The
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. C. Padma & Anr [2003] Insc 448 (12 September 2003)
S.N.
Variava & H.K. Sema. Sema,J
This
appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 5.12.1996 passed by the
High Court.
Briefly
stated the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal arise out of the
following circumstances. In a motor accident, which took place on 18.2.1989,
the respondents sustained bodily injuries. The claim petition was filed on
2.11.1995, claiming compensation of Rs.one lakh. The Claims Tribunal rejected
the plea of limitation raised by the appellant herein and awarded compensation
of Rs. 45,000/-. The Revision Petition, filed by the appellant, was also
dismissed by the High Court on 5.12.1996.
We
have heard Mr. Sunil Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant.
Respondent
Nos. 1 and 2 were put to notice. The Office Report dated 24.7.2003 disclosed
that the notice was served on respondent No.1 on 14th October, 1997 by affixing
notice on the door of the house of respondent No.1. A certificate of the High
Court dated 24th October, 1997 indicates that respondent No.2 had refused to
accept the notice and the same was affixed on the door of her given address.
The respondents are, therefore, not represented before us.
The
only contention, which has been strenuously urged by the counsel for the
appellant, is that the accident had taken place on 18.2.1989 and the claim
petition was filed on 2.11.1995; when the claim was barred under the old Act,
the same could not have been revived under the new Act. It is his contention
that on this score alone the claim petition should have been dismissed. To
answer this contention it would be useful to have a quick survey of changes
that have taken place in the Act. The old Act of 1939 has been repealed and
since then there is a sea of changes in the Act. In the old Motor Vehicles Act,
1939(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') sub-section (3) of Section 110-A
provided:
"110-A.
(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made
within six months of the occurrence of the accident:
Provided
that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the
said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented
by sufficient cause from making the application in time." The 1939 Act was
repealed w.e.f 1.7.1989. The period of limitation prescribed in the new Act is
provided under sub-section (3) of Section 166.
It
reads:- "166.(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained
unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident:
Provided
that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the
said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied
that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the
application in time." The only difference that has been brought about in
between the old Act and the new Act is that the Tribunal may entertain an
application after the expiry of period of six months but not later than twelve
months.
In the
instant case, at the time, when the respondents had filed claim petition on
2.11.1995, the situation was completely different. Sub-section (3) of Section
166 of the Act had been omitted by Act 53 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The result
of the Act 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 is that there is no
limitation prescribed for filing claim petitions before the Tribunal in respect
of any accident w.e.f. 14.11.1994.
It is
noticed that the High Court while dismissing the Revision Petition filed by the
appellant had followed the decision rendered by this Court in Dhannalal vs. D.P.Vijayvargiya,
(1996) 4 SCC 652. The facts of that case were like this. The appellant was
injured in a motor accident, which took place on 4-12-1990. The claim petition for compensation was filed before the
Tribunal on 7.12.1991 along with an application for condonation of delay, which
was allowed by the Tribunal by its order dated 18.11.1993. The validity of
order of the Tribunal was challenged before the High Court and the High Court
by its order dated 31.7.1995 set-aside the order of the Tribunal holding that
the power of Tribunal to condone the delay under Sub-section (3) of Section 166
of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 had been withdrawn and therefore the claim
petition must be filed within the period prescribed therein. This Court set
aside the High Court order.
This
Court in Dhannalal's case (supra), after examining the effect of the various
amendments that have been brought about in the Act, stated in paragraphs 6 and
7 as under:- 6."Before the scope of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the
Act is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid sub- section (3) of
Section 166 of the Act has been omitted by Act 53 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment)
Act, 1994 which came in force w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The effect of the Amending Act
is that w.e.f. 14.11.1994 there is no limitation for filing claims before the
Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised
the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal
representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting their claim
petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common knowledge that
majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period
during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the
accident of the breadearner of the family, in many cases such claimants are
virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escape death some of
such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years. In the present case
itself the applicant claims that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990 and he
was being treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. According to us, in its
wisdom, Parliament rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and
restricting the power of the Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond
the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh,
inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants.
The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by
the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of
only four days in preferring the claim petition.
7."In
this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of omission
of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the amending Act it does not
appear that the said sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at
the same time, there is nothing in the amending Act to show that benefit of
deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be extended to pending
claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of
deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an
illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994
when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one reason or the other
no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till
14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of
such accident? Whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected
by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve
months which had been prescribed when sub-section (3) of Section 166 was in
force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been
extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of sub-section (3) of
Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us, the answer should be in
negative.
When
sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to
entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such
accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground
that such claim petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section
166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time
has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to
protect the interests of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the
victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid
Amendment Act 54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158 which
provides:
"158.
(6) As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily
injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a
police officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a
copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information
or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal
having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a
copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of
receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and
insurer."
In
view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer-in-charge of the
police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information/report regarding
the accident to the Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be
forwarded to the insurer concerned. It also requires that where a copy is made
available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days of receipt
of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In this
background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166 should be given
full effect so that the object of deletion of the said section by Parliament is
not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can
prefer claim for compensation although not being preferred earlier because of
the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs
of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of
delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the Tribunal, the
High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case. The
appellant has been pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court. His right to get
compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by
the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed
any petition for claim till 14.11.1994 in respect of the accident which took
place on 4.12.1990, in view of the amending Act he became entitled to file such
claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim
petition which has been filed and is being pursued up to this Court cannot be
thrown out on the ground of limitation." (Emphasis supplied) The ratio
laid down in Dhannalal's case (supra) applies with full force to the facts of
the present case. When the claim petition was filed sub- section (3) of Section
166 had been omitted. Thus, the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim
petition without taking note of the date on which the accident took place.
Faced with this situation, Mr. Kapoor submitted that Dhannalal's case does not
consider Section 6A of the General Clauses Act and therefore, needs to be
reconsidered. We are unable to accept the submission. Section 6A of the General
Clauses Act undoubtedly provides that the repeal of a provision will not affect
the continuance of the enactment so repealed and in operation at the time of
repeal. However, this is subject to "unless a different intention appears".
In Dhannalal's case the reason for the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section
166 has been set out. It is noted that the Parliament realized the grave
injustice and injury caused to heirs and legal representatives of the victims
of accidents if the claim petition was rejected only on ground of limitation.
Thus "the different intention" clearly appears and Section 6A of the
General Clauses Act would not apply.
Mr. Kapoor,
learned counsel for the appellant, has placed reliance on the decision rendered
by this Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991
SC 2156. The facts of that case were that the appellant was injured in an
accident, which took place on 22.1.1989. The claim petition of the appellant
was filed on 15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay. The Tribunal
held that in view of sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles
Act, which came into force on 1.7.1989, the delay of more than six months could
not be condoned.
In the
facts and circumstances of that case this Court held that the case of the
appellant was covered by the new Act and the delay for a longer period than six
months could not be condoned. In our view, the facts of the case in Vinod Gurudas
(supra) are different from the facts of the present case, as noticed above.
Learned
counsel for the appellant, next contended that since no period of limitation
has been prescribed by the Legislature, Article 137 of the Limitation Act may
be invoked, otherwise, according to him, stale claims would be encouraged
leading to multiplicity of litigation for non-prescribing the period of
limitation. We are unable to countenance with the contention of the appellant
for more than one reason. Firstly, such an Act like Motor Vehicles Act is a
beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their
families, if otherwise the claim is found genuine. Secondly, it is a self
contained Act which prescribes mode of filing the application, procedure to be
followed and award to be made. The Parliament, in its wisdom, realised the
grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and legal representatives
of the victims who suffer bodily injuries/die in accidents, by rejecting their
claim petitions at the threshold on the ground of limitation, and purposely
deleted sub-section (3) of Section 166, which provided the period of limitation
for filing the claim petitions and this being the intendment of the Legislature
to give effective relief to the victims and the families of the motor accidents
untrammeled by the technicalities of the limitation, invoking of Article 137 of
the Limitation Act would defeat the intendment of the Legislature.
In the
result, we do not find any infirmity in the order under challenge, which would
warrant our interference. This appeal, being devoid of merits, is, accordingly
dismissed with no order as to costs.
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