for the survival of the rule of the court in the country.
Incidents which undermine the dignity of the courts should be condemned and
dealt with swiftly. When a judge is attacked and assaulted in his court room
and chambers by persons on whose shoulders lay the obligation of maintaining
law and order and protecting the citizen against any unlawful act needs to be
condemned in the severest of terms. If judiciary has to perform its duties and
functions in a fair and free manner, the dignity and the authority of the
courts has to be respected and maintained at all stages and by all concerned
failing which the very constitutional scheme and public faith in the judiciary
runs the risk of being lost.
It was
urged with some vehemence that principles of natural justice were not observed
in as much as opportunity to cross examine the witnesses who had deposed on
affidavits is concerned it may be stated that no such opportunity was asked for
in the High Court at trial stage. It was for them to ask for such an
opportunity to cross examine the parties who had deposed against them on affidavit.
Since the contemners did not avail of the opportunity at the trial stage the
plea of non-observations of principles of natural justice is not tenable.
Appellants were made aware of the procedure which was adopted by the High
Court. They were given full opportunity to put forth their point of view. Each
of them filed detailed affidavits along with evidence in support thereof. They
had attached their duty charts showing that they could not have been present at
the place of occurrence as they were on duty somewhere else. High Court has
considered and discussed the entire evidence present on the record before
recording the conviction. The contention that the affidavits of independent
witnesses were not considered cannot be accepted. Only those were convicted
against whom corroboration of the fact of their presence and participation in
the incident was confirmed from more than one source.
Plea
that reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded to the appellants is
equally untenable. We find from the record that all the material (affidavits,
show cause notice etc.) which were brought on record was properly served on the
learned advocates appearing for the contemners. The reports submitted by the
5th Additional Sessions Judge, District Judge affidavit of Shri Barai and his
staff, namely, R. Dass and B. Sharma and the other affidavits of the advocates
who had seen the occurrence and the reports submitted by the Director General
of Police and the Superintendent of Police were given to the learned advocates
who were appearing in the contemners in the High Court. Statements of A. Natarajan,
the then S.P., Harihar Chaudhary, the then Deputy Superintendent of Police, Ranjeet
Pandey, the then Sergeant Major and Shashilata Singh, the then S.I. were
recorded by the High Court in the presence of all the lawyers. The Registry of
the High Court was directed to keep their statements in a sealed cover. The contemners
were permitted to file affidavits and produced any other material in support of
the same. They were also permitted to file affidavits of any other person
supporting their version. They were all taken on record. After affording due
opportunity of hearing to the counsels appearing for the contemners the High
Court recorded the order of conviction. Thus the appellants were given the
evidence which had come on the record. They were given an opportunity to
controvert the allegations made against them and produce evidence in support
thereof. Counsel appearing for the contemners were satisfied with the
opportunity provided to them by the High Court. Plea that reasonable
opportunity was not afforded to the contemners was not raised before the High
Court. We are of the opinion that due reasonable and adequate opportunity was
afforded to the appellants to defend themselves and put forth their point of
view.
The
High Court has taken into consideration the entire evidence and material
available on the record including the evidence produced by the contemners. It
was not necessary for the High Court to discuss each and every affidavit
individually. Out of 26 persons named only 9 have been convicted by the High
Court. Since the procedure adopted was summary the High Court has taken care
not to convict a person unless direct evidence and/or circumstances with
sufficient corroborative material doubtless fastening guilt on the contemners
who have been punished was available.
The
High Court found only those contemners guilty against whom the element of doubt
was completely eliminated. Affidavit evidence if based on hearsay has been
excluded. Contemners against whom there was single identification were also
given the benefit of doubt. The version put forth by the appellants was not
accepted as it fell short of proof. High Court has considered the entire
evidence on the record while recording a finding of guilt against the
appellants. Thus the plea that the High Court did not take into consideration
the affidavits of independent witnesses is not tenable.
Learned
counsel for the appellants tried to point out that the appellants were not
present at the scene of incident as the appellants were on duty elsewhere. He
made reference to their duty charts which had been placed on record. We find
that the presence of S/Shri K.D. Choudhary, Ranjit Pandey, Ms. Shashi Lata
Singh, K.B. Singh, Gurubachan Singh, Daroga Singh, Prem Kumar Singh, Rajeev Ranjan
Bhagar and C.D.Jha, appellants herein has been confirmed by several persons.
The plea of ali bi taken by the appellants has been negatived by the High Court
as the duty charts had been prepared by these officers themselves. None of the
superior officers supported their versions. Presence of most of the appellants
had been confirmed by the 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Shri Barai, the other
two Court officials, advocates, the reports of Director General of Police and
the Superintendent of Police. None of these has any interest in falsely
implicating any of the appellants.
It is
unfortunate that neither the criminal proceedings nor the disciplinary
proceedings or the inquiry under the Commission of Inquiry Act have been
concluded. No doubt the appellants had been suspended initially but in due
course they have been reinstated. Some of them have retired as well. Inaction
on the part of the authorities resulted in emboldening others to commit similar
acts. In Arun Paswan (supra), proceedings for criminal contempt were initiated
against the appellant therein pursuant to the complaint lodged by the District
& Sessions Judge, Sasaram addressed to the Registrar General of the High
Court of Patna. In the report it was stated, inter alia, that S.I. Arun Paswan
(contemner) was directed to produce the case diary in case No. 2000/2001 under
Sections 302 and 201/34 I.P.C. As the investigation officer did not appear in
the case on the date fixed the District & Sessions Judge issued notice
requesting the investigation officer to appear personally to show cause as why
he should not be prosecuted under Section 349 Criminal Procedure Code. The
investigation officer produced the case diary and replied to the show cause notice.
The court was not satisfied with the cause shown for absence and rejected the
explanation.
Contemnor
was directed to remain present in the court till the rising of the court at 4.30 P.M.. A group of persons in plain clothes as also in
police uniforms came on the road in front of the court room of the District
& Sessions Judge and started raising the abusive slogans against the
District & Sessions Judge. One of the slogans raised was "District
Judge Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai". Proceedings under the Contempt of
Courts Act were initiated. They were convicted under the Contempt of Courts Act
and their conviction was upheld by this Court. What is being emphasised is that
had timely action been taken by the authorities and the criminal proceedings concluded
in time, incident, as referred to above, where slogans were raised
"District Judge Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai" could have been
avoided.
The
incident with which we are dealing with took place on 18th November 1997. The incident which has been dealt
with in the case of Arun Paswan, S.I. (supra) is dated 20th January, 2002. Both the incidents have taken
place in the State of Bihar, one in Bhagalpur and the other in Sasaram. The
manner in which the police personnel belonging to middle level of police
administration and entrusted with such responsibilities as require theirs
coming into contact with public day to day persuades us to make observation
that there is something basically wrong with the police in Bihar. Misconduct
amounting to gross violation of discipline committed not by a single individual
but by so many collectively and that too by those who have formed an
association consisting of members of a disciplined force in uniform was not
promptly and sternly dealt with by the State or its senior officials so as to
take care to see that such incident, even if happened, remains solitary
incident. Faced with the initiation of contempt proceedings, the persons
proceeded against did not have the courtesy of admitting their guilt and
tendering an apology which if done could have been dealt with mercy. They
decided to contest, of course the justice administration system allows them the
liberty of doing so ____ and they had every right of doing so ____ but at the
end it has been found that their pleas were false and their denial of charges
was aimed at prolonging the hearing as much as they could. We are shocked to
learn that the criminal courts seized of trial of the accused persons on
substantive charges for offences under the penal law of the land are awaiting
the decision of this appeal? Why for? Neither the High Court nor this Court has
ever directed the proceedings before the criminal Courts to remain stayed. The
criminal Court shall have to decide on the charges framed against the accused
persons on the basis of the evidence adduced in those cases and not on the
basis of this judgment.
Though
we have found no merit in any of the pleas raised on behalf of the appellants
and we have formed an opinion without hesitation that the appeals are to be dismissed,
this is a case the facts whereof persuade us to place on record certain
observations of ours.
In the
constitutional scheme the judiciary is entrusted with the task of upholding the
Constitution and the laws. Apart from interpreting the Constitution and the
laws, the judiciary discharges the function of securing maintenance of law and
order by deciding the disputes in a manner acceptable to civilised and peace
loving society. In order to maintain the faith of the society in the rule of
law the role of the judiciary cannot be undermined. In a number of cases this
Court has observed that foundation of the judiciary is the trust and confidence
of the people of the nation and when such foundation or trust is rudely shaken
by means of any disrespect by the very persons who are required to enforce the
orders of the court and maintain law and order the people's perception of
efficacy of the systems gets eroded.
The
Judges are ___ as a jurist calls ___ 'paper tigers'. They do not have any
machinery of their own for implementing their orders. People, while approaching
the Court of law which they regard as temple of justice, feel safe and secure
whilst they are in the Court. The police personnel is deployed in the Court
campus for the purpose of maintaining order and to see that not only the Judges
can work fearlessly in a calm, cool and serene atmosphere but also to see that
anyone coming to the Court too feels safe and secure thereat. Every participant
in court proceedings is either a seeker of justice or one who comes to assist
in administration of justice. So is the expectation of the members of the Bar
who are treated as officers of the Court. We shudder to feel what would happen
if the police personnel itself, and that too in an organised manner, is found to
be responsible for disturbing the peace and order in the Court campus, for
causing assault on the Judges and thus sullying the temple of justice apart
from bringing a bad name to an indispensable organ of the executive wing of the
State.
Police
is the executive force of the State to which is entrusted the duty of
maintaining law and order and of enforcing regulations for the prevention and
detection of crime. (Encyclopaedia Britanica, Vol.58, p.158). The police force
is considered by the society as an organised force of civil officers under the
command of the State engaged in the preservation of law and order in the
society and maintaining peace by enforcement of laws and prevention and
detection of crime. One who is entrusted with the task of maintaining
discipline in the society must first itself be disciplined. Police is an agency
to which social control belongs and therefore the police has to come up to the
expectations of the society.
We
have not been able to forget the policing role of the police of British Raj
wherein an attitude of hostility between the police and the policed under the
colonial rule was understandable. It is unfortunate that in one of the largest
constitutional democracies of the world the police has not been able to change its
that trait of hostility.
Long
back Sardar Patel had said, after achieving independence, ____ "the police
have inherited a legacy of suspicion and dislike. For this reason, there is
insufficient respect for the police today. But, now that the country is free,
both the public and the police must change their attitude." Shri S.V.M. Tripathi,
former Director General of Police has, in his evaluation 'Indian Police After
Fifty Years of Independence', said ____ "A sensitive
police officer can ensure justice and fair-play as no other public servant can.
The least he should do is to prevent injustices on the poor in the society and
other areas of administration, specially a police station. Upholding human rights,
and protection of life and property of citizens should be a matter of habit
with the police rather than that of display. The sooner we accept this premise
as imperative and honestly work towards achieving it, the better it would be
for the society and the nation. The police leadership will have to push the limits
of feasibility for this purpose." (The Indian Police Journal - Vol.XLV -
Nos.1 & 2, at p.5). Citizens of democratic India expect the police as
humane and efficient, professional and disciplined. It must be remembered that
the task entrusted to police is onerous and the police cannot succeed in
fulfilling their functions without people's cooperation and public approval.
Professor R. Deb, a scholar in Indian Police Service said - "If law
represents the collective conscience of Society, the Policeman, its principal
law enforcing agent ought to be the staunchest protagonist, defender and keeper
of that conscience." (Police and Law Enforcement, published by S.C. Sarkar
& Sons in 1988, p.1). He quotes Shri B.N. Mallick ___ an eminent policeman
of his times, as saying, that a modern policeman ought to be an ideal citizen
from every point of view. "He must be on the side of good everywhere, and
at all times. But to do good the policeman must himself be good. To be able to
induce others to obey the laws of society, he must obey them first. With his
example set before them, people will flock to his banner not only to seek his
help and protection but also to assist him in his noble task. He must be the
leader amongst men. This leadership he must earn by his integrity, kindness,
character, steadfastness, dignity, ability and self- sacrifice. He must always
set the right example". Professor R.Deb's description of an ideal police
is ___ "He should never forget that, like every other citizen he too is
subject to the Rule of Law, and is legally responsible for his actions in
carrying out his duties, for he who enforces law must live by the law. In
discharging his onerous duties and responsibilities under the law the policeman
must eschew all temptations to have recourse to short- cuts and extra-legal
methods. He must also be absolutely honest, impartial and fair even to the
worst legal transgressor. In fine he must be the ideal citizen and a true
servant of the people in the performance of his duties under the law." (ibid,
p.9) After all, what the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had done. Jokhu Singh had
appeared as a witness. His cross-examination was not concluded without which
his testimony was liable to be excluded from being read in evidence. The
learned Judge had exhausted practically all means for securing the presence of
the witness. He would neither attend nor make any communication to the Court.
Even the threat of initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act
did not deter him from abstaining. To secure his presence a non-bailable
warrant had to be issued. He avoided the service of non-bailable warrant of
arrest and appeared in the Court in the late hours. He was not apologetic and
felt that he was above the process of the Court. It cannot be said that the higher
authorities of police were not aware of the behaviour of Jokhu Singh. Either
they knew about it or they should have known about it. Instead of offering the
bail, Jokhu Singh was busy managing for the Judge being approached or
influenced by extra legal methods. Jokhu Singh and his confederate decided to
take the law in their own hands and assault the Judge and anyone who came in
their way. We do not think that any of the appellants deserve any sympathy or
mercy.
We
trust and hope that this case would set in motion the thinking process of the
persons occupying higher echelons in police administration specially in Bihar and take care to ensure that such incidents do not
recur in future.
We
direct the disciplinary authorities before whom the disciplinary proceedings
are pending and the criminal Courts before whom the prosecutions are pending
against the appellants to conclude the proceedings and the trial at the
earliest. The Commission holding the enquiry under the Commissions of Enquiry
Act, 1952 would also do well to conclude its proceedings at the earliest. We
request Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna to watch and if
necessary monitor the proceedings of the Commission of Inquiry and issue
directions to the criminal courts to expeditiously conclude the pending
criminal cases. If the commission of enquiry faces non-cooperation or any
obstruction in its progress, the Secretary of the Commission may send a
communication to the Registrar General of this Court pointing out the
difficulties, if any, faced by the Commission and contributing to the delay in
proceedings and any communication so received shall be placed by the Registrar
General before the Court for directions on judicial side. The result of
disciplinary proceedings, the judgment of the criminal Courts and the findings
of Commission of Enquiry shall be communicated forthwith to the Registrar
General of this Court and in any case before expiry of a period of six months
from today. Copies of this judgment shall be circulated to the Registrar
General, High Court of Patna and the Chief Secretary of the State of Bihar for being brought to the notice of
all concerned. Non-compliance with the directions given herein may be treated
as disobedience of the order of this Court liable to be dealt with accordingly.
The
appeals are dismissed. The appellants who are on bail shall forthwith surrender
to their bail bonds and taken into custody to serve out the sentences as passed
by the High Court of Patna. The Director General of Police, Bihar is directed to ensure compliance with this order by
securing presence of all the appellants to serve out the sentences passed on
them by the High Court.
We
place on record our appreciation for the invaluable assistance rendered to the
Court by Ms. Meenakshi Arora, who appeared as Amicus Curiae at our request.
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