Goa Plast (P) Ltd. Vs. Chico Ursula D'souza [2003] Insc 582 (20 November 2003)
B.P.
Singh & Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan, J.
This
appeal is preferred by the appellant/complainant against the order of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay, Panaji Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 37/1995
whereby the High Court confirmed the order of acquittal dated 25.08.1995 passed
by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class in Pvt. N.C. Case No. 149/93/8 for
offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
The
brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are as follows:
The
respondent issued 10 post-dated cheques of Rs.40,000/- each in favour of the
appellant totalling Rs.4 lakhs for payment towards the liability of the amount
misappropriated from the funds of the appellant-Company. The respondent wrote a
letter to the appellant denying liability to pay the aforesaid sum for the
reasons given in the letter dated 12.02.1993(Annexure P-1). The appellant
deposited the first cheque for encashment. The said cheque was dishonoured by
the Bank on the ground that the respondent had issued instructions to stop
payment. The appellant sent a legal notice to the respondent regarding the dishonour
of the cheque demanding payment of Rs.40,000/- within 15 days. As the
respondent did not comply with the aforesaid notice, a complaint was filed
against the respondent under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
(hereinafter referred to as "the Act") for offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Act. According to the appellant, the respondent/accused was
working as Managing Director of the appellant-Company. The services of the
respondent were discontinued from the month of July, 1992. The appellant
examined its General Manager on their behalf to prove the complaint. The
respondent in defence did not examine any witness. The respondent also did not
step in the witness box so as to subject himself to the cross-examination. He
only brought on record the letter dated 12.02.1993 written by him to the Company.
True copy of the advice from the Bank dated 12.04.1993, true copy of the
complaint dated 06.03.1996 and true copy of the deposition have been marked as Annexures
P-2, P-3 and P-4.
The
learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class vide order dated 25.08.1995 acquitted
the respondent holding that the petitioner failed to prove the liability and
also holding that the respondent had rebutted the statutory presumption under
Section 139 of the Act. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred
Criminal Appeal No.37 of 1995 to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay which also dismissed the appeal
holding that the appellant had failed to prove the liability on the part of the
respondent to pay the sum in question. Aggrieved by the judgment and order
dated 12.01.1996 of the High Court of Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 37/1995,
the present appeal was preferred by the appellant.
We
heard Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri
A.K. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.
Shri Dhruv
Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the
presumption has to be rebutted by leading evidence and not by mere explanation
or statement and that mere issuance of a cheque in favour of the
appellant-Company is sufficient to show that the respondent/accused owes
liabilities of the appellant- Company. While construing the provisions of
Section 138 of the Act, besides the fact that the cheque issued by the
respondent was dishonoured, nothing further is required to be proved by the
complainant and it is for the accused to rebut the presumption under Section
139 of the Act. He would further submit that merely by sending a letter or a
communication to the appellant-Company is not sufficient unless and until the
presumption is rebutted by leading evidence and that the presumption cannot be
said to be rebutted. Shri Dhruv Mehta would further urge that it was incumbent
on the respondent/accused to examine Rajan Kinnerkar as the respondent stated
in his letter dated 12.02.1993 that Rajan Kinnerkar was responsible for the
financial transactions of the Company and, therefore, he is responsible for the
unexplained expenditure of the Company's Accounts. It was further contended
that as soon as the respondent/accused presented or delivered the cheques to
the appellant-Company, he admitted the liability and the cheque on presentation
to the Bank being dishonoured, the ingredients of Section 138 of the Act are
satisfied and the accused committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of
the Act.
Shri
A.K. Sanghi, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/accused, submitted
that the appellant/complainant scrupulously avoided in the complaint and in the
examination-in-chief of P.W.1 to state the relationship with the
respondent/accused and there is also no whisper in the complaint as well as in
the evidence led on behalf of the appellant regarding the receipt of the letter
dated 12.02.1993. It was further submitted that the appellant has not placed
before the trial Court any details or statement as to how the respondent is
liable for any dues alleged to be against the respondent. Shri A.K. Sanghi
would further submit that mere presentation or delivery of the cheque, in the
instant case, to the appellant by the respondent will not amount to acceptance
of the debt or liability and on the contrary, the respondent has given the
entire history in his letter dated 12.02.1993 before presentation of the cheque
in the month of April, 1993 to the Bank. It was further stated that the very
letter was drafted by Rajan Kinnerkar and it was prepared, as directed by the
appellant, as per the draft and, therefore, the respondent has rightly and
specifically disowned the liability of Rs. 4 lakhs much less Rs.40,000/-
involved in the instant appeal.
Before
we advert to the respective contentions of the learned counsel appearing on
either side, it is beneficial to quote Section 138 and Section 139 of the Act
as it stood at the relevant time. Sections 138 and 139 of the Act read as
under:
"138.
Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.- Where
any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for
payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned
by the Bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the
credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds
the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that
bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,
without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may
extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided
that nothing contained in this Section shall apply unless
(a) the
cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the
date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is
earlier;
(b)
the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes
a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in
writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of information
by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the
drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to
the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque,
within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice."
"139.
Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is
proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred
to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability."
We
have perused the pleadings, annexures, the order passed by the learned Judicial
Magistrate and the judgment rendered by the High Court. In our view, the High
Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate failed to give effect to Section 139
of the Act which creates a presumption unless the contrary is proved that the
holder of cheque received the cheque for discharge in whole or in part of any
debt or other liability. We have perused the contents of the letter dated
12.02.1993. Neither the said letter is proved nor its contents nor is the
document produced in the proceedings of the Court.
It is
pertinent to note that in the said letter, the respondent/complainant did not,
however, deny the liability as such but merely shifted it on third person. The
veracity of the contents of the letter could only be verified if the contents
of the letter were proved.
The
High Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate have ignored the admission of
the liability by the respondent who said that the liability did exist but he
was not responsible for it. While considering this, the High Court and the
learned Magistrate treated the proof adduced by the respondent, namely, the
letter, denying the liability and that some other person is liable as
sufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. As already
noticed, the appellant examined its General Manager on his side. The respondent
did not examine any witness and also did not step in the witness box so as to
step himself for the cross-examination. The respondent has brought on record
the letter dated 12.02.1993 written by him to the Company.
In our
view, the High Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate have clearly
misunderstood the object behind Section 138 of the Act. Sections 138 and 139 of
the Act were enacted in view of the fact that cheques were issued for payment
of admitted liability but the drawer used to dishonour the said liability by
issuing instructions to the Bank for stop payment. To avoid the aforesaid and
to create an element of credibility and dependability, the aforesaid Sections
were enacted which provide a criminal remedy of penalty if the ingredients of
the Sections are satisfied. The High Court, in our view, gave an interpretation
which would defeat the very purpose for which the provisions were enacted. The
impugned judgment wrongly interpreted Section 139 of the Act which is a
presumption in favour of the holder. Reading the judgment with Section 139 of
the Act, it would appear that the High Court has read in to Section 139 of the
Act what is not contained in the Section. Many passages of the judgments of the
High Court and of the learned Judicial Magistrate are direct off shoot of the
wrong interpretation placed upon Section 139 of the Act and the High Court and
the learned Judicial Magistrate dwelt on extraneous factors and principles in
order to bring the present case out of the purview of Section 138 of the Act.
The
High Court while discussing the object of the Chapter dealing with offences relating
with dishonour of the cheque and extensively quoting commentary by Author Dr.
P.W. Rege, however, has failed to consider the important aspect which is
discussed at paragraph 16 which reads as under:
"It
is true that Negotiable Instruments Act has not failed to provide a remedy for
the aggrieved party; but the foregoing provisions of the Act lay down a
procedure which is in the first place very elaborate and since the remedy would
be merely of a civil nature, the process to seek civil justice, in the second
place becomes notoriously dilatory. To ensure promptitude in remedy against
defaulters, therefore, was the only way in which the element of credibility and
dependability could be re-introduced in the practice of issuing negotiable
instruments in the form of cheques. The best way to do this was to provide a
criminal remedy of penalty, which is just the thing that is sought to be done
by the Amending Act." To fulfil the objective, the Legislature while
amending the Act has made the following procedure:
"(i)
Under Section 138 a deeming offence is created.
(ii)
In Section 139, a presumption is ingrained that the holder of the cheque
received it in discharge of liability.
(iii)
Disallowing a defence in Section 140 that drawer has no reason to believe that cheque
would be dishonoured.
(iv)
An explanation is provided to Section 138 to define the words "debt or
other liability" to mean a legally enforceable debt or other
liability." If the aforesaid are borne in mind then the findings of the
High Court are legally perverse, namely, that Section 138 of the Act has
application only in the case of transactions involving Mercantile relationship
and the second being that the appellant has failed to prove the liability.
Paragraph 18 of the judgment of the High Court contains both the findings which
reads as under:
"In
this case no evidence or history being traced to show the relationship between
the complainant and respondent accused. From the cross- examination it
transpired that the respondent accused was working as the Manager of the
Factory. Thus, relation were Master and Servant or employee or employer there
being no business or commercial or mercantile relation between the
parties." The High Court, in our opinion, has failed to appreciate that on
the facts of the instant case, the liability was a legally enforceable debt or
liability as per the explanation to Section 138 of the Act, therefore, the
relationship between the appellant and the respondent was not at all a factor
germane to the proceedings for an offence under Section 138 of the Act. The
liability was legally enforceable debt is clear from the finding of the High
Court at paragraph 19 which is quoted below:
"The
Appellant-Company has attempted to short circuit the suit by compelling the
accused respondent to pay the amount." Both the Courts, in our view,
failed to consider the important aspect as to the stop payment instructions
issued by the respondent. Ordinarily, the stop payment instructions are issued
to the Bank by the account holder when there is no sufficient amount in the
account. In the present case, the reason for stopping the payment, however, can
be manifold. It is essential that to issue stop payment instructions, there
must be funds in the accounts in the first place. On this aspect, the Courts
below have failed to see whether as on the date of signing of the cheque dated
20.07.1992, the date of presentation of the cheque dated 10.01.1993, the date
of writing of letter dated 12.02.1993 and the date on which stop payment
instructions were issued to the Bank, the respondent has sufficient funds in
the account. Both the Courts below have held that after issuing the letter, the
respondent has stopped the payment, therefore, no mala fide can be attributed.
It is pertinent to notice that the appellant made an application to the Bank
Manager to ascertain whether or not there was sufficient amount in the account
for the payment dated 02.06.1995. The learned Judicial Magistrate disallowed
the said application without hearing the complainant holding that there is no
dispute about the dishonour of the cheque by the accused, therefore, no purpose
will be served by the Bank Manager as the dishonour is not in issue. Had the
Bank Manager been examined it would have been clear whether the account had
sufficient amount to pay the amount of the cheque or not. It would have enabled
also to know on what date stop payment order was sent by the drawer to the
Bank. The learned Magistrate committed a serious mistake in not allowing the
application and the proceedings passed thereon have suffered from serious
infirmity going to the root of the matter. The High Court and the learned
Judicial Magistrate have also not noticed that the respondent was otherwise
admitting the liability when the cheques were being issued. This was sufficient
evidence to prove that there was a liability and as per the presumption under
Section 139 of the Act, the cheques issued, therefore, were towards the
liability even as per the version of the respondent. The relevant Section which
is Section 138 of the Act giving the ingredients of the offence. In the opening
words of the Section it is stated:
"Where
any cheques drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a bank for
payment of any amount of money to any person from out of that account for the
discharge in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability." Both the
Courts below have ignored the admission of the liability by the respondent who
stated that the liability did exist but he was not responsible for it. While
considering this, the Courts below treated the proof adduced by the respondent,
namely, letter denying liability and that some other person is liable for it,
as sufficient to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. The Courts
below have also not considered that the accused had admitted that he was the
Managing Director of the appellant-Company when the liability arose.
Another
reason given by the Courts below to reject the complaint was that the appellant
has suppressed the fact about the letter dated 12.02.1993. In our view, there
is no obligation on the part of the appellant to reply to such letter as per
the scheme of Section 138 of the Act.
Certain
comments were made by the High Court in regard to the relationship of the
parties. For the cases filed under Section 142 of the Act for offence committed
under the Act the relationship between the drawer and the drawee is not
material because the liability admitted is one which can be legally enforced by
way of suit.
We
have perused the complaint also. On the point of pleadings in the complaint,
the complainant narrated all the necessary facts required to constitute offence
under Section 138 of the Act, therefore, there was no question of suppression
of facts in the case as held by the learned Judicial Magistrate and the
findings endorsed by the High Court. The complainant narrated that the
respondent owed the appellant a sum of Rs.40,000/-. The appellant has received
post-dated cheque for the said amount. The cheque was presented to the Bank and
was returned with the remark `stop payment'.
The
statutory notice was issued and was received by the respondent. The respondent
not having complied with the demand made, complaint was filed.
We
shall now advert to the rulings cited at the time of hearing. Learned counsel
relied upon paragraphs 13 to 16 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Modi
Cements Ltd. Versus Kuchil Kumar Nandi, (1998) 3 SCC 249 (three-Judge Bench),
which read as under:
"It
was, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that the decision in Electronics
Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. does not support the appellant
as far as the facts that emerged in the present cases inasmuch as the drawer
had intimated to the bank on 8-8-1984 to stop the payment whereas the cheques
were presented for encashment on 9-8-1994 although the same were drawn on
23-2-1994, 26-2-1994 and 28-2-1994. The learned counsel for the respondent
strongly relied upon the following observations in Electronics Trade and
Technology Development Corpn. Ltd.: (SCC p. 742, para 6) "Suppose after
the cheque is issued to the payee or to the holder in due course and before it
is presented for encashment, notice is issued to him not to present the same
for encashment and yet the payee or holder in due course presents the cheque to
the bank for payment and when it is returned on instructions, Section 138 does
not get attracted." (emphasis supplied) The learned counsel for the
appellant submitted that if the attention of the Court was drawn to the
provisions of Section 139 of the Act which according to him, had an important
bearing on the point in issue, the Court would certainly not have made the
above observations. The said section reads as under:
"139.
Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved,
that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in
Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability."
According
to the learned counsel if the observations of this Court in Electronics Trade
& Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. to the effect, (SCC p. 742, para 6)
"[s]uppose after the cheque is issued to the payee or to the holder in due
course and before it is presented for encashment, notice is issued to him not
to present the same for encashment and yet the payee or holder in due course
presents the cheque to the bank for payment and when it is returned on
instructions, Section 138 does not get attracted" is accepted as good law,
the very object of introducing Section 138 in the Act would be defeated.
We see
great force in the above submission because once the cheque is issued by the
drawer a presumption under Section 139 must follow and merely because the
drawer issues a notice to the drawee or to the bank for stoppage of the payment
it will not preclude an action under Section 138 of the Act by the drawee or
the holder of a cheque in due course. The object of Chapter XVII, which is intituled
as "OF PENALTIES IN CASE OF DISHONOUR OF CERTAIN CHEQUES FOR INSUFFICIENCY
OF FUNDS IN THE ACCOUNTS" and contains Sections 138 to 142, is to promote
the efficacy of banking operations and to ensure credibility in transacting
business through cheques. It is for this reason we are of the considered view
that the observations of this Court in Electronics Trade & Technology
Development Corpn. Ltd. in para 6 to the effect "Suppose after the cheque
is issued to the payee or to the holder in due course and before it is
presented for encashment, notice is issued to him not to present the same for
encashment and yet the payee or holder in due course presents the cheque to the
bank for payment and when it is returned on instructions, Section 138 does not
get attracted", does not fit in with the object and purpose for which the
above chapter has been brought on the statute-book." Learned counsel
relied on paragraph 38 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Hiten P. Dalal
versus Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001) 6 SCC 16 which reads as under:
"The
burden was on the appellant to disapprove (sic disprove) the presumptions under
Sections 138 and 139, a burden which he failed to discharge at all. The
averment in the written statement of the appellant was not enough.
Incidentally, the defence in the written statement that the four cheques were
given for intended transactions was not the answer given by the appellant to
the notice under Section 138. Then he had said that the cheques were given to
assist the Bank for restructuring (Ext.H). It was necessary for the appellant
at least to show on the basis of acceptable evidence either that his
explanation in the written statement was so probable that a prudent man ought
to accept it or to establish that the effect of the material brought on record,
in its totality, rendered the existence of the fact presumed, improbable. (Vide
Trilok Chand Jain vs. State of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 761). The appellant has done
neither. In the absence of any such proof the presumption under Sections 138
and 139 must prevail." Learned counsel also relied on paragraph 7 of the
judgment of this Court in the case of K.N. Beena Versus Muniyappan &
Another (2001) 8 SCC 458 which reads as under :
"In
this case admittedly the Ist respondent has led no evidence except some formal
evidence. The High Court appears to have proceeded on the basis that the
denials/averments in his reply dated 21.5.1993 were sufficient to shift the
burden of proof on to the appellant complainant to prove that the cheque was
issued for a debt or liability. This is an entirely erroneous approach. The Ist
respondent had to prove in the trial, by leading cogent evidence, that there
was no debt or liability. The Ist respondent not having led any evidence could
not be said to have discharged the burden of proving that the cheque was not
issued for a debt or liability, the conviction as awarded by the Magistrate was
correct. The High Court erroneously set aside that conviction." Learned
counsel placed reliance on paragraph 6 of the judgment of this Court in the
case of Goaplast (P) Ltd. Versus Chico Ursula D'Souza & Another, (2003) 3
SCC 232 which reads as under:
"In
the present case the issue is very different. The issue is regarding payment of
a post-dated cheque being countermanded before the date mentioned on the fact
of the cheque. For the purpose of considering the issue, it is relevant to see
Section 139 of the Act which creates a presumption in favour of the holder of a
cheque. The said section provides that:
"139.
It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque
received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability." Thus it
has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other
liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden
of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption.
This
presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act which is to
promote the efficacy of banking operation and to ensure credibility in business
transactions through banks persuades us to take a view that by countermanding
payment of post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from
the penal provision of Section 138 of the Act. A contrary view would render
Section 138 a dead letter and will provide a handle to persons trying to avoid
payment under legal obligations undertaken by them through their own acts which
in other words can be said to be taking advantage of one's own wrong. If we
hold otherwise, by giving instructions to banks to stop payment of a cheque after
issuing the same against a debt or liability, a drawer will easily avoid penal
consequences under Section 138.
Once a
cheque is issued by a drawer, a presumption under Section 139 must follow and
merely because the drawer issued notice to the drawee or to the bank for
stoppage of payment it will not preclude an action under Section 138 of the Act
by the drawee or the holder of the cheque in due course. This was the view
taken by this Court in Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi, (1998) 3 SCC
249. On same facts is the decision of this Court in Ashok Yeshwant Badave vs. Surendra
Madhavrao Nighojakar, (2001) 3 SCC 726.
The
decision in Modi case overruled an earlier decision of this Court in
Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Indian
Technologists & Engineers (Electronics) (P) Ltd., (1996) 2 SCC 739 which
had taken a contrary view. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken
in Modi case. The said view is in consonance with the object of the
legislation. On the faith of payment by way of a post-dated cheque, the payee
alters his position by accepting the cheque. If stoppage of payment before the
due date of the cheque is allowed to take the transaction out of the purview of
Section 138 of the Act, it will shake the confidence which a cheque is
otherwise intended to inspire regarding payment being available on the due
date." Reliance was also placed on paragraph 17 of the judgment of this
Court in the case of M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Another Versus Medchl Chemicals and Pharma
(P) Ltd. and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234 which reads as under:
"There
is therefore no requirement that the complainant must specifically allege in
the complaint that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of proving that
there was no existing debt or liability was on the respondents.
Thus
they have to discharge in the trial. At this stage, merely on the basis of
averments in the petitions filed by them the High Court could not have
concluded that there was no existing debt or liability." We are unable to
agree with the reasonings adopted by the Courts below. The judgments of the
High Court and the learned Judicial Magistrate are set aside. We hold that
Section 138 of the Act will be attracted in the facts of the case and a case
for punishment under the provisions is made out.
In the
instant case, the cheque issued by the respondent has been stopped for payment
on his instructions and the cheque was returned to the appellant unpaid. In
view of our discussion in the foregoing paragraphs and on the consideration of
the facts and circumstances of the case and the law on the subject, we hold
that the respondent shall be deemed to have committed an offence. When the
matter was taken up for further hearing on 17.11.2003, learned counsel for the
respondent submitted that this Court may consider the case of the respondent
and the reason for his inability to pay the amount and may consider imposing
lesser sentence by taking a lenient view. We are unable to countenance the said
submission for the various reasons stated supra.
We
have no doubt that the respondent has committed an offence punishable under the
provisions of Section 138 of the Act and is liable to be punished. The
transaction in question took place between the parties in the year 1993,
therefore, Section 138, as it stood at the relevant time, would be applicable
to the present case. Section 138 provides imprisonment for a term which may
extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque,
or with both. Section 138 has now been amended and the penalty of imprisonment
for a term which may extend to one year has been substituted to two years as
provided by the Amending Act of 2002 and the fine which may extend to twice of
the amount of the cheque. This has been prescribed as the punishment for the
offence under Section 138 of the Act.
The
object and the ingredients under the provisions, in particular, Sections 138
& 139 of the Act cannot be ignored. Proper and smooth functioning of all
business transactions, particularly, of cheques as instruments, primarily
depends upon the integrity and honesty of the parties. In our country, in a
large number of commercial transactions, it was noted that the cheques were
issued even merely as a device not only to stall but even to defraud the
creditors. The sanctity and credibility of issuance of cheques in commercial
transactions was eroded to a large extent. Undoubtedly, dishonour of a cheque
by the Bank causes incalculable loss, injury and inconvenience to the payee and
the entire credibility of the business transactions within and outside the
country suffers a serious set back. The Parliament, in order to restore the
credibility of cheques as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment enacted the
aforesaid provisions. The remedy available in a Civil Court is a long drawn matter and an unscrupulous drawer normally
takes various pleas to defeat the genuine claim of the payee.
We,
therefore, grant one month's time from this date to the respondent herein to
pay a sum of Rs.80,000/- (twice the amount of the cheque) by way of Demand
Draft drawn in favour of the appellant and payable at Goa (in the address given
in the paper book). In default thereof, the respondent shall suffer simple
imprisonment for six months.
In the
result, the appeal stands disposed of.
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