State
of Haryana Vs. Balwant Singh [2003] Insc 133 (4 March 2003)
Shivaraj
V. Patil & Arijit Pasayat. Shivaraj V. Patil J.
The
State of Haryana is in appeal challenging the
judgment and decree passed by the High Court in second appeal reversing the
judgment and decree passed by the trial court as affirmed by the first
appellate court.
The
respondent was driving bus of the Haryana Roadways. An accident was caused
because of the rash and negligent driving of the respondent. In the said
accident, one person died and other person suffered injuries. In the claim
petition filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, an award was passed
which resulted in the loss of Rs. 1,12,950/- to the Transport Department of the
State. A charge-sheet was issued under Rule 7 of Haryana Civil Services
(Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 (for brevity 'the Rules'). After holding
enquiry, a punishment was imposed on him reducing the pay to the minimum of
time scale of Driver for a period of four years by the order dated 12.3.1990.
This order was passed against him in the wake of the orders of the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal, Kurukshetra. On account of causing of the same
accident, a criminal case was also registered vide F.I.R. No. 127 dated
25.7.1988 for the offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304-A IPC. He was
convicted by the court after trial in the said criminal case. Based on this
conviction, the General Manager of Haryana Roadways passed another order dated
17.9.1992 terminating the services of the respondent. This order was
communicated to the respondent when he was undergoing punishment. After he was
released from jail in January, 1993, he submitted a joining report in the
office of the General Manager, Haryana Roadways, Karnal. Instead of accepting
joining report, the termination order dated 17.9.1992 was handed over to him.
He filed an appeal before the Commissioner and Secretary, Haryana Roadways
against the order of termination of his services on the ground that he could
not be tried twice for the same offence. When the appeal was still pending, he
filed a suit alleging that no proper opportunity was given to him and no
enquiry was held but the termination order was passed only on the basis of the
judgment passed by the learned Sessions Judge upholding his conviction. The
appellant contested the suit on several grounds inter alia contending that due
to negligence of the respondent, the appellant suffered loss of Rs.1,12,950/-
as he was careless on his duty; the order of termination of his services was
rightly passed and there was no need to conduct an enquiry under Rule 7(2) of
the Rules when the said order was passed on the basis of the conviction and
sentence passed against him. After trial, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by
judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the respondent filed an appeal
before the appellate court. The appeal was also dismissed. Not being satisfied
with the order passed in the appeal, the respondent filed second appeal before
the High Court. The same was allowed setting aside the decrees passed by both
the courts below only on the ground that an employee could not be punished
twice for the same offence in view of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of
India as no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than
once. Hence, this appeal questioning the validity and correctness of the
impugned judgment and decree passed in the second appeal by the High Court.
The
learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Court committed a
manifest error in taking a view that the respondent was prosecuted and punished
for the same offence twice; earlier order dated 12.3.1990 was passed after
holding enquiry under Rule 7 of the Rules, because of rash and negligent
driving of the bus, he caused loss to the Haryana Roadways to the tune of
Rs.1,12,950/-, defamed the Transport Department and proved indiscipline; the
said action was taken in the wake of the orders of the Motor Accidents Claims
Tribunal reducing his pay to the minimum time scale of Driver for a period of four
years; thereafter, the order dated 17.9.1992 terminating his services was
passed on the basis of conviction and sentence passed against him by the
criminal court for offence under Section 304-A IPC. According to the learned
counsel, the cause of action and grounds for passing two orders aforementioned
against the respondent being different and distinct, there was no question of
the respondent suffering double jeopardy; he was not prosecuted and punished
twice for the same offence; action was taken according to the Rules governing
the case of the respondent on two different occasions. He also contended that
the High Court was not right and justified in reversing the concurrent findings
of fact recorded by both the courts below. As against these submissions, the
learned counsel for the respondent supported the impugned judgment for the very
reasons stated in the impugned order.
From
the facts that are not in dispute, it is abundantly clear that the order dated
12.3.1990 was passed against the respondent reducing the pay to the minimum of
time scale of Driver for a period of four years on account of his causing loss
and bringing bad name to the Department in the light of the order passed by the
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, that too after holding enquiry under the Rules
after giving him opportunity. The second order dated 17.9.1992 was passed on
the basis of the conviction and sentence passed against him by the competent
criminal court for the offence under Section 304-A IPC which was permissible
under the Rules. These being the facts, there was no question of prosecuting
and punishing the respondent for the same offence twice. The High Court was not
right in equating departmental enquiries on different grounds to a prosecution
in criminal case.
The
High Court also has failed to see that the two orders passed against the
respondent were on different grounds and were on different cause of actions.
Under
Rule 7(1) of the Rules, no order imposing a major penalty shall be passed
against a person to whom the said Rules are applicable unless he has been given
a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be
taken. Under Rule 7(2) procedure to be followed and the requirements to be
satisfied before imposing penalty in that regard are indicated.
Sub-rule
2(b) of Rule 7 states that the provisions of the foregoing sub-rule shall not
apply where any major penalty is proposed to be imposed upon a person on the
ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal case. In the
present case, the first order was passed on 12.3.1990 reducing the pay to the
minimum of time scale of Driver under Rule 7(1) of the Rules.
The
second order terminating his services was passed on 17.9.1992 under Rule 7(2)(b).
When a major penalty is proposed to be imposed upon a person on the ground of
conduct which led to his conviction on a criminal charge following the
provisions contained in Rule 7(1) and (2) is not required. Rule 7 itself makes
a distinction in regard to the punishment to be imposed depending on the
grounds.
A
three Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India and anr. vs. P.D. Yadav
[(2002) 1 SCC 405], while dealing with more or less a similar contention with
regard to double jeopardy, has held thus:- "A contention, though feebly,
was advanced on behalf of some of the respondents that forfeiture of pension in
addition to the punishment imposed under Section 71 of the Army Act amounted to
double jeopardy. In our view, this contention has no force.
There
is no question of prosecuting and punishing a person twice for the same
offence. Punishment is imposed under Section 71 of the Army Act after trial by
Court Martial. Passing an order under Regulation 16(a) in the matter of grant
or forfeiture of pension comes thereafter and it is related to satisfactory
service. There is no merit in the contention that the said Regulation is bad on
the ground that it authorized imposition of a double penalty; may be in a given
case, penalty of cashiering or dismissal from service and the consequential
forfeiture of pension may be harsh and may cause great hardship but that is an
aspect which is for the President to consider while exercising his discretion
under the said Regulation. May be in his discretion, the President may hold
that the punishment of cashiering or dismissal or removal from service was
sufficient having regard to circumstances of the case and that a person need
not be deprived of his right to pension. A crime is a legal wrong for which an
offender is liable to be prosecuted and punished but only once for such a
crime.
In
other words, an offender cannot be punished twice for the same offence.
This
is demand of justice and public policy supports it. This principle is embodied
in the well-known maxim nemo debet bis vexari, (si constat curiae quod sit) pro
una et eadem causa meaning no one ought to be vexed twice if it appears to the
court that it is for one and the same cause. Doctrine of double jeopardy is a
protection against prosecution twice for the same offence.
Under
Articles 20-22 of the Indian Constitution, provisions are made relating to
personal liberty of citizens and others. Article 20(2) expressly provides that:
"No. one shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than
once." Offences such as criminal breach of trust, misappropriation,
cheating, defamation etc., may give rise to prosecution on criminal side and
also for action in civil court/other forum for recovery of money by way of
damages etc., unless there is a bar created by law. In the proceedings before
General Court Martial, a person is tried for an offence of misconduct and
whereas in passing order under Regulation 16(a) for forfeiting pension, a
person is not tried for the same offence of misconduct after the punishment is
imposed for a proven misconduct by the General Court Martial resulting in
cashiering, dismissing or removing from service.
Only
further action is taken under Regulation 16(a) in relation to forfeiture of
pension. Thus, punishing a person under Section 71 of the Army Act and making
order under Regulation 16(a) are entirely different. Hence, there is no
question of applying principle of double jeopardy to the present case."
Under these circumstances, there was no question of the respondent suffering a
double jeopardy. The aid of Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India was
wrongly taken. Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India does not get
attracted to the facts of the present case. Before the trial court, no issue
was raised as to the respondent suffering a double jeopardy although in the first
appellate court, the discussion was made on this point. In the view we have
expressed above that the High Court committed a serious error in holding that
the respondent was prosecuted and punished for the same offence twice, the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained. Hence, the same is set aside. The
judgment and decree passed by the trial court as affirmed by the first
appellate court is restored. The appeal is allowed accordingly but with no
order as to costs.
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