Kanpur Development Authority Vs. Smt. Sheela
Devi & Ors [2003] Insc 601 (28 November 2003)
Shivaraj
V. Patil & D.M. Dharmadhikari. Shivaraj V. Patil J.
Kanpur
Development Authority (KDA) has filed these appeals challenging the correctness
and validity of the common order dated 21.5.1997 made by the Division Bench of
the High court in Writ Petitions.
Three
schemes were floated by KDA in September, 1978 with financial support of
'HUDCO' "on no profit no loss basis". The three Schemes were;
(1)
For Economically Weaker Section;
(2)
For Lower Income Group and
(3)
Middle Income Group. Applications were invited in the prescribed form fixing
the last date as 29.9.1978.
The
applications were to be made in the prescribed form along with the earnest
money for each category. A brochure was issued showing the cost of each house
and terms and conditions of the Schemes. In these cases, we are not concerned
with the houses constructed in two other schemes which were allotted to the
applicants on the basis of lottery on 25.10.1980 and cost specified in the
brochure and the possession of the houses was delivered to them. However, the
applicants (respondents herein) in the Middle Income Group were not allotted
the houses and their applications were kept pending for more than 18 years for
no fault of them.
As per
the terms and conditions mentioned in the brochure in the MIG Category, the
applications were to be made along with the earnest money by 29.9.1978. The
estimated cost of each house was specified in the brochure as Rs. 48,000/-. The
persons whose income was between Rs. 601/- to Rs. 1500/- per month were
eligible for Middle Income Group Houses. The houses were to be allotted among
the valid applicants by lottery. After the lottery was drawn and on receipt of
letter of information of allotment, the applicants had to deposit balance of
the 1/4th of the cost of the house. Thereafter, physical possession of the
houses was to be delivered to the allottees and the remaining 3/4th of the cost
of the house i.e. Rs.36,000/- was to be paid by the allottees in 48 quarterly
installments in 12 years with 11.5% interest as per the brochure. Since there
were only 108 valid applications altogether for 111 MIG houses, all the
applicants could have been allotted MIG houses when 1/4th cost of the house was
deposited by the applicants as on 31.3.1979, what remained was only to draw a
lottery among the 108 valid applicants for the specific houses to each one of
the applicants. And thereafter the possession of specified house was to be
delivered to each allottee as the constructions of 111 MIG houses were
completed in 1980.
However,
KDA chose to include names of some more applicants after the last date i.e.
29.9.1978, which gave rise to disputes.
Some
affected applicants filed suits in 1981/1982. None of these respondents were
parties in those suits.
The
court finding fault with the KDA decreed the suit and directed it to allot the
houses to 108 valid applicants keeping 8 houses reserved for the persons who
are plaintiffs in those two suits. The appeals filed by the KDA against the
decree passed by the trial court were also dismissed. Instead of complying with
the decree, KDA increased the cost of each houses from Rs. 48,000/- to
Rs.2,08,000/- by the notification dated 24.12.1994 stating that each applicant
had to deposit a further sum of Rs.40,000/- and in case of default the name of
the applicant would not be included in the list of lottery for allotment of
houses.
In
these circumstances, some of the respondents were compelled to file writ
petitions.
The
writ petitions were admitted and interim orders were issued to include the
names of 85 general category applicants in the lottery. In spite of the interim
order dated 4.1.1995, KDA again issued a notification on 10.1.1995 stating that
the date of lottery had been extended to 17.1.1995.
The
lottery was drawn among the 108 valid applications, keeping 8 houses reserved
to the plaintiffs in the two suits. In February, 1995, information of allotment
was issued to all the allottees along with demand for Rs. 24,000/- from each
one of them towards first 6th monthly installment. The High Court in the writ
petitions stayed this demand. The KDA filed the counter affidavit in the writ
petitions taking a stand that it was entitled to escalate the price as per the
brochure; the initial price fixed as the cost of the houses, was only
tentative; the delay in drawing of lottery and allotment of house was on
account of the suits filed and because of the pendency of the cases. According
to the KDA, the action taken by it in increasing the cost of the house to Rs. 2,08,000/-
was quite justified. The Division Bench of the High Court, after detailed
consideration of the respective contentions, allowed the writ petitions
granting relief to the respondents by quashing the order dated 24.12.1994 of
the KDA increasing the cost of the houses and directed it to deliver the
possession of the houses to the respondents on the cost fixed in the brochure.
The
learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Court failed to appreciate
that the Vice Chairman of KDA could determine the cost of the houses and the
cost fixed by him was reasonable and fair; the High court could not have
interfered with such determination of cost. The High Court should have taken
into consideration the position that the KDA brought out the scheme for
allotment of houses on 'no profit and no loss basis'; the cost fixed was based
on the relevant materials and it was not arbitrary so as to interfere with the
same; it was not open to the High Court to hold that the price of the house
fixed was arbitrary and unreasonable without going into the method or the basis
for calculating the cost of the house. The delay in allotment of houses was not
deliberate or intentional; it was because of long pending litigation in courts.
The learned counsel added that KDA constructed the houses by raising loans
under the HUDCO Scheme; it has paid enormous amount of interest on the loan
raised; it had to pay heavy compensation for acquisition of land.
On the
other hand, the learned senior counsel for the respondents argued fully
justifying the impugned order. He submitted that the delay in allotment of
houses and delivering the possession of the same to the respondents was on
account of the appellant; the respondents complied with the every condition
contemplated in the brochure; the unreasonable stand and conduct of the
appellant was responsible for delay and no blame can be put on the respondents
in that regard. Two suits were filed in 1981/1982 by eight plaintiffs in all.
Nothing prevented the appellant from allotting the houses to the respondents
keeping aside eight houses for the eight plaintiffs as they were available in
excess of the applications. The appellant moved for vacating the interim order
in those suits filed in 1981/1982 only in 1990.
The
present respondents were not parties in those suits. The appeals filed by the
KDA against the decree passed in the suits were dismissed on 24.5.1994. The
learned counsel further contended that as per the brochure issued by the
appellant, escalation of cost of houses could not exceed 10%; cost of the
houses should be determined as on the date of completion of the houses and not
on the date of the allotment or delivering the possession of the houses. The
appellant has tried to prosecute parallel remedies inasmuch as it filed review
petitions before the High Court and special leave petition before this Court
against the impugned order. The respondents were salaried employees having
income between Rs.601 to Rs.1500 per month; they had arranged their financial
affairs with a hope to get houses. Had they been given the possession of the
houses immediately after their completion in 1981, they could have saved money
paying by way of rent to houses where they were staying. The learned counsel drew
our attention to I.A. Nos. 7-8 of 2003 filed by the respondents to take action
against the appellant under Section 340 read with Section 195 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure by ordering an inquiry into the offences committed by the
appellant under Sections 193, 196, 199, 200, 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, 471 read
with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code in respect of production of false
and fabricated documents and giving false evidence during the proceedings. In
these applications it is specifically averred that the appellant produced a
translated copy of the brochure (Annexure A-1) alleging the same to contain the
1978 Scheme for allotment of houses in Mohalla Barra Third Phase, Kanpur. The correct copy (translated) of
the brochure that was given to the respondents at the time of application for
the said Scheme is filed as Annexure A-2. The original copy in Hindi was placed
before us during the hearing. According to the respondents Annexure A-1 was
filed before the High Court by the appellant, which is fake, fabricated and
materially different from the true translation of the original brochure and
that the said document has been filed by the appellant with oblique motives to
thwart/alter the course of justice. It is further stated in these I.As. that
the case of the appellant before this Court is based on the premise that
"In the brochure Clause 4 relating to payment of price, stipulated that
the final price shall be determined by the Vice Chairman of the KDA and that
the said price shall be determined by the Vice Chairman of the KDA and the
price would be binding on the applicants. The brochure for allotment of houses
under the Scheme also provided that the Vice Chairman of the KDA is empowered
to alter/change the price/shape of the houses shown in the brochure and it
shall be binding on every applicant". The prayer is made in these I.As. to
order for a preliminary inquiry into the offences committed by the persons
responsible in the appellant authority during the course of the judicial
proceedings and after recording the findings make a complaint to the Chief
Judicial Magistrate for the prosecution of the accused persons in accordance
with law. During the course of hearing when the original brochure in Hindi was
produced on behalf of the respondents the learned counsel for the appellant did
not dispute its correctness and authenticity.
We
have carefully considered the respective submissions made on behalf of the
parties and to appreciate them, it may be necessary to refer to the relevant
terms and conditions under different headings contained in the brochure. In the
light of the controversy as to the translated copies of the brochures produced
by the appellant and the respondents and in view of what is stated above in
relation to them the relevant terms and conditions contained in translated copy
of the brochure (Annexure A-2) filed along with I.A. Nos. 7-8 on comparison of
the same with the original in Hindi, reads: - " Signature (L.N. Tripathi)
(Rubber stamp) Head Clerk (Sales) Kanpur Development Authority BURRA HOUSING
CONSTRUCTION SCHEME (financially supported by HUDCO) Third Phase (Application
Form) KANPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Price Rs.5/-" "(Application form
for applicant only) KANPUR DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY No.____ (Without putting
adverse effect) Price Rs.5/- BARRA HOUSING SCHEME
To:
Vice
Chairman Development Authority Kanpur Sir, I/We ___________________ son/wife of
_______________ apply for a house in the proposed houses under "Barra Grah
Nirman Yogna" of Kanpur Development Authority, the estimated cost of which
is Rs.48,000/- (which can also exceed upto 10%).................."
"SYSTEM
AND RULES OF ALLOTMENT OF HOUSES 8) The Vice-Chairman can change any rule or
can cancel and can make other rule which shall be acceptable to the
applicant."
"KANPUR
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY BARRA HOUSING CONSTRUCTION SCHEME Details of House &
Rules for Payment ------------------------------------------------------- Sl.
Category Area Details Monthly Sale Adv. 31.12.78 31.12.79 Qtly. Rate No. of
house of land of income price amount install- of In sq. house of family of with
ments interest/ mt. Not house appli- year exceeding which cation can increase upto
10% ------------------------------------------------------- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
10 11 1. ..............
2.
..............
3. Middle
167.20 2 rooms, 1500 48000 5000 2500 4500 48 11.5% Income drawing Group dining,
Bath & Toilet Room & Lounge " In the application form as
prescribed by the KDA, it is clearly mentioned that the estimated cost of the
house in MIG scheme is Rs.48,000/- (which can also exceed up to 10%). There was
some controversy with regard to the terms and conditions mentioned in the
brochure. It was contended on behalf of the respondents that there was
deliberate misrepresentation by KDA before the High Court by filing incomplete
and incorrect extract of Brochure. Before us, not only translated copy but
original of Brochure in Hindi itself was produced by respondents and there was
no controversy as to the terms and conditions in relation to the relevant
clauses extracted above. As rightly contended on behalf of the respondents
there is no clause 4 in the brochure relating to payment of price on which the
appellant claimed that the Vice- Chairman of the KDA has the right to increase
the price and fix the final price that would be binding on the applicants. This
being the position, the very foundation for increase of the price of houses and
justification thereof itself is destabilized and knocked down. Clause 4 of the
brochure is altogether different, which reads: -
"4)
House category 2 and 3, the interested applicants to deposit full amount of the
house, will have to deposit balance of the 1/4th of cost by 31.12.1978. The
information of lottery will be sent by registered post on the address mentioned
in the application form. The remaining 3/4th of the cost of the house will have
to be deposited in cash or by Bank draft in favour of Development Authority
within 60 days from the information of lottery given by registered post,
otherwise all proceedings regarding allotment will be cancelled and the advance
money will be forfeited." It is not in dispute that the respondents made
applications within the time fixed, satisfied the terms and conditions for
allotment of houses and they were not the plaintiff in the suits filed in 1981/1982.
The construction of houses was completed in 1980, the cost of the house was
determined as on 24.12.1994. Nothing prevented the KDA from allotting houses to
the respondents, when the houses were ready for allotment. Particularly, when
houses available were more than the applications received before the last date.
For no fault of the respondents, they were made to wait for more than 18 years.
As per the brochure, the houses were to be allotted through lottery system by
drawing lot among the eligible applicants, who got themselves registered
through the prescribed format within the time fixed and paid required money
within time.
In the
instant case in MIG scheme, 111 houses were available but the number of
applicants were less including the respondents.
Only 8
persons had filed suits in the years 1981/1982. There should have been no
difficulty in allotting the houses and delivering the possession to the
respondents immediately on their completion in 1980. In that event, the payment
of interest on loan said to have been taken by the authority would not have
arisen. It cannot also be ignored that the respondents were/are mostly salaried
employees having monthly income of Rs.601-1500.
They
must also have adjusted and arranged their finances and affairs to make payment
towards the houses. It may also be kept in mind that the allottees were
expected to pay the remaining amount after initial deposit and first
installment, in 48 installments. Even having regard to the payment of money in
installments, the estimated cost which was fixed at Rs. 48,000/- with a clear
and express understanding that increase in the cost of the house could be up to
10% of the cost of the house. In the brochure, it is also mentioned that the
price of the houses mentioned is totally approximate and that the final price
of the houses would be determined by the Vice Chairman, KDA, on the completion
of the houses. Prices of the houses in these cases were determined as on
24.12.1994 as against the express clause that the determination of the final
price shall be as on the date of completion of the construction of the houses
i.e. in the year 1980. As can be seen from the prescribed form of application
and rules for payment the increase of the cost of the house can be up to 10%.
Further it is clear from the prescribed form of application as filled by the
respondents that the estimated cost of the house is Rs. 48,000/- which could
exceed up to 10%. The argument advanced on behalf of the appellant to the
effect that the Vice Chairman has power to determine the prices of the houses
and the price determined is binding on the respondents, runs contrary to
brochure. Hence it cannot be accepted.
Further
for no fault of the respondents they cannot be penalized to pay the cost of
construction as determined on 24.12.1994 when the houses were ready in 1980. As
can be seen from the impugned order, the High Court has found thus: - "It
was undesirable conduct of the authority which gave rise to the civil
litigation. There were no restraints and constraints for the respondents in
drawing the lottery and making the allotments to the genuine applicants even
during the pendency of the civil suit and appeal before the District Judge.
There is nothing in the counter affidavit to demonstrate that the respondents
were under legal obligation to refuse the allotment of the houses to the
persons or make delay in allotment of the houses to them. So in absence of a
reasonable and sufficient justification preventing the respondents to make
allotment in 1979, we feel that the respondents should be blamed for delay in
making the allotment." The High Court has further observed: - "It may
be mentioned that the petitioners deposited the installments under the hope and
trust that they will get the houses within the time schedule advertised at the
initial stage.
Much
time is elapsed between the registration of the applications for allotment of
the houses and actual construction and delivery of possession thereafter. It is
worth mentioning that the petitioners might be living in the rented house since
1979 and they might have managed their financial position in such a manner that
after the deposit of the installments they will get the house of their own and
thereafter they will be free from payment of house rent and then they will be
shifted from the rented house to the allotted house, but on account of
inordinate delay in delivery of possession of allotted house, their financial
calculation and expectation stands frustrated causing various types of
financial loss to them. On the other hand, once the authorities made offers and
the same were accepted by the allottees, with the legitimate exception, the
statutory obligation cast upon the authorities is to complete the same within
the time schedule mentioned in the offer and if they fail to discharge the
same, they should be held responsible for it and not the petitioners." The
High Court finally concluded that delay in allotting and in delivering the
possession of the houses to the respondents was caused due to the lapse on the
part of the appellant, and, therefore, in the fairness of things, the KDA
should not be allowed to determine unjust and unfair cost of the houses in an
arbitrary manner.
We
have no good reason to take a different view in the light of what is stated
above. We have to note one more submission made on behalf of the appellant that
the appellant works on no loss and no profit basis and it has raised huge loan
under the HUDCO scheme for construction of houses and it has to pay heavy
interest on the amount of loan raised. The appellant neither urged nor laid any
foundation for this argument before the High Court. No details and particulars
were given as to the amount of loan raised and the period for which interest
has been paid in respect of the houses constructed which are to be allotted to
the respondents.
Further
the final price of the houses had to be determined on the date of their
completion. As found, there was delay on account of the appellant and if that
occasioned payment of interest, the respondents cannot be held responsible,
having regard to the terms and conditions contained in the brochure. This
apart, no justifiable case is made out for escalation of price of the houses in
these cases, to say that the appellant could enhance the prices for the
unforeseen or compelling reasons beyond control of appellants even as against
the terms and conditions contained in the brochure.
The
learned counsel for the appellant cited two decisions in Delhi Development
Authority vs. Pushpendra Kumar Jain [1994 Supp. (3) SCC 494] and Prashant Kumar
Shahi vs. Ghaziabad Development Authority [(2000) 4 SCC 120], in support of his
submissions. In our view both these decisions do not help the appellant when we
look at the facts of those cases and the views expressed therein.
In the
Case of Delhi Development Authority (supra) the facts were that Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) published a scheme called "Registration Scheme
of New Pattern, 1979 of intending purchasers of flats to be constructed by
Delhi Development Authority" providing a procedure for allotment of flats.
In the brochure, clause (11) provided schedule of payment. Clause (14) was to
the effect that "it may please be noted that the plinth area of the flats
indicated and the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure are illustrative
and are subject to revision/modification depending upon the exigencies of
lay-out, cost of construction etc.". The Court took notice that there were
always more applicants than the number of flats available.
The
DDA had been adopting the method of draw of lots among the registered
applicants to select the allottees. The writ petition was filed by one of the allottees
because between the date on which lots were drawn and the date on which the
allotment was communicated to the respondent, the land rates were revised by
the DDA by the circular dated 6.12.1990, as there has been substantial
enhancement of land rates in the region of about 50 to 70%. Since the allotment
was made to allottee on January 9/13, 1991, he was called upon to remit the
amount on the basis of revised land rates as aforesaid. The Division Bench of
the High Court accepted the plea of the allottee writ petitioner. This Court,
allowing the appeal filed by the DDA, found fault with two reasons given by the
High Court: (1) Though the draw was held on 12.10.1990, the
allotment-cum-demand letter was issued to the respondent only on January 9/13,
1991. This delay was the result of inefficiency of the DDA, and (2) as the
issue of allotment-cum-demand letter was delayed in the office of DDA, it cannot
charge the revised land rates to the respondent inasmuch as the respondent
became entitled to get the flat on 12.10.1990; the revision of land rates
subsequent to the draw of lots cannot affect the respondent. This Court held
that there was no legal basis for holding that the respondent obtained the
vested right to allotment on the draw of lots as the system of drawing of lots
was resorted to with a view to identify the allottee; it was not the allotment
by itself.
Mere
identification or selection of the allottee does not clothe the person selected
with a legal right to allotment at the price prevailing on the date of draw of
lots. The scheme did not say so either expressly or by necessary implication.
On the contrary clause (14) made provision for modification or revision of cost
of construction, etc. On facts it was also found that there was no unreasonable
delay or inefficiency on the part of the DDA.
Further,
the validity or justification of the revision of land rates by circular dated
6.12.1990 was not questioned in the writ petition. But in the present case the
facts are entirely different. On facts it is found that there has been
unreasonable and unjustified delay on the part of the appellant in allotting
and delivering the possession of the houses. The clause in regard to
determination of price is not similar to clause (14) in the aforementioned case
of DDA. The cost of escalation could not exceed 10% of the tentative cost. The
cost of construction of house in these cases on hand was to be determined as on
the date of the completion of the construction of the house and not on the date
of delivering possession of the house. Unlike in the case of DDA it was not the
case of revision of land rates alone, that too in the absence of any circular
indicating revision of cost of land before allotment or delivery of possession
of houses.
The
case of Prashant Kumar Shahi, aforementioned, is also of no help to the
appellant. It supports the case of the respondents. This Court held that if the
authority is found to be responsible for the delay in delivery of the
possession of the plots in terms of the agreement arrived at or according to
the assurance given in the brochure, the allottee cannot be burdened with the
interest on the balance amount not paid by him. But on the facts of that case
fault was found with the allottee in regard to the delay in payment. As already
recorded above, in these appeals, with which we are concerned, delay was on
account of the appellant authority itself.
The
learned counsel for the respondents in support of his submissions cited the
decision of this Court in Indore Development Authority vs. Sadhana Agarwal (Smt)
and others [(1995) 3 SCC 1].
In the
facts and circumstances of that case having regard to the reasons for the
increase in the cost no interference was called for by the High Court. Further,
the High Court was justified in saying that in such circumstances, the
authority owed a duty to explain and satisfy the court, the reasons for such
high escalation. The High Court has to be satisfied on the materials on record
that the authority has not acted in an arbitrary or erratic manner. In the said
decision reference is made to two earlier decisions of this Court including the
case of DDA aforementioned. In paragraph 9 it is stated, thus:-
"9.
This Court in the case of Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh
[(1989) 2 SCC 116], had to deal with a similar situation in connection with the
Bareilly Development Authority which had undertaken construction of dwelling
units for people belonging to different income groups styled as "Lower
Income Group", "Middle Income Group", "Higher Income
Group" and the "Economically Weaker Sections". The respondents
to the said appeal had registered themselves for allotment of the flats in
accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the brochure issued by
the Authority. Subsequently, the respondents of that appeal received notices
for the Authority intimating the revised cost of the houses/flats and the
monthly installment rates which were almost double the cost and rate of instalments
initially stated in the General Information Table. But taking all facts and
circumstances into consideration, this Court said that it cannot be held that
there was a misstatement or incorrect statement or any fraudulent concealment,
in the brochure published by the Authority. It was also said that the
respondents cannot be heard to say that the Authority had arbitrarily and
unreasonably changed the terms and conditions of the brochure to the prejudice
of the respondents. In that connection, it was pointed out that the most of the
respondents had accepted the changed and varied terms.
Thereafter
they were not justified in seeking any direction from the Court to allot such
flats on the original terms and conditions. Recently, the same question has
been examined in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. Pushpendra Kumar
Jain. In respect of hike in the price of the flats, it was said : (SCC p. 497,
Para 8) "Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not clothe
the person selected with a legal right to allotment at the price prevailing on
the date of draw of lots. The scheme evolved by the appellant does not say so
either expressly or by necessary implication. On the contrary, clause (14)
thereof says that 'the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure are
illustrative and are subject to revisions/ modification depending upon the
exigencies of lay out, cost of construction etc'."
Although
this Court has from time to time, taking the special facts and circumstances of
cases in question, has upheld the excess charged by the development authorities
over the cost initially announced as estimated cost, but it should not be
understood that this Court has held that such development authorities have
absolute right to hike the cost of flats, initially announced as approximate or
estimated cost for such flats. It is well known that persons belonging to
middle and lower income groups, before registering themselves for such flats,
have to take their financial capacity into consideration and in some cases it
results in great hardship when the development authorities announce an
estimated or approximate cost and deliver the same at twice or thrice of the
said amount. The final cost should be proportionate to the approximate or
estimated cost mentioned in the offers or agreements. With the high rate of
inflation, escalation of the prices of construction materials and labour
charges, if the scheme is not ready within the time-frame, then it is not
possible to deliver the flats or houses in question at the cost so announced.
It will be advisable that before offering the flats to the public such
development authorities should fix the estimated cost of the flats taking into
consideration the escalation of the cost during the period the scheme is to be
completed. In the instant case the estimated cost for the LIG flat was given
out at Rs. 45,000. But by the impugned communication, the appellant informed
the respondents that the actual cost of the flat shall be Rs. 1,16,000 i.e. the
escalation is more than 100%. The High Court was justified in saying that in
such circumstances, the Authority owed a duty to explain and to satisfy the
Court, the reasons for such high escalation. We may add that this does not mean
that the High Court in such disputes, while exercising the writ jurisdiction,
has to examine every detail of the construction with reference to the cost
incurred. The High Court had to be satisfied on the materials on record that
the Authority has not acted in an arbitrary or erratic manner. "We are of
the view that each case is to be decided in the facts and circumstances of the
case in the light of the scheme published/framed and the terms and conditions
mentioned in the Brochure and/or in the prescribed form of application in the
matter of escalation/determination of cost of house/flat. However, cases where
there is limit for fixing the escalation of cost, normally the price of house
or flat cannot exceed the limits so fixed. The determination of cost of
house/flat or escalation of cost cannot be arbitrary or erratic. The authority
has to broadly satisfy by placing material on record to justify the escalation
of cost of a house/flat. Whether the delay was caused by the allottee or the
authority itself is also a factor which has bearing in determination of the
cost of house/flat. The unforeseen cause or the reason beyond control of the
authority in a given case may be another factor to be kept in view. We may also
notice that in these cases the tentative cost of houses was fixed at Rs.48,000/-
but final cost was determined at Rs.2,08,000/-. This increase is not mere
escalation but it is a multiplication by almost four and half times, although
escalation could not exceed 10% as is evident from the contents of the Brochure
read with prescribed form of application for allotment of house itself.
Contentions of the KDA run contrary to the contents of its own Brochure on
which the respondents acted adjusting their financial affairs understanding
that the cost of the houses would be fixed in terms of brochure and that too
not exceeding 10% of the estimated cost fixed initially.
As to
the complaint that the appellant having filed review petition before the High
Court seeking review of the impugned judgment could not prosecute parallel remedy
by filing SLP in this Court, the learned counsel for the appellant was not in a
position to say as to what happened to the review petition filed in the High
Court. In our view it may be unnecessary to say anything further on this aspect
in the view we have taken and are disposing of these appeals themselves on
merits. As regards the prayer made by the respondents in I.As. 7-8 we do not
think it necessary to probe further in these proceedings. Hence no orders are
required to be passed in these I.As.
Thus
having regard to the facts found and in view of what is stated above, we cannot
find fault with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court in the impugned
judgment. Hence, finding no merit in these appeals, they are dismissed but with
no order as to costs.
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