National
Textile Corpn. Ltd. & Ors Vs. M/S Haribox Swalram & Ors [2004] Insc 231
(5 April 2004)
S. Rajendra
Babu & G.P. Mathur.
(With
CA No.3144 of 2002) G.P. MATHUR,J.
These
appeals by special leave have been preferred against the judgment and order dated
4.8.2000 of a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, whereby the appeal
preferred by respondent nos. 1 and 2 was allowed, the order dated 11.4.1997 of
the learned single Judge dismissing the writ petition was set aside and the
writ petition was disposed of with certain directions.
2. The
respondent nos. 2 and 3 filed the writ petition praying that a writ of mandamus
be issued commanding the appellant herein to produce the entire records
relating to the withholding of delivery of goods pursuant to the contracts
mentioned in Annexure-A to the writ petition and also to deliver the goods
mentioned in Annexure-A upon adjustment of advance payment made by them. A
further prayer was made that the appellants herein be directed to take a final
decision as envisaged in the letter dated 24.10.1989 (Annexure A to the writ
petition) and an injunction be issued restraining the appellants from
transferring, dealing with or disposing of goods pursuant to the contracts
mentioned in Annexure-A in any manner without keeping the goods which are to be
supplied to writ petitioner no.1.
3. The
case set up in the writ petition is as follows. The writ petitioners had been
purchasing various quantities of cloth from Finlay Mills Limited and Gold Mohur
Mills Limited, both situate in Bombay. The
petitioners entered into contracts specified in Annexure-A to the writ petition
and made advance payment against the same. The concerned mills supplied and
delivered the goods to the petitioners from time to time but a substantial part
of the contract remained unexecuted. By the letter dated 26.9.1993 the mills
were requested to take necessary steps for immediate delivery of the goods, in
respect whereof payment had already been made. The mills vide their letter
dated 29.9.1993 intimated that deliveries could not be effected as the banking
transaction and accounts of the mills had been frozen, but assured that
arrangements were being made to deliver the goods as early as possible.
The
management of the mills was taken over by the Central Government on 18.10.1993
under Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management) Ordinance, 1983 which
was subsequently replaced by Textile Undertakings (Taking Over of Management)
Act, 1993 on 25.12.1993. The Central Government constituted National Textile Corporation
(South Maharashtra) Limited for the purpose of managing the textile
undertakings which in turn as additional custodian took over the management of
the two textile undertakings. The writ petitioners, thereafter approached the
appellants for release of the goods and one bale of contractual specification
was delivered but 12 bales were detained by the Excise Authorities, as a
consequence whereof the same were not delivered. The National Textile
Corporation (South Maharashtra) vide their letter dated 15.3.1984 requested the
Officer on Special Duty of taken over mills including Gold Mohur Mills and Gold
Mohur Mills to furnish particulars in prescribed proforma to enable it to take
up the matter with the Central Government for taking action under section 11(1)
of the Act for the purpose of cancelling or varying any contract or agreement
entered prior to pre-take over period which action had to be taken on or before
14.4.1984. After giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the parties
concerned. the textile mills called upon the writ petitioners to verify the
pre-take over contracts and joint meetings took place for the said purpose and
the matter was referred back to the Officer on Special Duty.
The
writ petitioners then vide their letter dated 13.10.1984 requested the
Chairman-cum-Managing Director of National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra)
Ltd. to deliver the balance quantity of cloth in terms of the pending contracts
and to adjust all sums of money which had been paid by way of advance. The
appellants sent a reply on 7.11.1994 stating that
(1) all
the outstanding contracts had been cancelled on the date of take over as they
were not binding upon them;
(2)
the deposits that were made with the erstwhile management were not specifically
marked towards any of invoice of packed material and as such could not be
adjusted against any future delivery and the writ petitioners will have to
claim this amount from the erstwhile management since the custodian is
prohibited from discharging any liability pertaining to pre-take over period;
and
(3) there
were no invoices against which payments were received from the petitioners
prior to take over and as such the question of effecting delivery of paid
stocks did not arise. The writ petitioners made several representations and
they were informed by the letter dated 4.10.1989 that the matter relating to
delivery of cloth in pursuance of pre-take over contracts was under active
consideration.
However,
no delivery was effected. The writ petition was thereafter filed in December,
1989 seeking the reliefs mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment.
4. The
writ petition was contested on behalf of the appellants herein and the
Principal Officer of National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd. filed a detailed
counter-affidavit. Certain pleas taken in para 3 of the counter affidavit have
an important bearing and therefore the same is being reproduced below:
"Para3.
At the outset I state as follows :-
a) The
writ petition being directed to obtain specific performance of the disputed
contracts and further claiming a decree for the same which can and should be
obtained by filing a regular suit, further the same being concerned with very
many disputed questions of facts, this application to by pass the said usual
procedure of suit is not maintainable and ought to be dismissed on that ground.
b) The
contract in question admittedly having been entered into at Bombay, with
companies situate at Bombay, relating to goods to be delivered from Bombay and
the payment in respect thereof were required to be made at Bombay and some part
whereof having in fact been paid at Bombay, the entirety of the cause of action
being the subject matter of the writ petition had arisen, if at all, within the
jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court.
Accordingly
the instant writ petition seeking to enforce such cause of action which has
arisen wholly outside the said jurisdiction is not enforceable at the High
Court at Calcutta, neither the High Court of Calcutta
has jurisdiction over the same. Hence, the application is misconceived and not
maintainable.
c)
Admittedly, the cause of action contained in the writ petition having arisen in
1983 when the Take Over Act came into force and sought to be enforced in 1989
after expiry of long six years, is clearly belated.
The
applicant being also guilty of latches no relief should be granted in a writ
petition which only helps the vigilant but not the ident. Besides, the
application is also barred by the law of limitation and ought liable to be rejected."
It was further pleaded that on the appointed date no goods manufactured,
earmarked and ready for delivery as claimed by the writ petitioners were lying
and as such there was no question of delivery of any remaining goods under any
alleged contract. Whatever goods were delivered to the writ petitioners, the
same had been earmarked for them as invoices in respect whereof had already
been issued for which payments had been received earlier and title in respect
whereof had already passed on to the writ petitioners. Similar procedure had
been adopted in respect of many others and cloth was delivered to them which
were lying manufactured in their account. However, there was no liability to
deliver any further goods.
The
respondents had not received any advance payment as alleged by the writ
petitioners. It was further pleaded that the respondents under the provisions
of the Act were not liable to deliver any further goods under any alleged
contract for the pre-take over period in respect whereof no title had passed on
to the writ petitioners. It was specifically denied that other dealers,
similarly situate, had been delivered any goods in respect of pre-take over
contracts and a uniform principle was adopted in this regard. No invoices had
been raised in respect of any alleged balance goods of a pre- take over period.
It was also pleaded that the payments, if any, alleged to have been made by the
writ petitioners were in fact made to the erstwhile company and the writ
petitioners were at liberty to recover the same from them but the respondents
were not liable to pay back any amount or to deliver any goods. It was also
asserted that the respondents had been discharged of every liability of any
kind for the pre-take over period. The other allegations made in the writ
petitions were also denied.
5.
After exchange of affidavits the hearing of the writ petition commenced before
a learned Single Judge on 14.6.1990 and finally judgment was reserved on
5.12.1990. However, after considerable period of time the writ petition was
released by the learned Single Judge. Thereafter sometime in 1995 the writ
petitioners made a prayer to file a supplementary affidavit for the purpose of
bringing on record a letter dated 24.10.1989 allegedly written by the
Chairman-cum-Managing Director, National Textile Corporation which was
addressed to the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Textile, Government of India. The
prayer was strongly opposed on behalf of the appellants herein. The learned
Single Judge by his order dated 17.1.1995 granted permission for filing of a
supplementary affidavit and affidavit-in- opposition, if any. Thereafter, the
writ petitioners filed an affidavit annexing therewith a copy of a letter dated
24.10.1989 purported to have been written by Mr. Sundaram Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, National Textile Corporation to Shri Saptharishi, Joint Secretary,
Ministry of Textile, Government of India. The letter makes a reference to the
representation made by the writ petitioners and two other firms regarding
delivery of cotton fabrics by Finlay Mills and Gold Mohur Mills against
pre-take over contracts. It states that the matter had been examined at their
end and the position of contract balance as per the party and the contract
balance as per the mills was as detailed in Annexure-A enclosed to the letter.
It is further mentioned therein that the position could not be certified as
absolutely correct as most of the original records and documents were in
possession of CBI. It goes on to say that after taking over of the management,
all the contracts for supply had not been subsequently cancelled and/or varied
by the Additional Custodian at any time. If the request was to be considered,
all parties similarly situated will have to be treated on the same footing and
accordingly deliveries to the extent of Rs.101.72 lakhs will have to be
effected to 224 parties of eight taken-over textile mills without receiving any
demand. At the end of the letter it is stated that though the party had raised
a dispute promptly the question whether a parties' claim had to be acceded to
now after a lapse of six years raised a point of proprietary and also loss of Rs.
40.70 lakhs to NTC. In the concluding portion of the letter it is mentioned
that although the party had raised a fairly arguable case, the best course of
action would be to obtain a judicial pronouncement in the matter so as to avoid
any possible future objection from audit or from propriety angle. In the
Annexure to the letter the credit balance of the writ petitioners as on
18.10.89 was shown as Rs.10,47,145.33 as against Finlay Mills and
Rs.21,89,056.26 as against Gold Mohur Mills.
6 An
affidavit in reply was filed to the aforesaid supplementary affidavit and it
was submitted that the writ petitioners were put to strict proof of the letter
dated 24.10.1989 as the same was alleged to have been given to them by Mr. Sundaram
without disclosing the reason for doing so. The letter was a confidential
internal communication and there was no occasion for Mr. Sundaram to hand over
a copy of the same to the writ petitioners especially when he (Mr Sundaram) had
left employment of National Textile Corporation (South Maharahstra) Ltd. in December, 1992. The letter was at best comment or
opinion of Mr. Sundaram and was contrary to the opinion of the Attorney-General
to the effect that the alleged contracts were not genuine. A copy of the
opinion of the Attorney-General was also annexed.
It was
also pleaded that the Government of India had not accepted the alleged claim of
the writ petitioners and had in fact launched prosecution against the Principal
Officer of respondent no.4 for giving delivery of stocks to several parties
after the date of taking over. It was further pleaded that the letter cannot be
taken as an admission of the alleged claim of the writ petitioners under any
circumstances.
7. The
learned Single Judge held that the contract sought to be relied upon by the
writ petitioners was doubtful as it did not signify the assent of the concerned
mills. Whether sale contracts were made in the manner indicated and were acted
upon by the mills concerned was a question of fact which had to be established
by evidence. There was no evidence on record of the case to establish the
contract. Similarly no attempt had been made by the writ petitioners to establish
independently that a sum in excess of Rs. 40 lakhs was lying to the credit of
the concerned mills. In fact there was no assertion to that effect in the writ
petition and no particulars of such advance had been furnished. It was also
held that the respondents in the writ petition were not in picture at the time
the invoices, which had been relied upon, were prepared and it was the
management which was in control of the concerned mills before the take over
period and therefore in such circumstances it was obligatory on the part of the
writ petitioners to prove the facts but no attempt to that effect had been made
except relying upon the letter of the concerned mills of September, 1983. The
learned Single Judge also held that he had directed the writ petitioners to
produce the original of the pending contracts but they failed to comply with
the said direction. They merely handed over a zerox copy of the contract of
sale of cotton cloth which only contained the signature of the buyer and not of
the seller. This zerox copy produced was of a printed proforma wherein the
words "The Gold Mohur" had been typed before the printed words
"Mills Ltd." Even this document did not make any mention of any
payment having been made by way of advance nor it mentioned that any credit
balance lying with the mills should be appropriated towards the contract.
The
learned Judge further held that the respondents had disowned their obligation
to deliver the goods in November, 1984 but the writ petition was filed after
more than five years and even if the period of limitation was taken to be that
of a civil suit, the writ petition was barred by limitation. The learned Judge
then considered in detail the effect of sub-section (7) of section 3, and
sections 6 and 11 and other provisions of the Act and held that all contracts
relating to the management of the business and all contracts relating to the
management of the affairs of the Textile Undertaking stood terminated on the
appointed day and consequently the Central Government or the Custodian were
neither obliged to discharge the contractual obligations by effecting
deliveries, nor they were obliged to give any adjustments of the advances said
to have been made. Regarding the letter dated 24.10.1989 it was held that the
letter itself mentions that the facts stated therein could not be verified as
most of the original records and documents had been seized and were lying in
possession of CBI. That apart, the object of the letter was not to admit any
liability or obligation but an opinion was expressed that the best course of
action was to obtain a judicial pronouncement in the matter. Finally, the
learned Single Judge held that the entire cause of action accrued in Bombay and
therefore the High Court of Calcutta had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ
petition. On these findings the writ petition was dismissed.
8.
Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge the
writ petitioners preferred an appeal before the Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court. The Division Bench held that Calcutta High Court had the
jurisdiction to hear the matter as part of cause of action accrued there. On
merits it was held that ordinarily a writ of mandamus cannot be issued for
specific performance of a contract yet there is no absolute bar in doing so.
The Bench went on to hold that whether in fact there existed any contract or
not would be a question of fact and having regard to the fact that the State
has a statutory duty to perform the contract the appeal was disposed of with the
following direction:
"In
a situation of this nature, we are of the opinion that interest of justice
would be subserved if the present incumbent of the post of
Chairman-cum-Managing Director gives an opportunity of hearing to the
petitioners and try to sort out the differences before the parties across the
table. We do not intend to go into the merit of the matter so as to arrive at a
finding one way or the other as to whether the existence of contract had been
proved or not but by moulding the reliefs, we are of the opinion that even if
it be found that it is not possible for the respondent no.2 to supply the goods
to the petitioners, we have no doubt in our mind that in the event it is found
that a sum of Rs.40 lakhs is lying in its hand, steps should be taken for its
refund as expeditiously as possible and upon payment of interest @ Rs.12%
p.a."
9. Shri
Kirit N. Raval, learned Solicitor General appearing for the appellants, has
strenuously urged that no part of cause of action had accrued in Calcutta as
the Textile Mills were situate in Bombay and supply was to be made ex-factory
at Bombay and the alleged payment by the writ petitioners was also made at the
said place. It has thus been urged that it is not a case where even a part of
cause of action may have accrued in the State of West Bengal which could enable
the Calcutta High Court to entertain the writ petition and to grant any relief
to the writ petitioners. Shri G.C.Bharuka, learned senior counsel appearing for
the respondents herein (writ petitioners) has submitted that the writ
petitioners were carrying on business at Calcutta, the letters were sent by
them from Calcutta and replies to the same had also been received by them at
Calcutta and therefore part of cause of action had accrued in the State of West
Bengal and consequently the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court
that it had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition was perfectly
correctly.
10.
Under Clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court is empowered
to issue writs, orders or directions to any Government, authority or person
exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause
of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power,
notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence
of such person is not within those territories. Cause of action as understood
in the civil proceedings means every fact which, if traversed, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a
judgment of the Court. To put it in a different way, it is bundle of facts
which taken with law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief
against the defendant. In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. AIR 2002 SC 126
in the context of clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution, it has been
explained that each and every fact pleaded in the writ petition does not ipso
facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action
within the Court's territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such
which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case.
Facts
which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give
rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court
concerned. A similar question was examined in State of Rajasthan v. M/s Swaika Properties AIR 1985
SC 1289. Here certain properties belonging to a company which had its
registered office in Calcutta were sought to be acquired in Jaipur and a notice
under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act was served upon the
company at Calcutta. The question which arose for consideration was whether the
service of notice at the head office of the company at Calcutta could give rise
to a cause of action within the State of West Bengal to enable the Calcutta
High Court to exercise jurisdiction in a matter where challenge to acquisition
proceedings conducted in Jaipur was made. It was held that the entire cause of
action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 152 of the
Rajasthan Act arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High
Court and it was not necessary for the company to plead the service of notice
upon them at Calcutta for grant of appropriate writ, order or direction under
Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the notice issued by the Rajasthan
Government under Section 52 of the Act. It was thus held that Calcutta High
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
11.
The question of jurisdiction was considered in considerable detail in Oil and
Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu 1994 (4) SCC 711 and it was held
that merely because the writ petitioner submitted the tender and made
representations from Calcutta in response to an advertisement inviting tenders
which were to be considered at New Delhi and the work was to be performed in Hazira
(Gujarat) and also received replies to the fax messages at Calcutta, could not
constitute facts forming an integral part of cause of action. It was further
held that the High Court could not assume jurisdiction on the ground that the
writ petitioner resides in or carries on business from a registered office in
the State of West Bengal.
12. In
the present case, the textile mills are situate in Bombay and the supply of
cloth was to be made by them ex-factory at Bombay. According to the writ
petitioners, the money was paid to the mills at Bombay. The learned Single
Judge after a detailed discussion of the matter held that the Calcutta High
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The Division Bench
has reversed this finding on the ground that concluded contract had come into
existence which could be cancelled only after giving an opportunity of hearing
and consequently the question of revocation of the contract at its Calcutta
address would constitute a cause of action. In our opinion, the view taken by
the Division Bench is wholly erroneous in law.
It was
nowhere pleaded in the writ petition that the appellant herein had initiated
any action under Section 11 of the Act by issuing any notice to the writ
petitioner for cancellation of the contract. In fact, it is stated in para 18
of the petition that the Central Government did not follow the procedure
prescribed in Section 11 for cancellation of contract. Regarding the
jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, the relevant statement was made in para
73 of the writ petition wherein it was stated as under :
"73.
Your petitioner carries on business and maintains all accounts at the aforesaid
place of business within the jurisdiction. Your petitioner states that by
reason of the aforesaid, your petitioners have suffered loss and damage at its
said place of business within the jurisdiction. All notices and correspondences
referred to herein-above addressed to your petitioner has been received by your
petitioner at your petitioner's place of business within the jurisdiction. In
the circumstances this Hon'ble Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the
present application." As discussed earlier, the mere fact that the writ
petitioner carries on business at Calcutta or that the reply to the
correspondence made by it was received at Calcutta is not an integral part of
the cause of action and, therefore, the Calcutta High Court had no jurisdiction
to entertain the writ petition and the view to the contrary taken by the
Division Bench cannot be sustained. In view of the above finding, the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed. However, in order to avoid any further
harassment to the parties and to put an end to the litigation, we would examine
the matter on merits as well.
13.
Chapter II of the Textile Undertakings (Taking over of Management) Act, 1983
deals with Taking Over Of The Management Of Certain Textile Undertakings. Sub-section
(1) of Section 3 lays down that on and from the appointed day, the management
of all the textile undertakings shall vest in the Central Government.
Sub-section (7) of Section 3 is important and it reads as under :
Section
3 (7): For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that any liability
incurred by a textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the
appointed day shall be enforceable against the concerned textile company and
not against the Central Government or the Custodian.
This
provision is very clear and says in no uncertain terms that any liability
incurred by a textile company in relation to the textile undertaking shall not
be enforceable against the Central Government or the custodian.
The
effect of this provision was examined in Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v.
National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Ltd. 1996 (1) SCC 313 where
the question of payment of gratuity of a workman who left the employment just a
few months before "the appointed day" came up for consideration. It
was held that the language of sub-section (7) of Section 3 is clear and
unambiguous inasmuch as in the said provision it has been declared that any
liability incurred by the textile company in relation to the textile
undertaking before the appointed day shall be enforceable against the textile
company concerned and not against the Central Government or the Custodian. It
was also held that the words "any liability" in sub-section (7) of
Section 3 are of wide amplitude to cover every liability that was incurred by
the textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the appointed
day. The Court thus rejected the contention that sub-section (7) of Section 3
must be so construed as to exclude its applicability in respect of liability
for payment of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Court also
examined the provisions of the Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation)
Ordinance, 1995 (Ordinance No.6 of 1995) which was later on replaced by the
Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1995) and held as under :
"The
provisions of Ordinance 6 of 1995 also show that the liabilities for the period
prior to the take-over of the management are to be discharged from the amount
payable to the owner of the textile undertaking for the acquisition of the
undertaking and not by the NTC. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the
contention urged on behalf of the appellant that NTC is liable in respect of
the gratuity amount payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act to Respondent 2."
14.
The legal position is, therefore, absolutely clear that any liability incurred
by a textile company in relation to the textile undertaking before the
appointed day cannot be enforced against the Central Government or the
Custodian. According to the case set up by the writ petitioners, money was paid
by them to the two textile mills before the appointed day but they had failed
to supply the cloth. Assuming the aforesaid position to be correct, after
receipt of money, the textile mills having incurred a liability, were under an
obligation to supply the cloth to the writ petitioners. On the facts pleaded,
the liability had been incurred by the textile company and consequently it
could not be enforced against the Central Government or the Custodian. We are thus
unable to accept the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court that it
was not a liability of the textile company.
15. In
paras 7 and 9 of the counter affidavit filed by the appellants before the High
Court, the correctness of Annexure A was specifically denied. In paras 15 and
16 it was categorically pleaded that on the appointed day no goods manufactured
and earmarked for the writ petitioners were lying in the mills. In paras 21,
22, 24 and 27 receipt of payment allegedly made by the petitioners was also
denied. The appellants herein having specifically denied receipt of any payment
or existence of any manufactured and earmarked cloth for the writ petitioners
on the appointed day, no relief could have been granted to the writ petitioners
in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The writ petition raised
highly disputed questions of fact which, as rightly observed by the learned
Single Judge, could be proved by leading evidence in a properly constituted
suit and was not a matter to be investigated in a writ petition.
16.
The appellants herein had also disputed the correctness of the letter allegedly
written by Mr. V. Sundaram, Chairman-cum-Managing Director of NTC to the Joint
Secretary, Ministry of Textiles, Government of India on 24.10.1989. It is
noteworthy that though the letter is of October 1989 but the same was filed
along with the supplementary affidavit on 27.1.1995 i.e. more than 5 years
after filing of the writ petition which had been filed in December, 1989. Mr. Sundaram
had left the employment in 1992. As the letter shows, it was an internal
correspondence between the Chairman of National Textile Corporation and Joint
Secretary, Ministry of Textiles, Government of India. The letter does not show
that its copy was sent to anyone else much less to the writ petitioners. In para
4 of the supplementary affidavit filed by Mahender Kumar Goenka, it was stated
that on his request Mr. Sundaram was kind enough to hand over a copy of the
said letter dated 24.10.1989 to the petitioner. It is extremely difficult to
believe that though Mr. Sundaram left the employment in 1992, but he was
keeping a copy of the said letter with him and handed over the same to Shri Goenka
in 1995. Shri Sundaram, who was an IAS Officer holding a very responsible post
of Chairman-cum-Managing Director of National Textile Corporation, is not
expected to keep private copies of official documents nor to hand over the same
to a private party. We are, therefore of the opinion that the view taken by the
learned Single Judge that the said document is of extremely suspicious
character and could not be taken into consideration is perfectly correct.
17. We
are also in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the
writ petition which was filed in December 1989 was highly belated as the claim
of the writ petitioners had been categorically refuted by the letter dated
7.11.1990 by the Director Finance on behalf of National Textile Corporation
(South Maharashtra). The petition was therefore liable to be rejected on this
ground alone. That apart, the prayer made in the writ petition is for issuance
of a writ of mandamus directing the appellant herein to supply the goods
(cloth). It is well settled that in order that a mandamus be issued to compel
the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which
imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the
Statute to enforce its performance. The present is a case of pure and simple
business contract. The writ petitioners have no statutory right nor any
statutory duty is cast upon the appellants whose performance may be legally
enforced. No writ of mandamus can, therefore, be issued as prayed by the writ
petitioners.
18.
For the reasons mentioned above, we are of the opinion that the writ petition
filed by the respondent herein was wholly devoid of merit and the same was
rightly dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court.
The
appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order of the Division Bench of
the Calcutta High Court dated 4.8.2000 is set aside and that of the learned
Single Judge restored. The appellant will be entitled to their cost here as
well as in the High Court.
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