Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Vs. P.P. Singh & Anr  Insc 25 (27 January 2003)
Sinha & Ar. Lakshmanan
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 60, 61, 62, 63 AND 64 OF 2001 S.B. SINHA, J :
effect of the recommendations of a Committee of two Judges as regards criteria
for grant of selection scale appointed by an Acting Chief Justice which have
subsequently been approved by a Full Court of the High Court is in question in
these appeals which arise out of a judgment and order passed by a Division Bench
of Rajasthan High Court dated 23rd November, 2000 in D.B. Civil Writ Petitions
No. 671 of 2000, 987 of 2000 and 1263 of 2000.
High Court of Rajasthan in exercise of its power conferred upon it under
Section 46 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 read with Article 225 of
the Constitution of India and all other powers enabling it in that behalf made
Rules known as Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952
(hereinafter called and referred to as "the Rules").
Rules came into force on or about 1st October, 1952.
3 of the said Rules refers to Administrative Business of the High Court.
Rules of the High Court were amended by a Resolution of the Full Court of the
High Court on 26.11.1966; and the relevant portion of the Minutes thereof are
as under :- "Minutes of the proceedings of the Full Court Meeting held on
Saturday, the 26th November, 1966, at 11 A.M. in the Chamber of the Hon'ble the
Amendment in the High Court Rules relating to the Administrative Business of
Any other matter which Hon'ble the Chief Justice may like to be discussed.
NO. II:- The
amendments proposed by the Hon'ble Administrative Judge in Chapter III of the
High Court Rules relating to the administrative and executive business of the
Court were considered.
that in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 46 of the Rajasthan High
Court Ordinance, 1949, and Articles 225, 227, 233, 234 and 235 of the
Constitution of India and all other powers enabling the Court in that behalf,
the following changes and amendments in Chapter III of the High Court Rules
relating to the administrative and executive business of the Court be effected
words "Executive and" occurring in the heading of Chapter III shall
rules 14 to 22 the following rules shall be substituted :-
Administrative business relating to control over subordinate courts and to
superintendence over courts and tribunals. All administrative business of the
Court relating to the control over subordinate courts vested in the Court under
Article 235 of the Constitution or otherwise and to the superintendence over
the courts and tribunals vested in the Court under Article 227 of the Constitution
or otherwise shall be disposed of as provided hereinafter.
Matters on which all Judges shall be consulted. On the following matters all
the Judges of the Court shall be consulted, namely :-
as to changes in or the issue of new rules for the guidance of subordinate
promotion and seniority of Judicial offices;
of promotion, supersession or reduction of Judicial Officers;
or dismissal of any Judicial Officer;
retirement of Judicial Officers otherwise than by way of punishment;
questions of policy or those affecting the powers and status of the Court laid
before the Court by the Chief Justice or any other Judge;
matter which the Chief Justice or the Administrative Committee, as constituted
under Rule 16, may consider fit to be laid before them for consideration.
Committee of Judges shall be formed composed of the Chief Justice, the
Administrative Judge and such other Judge or Judges as the Chief Justice may,
from time to time, appoint. This Committee shall be called the Administrative
Subject to these Rules, the Administrative Committee shall act for the Court in
its administrative business in respect of the matters enumerated in rule 17.
Matters on which the Administrative Committee shall be consulted. The
Administrative Committee shall be consulted on the following mattes, namely
issue of general letters to subordinate courts;
issue of directions regarding the preparation of returns and statements; and
other matter which the Chief Justice or the Administrative Judge may desire to
be brought before it.
Consultation how made.- The consultation with the Judges and the Administrative
Committee, referred to in Rules 15 and 17 respectively, shall be made either by
circulating the papers connected with the matter among the Judges or the
Administrative Committee, as the case may be, or by laying the matter before a
meeting of the Judges or the Administrative Committee called by the Chief
Decision in case of difference of opinion.- All the matters referred to in
Rules 15 and 17 shall be disposed of in accordance with the views of the
majority, and in case the Judges, including the Chief Justice, are equally
divided, in accordance with the views of the Chief Justice.
Administrative business to be disposed of by the Chief Justice.- Subject to
Rules 15 and 17, the administrative business referred to in Rule 14 shall be
disposed of by the Chief Justice.
Appointment of Administrative Judge and allocation of work.-
The Chief Justice shall appoint a Judge to carry on the general administration
of the Court. Such Judge shall be called the Administrative Judge and shall
dispose of the administrative business in accordance with rule 22.
The Chief Justice may also, by a general or special order, allocate specified
business for disposal to any other Judge or a Committee of Judges, and such
Judge or Committee of Judges shall dispose of the same, subject to any special
directions of the Chief Justice.
Papers to be submitted to the Chief Justice after circulation.- After any
papers have been circulated for opinion, they shall be submitted again to the
Chief Justice, who shall examine the matter and issue orders in accordance with
Quorum.- The quorum necessary for the transaction of business shall be not less
than two-third of the Members in the case of a meeting of the Administrative
Committee and not less than one-half of the Judges in the case of a Judges'
existing Rule 32 shall be re- numbered as Sub-Rule (1) of that Rule, and the
following new Sub-Rule (2) shall be added :- "(2) For the removal of
doubt, it is hereby mentioned that all administrative work disposed of by the
Chief Justice, the Administrative Judge or any other Judge or Judges to whom
the work has been assigned by the Chief Justice for disposal shall be deemed to
be disposed of by the Court." Rule 32 of the said Rules is as under:
Effect of any irregularity in or omission to follow the procedure laid down in
this Chapter :-
irregularity in, or omission to follow, the procedure laid down in this Chapter
shall affect the validity of any order passed or anything done under these
For the removal of doubt, it is hereby mentioned that all administrative work
disposed of by the Chief Justice, the Administrative Judge or any other Judge
or Judges to whom the work has been assigned by the Chief Justice for disposal
shall be deemed to be disposed of by the Court."
about 17.1.1969 Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1969 came into being
which inter alia contained a provision relating to grant of selection scale in
terms of Rule 23 thereof which reads as under :- "Appointments to posts in
the Selection Grade :- Appointments to the posts in the selection grade of the
service shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the Court on the
basis of merit.
about 30th of April, 1990 a Committee of two Hon'ble Judges of the said Court
was constituted by the Full Court for the purpose of consideration of
individual merit of the judicial officers of Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service
(RHJS) relating to appointment to selection scale. Pursuant to or in
furtherance thereof a Committee of two Judges considered the same and suggested
that last five years of ACRs to be considered in the merit criteria therefor.
However, the Full Court by Resolution dated 5th October, 1990 took a decision to take into
consideration three good ACRs out of five ACRs only for the said purpose. As
regards grant of super time scale to Rajasthan Judicial Service, the Full Court
of the High Court by a Resolution dated 14.8.1997 adopted the criteria of five
good ACRs out of seven ACRs for grant of super time scale.
Acting Chief Justice of the High Court, however, constituted a Committee
consisting of two Judges of the said Court to consider/ examine and to make
recommendations for formation of officiating promotee RHJS officers for their
substantive appointment in their service and for promotion of RHJS officers in
the ordinary scale to selection scale by an order dated 26th March, 1998. The
Committee submitted its report on 30th March, 1998, upon considering the cases of all
eligible candidates in the light of the existing Rules as also the Full Court
Resolutions. With a view to arrive at its finding, the Committee, however,
found those officers fit and meritorious for grant of selection grade who
obtained at least five outstanding/ very good/ good ACRs out of seven and where
no adverse entry was recorded. As regards those, whose ACRs have not been
recorded for one reason or the other, the Committee deferred consideration of
their cases for the time being. The Committee, however filed an additional
report on 27.4.1999 whose cases were deferred earlier.
matter was placed before the Full Court on 30th April, 1999 by the Chief
Justice. Twenty Hon'ble Judges of the High Court participated therein. By
Resolution dated 30th April, 1999, the Full Court considered the report
submitted by the said two Judges Committee and approved the name of 25 officers
who were found fit for grant of selection scale. The cases of the respondents
herein along with four others, however, were deferred. The matter relating to
the additional report of the said two Judges' Committee was again placed before
the Full Court on 27-11-1999. It accepted the report of the Committee and
declined to grant selection scale to the respondents herein. Pursuant to or in
furtherance of the aforementioned recommendations made by the High Court, the
Governor by a notification dated 5.2.2000 made appointment to the officers of
Higher Judicial Service named therein to the post of selection grade with effect
from the date mentioned against their names respectively.
first respondent in each of these appeals filed writ petitions questioning
non-grant of selection grade to them by filing writ petitions before the Jaipur
Bench of the Rajasthan High Court.
reason of the impugned judgment the High Court inter alia held :
The Acting Chief Justice was not authorised to constitute the two Judges
Committee, and, thus, it could not make/ lay down any merit criteria.
all the Judges of the High Court have not been consulted, the Committee
appointed by the Acting Chief Justice alone could not evolve the merit criteria
in view of sub-rule (h) of Rule 15 of 1952 Rules.
The earlier policy decision adopted by the Full Court could not be changed as Rule
15 of 1952 provides for prior consultation of the Judges of the High Court and
as all Judges were not consulted in the matter subsequent approval thereof
could not cure illegality.
said writ petitions were disposed of with the following directions :-
direct the respondents to consider the cases of all the three petitioners
afresh against the vacancies occasioned in 1998 and 1999 in view of the merit
criterion evolved and approved by the Full Court in the year 1990 and 1994. If they are found eligible for promotion to
selection scale of the RHJS, they can be accorded the selection scale by
creating supernumerary posts in terms of Rule 18 of the Rajasthan Service
This decision shall not affect the order dated February 5, 2000 whereby
selection scale of the RHJS was granted to twenty six officers.
The fresh consideration as directed above is expected to be done as
expeditiously as possible, in the meanwhile three posts in the selection scale
of the RHJS shall be kept vacant.
it was observed:
is however made clear that though we have declared the entire exercise of the
respondents in granting selection scale as illegal yet we do not intend to
unsettle the grant of selection scale to twenty six judicial officers as they
are not before us. We, therefore, direct that this decision shall not affect
the order dated February
5, 2000 of the
respondent whereby selection scale was granted to twenty six judicial officers.
But if the petitioners, after consideration of their service record from 1993
to 1997 and from 1994 to 1998 are found eligible for selection scale, they
shall be considered with reference to the selection of 1998 and 1999 when their
junior colleagues were promoted. The petitioners in that event can be accorded
the selection scale of the RHJS by creating supernumerary posts in terms of
Rule 18 of the Rajasthan Service Rules." Learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, would submit that having regard to the provisions of
the Rules, the High Court must be held to have committed an error in holding
that the Acting Chief Justice had no jurisdiction to constitute the Committee.
contended that once it is held that the Acting Chief Justice had the
jurisdiction to constitute a Committee and the decision of the said Committee
was approved by the Full
Court, the earlier
policy decision must be held to have been varied by the High Court. The learned
counsel in support of the said contentions has placed strong reliance in State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and Another reported in [(1978) 2
SCC 102], Brij Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. & Ors. [JT 2000 (9) SC 464],
Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah [(1988) 3 SCC 211].
Kant, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the first respondent in each case,
would, on the other hand, submit that as the power of the Chief Justice to
constitute a Committee is governed by a statutory rule, he must be held to have
acted without jurisdiction in appointing the said Committee. Strong reliance in
support of the said contention has been placed in Orissa Small Industries Corpn.
Ltd. and Another v. Narasingha Charan Mohanty and others [(1999) 1 SCC 465].
term "Chief Justice" will include the Judges authorised to act on his
behalf in view of interpretation clause contained in Section
Chapter III of the Rules provides for administrative business of the Court. In
terms of Rule 14 of the Rules, Administrative Business of the Court relating to
control over subordinate courts vested either under Article 235 or 227 of the
Constitution of India were to be disposed of as provided therein.
Rules have been made by the High Court. The High Court, therefore, can also
amend the rules. It is not the case of the writ petitioners-First respondents
herein that the High Court had no jurisdiction to evolve the criteria for grant
of selection scale to the officers of the Rajasthan Judicial Service or
Rajasthan Higher Judicial Service. It may be true that by reason of Resolution
dated 5th October, 1990 the Full Court inter alia opined that for the purpose
of grant of selection scale three good ACRs out of five ACRs were to be taken
into consideration but the said decision of the Full Court was subject to
reading of the aforementioned rules clearly goes to show that the Chief Justice
has the requisite jurisdiction to constitute a Committee and the report of the
Committee upon consultations of all the Judges of the High Court in terms of
Rule 15 shall become a decision of the Court. Rule 29(2) and Rule 32 as quoted
(supra) also clearly show that even no irregularity which might have taken
place in the procedure laid down in Chapter III shall not affect the validity
of the order passed or anything done in the Rules and the same shall be deemed
to be disposed of by the Court. The legal fiction created must also be given
its full effect.
beyond any pale of controversy that the control over the subordinate courts
within the meaning of Article 235 of the Constitution of India is that of the
High Court. Such control of the High Court includes general superintendence of
the working of the subordinate courts, disciplinary control over the Presiding
Officers, disciplinary proceedings, transfer, confirmation and promotion and
appointment etc. Such control vested in the High Court is complete.
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal, (1998) 3 SCC
72, District Judges Baradakanta Mishra v. High Court of Orissa (1976) 3 SCC
327, High Court of Punjab v. State of Haryana, (1975) 1 SCC
843, Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra (1999) 7 SCC 739, State of Haryana
v. Inder Prakash Anand, (1976) 2 SCC 977 and State of Assam v. S.N. Sen (1971)
2 SCC 9].
also true that the powers of the Chief Justice under Articles 235 and 229 of
the Constitution of India are different and distinct.
control over the subordinate courts vests in the High Court as a whole, the
control over the High Court vests in the Chief Justices only. [See All India
Judges' Association v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 119]. However, the same
does not mean that a Full Court cannot authorise the Chief Justice in respect
of any matter whatsoever. In relation to certain matters keeping the rest of it
in itself by the Full Court, authorization to act on its behalf in favour of
the Chief Justice on a Committee of Judges is permissible in law. How far and
to what extent such power has been or can be delegated would be discernible
only from the rules. Such a power by the Full Court can also be exercised from time to time.
Judges of the Rajasthan High Court, as noticed hereinbefore, in terms of
sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 of the Rules authorised the Chief Justice to constitute
a committee. Such constitution of the committee by the Chief Justice having
been made in terms of the rules must be held to have been made by the High
Court itself. Such authorization is not a limited one as thereby the extent to
which such authorization can be exercised has not been spelt out. Furthermore,
authorization in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 21 of the Rules having been laid
down in Chapter III which relates to the Administrative Business of the Court,
there cannot be any doubt whatsoever even in the matter of control of the High
Court in terms of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice
of the High Court had the jurisdiction to exercise the said power.
such a resolution authorising the Chief Justice to constitute a committee has
been passed; having regard to the decision of this Court in the High Court of
Judicature of Bombay v. Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil [(1997) 6 SCC 339], there
cannot be doubt whatsoever that the exercise of power by the Chief Justice in
that behalf was absolutely valid. It is, therefore, not correct to contend that
the Chief Justice could appoint the two-Judges committee only with the approval
of the Full Court.
of power by the Chief Justice, however, indisputably must be made in terms of
the rules. The questions raised in these appeals must, therefore, be considered
from that angle.
High Court, in our opinion, therefore, clearly erred in arriving at the
aforementioned finding that the constitution of the committee was illegal.
submission on behalf of the respondents to the effect that in the matter relating
to fixation of criteria for the purpose of appointment to the selection grade,
the two-Judges committee could not be made without consulting all the Judges is
stated to be rejected.
said submission is based on a total misconception. Laying down the merit
criteria for appointment to the selection grade also was within the domain of
the High Court. It could not only lay down such criteria but also amend or
modify the same from time to time. For the said purpose also the Chief Justice
could appoint a committee, the recommendation whereof was to be subject to the
approval of the Full Court. Rule 15 of the Rules does not say that before an
action can be initiated in that behalf by the Chief Justice all the Judges are
to be consulted. Rule 15 of the Rules postulates a final decision in the matter
specified therein and not initiation of process therefor.
also incorrect to contend that all the Judges of the High Court are required to
be consulted at a time.
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents is again not correct in
contending that the two-Judges Committee was not justified in evolving a merit
criteria different from the one approved by the Full Court. The two-Judges
Committee did not take any final decision in that behalf. It having regard to
the facts and circumstances of the case and upon consideration of the extant
rules as well as the earlier decisions of the Full Court applied certain
principles and criteria which inevitably was subject to approval of the Full
procedure for holding a Full Court meeting as quoted supra would clearly show
that the meeting which had requisite quorum as contemplated under Rule 29 would
amount to compliance of the Rules.
Rule 15 provides that all the Judges shall be consulted in the matters
enumerated therein but Rule 18 provides for the mode and manner thereof.
such consultation is to be made by circulation, undoubtedly, the relevant
documents are required to be circulated to all the Judges.
event, however, such consultation is to be effected by placing the matter
before a Full Court, all the Judges are therefor invited but the same would not
mean that in the event, one or more Judge (s) does/do not attend the Full
Court, the resolution passed by it shall be invalid. Rule 29 provides for a
quorum. In the case of a meeting of the Judges of the court, the quorum will be
complete if one-half or more of the Judges attend the same. Consultation with
all the Judges would, thus, not mean that even if some of the Judges do not
choose to make themselves available in a Full Court Meeting, consultation with
all the Judges shall not be complete.
notice that even in the Full Court meeting held on 26th November, 1966 all the Hon'ble
Judges of the High Court were not present.
Committee was constituted for the purpose of considering the cases of concerned
officers. It is not and cannot be the case or the contention of the writ
petitions that even for the purpose of considering the case of the eligible
judicial officers at the threshold, it was absolutely necessary to place the
matter before the Full Court.
Acting Chief Justice constituted the Committee for a specific purpose. The
Committee merely submitted its opinion which was subject to approval by the
Full Court. Once the opinion of the matter is approved by the Full Court, in
our opinion, it must be held that there had been a compliance of Rule 15 of the
of a Statute depends upon the text and context thereof. A Statute should be
interpreted having regard to the purpose and object for which the same was
made. The Chief Justice of a High Court although first amongst the Judges, by
the nature of office he holds, he is the head of the State Judiciary. Authorisation
by the Full Court in favour of the Chief Justice to constitute a Committee
and/or take actions for the subordinate judiciary must be viewed from that
context. Rule 15 of the Rules provides for such matters which require
consultations with the other Judges of the High Court.
of consultation with the Judges would not arise unless the subject matter therefor
is identified. It is for Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the High Court to
identify such matters and place the same before the Full Court with relevant
papers and documents.
therefore, axiomatic that not only the Chief Justice of High Court was free to
initiate any proceedings and obtain the opinion of a Committee of Judges on
such matters and the only legal requirement therefor is to place such proposals
together with the opinion of the Committee before the Judges of the High Court
so that the matter can be fully thrashed out. Once the Full Court approves the
recommendations made by the Committee of Judges, it becomes decision of the
Court which could be sent to the Governor for acting thereupon.
almost identical question came up for consideration whether the High Court can
delegate its power to a Judge or a small Committee of the Judges of the Court
so as to authorise it to act on this behalf in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Batuk Deo
Pati Tripathi and Another (supra). In no uncertain terms it was held :-
"The control vested in the High Courts by that article comprehends,
according to our decisions, a large variety of matters like transfers,
subsequent postings, leave, promotions other than initial promotions,
imposition of minor penalties which do not fall within Article 311, decisions
regarding compulsory retirements, recommendations for imposition of major
penalties which fall within Article 311, entries in character rolls and so
forth. If every Judge is to be associated personally and directly with the
decision on every one of these matters, several important matters pertaining to
the High Court's administrative affairs will pile into arrears like court
arrears. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the control will be better
and more effectively exercised if a smaller committee of Judges has the
authority of the court to consider the manifold matters falling within the
purview of Article 235. Bearing in mind therefore the nature of the power which
that article confers on the High Court, we are of the opinion that it is wrong
to characterize as 'delegation' the process whereby the entire High Court authorises
a Judge or some of the Judges of the Court to act on behalf of the whole Court.
Such an authorization effectuates the purpose of Article 235 and indeed without
it the control vested in the High Court over the subordinate courts will tend
gradually to become lax and ineffective. Administrative functions are only a
part, though an important part, of the High Court's constitutional functions.
functions ought to occupy and do in fact consume the best part of a Judge's
time. For balancing these two-fold functions it is inevitable that the
administrative duties should be left to be discharged by some on behalf of all
functions brook no such sharing of responsibilities by any
instrumentality." In Registrar, High Court of Madras v. R. Rajiah (supra),
it was observed :
In Rajiah's case, a Review Committee consisting of three judges was appointed
by a resolution of the High Court. In the meeting of the Review Committee held
on June 25, 1979 to consider the case of the respondent Rajiah, only two judges
of the High Court were present. The two judges came to the conclusion that the
respondent, Rajiah, should be compulsorily retired with effect from April 2,
1980. The Division Bench found that the third judge had no notice of the
meeting held on June 25, 1979, but he agreed with the view expressed by the two
judges with a slight modification that the respondent would retire with effect
from March 3, 1980 under Rule 56(d) of the Fundamental Rules. The Division
Bench of the High Court took the view that as all the three judges had not sat
together and considered the question of compulsory retirement of respondent Rajiah,
and that, further the third judge having also modified the decision of the two
judges, namely, that the respondent would be compulsorily retired with effect
from March 3, 1980, the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the
respondent, Rajiah, was vitiated. It is true that the members of the Review
Committee should sit together and consider the question of compulsory
retirement, but simply because one of them did not participate in the meeting,
and subsequently agreed with the view expressed by the other two judges, it
would not vitiate the decision of the Committee to compulsorily retire the
third judge might (sic not) be justified in correcting the date with effect
from which the respondent would compulsorily retire, but that is a very minor
issue and would not, in our opinion, make the decision invalid.
regard to the case of the other respondent, namely, K. Rajeswaran, the High
Court took the view that the constitution of the Review Committee by the Chief
Judge and not by the Full Court was illegal. We are unable to accept the view
of the High Court. We fail to understand why the Chief Justice cannot appoint a
Review Committee or an Administrative Committee. But in one respect the High
Court is, in our opinion, correct, namely, that the decision of the Review
Committee should have been placed before a meeting of the judges. In the case
of the respondent, K. Rajeswaran, the decision and recommendation of the Review
Committee was not placed before the Full Court Meeting. Nor is there any
material to show that the same was circulated to the judges. In that sense, the
recommendation of the Review Committee was not strictly legal."
Furthermore, the terminology 'consultation' used in Rule 15 having regard to
purport and object thereof must be given its ordinary meaning. In Words and
Phrases (Permanent Edition, 1960, Volume 9, page 3) to 'consult' is defined as
'to discuss something together, to deliberate'. Corpus Juris Secundum (Volume
16A, Ed. 1956, page 1242) also says that the word 'consult' is frequently
defined as meaning 'to discuss something together, or to deliberate'. By giving
an opportunity to consultation or deliberation the purpose thereof is to enable
the Judges to make their respective points of view known to the others and
discuss and examine the relative merits of their view. It is neither in doubt
nor in dispute that the Judges present in the meeting of the Full Court were
supplied with all the requisite documents and had full opportunity to
deliberate upon the Agenda in question.
is another aspect of the matter which may require consideration. For all intent
and purport the report of the two Judges Committee has been approved by the Full
Court. Once approved, it terminated into a decision of the Full Court itself.
In the instant case even the Governor has acted upon the recommendations of the
High Court. The writ petitioners-first respondents herein did not question the
appointments of the appointees not the High Court. Thus, there cannot be any
doubt whatsoever that for all intent and purport the opinion of the two Judges
Committee received approval at the hands of the Full Court.
High Court, in our opinion, further committed a manifest error in arriving at
its conclusion in so far as it failed to take into consideration that Rule 15
does not postulate the prior approval of the Full Court in relation to any
action which may be initiated by the Chief Justice.
an approval is required, an action holds good. Only if it disapproved it losses
its force. Only when a permission is required, the decision does not become
effective till permission is obtained.
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and Another v. Friends Coop. Housing Society Ltd
and Another [(1995) Supp (3) SCC 456]. In the instant case both the
aforementioned requirements have been fulfilled.
is another aspect of the matter. In terms of Rule 2(2) of the Rules, the
decision of the Full Court would have a retrospective effect and retroactive
view of the matter, even in a case where the initial action is illegal, the
same can be ratified by a body competent therefor. This aspect of the matter
has not been considered by the High Court at all.
Parmeshwari Prasad Gupta v. the Union of India [(1973) 2 SCC 543] this Court held
if it be assumed that the telegram and the letter terminating the services of
the appellant by the Chairman was in pursuance to the invalid resolution of the
Board of Directors passed on December 16, 1953 to terminate his services, it
would not follow that the action of the Chairman could not be ratified in a
regularly convened meeting of the Board of Directors. The point is that even
assuming that the Chairman was not legally authorised to terminate the services
of the appellant, he was acting on behalf of the Company in doing so, because,
he purported to act in pursuance of the invalid resolution. Therefore, it was
open to a regularly constituted meeting of the Board of Directors to ratify
that action which, though unauthorized, was done on behalf of the Company.
Ratification would always relate back to the date of the act ratified and so it
must be held that the services of the appellant were validly terminated on December
17, 1953" (See also Marathwada University v. Seshrao Balwant Rao Chavan
(1989) 3 SCC 132 para 28], Babu Verghese and Others v. Bar Council of Kerala
and Others [(1999) 3 SCC 422 para 35] and Barnard v. National Dock Labour Board
[(1953) 1 All ER 1113]).
Small Industries Corpn. Ltd. And Another v. Narasingha Charan Mohanty and
Others (supra) where upon the learned counsel has placed strong reliance, this
apart, the Court is not entitled to assess the respective merit of the
candidates for adjudging their suitability for being promoted and the only
right the employee has is a right of consideration. The said right of
consideration not having been infringed in the present case, the High Court was
not justified in issuing the impugned direction for reconsideration of his
case." The said decision, therefore, mutilates against the contentions of
the first respondent herein in these cases Shri P.P. Singh, Shri G.P. Pandey
has been granted selection scale in RHJS with effect from 1.8.2000 and Shri
P.K. Bhatia has been given with effect from 29.3.2000. Shri P.P. Singh has also
retired from service on superannuation.
of the opinion that impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained which
is set aside accordingly. The appeals are allowed but in the facts and
circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.