Thirumala
Tirupati Devasthanams & Anr Vs. Thallappaka Ananthacharyulu & Ors
[2003] Insc 445 (10
September 2003)
S.N.
Variava & H.K. Sema. S. N. Variava J
These
Appeals are against the Judgment dated 25th September, 1996 by which two Writ Petitions seeking
writs of prohibition and a contempt petition have been disposed of.
The
dispute in this proceedings relates to 28.58 acres in Survey Numbers 686, 645
and 679 of Tirumala Village. This land is situated on Tirumala Hills where the temple of Sri Venkateshwara Swamy is situated. The Appellants are the
statutory Devasthanam in control and management of the temple. The facts
leading to the present litigation are set out in the impugned Judgment. In the
impugned Judgment the Appellants are referred to as "T.T.D." whereas
the Respondents are referred to as "the Tallapaka people". The facts,
as set out in the impugned Judgment, are as follows:
"4.
Sri Krishna Devaraya one of the greatest Emperors who ruled southern India in
the 15th century granted an extent of Ac. 27-04 cents of land on Tirumala Hills
(now covered by Survey Nos. 586 and 645) to Sri Tallapaka Annamacharya, the
celebrated saint, composer and reformer, the progenitor of the petitioners
herein (for short "the Tallapaka people"). Annamacharya was a great
devotee of Lord Venkateswara, in whose praise he wrote and composed music for
32,000 devotional songs. He attained immortality as the greatest devotee of
Lord Venkateswara and also the founder of the Bhakti cult, propagating the
philosophy of Sri Ramanuja. Kings and emperors showered upon him honours and
granted large number of inams in recognition of the spiritual service he
rendered. He and his descendants, for over centuries, endowed vast properties
for religious and charitable purposes. Tallapaka Venkata Seshacharyulu, the
father of the petitioner in W. P. No. 8347 of 1996 and C.C. No. 373 of 1996 was
the 12th descendant of Annamacharya.
5. The
T.T.D. filed an application before the Revenue Divisional Officer, Chandragiri
in 1962 under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951
against Tallapaka Venkata Seshacharyulu seeking resumption of the inam alleging
that it was a grant in favour of the "Manager for the time being of Nandanavanam
at Tirumala or Tirupati to be held for the support of Sri Venkataswara Swamy
Pagoda at Tirumala and to be held so long as the conditions of the grant are
duly fulfilled". The T.T.D. contended that the grant was for the
maintenance of flower and Tulasi garden and fruit bearing trees for the daily
worship of and offering to Lord Venkateswara but neither offerings were made
nor plants and trees maintained much less flowers and Tulasi plants were
supplied from the Nandanavanam to the deity by the inamdars. The T.T.D.
therefore, prayed for:
(i) resumption
of the inam and determining it as a grant of both melwaram and kudiwaram (land
revenue as well as proprietary right); and
(ii) regranting
the inam to the T.T.D. as an endowment. That application was disposed of by the
Revenue Divisional Officer holding that the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chandragiri
had already issued a ryotwari patta under the Inams Abolition Act in favour of
the T.T.D. and, therefore, no further relief was called for.
The inamdars
carried the matter in revision to the Commissioner, Survey, Settlements and
Land Records (for short "the Commissioner") under Section 14-A of the
Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act, 1956 (for short "the Inams Abolition Act") and the Commissioner,
while allowing the revision, remitted the matter to the Tahsildar for fresh
enquiry on the ground that while granting patta in favour of the T.T.D. the
Deputy Tahsildar had not issued notices to the parties.
6.
After the remand, the Deputy Tahsildar conducted an enquiry under Section 3 of
the Inams Abolition Act after notices to both the Institution (T.T.D.) and the inamdars
and recorded a finding that the land in question is an inam land in Ryotwari
village and that it was not held by an institution. On appeal, preferred by the
T.T.D., the Revenue Divisional Officer affirmed the order of the Deputy Tahsildar.
The T.T.D. carried the matter in revision to the Commissioner who, while
recording the concession made by the Counsel for the T.T.D., that the lands in
question were in possession of the inamdars on the crucial dates (as envisaged
by Section 4 of the Inams Abolition Act) and that the inamdars had been in
possession of the lands since 7-6-1933, dismissed the revision petition.
xxx xxx
xxx
7. The
T.T.D. filed W.P. No. 11895 of 1986 challenging the order of the Commissioner
affirming the orders of the subordinate statutory tribunals and the inamdar
filed W. P. No. 11437 of 1986 contending that an extent of Ac. 3-05 cents of
land in question was illegally occupied by the T.T.D. without paying
compensation and, therefore, he was entitled to be compensated for the wrongful
deprivation. A learned single judge heard both the matters together and by a
common judgment, allowed the writ petition filed by the T.T.D. holding that the
grant in question was to the institution and that the possession of the land
"on the relevant dates" by the inamdars was only on behalf of the
institution but not in recognition of their rights as inamdars and that the
view of the Commissioner that the inam was burdened with service was contrary
to the recitals in the two title deeds. The learned Judge by his common
judgment dated 17-4-1987 quashed the revisional order of the
Commissioner and consequently dismissed W.P. No. 11437 of 1986 filed by the inamdar.
Two
Writ Appeals W.A. Nos. 1752 of 1987 and 4 of 1993 arising out of the above two
writ petitions were allowed by a common judgment dated 23-12-1992. ………………………………………………
8…………………………………..The
judgment of the Division Bench was carried in appeal to the Supreme Court in
Civil Appeal Nos. 3468-69 of 1993………….……………… the Supreme Court dismissed both
the appeals on 11-1-1995… ………………………..Review Petition Nos. 683-684 of 1995
seeking review of the aforesaid order of the Supreme Court 9th May, 1995 were
dismissed.
9.
After the dismissal of the review petitions by the Supreme Court the Tallapaka
people (inamdars) filed an application before the Inams Deputy Tahsildar for
grant of patta under Section 7(1) of the Inams Abolition Act and the same was
granted by the Deputy Tahsildar by an order dated 9-8-1995.
10.
The T.T.D. filed a suit O.S. No. 69 of 1995 in the Court of the Principal
Subordinate Judge, Tirupati seeking a declaration that it is the absolute owner
of the Ac. 25-08 cents of land covered by Survey Nos. 686 and 679/92 and for a
consequential direction to the Tallapaka people to surrender possession of the
same. The T.T.D. also filed an appeal under Section 7(2) of the Inams Abolition
Act before the Revenue Divisional Officer challenging the grant of patta by the
Deputy Tahsildar in favour of the Tallapaka people. In the plaint filed in O.S.
No. 69 of 1995, it was averred by the T.T.D. inter alia, that the entire
property lying within the limits of Tirumala belongs to the deity.
Lord Venkateswara.
The question of title to the suit land was not the subject matter of the
earlier litigation between the T.T.D. and the Tallapaka people and in spite of
the failure of the T.T.D. in the revenue proceedings and the judgment in the
writ appeals (the first Tallapaka case), the question of title can still be
agitated in a Civil Court. After adverting to certain G.O's. and the earlier
proceedings before the revenue authorities it was averred by the T.T.D. in the
plaint that the inam was to the temple and not a personal grant to the Tallapaka
people. As already stated at the very outset, the inamdars (the Tallapaka
people) filed the present two writ petitions, each for a writ of Prohibition:
one in regard to the suit and the other in regard to the appeal before the
Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati restraining them from proceeding further
in the matters. In the contempt case it was alleged by the inamdars that the
T.T.D. in deliberate disobedience of the judgment of this Court in the first Tallapaka
case had instituted the suit and, therefore, it is liable to be punished for
contempt. "By the impugned Judgment the contempt petition has been
dismissed.
However
writs of prohibition have been issued in the following terms:
"34.
In the result, both the W.Ps. are allowed. A writ of prohibition will issue in
W.P. No. 5997 of 1996 prohibiting the principal Subordinate Judge Tirupati from
proceeding with the suit O.S. No. 69 of 1995. Likewise, a writ of prohibition
will issue in W.P. No. 8347 of 1996 prohibiting the Revenue Divisional Officer,
Tirupati from proceeding with the appeal preferred by the T.T.D. against the
order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor in S.R. No. 1/95 dated
9.8.1995." The reasoning adopted in the impugned judgment, in granting the
writ of prohibition, is that having urged all contentions in the earlier round
of litigation Appellants were now estopped from claiming any rights.
The
High Court held that the principles of res judicata applied. The High Court
justified issuance of writs of prohibition on the following reasoning:
"If
the Civil Court and the Court of the Revenue Divisional Officer were permitted
to proceed with the trial and the appeal, they would be acting outside their
powers. A writ of prohibition can be issued to prevent a person from acting or
continuing to act in such a way as to abuse jurisdiction of a judicial or
quasi-judicial body. It is not necessary for the petitioners to wait until the
decisions are rendered by the Civil Court
and the Revenue Divisional Officer and then move this Court for a writ of
certiorari." At this stage it is necessary to set out Section 14 of the
Andhra Pradesh (Andhara Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari)
Act, 1956 (hereinafter called the said Act) which reads as follows:
"Bar
of jurisdiction of Civil Courts:-No suit or other proceedings shall be
instituted in any Civil
Court to set aside or
modify any decision of the Tehsildar, the revenue Court, or the Collector under
this Act, except where such decision is obtained by misrepresentation, fraud or
collusion of parties." Mr. Venugopal submitted that proceedings under the
said Act are summary in nature. He submitted that such summary proceedings can
never bar a suit on title. He submitted that on the question, whether a civil
Court's jurisdiction is barred, because a patta has been granted under the said
Act, there are a number of authorities of this Court. He fairly pointed out the
Judgments in the cases of Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat vs. Nori V. Deekshithulu
reported in 1991 Supp (3) SCC 228, Peddinti Venkata Murali Ranganatha Desika Iyengar
vs. Government of A. P. reported in 1996 (3) SCC 75, Pushpagiri Math vs. Kopparaju
Veerabhadra Rao reported in 1996 (9) SCC 202, S. Vanathan Muthuraja vs. Ramalingam
reported in 1997 (6) SCC 143. In all these cases it has been held that the suit
on title was barred. He submitted that there are identical provisions in the
Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and the
Madras Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963.
He
submitted that there are a number of decisions of this Court where it has been
held that merely because a patta has been granted the jurisdiction of the civil
courts to decide title is not barred. He pointed out the judgments in the cases
of State of Tamil Nadu vs. Ramalinga Samigal Madam
reported in 1985 (4) SCC 10, R. Manicka Naicker vs. E. Elumalai Naicker
reported in 1995 (4) SCC 156, Sayyed Ali vs. A.P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad
reported in 1998 (2) SCC 642 and Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal
vs. T. Parvathi Ammal reported in 1998 (9) SCC 603. He submitted that there is
a conflict of opinion between the above-mentioned two sets of decisions. He
submitted that in view of the conflict of decisions the question whether a civil
court has jurisdiction to try a suit on title should be referred to a larger
bench. We are unable to except this submission. One set of Judgments are under
the said Act whereas the other set of judgments are under legislations in Tamil
Nadu. In Sri-La-Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal's case (supra) reliance
had been placed on Vatticherukuru's case (supra) in support of the proposition
that a suit on title was barred. The three Judge bench distinguished that case
on the ground that the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act and the Tamil Nadu
Acts are different. Once a three Judge bench has taken a view that the
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act are different from those of the Tamil Nadu
Acts it cannot be said that there is any conflict of decisions. The decision of
the three Judge bench is binding on this Court. It will thus have to be held
that in respect of the said Act the first set of Judgments would apply whereas
in respect of the legislations in Tamil Nadu the second set of Judgments would
apply. It must be mentioned that in support of the submission that the title
suit is not barred Mr. Venugopal had also relied upon a full bench judgment of
the Madras High Court reported in (1998) The Madras Law Journal Reports 722.
Thus
as per the law laid down by this Court in Andhra Pradesh the civil Court would
have jurisdiction only in cases of misrepresentation, fraud or collusion of
parties. The question still remains whether the High Court could or should
have, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, issued writs of prohibition against
the civil Court from proceeding with the suit before it and against the Revenue
Divisional Officer, Tirupati from proceeding with the appeal preferred by the
Appellants against the order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar, Chittoor.
It
must be remembered that in the Civil Procedure Code there are sufficient
provisions, particularly Order 7 Rule 11 and Order 14 Rule 2, which give to the
civil Court powers to decide its own jurisdiction and questions regarding
maintainability of the suit. The civil Court is also competent to decide
whether a suit before it is barred on principles of estoppal or res judicata.
Mr. Venugopal
submitted that apart from Certiorari, this is the first time where a High Court
has issued a writ, against a Civil Court,
prohibiting it from proceeding with a civil suit instituted before it. He
submitted that there are elaborate provisions in the Civil Procedure Code for
rejecting a plaint and/or deciding questions of maintainability and for trying
issues of its own jurisdiction as preliminary issues. Mr. Venugopal submitted
that the precedent set has enormous potential of being mis-utilised and for
multiplying litigation. He submitted that if this is permitted, a defendant who
does not want an interim order to be passed against him would seek writs of
prohibition against the Court from proceeding with the hearing and disposal of
the suit.
Mr. Venugopal
submitted that the consequences would be far reaching.
He
submitted that if this is permitted, a writ of prohibition can be issued by a
High Court in one State against the trial of a suit in another State provided summons
are served or interim orders are received in that State, so that part of the
cause of action arises in the former State. In support of this submission he
relied upon the case of Navinchandra N. Majithia vs State of Maharashtra and
others reported in 2000 (7) SCC 640.
Mr. Venugopal
showed to this Court the case of Mirajkar vs State of Maharashtra reported in
1966 (3) SCR 779. In this case the High Court had stopped publication of the
proceedings of a trial before it. A writ under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India was filed challenging the validity of that order on the ground that it
infringed fundamental rights under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of
India. It was held, by the majority, that if a judicial Tribunal makes an
order, which it has jurisdiction to make, the order cannot offend a fundamental
right. It was held that an order is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal if
the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the matters that were litigated before
it. It was held that the Tribunal having jurisdiction does not act without
jurisdiction if it makes an error in the application of law. It was held that
if a judicial order is erroneous any person aggrieved by the order, even a
stranger, can file an appeal. It was held that the question about existence of
jurisdiction as well as validity and propriety of the order cannot be raised in
writ proceedings.
Mr. Venugopal
also relied upon a well reasoned judgment of the Madras High Court in the case
of I. S. Lulla vs Smt. Hari and others reported in AIR (1962) Madras 458 wherein it has been held that
Article 226 does not clothe the High Court with jurisdiction to quash the
orders of a subordinate Court. It has been held that orders susceptible to
appeal or revision cannot be quashed by a Writ of certiorari or a writ of
prohibition restraining or prohibiting the subordinate Court from proceeding to
exercise jurisdiction in any matter before it. It has been held that the
jurisdiction to issue writ is not a cloak of an appeal in disguise. It has been
held that jurisdiction under Article 226 is an original jurisdiction which is
quite distinct and separate from the appellate jurisdiction.
Mr Venugopal
also relied upon the case of U. P. Sales Tax Service Association vs Taxation
Bar Association reported in 1995 (5) SCC 716. In this case it has been held
that the writ of Prohibition can only be issued when the inferior Court or
Tribunal
(a) proceeds
to act without or in excess of jurisdiction,
(b)
proceeds to act in violation of rules of natural justice,
(c) proceeds
to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or
(d) proceeds
to act in contravention of fundamental rights.
Mr Venugopal
very fairly brought to the notice of this Court the reported in 1977 (2) SCC
435 where a Writ of certiorari was issued against a judgment on the footing
that the Court had acted illegally and there was an error apparent on the face
of the record. It is however to be noted that there is no discussion, in this
case, as to the circumstances under which a Writ of certiorari or prohibition
can be issued. He also fairly pointed out the case of Chhedi Lal Gupta &
Ors. vs Mohammad Sattar reported in AIR (1963) Allahabad 448 wherein it had
been mentioned that the Writ of Prohibition had been issued earlier by the High
Court from proceeding with the trial on the ground that the suit was one for
infringement of trademark and could thus, by virtue of Section 73 of the
Trademark Act, be filed only in the Court of the District Judge at Allahabad.
However it must be noted that in this case it had been held that the Writ of
Prohibition did not prevent the trial Court from returning the plaint for
presentation to the proper Court under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure
Code.
On the
other hand Mr. Mishra submitted that Article 226 of the Constitution of India
makes no distinction with respect to the power which a Writ Court can exercise for any of the
prerogative writs which can be issued for enforcement of any of the rights
conferred by Part III of the Constitution of India or for any other purpose. He
submitted that mandamus, prohibition and certiorari are exercised in the same
manner depending upon the nature of the controversy and the stage at which they
can be effective. He submitted that a certiorari was a writ addressed to a
proceeding in the Court and order passed therein whereas a prohibition was
directed to the subordinate Court or to any other judicial or quasi-judicial
authorities.
Mr. Mishra
submitted that the instant case was one where a suit was being entertained in
the teeth of a specific bar under the said Act and even though the suit was hit
by res-judicata. He submitted that all the issues were adjudicated by the
competent quasi-judicial authorities and affirmed by the Division Bench of the
High Court and this Hon'ble
Court in the earlier
round of litigation. He submitted that the Civil Court has acted without jurisdiction in entertaining and proceedings
with the suit. He submitted that the inferior court cannot traverse the
findings in the judgment of the High Court and this Hon'ble Court. Mr. Mishra submitted that the
primary rule is that a writ of prohibition is issued to a Court which also is
an authority and since it is issued to a Court it is also issued to such
persons or authorities who exercise judicial or quasi-judicial powers.
In
support of the submission that the High Court has power to issue directions or
orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. Mr Mishra relied upon the case of Hari
Vishnu Kamath vs Syed Ahmed Ishaque reported in (1955) SCR 1104. In this case
the question was whether a writ of certiorari could be issued against an
Election Tribunal after it had become functous officio. It was held that the
intention of the Constitution was to vest in the High Court a power to
supervise decisions of Tribunals by issue of appropriate writs and directions
and that the exercise of that power cannot be defeated by technical
consideration of form and procedure. It was held that the High Courts must
however observe the principles which regulate the exercise of such
jurisdiction. It was held that before a writ of certiorari can be issued there
must be an error apparent on the face of the record.
Observations
in following cases were cited with approval:
"The
decision in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw
([1951] 1 K.B. 711) was taken in appeal, and was affirmed by the Court of
Appeal in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal; Ex parte Shaw
([1952] 1 K.B. 338). In laying down that an error of law was a ground for
granting certiorari, the learned Judges emphasised that it must be apparent on
the face of the record. Denning, L.J. who stated the power in broad and general
terms observed :
"It
will have been seen that throughout all the cases there is one governing rule :
certiorari is only available to quash a decision for error of law if the error
appears on the face of the record".
The
position was thus summed up by Morris, L.J. :
"It
is plain that certiorari will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.
It does not lie in order to bring an order or decision for rehearing of the
issue raised in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of law where
revealed on the face of an order or decision, or irregularity, or absence of,
or excess of, jurisdiction where shown".
In Veerappa
Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd. and Others ([1952] S.C.R. 583), it was
observed by this court that under article 226 the writ should be issued
"in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act
wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the
principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in
them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record". In T. C. Basappa
v. T. Nagappa ([1955] S.C.R. 250) the law was thus stated :
"An
error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of
'certiorari' but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the
proceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the
provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected
by 'certiorari' but not a mere wrong decision".
Mr Mishra
also relied upon the case of Union of India and others vs Upendra Singh
reported in 1994 (3) SCC 357. In this case the Central Administrative Tribunal
had examined the correctness of charges framed in a disciplinary proceedings.
It was held that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was akin to the jurisdiction
of the High Court under Article 226. It has then been held that:
"4.
……………………… A writ of prohibition is issued only when patent lack of jurisdiction
is made out. It is true that a High Court acting under Article 226 is not bound
by the technical rules applying to the issuance of prerogative writs like
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in United Kingdom, yet the basic
principles and norms applying to the said writs must be kept in view, as
observed by this Court in T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa ((1955) 1 SCR 250 : AIR
1954 SC 440). It was observed by Mukherjea, J.
speaking
for the Constitution Bench :
"The
language used in Articles 32 and 226 of our Constitution is very wide and the
powers of the Supreme Court as well as of all the High Courts in India extend
to issuing of orders, writs and directions including writs in the nature of
'habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition and certiorari' as may be
considered necessary for enforcement of the fundamental rights and in the case
of the High Courts, for other purposes as well. In view of the express
provisions in our Constitution we need not now look back to the early history
or the procedural technicalities of these writs in English law, nor feel
oppressed by any difference or change of opinion expressed in particular cases
by English Judges. We can make an order or issue a writ in the nature of
'certiorari' in all appropriate cases and in appropriate manner, so long as we
keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise of
jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law."
5. The
said statement of law was expressly affirmed by a seven-Judge Bench in Ujjam Bai
v. State of U.P. (AIR 1962 SC 1621, 1625) The reason for this dictum is
self-evident.
If we
do not keep to the broad and fundamental principles that regulate the exercise
of jurisdiction in the matter of granting such writs in English law, the
exercise of jurisdiction becomes rudderless and unguided; it tends to become
arbitrary and capricious. There will be no uniformity of approach and there
will be the danger of the jurisdiction becoming personalised. The parameters of
jurisdiction would vary from Judge to Judge and from Court to Court. (emphasis
supplied) Mr Mishra also relied upon the case of Smt. Ujjam Bai vs State of
Uttar Pradesh reported in 1963 (1) SCR 778. In this case the question was
whether a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India was
maintainable against an assessment made by a sales tax officer under a valid
act. The majority held that the writ petition was not maintainable. In this
case it has been held by Aiyar J as follows:
"Now,
I come to the controversial area. What is the position with regard to an order
made by a quasi-judicial authority in the undoubted exercise of its
jurisdiction in pursuance of a provision of law which is admittedly intra vires
? It is necessary first to clarify the concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
means authority to decide.
Whenever
a judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal is empowered or required to enquire into
a question of law or fact for the purpose of giving a decision on it, its
findings thereon cannot be impeached collaterally or on an application for
certiorari but are binding until reversed on appeal. Where a quasi-judicial
authority has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it does not lose its
jurisdiction by coming to a wrong conclusion whether it is wrong in law or in fact.
The question, whether a tribunal has jurisdiction depends not on the truth or
falsehood of the facts into which it has to enquire, or upon the correctness of
its findings on these facts, but upon their nature, and it is determinable
"at the commencement, not at the conclusion, of the inquiry'.
(Rex
v. Bolten ([1841] I Q.B. 66, 74.)). Thus, a tribunal empowered to determine
claims for compensation for loss of office has jurisdiction to determine all
questions of law and fact relating to the measure of compensation and the
tenure of the office, and it does not exceed its jurisdiction by determine any
of those questions incorrectly but it has no jurisdiction to entertain a claim
for reinstatement or damages for wrongful dismissal, and it will exceed its jurisdiction
if it makes an order in such terms, for it has no legal power to give any
decision whatsoever on those matters. A tribunal may lack jurisdiction if it is
improperly constituted, or if it fails to observe certain essential
preliminaries to the inquiry. But it does not exceed its jurisdiction by basing
its decision upon an incorrect determination of any question that it is
empowered or required (i.e.,) had jurisdiction to determine. ………………..
The
characteristic attribute of judicial act or decision is that it binds, whether
it be right or wrong. An error of law or fact committed by a judicial or
quasi-judicial body cannot, in general, be impeached otherwise than on appeal
unless the erroneous determination relates to a matter on which the jurisdiction
of that body depends. These principles govern not only the findings of inferior
courts stricto sensu but also the findings of administrative bodies which are
held to be acting in a judicial capacity. Such bodies are deemed to have been
invested with power to err within the limits of their jurisdiction; and
provided that they keep within those limits, their decisions must be accepted
as valid unless set aside on appeal. Even the doctrine of res judicata has been
applied to such decisions."
On the
basis of the authorities it is clear that the Supreme Court and the High Courts
have power to issue writs, including a writ of prohibition. A writ of
prohibition is normally issued only when the inferior Court or Tribunal
(a) proceeds
to act without or in excess of jurisdiction,
(b)
proceeds to act in violation of rules of natural justice,
(c) proceeds
to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional, or
(d) proceeds
to act in contravention of fundamental rights.
The
principles, which govern exercise of such power, must be strictly observed. A
writ of prohibition must be issued only in rarest of rare cases. Judicial
disciplines of the highest order has to be exercised whilst issuing such writs.
It must be remembered that the writ jurisdiction is original jurisdiction
distinct from appellate jurisdiction. An appeal cannot be allowed to be
disguised in the form of a writ. In other words, this power cannot be allowed
to be used "as a cloak of an appeal in disguise". Lax use of such a
power would impair the dignity and integrity of the subordinate Court and could
also lead to chaotic consequences. It would undermine the confidence of the
subordinate Court. It was not even argued that there was total lack of
jurisdiction in the civil Court. It could not be denied that the civil Court,
before which the suit was pending, had powers to decide on the maintainability
of the suit and to decide on questions of its jurisdiction.
The
civil Court had jurisdiction to decide whether the suit was barred by Section 14
of the said Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel.
Thus
unless there was some very cogent or strong reason the High Court should not
have prevented the Court of competent jurisdiction from deciding these
questions. In other words the High Court should not usurp the jurisdiction of
the civil Court to decide these questions.
In the
impugned Judgment no reason, much less a cogent or strong reason, has been
given as to why the civil Court could not be allowed to decide these questions.
The impugned Judgment does not state that the civil Court had either proceeded
to act without or in excess of jurisdiction or that it had acted in violation
of rules of natural justice or that it had proceeded to act under law which was
ultra vires or unconstitutional or proceeded to act in contravention of
fundamental rights. The impugned Judgment does not indicate as to why the High
Court did not consider it expedient to allow the civil Court to decide on
questions of maintainability of the suit or its own jurisdiction. The impugned
judgment does not indicate why the civil Court be not allowed to decide whether
the suit was barred by virtue of Section 14 of the said Act or on principles of
res judicata/estoppel. To be remembered that no fundamental right is being violated
when a Court of competent jurisdiction is deciding, rightly or wrongly, matters
before it.
Faced
with this situation Mr. Mishra submitted that in the written statement filed by
the Respondents it had been contended that the suit was not maintainable and
was barred on principles of res judicata/estoppel. He submitted that in spite
of these points having been urged before the civil Court an interim injunction
restraining the Respondents from alienating the suit lands had been issued. He
submitted that the civil Court had thus exercised jurisdiction when it clearly
had no jurisdiction. He submitted that it was under these circumstances that
the Respondents filed writ petitions before the High Court. On this submission
Mr. Venugopal pointed out to us that whilst granting an interim injunction the
civil Court had considered, prima facie, the question of maintainability of the
suit. Mr. Venugopal also pointed out that the Respondents had filed an appeal
against the order granting interim injunction. It was pointed out that the
appeal is also dismissed holding prima facie that the suit was maintainable. Mr.
Mishra could not deny these facts. These facts indicate how chaotic a result
has prevailed by grant of the writ of prohibition. The impugned Judgment prohibits
the civil Court from proceeding with the suit. Thus the suit will lie on the
dormant file of the civil Court indefinitely.
However
the interim injunction granted by the civil Court, as affirmed by the appellate
Court, will continue to operate. To be remembered that in the impugned Judgment
there is no reference to these orders and no writ of certiorari has been issued
quashing those orders. The end result would be that the suit cannot proceed yet
the Respondent will continue, indefinitely, to be restrained by the interim
order. Faced with this situation Mr. Mishra submitted that this Court in
exercise of its powers should quash the interim order. Mr. Mishra submitted
that this was the equitable and correct course to be followed by this Court.
He
submitted that this Court should not interfere with the impugned order as it
would be futile to force the Respondents to undergo a full round of litigation
for a second time when all questions, between the parties, including questions
of title were already decided in the earlier round of litigation.
We
have considered the rival submissions. It is not possible to accept Mr. Mishra
submission that this Court should quash the interim orders. Those orders are
not before this Court and this Court cannot blindly quash orders passed by
Courts of competent jurisdiction without even looking into the orders. Even
presuming, without so holding, that the suit is not maintainable by virtue of
Section 14 of the said Act or on principles of res judicata/estoppel in our
view the High Court should have permitted the civil Court, which was competent
to decide these questions to do so. At the most the High Court could have
directed the civil Court to decide these issues as preliminary issues. In our
view the correct course is to set aside the impugned Judgment and direct the
civil Court to decide the question of maintainability of the suit in view of
Section 14 of the said Act and/or its jurisdiction to entertain the suit as
also the question whether the suit is barred by principles of res judicata as
preliminary issues. We see no substance in the apprehension that in deciding
the preliminary issues the civil Court will not keep in mind Judgments of this
Court (set out therein above) pertaining to maintainability of the suit once patta
is granted under the said Act. Undoubtedly the civil Court would see whether in
effect the suit is for purposes of setting aside or modifying the decisions
taken in the earlier round of litigation.
It
must also be mentioned that during arguments Mr. Venugopal had submitted that
the Appellants were considering applying for amendment of the plaint in order
to plead fraud. We are sure that if any such application is made the same will
be considered on its merits after hearing the other side. It must be mentioned
that Mr. Mishra had submitted that by the proposed amendments admissions are
sought to be retracted. We see no reason to conclude that the civil Court would
permit retraction of admissions.
Finally
it must be mentioned that both sides had argued on the merits of the case. Mr. Venugopal
relied upon, what he called, Title Deeds bearing Numbers 2920 in respect of
1.53 acres and 2921 in respect of 27.4 acres. The two grants are identically
worded. Thus it is sufficient to reproduce Grant number 2920 which reads as
follows:
"NO.2920
Title deed granted to the Manager for the time being of Nandanavanam at Tirupati
and Tirumala.
1. By
order of the Governor in council of Madras acting on behalf of the Secretary of
State for India in Council, I acknowledge your title to a Devadayam of Nandanavanam
Inam consisting of the right to the Government Revenue on land claimed to be
(one) 1.53 acres of dry and situated in the village of Tirumala, Taluk of Chandragiri,
District of North Arcot and held for the support of Venkateswara Swamy Pagoda
in the village.
2.
This Inam is confirmed to you and your successors tax-free to the held without
interference as long as the conditions of the grant duly fulfilled.
Sd/- Inam
Commissioner" He submitted that these grants are in favour of the manager
and are a gift to the temple. He submitted that these were granted as far back
as 9th August, 1882. He submitted that on 21st April 1960 a patta was granted
to the Devasthanam under the said Act. He submitted that the grant of patta was
confirmed in appeal by the RDO, Tirupati. He submitted that on 4th November
1965 the Government of Andhra Pradesh confirmed the grant of patta. He
submitted that the 9th April 1990 rules were framed under Section 97 read with
Section 153 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions
and Endowments Act, 1987 and Rule 196 declared these properties as the
exclusive properties of the Devasthanam. He submitted that clearly the title to
the property was with the Devasthanam. He submitted that in the earlier
proceedings the only question was to whom a Ryotwari patta had to be granted.
He submitted that in those proceedings the question of title was not looked
into. He submitted that this Court in its order dated 11th January 1995,
affirmed the findings of the Commissioner to the effect that the title to the Inam
lands was not a condition precedent for grant of patta. He submitted that thus
this Court had made it clear that it was not going into the question of title
in those proceedings. He submitted that the Appellants were thus not estopped
from filing a suit and the principles of res judicata had no application.
Mr. Venugopal
submitted that a Ryotwari patta is only a bill for direct payment of revenue to
the State and if at all only prima facie evidence of title. In support of this
proposition he relied upon the book on Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency by
S. Sunderraja Iyengar and the case of Ramamoorthy vs State of Madras reported
in (1970) The Indian Law Reports 788. Mr. Venugopal submitted that a mere
decision on grant of patta cannot exclude a subsequent suit based on title. Mr.
Venugopal submitted that no provision of the said Act provides expressly for a
determination of title. He submitted that Rule 15(1) of the Rules made under the
Act, provides for summary proceedings. Mr. Venugopal submitted that if a decree
is passed in their suit on title then the grant of a Ryotwari patta will get
nullified incidentally. He submitted that the purpose of the said Act cannot be
that notwithstanding title (unlike agrarian reforms) the inamdar institution
will stand deprived of its property by a sidewind.
On the
other hand Mr. Mishra submitted that the Suit is barred in view of the specific
findings by the revenue authorities and as affirmed by the Division Bench of
the High Court in W.A. No. 4/1993 and 1752 of 1987 in the first Thallappaka
case reported in 1993 (1) Andhra Law Times 293. He relied on this Judgment and
pointed out that on consideration of Section 3, 4(1), 7 & 14(A) of the said
Act, it is held that as per the Inam's Fair Register the legal title was that
of Respondents and not Appellants. He submitted that the said decision has
finally settled the question of title and rights as a rayat. Mr. Mishra pointed
out the plaint in the suit now filed by the Appellants that there was no plea
of misrepresentation, fraud or collusion in this suit. He pointed out that even
in answer to the writ petitions filed by the Respondents, the Appellants had
not taken up a contention that the earlier findings were obtained by
misrepresentation, fraud or collusion.
He
pointed out that even in this Civil Appeal there is no ground that there had
been any misrepresentation, fraud or collusion in obtaining the earlier
decision. He submitted that thus the express bar to the suit, as provided under
Section 14 of the said Act, willfully apply. He submitted that the High Court,
in the impugned Judgment, has rightly held so. Mr. Mishra submitted that the
Suit is also barred on the principle of constructive res-judicata. In support
of the submission that principles of res-judicata to apply even to decisions in
Writ proceedings Mr. Mishra relied upon the case of Gulabchand Parekh vs State
of Bombay reported in 1965 (2) SCR 547. In support of the submission that the Inam
Fair Register is evidence of utmost importance Mr Mishra relied upon the cases
of N. Y. Lakshminarasimachari vs Sri Agasthewaraswami Varu of Kolakalur
reported in 1960 (2) SCR 768;
Shri Vallabharaya
Swami Varu (Deity) of Swarna vs Deevi Hanumancharyulu & Ors. reported in
1979 (3) SCC 778 and Subramania Gurukkal vs Shri Patteswaraswami Devasthanam
reported in 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 519.
Mr. Mishra
submitted that in the earlier round of proceedings Appellants had admitted that
the possession, on the relevant date, was with the Respondents. Mr. Mishra
pointed out that in the first Thallappaka's case the Commissioner while
dismissing Appellants revision application noted in the order dated 7.2.1986
that the then counsel for the Appellants conceded as follows:
"The
counsel for the T.T.D. concedes that the lands were in possession of the
respondents on the crucial dates and that in the notice issued by the executive
officer, T.T.D. in his ROC No. G1/10291/59 dated 8.8.1959 it has been clearly
stated that Tallapakam Venkata Seshacharyulu and others were in possession of
the lands since 7.6.1933." Mr. Mishra submitted that it was an admitted
position, even in the plaint of the suit now filed by the Appellants, that the
Respondents were in possession of the land. He submitted that as the
Respondents alone enjoyed the land, their possession was sufficient for
acceptance of their entitlement for Ryotwari patta. He submitted that the
Appellants had produced no documentary evidence to show that land in question
belonged to the temple. He submitted that on the contrary there was evidence to
show that Appellants had filed a suit against one Mahant Prayag Das for
recovery of possession of vast extents of lands.
He
submitted that significantly in that suit theses lands were not shown as lands
of the Appellants. He submitted that in that suit the Appellants claimed 16
plots of land describing them as Nandanavanam i.e. garden of the temple,
however, no relief was claimed in respect of these lands and these lands were
not described in the said suit as Nandanavanam or the garden belonging to the
temple. Mr. Mishra submitted that in view of the above noted facts the High
Court's Judgment is correct in law. Mr. Mishra submitted that Section 2 A of
the said Act has to be read with Section 4(1) and 7 of the Act. While communal
lands would vest in the Government other village lands in possession of the inamdar
shall remain with him and he would be entitled to Ryotwari Patta.
We see
no reason to express any opinion on the rival submissions. Were we to express
any opinion we would be committing the same mistake that the High Court has
committed viz usurping the jurisdiction of the civil Court to decide these
questions. We therefore express no opinion on merits.
In
view of what is set out herein above we set aside the impugned Judgment to the
extent that it prohibits the civil Court from proceeding with Suit 69 of 1995.
We direct the civil Court to frame and decide, as expeditiously as possible and
in any case within six months from today, preliminary issues as to
maintainability of the suit in view of Section 14 of the said Act and whether
the suit is barred on principles of res judicata/estoppel.
We are
in agreement with the observations of the High Court that grant of Patta to the
Respondents was a formality in pursuance of the decisions in the earlier round
of litigation. It is only if it is held that the Appellants suit is
maintainable and not barred on principles of res judicata/estoppal that the
Appellants can be allowed to pursue the appeal. Thus the writ of prohibition
preventing the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirupati from proceeding with the
appeal preferred by the Appellants against the order of the Inams Deputy Tahsildar,
Chittoor in S.R. No. 1/95 dated 9.8.1995 must continue for the present. Those
proceedings shall therefore continue to remain stayed till after the final
decision on the preliminary issues. If the preliminary issues are finally
answered in favour of the Appellants then the writ of prohibition in respect of
the appeal shall automatically stand vacated. If however the preliminary issues
are finally answered against the Appellants the writ of prohibition shall stand
confirmed.
These
Appeals stand disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.
Back