Bhat & Anr Vs. Claude Pinto & Ors  Insc 79 (14 February 2003)
Sinha & Ar. Lakshmanan S.B. Sinha, J :
are in appeal before us. Plaintiff No.1 was a tenant in a part of the premises
in question, which belonged to Montu Mary Pinto, since deceased. She died in
1974. She executed a Will and last testament (Exhibit P-2(2A) on or about
25.4.1972 whereby Defendant No.1 was appointed as the sole Executor. The
relevant clauses of the said Will are :
my death the Executor of this Will shall take possession of my entire
properties and manage them. He shall also obtain Court probate upon this Will
after my death, and sell away my said properties for the best price possible to
others. He shall minus the expenses met by him for obtaining the Probate etc.
and divide the balance sale price amount unto four equal shares and pay one
such share out of the same to my son Staneley T. Thomas alias Stanley Pinto and
another such share to my son Victor L. Pinto and obtain receipts from them. He
shall further pay of his own share to each of his own children who are living
now and who will be born to him hereafter Rs. 100/- (one hundred) each and keep
the rest of the amount for himself and he shall also pay out of the share
amount of my said daughter a sum of Rs. 600/-(Six hundred) to her son Sunil Rodrigurs
and pay also Rs. 100/-(one hundred) each to each of her living children and
also to those who may be born to her hereinafter and pay the balance left over
to my said daughter.
if my said heirs desire to partition my property among themselves after my
death, the Executor shall consent to it and do so by the help of two
independent arbitrators and divide them into four equal lots as decided by the
Arbitrators and grant each such lot to each one of my said heirs who shall each
inherit the respective properties absolutely with entire right. But in these
circumstances the amounts mentioned to be paid out as stipulated hereabove
shall be paid by the concerned holders of the property shares."
Indisputably the said Will was probated. Defendant No.1, however, as Executor
or otherwise did not sell the property immediately. While he was toying with
the idea of alienating the suit property, the plaintiff- appellant who is a
practicing advocate and whose advices had been sought for as regards possible
legal impediments, if any, in relation thereto, offered himself as a willing
purchaser. A large number of correspondences passed between the parties. The
evidence on record shows that the Plaintiff No.1 drafted the agreement for sale
and handed over the same to Defendant No.1 who made corrections therein. On or
about 4.12.1979, an agreement of sale was entered into between the parties, paragrapgh
1 whereof is in the following terms :
in consideration of second party agreeing to pay to First Party a total price
of Rs. 1,23,750/- (Rupees one lakh twenty three thousand seven hundred and
fifty) only, the First Party for self and as Executor hereby agrees to convey
the property described in the schedule hereto subject to ratification by the
co-heirs to terms hereinafter appearing." (Emphasis supplied) It appears
from the records that the plaintiff advised Defendant No.1 to obtain power of
attorney from the other legatees so that all of them can execute the deeds of
sale jointly. Two such draft sale deeds were prepared;
be executed in favour of Plaintiff No.1 and another in favour of Plaintiff No.2
who was the nominee of the Plaintiff No.1.
Defendant No.1 did not execute the deeds of sale purported to be in terms of
agreement dated 4.12.1979, the plaintiffs filed the suit for specific
performance of contract on or about 24.1.1989. Defendant No.1 contested the
said suit raising various pleas, whereupon the learned Trial Court, inter alia,
framed the following issues :
Whether the defendant, as Executor of the Will of his mother, is not competent
to sell the plaint schedule property without the consent or approval of the
other legatees under Will ?
Does the first plaintiff prove that the document dated 4-12-1979 is valid and binding on the defendant and that he is
entitled to enforce the terms mentioned therein ?
Does the first plaintiff prove that there was a concluded agreement for sale
between him and the defendant dated 4-12-1979 ?
Whether the second plaintiff can seek specific performance of the agreement
dated 4-12-1979 ?
Whether defendants 2 to 7 would be put to great hardship if the agreement of
sale is to be enforced ?
Whether the plaintiff took unfair advantage in obtaining the suit agreement of
sale as contended in the written statement by the defendants ?
learned Trial Court by its judgment and decree dated 11.3.1993 decreed the
suit. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, Defendant No.1 preferred an
appeal. The High Court of Karnataka by its judgment dated 4.4.1996 passed in
F.R.A. 286 of 1993 reversed the said judgment. The High Court formulated the
following points for its consideration :
Whether the Executor has absolute powers to sell the immovable property
bequeathed completely ignoring the provision made in the Will dated 24-5-1972 for partition of the said property among the legatees
Whether the agreement to sell dated 4-12-1979 executed by the first defendant subject
to ratification of the terms and conditions contained therein by the other co-
heirs is a concluded contract ?
Whether the suit O.S. No. 26/1981 was rightly proceeded within law bringing the
defendants 2 to 7 as legal representatives of the deceased sole Executor, the
first defendant ?
Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the trial Court is
justified in decreeing the suit of the plaintiffs for specific performance ?
the questions were answered by the High Court against the appellants.
K.N. Bhat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, would
submit that the High Court committed a serious error in construing the Will to
the effect that the right of the legatees to ask for partition shall prevail
over the right of the Executor to sell the property. The learned counsel would
submit that having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 211(1) and
307(1) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the Executor has an absolute right
to dispose of the property of the testator and in that view of matter the
question of the legatees exercising their right of partition in preference of
the Executor's right to sell the property which would otherwise be in
consonance of the aforementioned provisions of the Indian Succession Act, did
would urge that the expression used in the said agreement to sell dated
4.12.1979 "subject to ratification by the co-heirs to terms hereinbefore
appearing" must be held to have been inserted for the benefit of Plaintiff
No.1 and as such he was at liberty to waive his right. In support of the
aforementioned contentions reliance was placed on P.H. Alphonso vs. Mrs. Irene
Dias & Others [(1967) 2 Mysore Law
Journal 465] and Smt. Babuain Chandrakala Devi vs. Smt. Pokhraj Kuer and others
[AIR 1963 Patna 2] Dr. Jiwan Lal & Ors. vs. Brij
Mohan Mehra & Anr. [(1973) 2 SCR 230].
pointed out that the Executor of the Will Claude Pinto, Original Defendant
No.1, died on 15.12.1988 and having regard to the fact that the legatees had
been brought on record as his legal representatives in respect whereof the
Trial Court held that the suit did not abate, the High Court committed a
manifest error in holding that it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiffs
to approach the District Judge for appointment of another Executor of the Will
in view of Section 21(1) of the Indian Succession Act. As regards Point No.4,
it was submitted that having regard to the fact that the Trial Court negatived
the contention raised on behalf of the defendants that Plaintiff No.1 was not
the lawyer of Defendant No.1 and, thus, there was no question of any undue
influence, having not been disturbed by the High Court, it erred in holding
that it is not fair and equitable to pass a decree for specific performance of
S.K. Gambhir, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the
other hand, would submit that the parties to the agreement proceeded on the
basis that the deed of sale was to be executed by the legatees and not by the
Original Defendant in his capacity as Executor. The learned counsel would
contend that it is one thing to say that in terms of Sections 211 and 307 of
the Indian Succession Act, a right of the Executor of the Will to alienate the
property of the testator is absolute but in the instant case, the Original
Defendant did not exercise his right as an Executor but only as one of the
legatees. Mr. Gambhir would urge that having regard to the fact that in the
agreement of sale dated 4.12.1979, a stipulation was specifically inserted at
his instance that the same was 'subject to ratification by other co-heirs', no
concluded contract was arrived at and in that view of the matter the suit for
specific performance was not maintainable.
would further submit that the materials brought on records by the parties would
clearly demonstrate that the said restriction was inserted not for the benefit
of Plaintiff No.1 at all. Mr. Gambhir argued that the sequence of events would
clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff No.1 took undue advantage of his position as
a tenant as also a practicing advocate.
learned counsel pointed out that in view of the provisions of the Karnataka
Rent Control Act, as it then prevailed, the Rent Controller had the absolute
jurisdiction to induct a tenant as and when a tenanted premise is vacated. It
was pointed out that Plaintiff No.1's legal advice was sought for by the said
defendant as to how to prevent such action on the part of the Rent Controller.
At that time he was advised that in the event an agreement of sale is executed,
such a contingency can be avoided.
learned counsel, however, conceded that the High Court may not be correct in
its view that although the legatees had already been brought on record on the
death of the Original Defendant, it was obligatory on the part of the
plaintiffs to approach the District Judge with a prayer to appoint another
Executor in his place.
learned counsel supported the judgment of the High Court as regards its refusal
to exercise of discretionary power in terms of Sections 20(2)(b) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963. Our attention has been drawn to the fact that in the
suit for specific performance of the contract, the other respondents herein
filed an application for getting impleaded as parties but the same was
rejected. A revision application filed there-against by the respondents was
also dismissed by the High Court observing that they were free to file a suit
for partition. Relying on or on the basis of such observation of the High Court,
a suit for partition was filed to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The same was
decreed. The house in question was allotted in favour of the Respondents
according to the respective shares. Respondent No.6 also took certain steps
against Plaintiff No.1 as a tenant wherein also Plaintiff No.1 did not examine
himself or questioned the validity of the decree passed in the partition suit.
The learned counsel pointed out that the plaintiffs did not pay a single penny
to the respondents and furthermore keeping in view the subsequent events,
namely, the decree passed in the partition suit, it may not be equitable to
grant a decree for specific performance of the agreement of sale at this
distant point of time.
core question which, in our opinion, arises for our consideration in this
appeal is as to whether the restrictive covenant contained in the agreement
dated 4.12.1979 would amount to a conditional agreement or a concluded contract
and/or whether the same was for the benefit of Plaintiff No.1.
perusal of the Will dated 25.4.1972 leaves no manner of doubt that although
thereby the Original Defendant was given liberty to sell the property in
question and distribute the amount received thereby in the manner stated
therein but the legatees have also been given an option to partition the
property. Once such a desire is expressed before a deed of sale is executed,
the Executor had no other option but to consent thereto.
in the aforementioned backdrop, the conduct of the parties may be noticed. Plaintiff
No.1 was a tenant in respect of a part of the premises in suit. The other part
of the premises was occupied by one Venketesh. The evidence on record clearly
shows that the parties to the agreement were in correspondences. The Original
Defendant took the legal advice of Plaintiff No.1 as regards the effect of the
said Will in 1974. Plaintiff No.1 advised the Original Defendant to obtain a
probate. He also gave an advice that steps are required to be taken under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act.
correspondences passed between the parties would clearly show that they were in
question also arose as to whether any lease in favour of Plaintiff No.1 without
filing any declaration under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act would
be valid or not or whether they could take action for regularisation thereof.
The question as regards sale of property appears to have cropped up in February
1977 whence the Original Defendant No. 1 by a letter dated 11.2.1977 addressed
to Plaintiff No.1 informed him that he had obtained a probate and he is
required to take action in terms thereof. It was in that connection a query was
made "if we (presumably the legatees) wanted to dispose of the property,
would it be necessary to take permission from the court or the land ceiling
authority". Plaintiff No.1 by his letter dated 19.3.1977 gave his advices
in details on his proposal to dispose of the property saying:
you want to dispose of the property, permission of the court is unnecessary. But
the permission of competent authority under the Land Ceiling Act is necessary.
Only after you fix up a buyer, necessary formalities can be gone through. There
is no provisions for obtaining a blanket permission to sell. The formalities
are quire laborious and in some. If you have any particular buyer in mind and
only after such and you agree, then only you can think of obtaining the
permission of the competent authority. In passing I may mention that if you
have any idea to sell the property or any portion thereof, please let me place
my first offer.
even Mr. Venketesh might be interested to buy though I have not specifically
asked him" The Original Defendant No. 1 thereafter visited Mangalore and
discussed about the pros and cons of selling the property with the plaintiff,
which would appear from his letter dated 20.3.1978. He again wanted Plaintiff
No.1's advice on certain matters. Plaintiff No.1 pointed out several
disadvantages in respect of the property in question which may be proved to be impediments
in the matter of getting good price. He in his letter dated 9.4.1978 contended:
is difficult to give current market price in terms of square metres because
land in Mangalore is even now sold only in terms of cents. Your plot is mulageni
plot. It is situated by the side of a lane in which no heavy vehicle can pass
through. There are two disadvantages which will diminish the value. Any
building licence at Mangalore will be granted only after the land is converted
as house site as per Sec.95 of the Land Revenue Act, the authority to grant
conversion certificate (popularly called NOC) being the Deputy Commissioner,
Conversion will be granted only to an owner applicant and not to a mulagenidar
applicant. No new building can be easily constructed on your plots without
doing some understand work in the concerned offices. On the main road side,
near Kamath Nursing Home, Mr. Prabhu who owns lands, has recently sold them at
the rate of about Rs.3 to 3 thousand per cent of land. Your lands may fetch about
Rs.2 to 2 thousand and the buildings being of mud will not fetch any value.
a third party purchaser will consider the question whether he gets actual
possession or not." Yet again in the said letter, Plaintiff No.1 made an
offer to purchase the property on his own behalf as well as on behalf of Mr. Venketesh.
Original Defendant No.1 was merely nurturing the idea of selling the property.
Various correspondences passed between the parties and whenever any occasion
arose, Plaintiff No.1 renewed his offer. In the meantime, Mr. Venketesh was
transferred to Bangalore and although he retained the possession of the
tenanted premises for some time, but later on vacated the same. In terms of the
provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, in the event a tenanted premises
falls vacant, the Rent Controller may allow the same to other person. Sections
4 and 5 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 read thus:
of vacancy by landlords.
Every landlord shall, within fifteen days after the building becomes vacant by
his ceasing to occupy it or by the termination of a tenancy or by the eviction
of the tenant or by the release of the building from requisition, or otherwise,
give intimation in the prescribed form by registered post to the Controller.
Except as provided in this Part, no person shall let, occupy or otherwise use
any building which becomes vacant without the landlord giving intimation under
sub-section (1) and for a period of fifteen days from the date on which the
intimation is received by the Controller or within a period of one week after
the termination of the proceedings under Section 8, if any, whichever is later:
that this sub-section shall not apply to a building in respect of which the
landlord has obtained an order for possession on any of the grounds specified
in clause (h) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 or to any
building which has been released from requisition for the use and occupation of
the landlord himself :
further that if the building is not occupied in accordance with an order for
possession under clause (h) of the proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 21,
or if the building is not occupied by the landlord after its release from
requisition, within a period of two months from the date of such order or
release, as the case may be, the landlord shall immediately after the said
period of two months or within such further time as the Controller may allow,
give intimation to the Controller in accordance with the provisions of this
sub-section and for this purpose the building shall be deemed to have become
vacant on the date of the expiry of the said period of two months.
Any landlord who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or (2) shall, on
conviction, be punished with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees :
that such fine shall not be less than fifty rupees.
Nothing contained in this section shall apply
a residential building the monthly rent of which does not exceed fifteen rupees
per month or the annual rental value of which does not exceed one hundred and
eighty rupees; or
to a non-residential building the monthly rent of which does not exceed
twenty-five rupees or the annual rental value of which does not exceed three
hundred rupees; or
to any building in any city, town or village owned by any local authority,
company, association or firm, whether incorporated or not and bona fide
intended solely for the occupation of its officers and servants employed in the
same city, town or village.
Order of leasing of vacant building.
The Controller may, by order in writing served on the landlord, direct that any
vacant building, whether intimation of its vacancy has been given by the
landlord under sub-section (1) of Section 4 or not, be given to the landlord
for his use and occupation or on lease to such public authority or other
persons as he may think fit:
that where such building is a residential building no such order shall be made
in favour of a person not being the landlord, who or any member of whose family
owns a residential building in the same city or town or village in which the
vacant building is situated.
Explanation. - A building may be directed to be
leased under this section notwithstanding that it is subject to an agreement of
lease or has been let or occupied in contravention of sub-section (2) of
landlord, who contravenes an order made under sub-section (1) shall, on
conviction, be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three months or with fine or with both." By a letter dated 30.10.1979
(Exhibit D/40) Plaintiff No.1 intimated to the Defendant No. 1 about the visit
of the Rent Controller and the latter having made queries as regards the status
of the tenanted premises. Plaintiff No.1 stated that he had tried to see that
the Inspector does not file his report.
also intimated that he had spent Rs.50/- for keeping the matter in abeyance.
letter dated 13.11.1979 (Exhibit D/41), Plaintiff No.1 informed the Defendant
No. 1 that somebody had complained to the Rent Controller and as such he would
have to submit a report. Yet again by a letter dated 19.11.1979 (Exhibit D-42),
he advised the Original Defendant that in the event he received notice, it will
be appropriate that he appears through a lawyer and contest the proceedings. He
the lawyer appears he can ask for time for filing objection etc. and the
allotment can be stalled. If decision goes against us, we can appeal to D.C.
and then to High Court.
meantime, our High Court has ruled that if owner requires release of building
for sale, the Rent Controller should ordinarily accept it." However, it
does not appear from the records that any provision of law or any judgment of the
High Court had been rendered to the effect that in the event a landlord
requires the premises for the purpose of selling the same, Sections 4 and 5 of
the Karnataka Rent Control Act would not apply..
Plaintiff No.1 in his deposition stated :
Ex.D.42 I have not given advice to the defendant as suggested by you that the Mysore
High Court ruled that if the agreement is executed in respect of the vacant
tenanted house it cannot be allotted to anybody. It is not true to suggest that
I got executed Ex.P.10 mentioning the defendant that the vacant house of him
cannot be allotted by the Rent Controller" He further stated :
my letter at Ex.D.41, I assured him that I would protect his interest before
the Rent Controller. But in Ex.D.41, I have asked him to send a vakalath form
i.e., duly signed by him to me. In Ex.D.40 I informed him to act quickly and
preferably to visit Mangalore and save the house from Rent Controller. After
Ex.D.40, he came to Mangalore during 1st week of December, 1979. I cannot say
as to how many days prior to the sale agreement at Ex.P.10 he came from Bombay
to Mangalore" It is evident that negotiation for selling the property in
question started in the aforementioned backdrop of events and ultimately the
agreement of sale was executed.
therefore, in our opinion is right in contending that Plaintiff No.1 created a
scare in the mind of Defendant No.1 about the house being allotted to some
other person by the Rent Controller. Plaintiff No.1 evidently had an upper hand
when negotiation for sale of the house between him and the Original Defendant
No.1 took place.
agreement of sale in question was, admittedly, drafted by Plaintiff No.1. He in
his deposition stated :
is a Law Graduate and an officer in Tata Company. Defendant read the contents
of Ex.P.12, and made corrections therein. The corrections made by the defendant
in Ex.P.12 are at Ex.P.12(a), P.12(b), P.12(c) and P.12(d).
himself wrote the description of the suit property in the schedule to the
agreement at Ex.P.12(e). After correction made by the defendant at Ex.P.12(b),
I carried out the same by correcting in Ex.P.12 in the language of
lawyer." It would, therefore, not be correct to contend that the
restrictive covenant was inserted for the benefit of Plaintiff No.1.
Furthermore, if the agreement was entered into by him only as an Executor of
the Will, it was not necessary for him to write that the same was being
executed for self as well as an Executor. He, therefore, wanted to convey the
property also as a legatee and/or one of the heirs of her mother, Mrs. Minto
Mary Pinto apart from being the Executor of the Will.
aforesaid context only the expression 'subject to ratification by the co-heirs'
must be interpreted.
draft sale deeds which were marked as Exhibits D-15 and D-23 were also drafted
by Plaintiff No.1. It appears from the letter dated 21.1.1980 that Plaintiff
No.1 asked the Defendant No.1 to get power(s) of attorney executed by his
brothers and sister in his favour, the drafts whereof were also prepared by
him. The draft sale deed would clearly demonstrate that the property in suit
was to be executed by Stanely T. Thomas, Victor L. Pinto, Mrs. Agnee Rodrigues
Nee Pinto, represented by their brother and power of attorney holder Claude
Pinto having been aurhorised by Nos. 1 and 2 as per power of attorney (dated
blank) and by Claude Pinto.
therefore, cannot be said that the intention of the parties was that the
Defendant No.1 would alienate the property in suit as Executor of his mother's
an agreement is entered into subject to ratification by others, a concluded
contract is not arrived at. Whenever ratification by some other persons, who
are not parties to the agreement is required, such a clause must be held to be
a condition precedent for coming into force of a concluded contract.
word 'subject to' has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at
page 1278, inter alia, as : "subservient, inferior, obedient to; governed
or affected by; provided that; provided; answerable for". In Collins'
English the words 'subject to' has been stated to mean as : "under the
condition that : we accept, subject to her agreement".
said agreement for sale, therefore, was not enforceable in a court of law.
Henry Earnest Meaney and another vs. E.C. Eyre Walker [AIR (34) 1947 All.332],
the law is stated in the following terms :
from this, we are of the opinion that there was no completed contract between
have already said that in the plaint the plaintiff alleged that the letter of
Mr. Meaney dated 29th August 1941, was an offer and the telegram dated 31st
August 1941, was the acceptance by which the contract was completed. In his
arguments before us learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent admitted that
the letter of 29th August 1941, was nothing more than an invitation to offer
and the plaintiff's telegram dated 31st August 1941, must be taken as a
definite offer of purchase made on his behalf. We have already said that the
letter of 1st September 1941 was not an absolute and unqualified acceptance of
the offer as required by s.7, Contract Act. In the letter there was no doubt an
expression of the willingness to sell the land to the plaintiff, but then it
was qualified by the statement that the defendant would sell the land to the
plaintiff if it was not wanted by others who might have a right of pre-emption.
The plaintiff was not able to rely on any correspondence after 1st September
1941, for his argument that there was a completed contract between the parties.
It was not till about 2nd October 1941, that the parties met when Mr. Meaney
came to Dehra Dun. It is nobody's case that there was an oral contract entered
into between the 2nd and 4th October. On 4th October we know that the plot of
land which the defendants intended to sell and the plaintiff intended to
purchase was measured and was found to be less than five bighas in area and the
whole talk fell through."
Warehousing & Forwarding Company of East Africa Ltd. vs. Jafferali &
Sons. Ltd. [1964 Law Reports - Appeal Cases 1], the Privy Council held:
Elliott contracted subject to ratification by his principal there would be no
concluded contract until ratification had been obtained. The respondents
contended upon the authority of Koenigsblatt vs. Sweet that ratification by the
principal can operate back to the date when the contract was made by the agent
without the necessity of communication to the other party. But in that case the
limitation of the agent's authority was not known to the other contracting
party. In such a case the agent contracts as principal and his principal is
bound upon ratification taking place.
however, the other party to the contract has intimation of the limitation of
the agent's authority neither party can be bound until ratification has been
duly intimated to the other party to the contract. It would be contrary to good
sense to hold that a concluded contract had been made in these
circumstances." In Dr. Jiwan Lal's case (supra) whereupon reliance has
been placed by Mr. Bhatt, Clause (6) of the agreement was as under :
In the event of the above said premises, which is the subject matter of sale
not being vacated by the Income-tax Authorities or is subsequently
requisitioned by the Government prior to the registration of the sale-deed the
vendor shall refund to the purchaser the sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten
thousand only) received by the vendor as earnest money plus interest at the
rate of 6 per cent per annum." Having regard to the nature of the
transaction and keeping in view the materials on record it was held that the
clause 6 aforementioned was for the benefit of the purchaser and in that
situation, this Court held that the same may be waived. Such is not the
however, beyond any cavil that in terms of Sections 211(1) and 307(1) of the
Indian Succession Act, the Executor of a Will has an absolute right to transfer
the property as has been held in Smt. Babuain Chandrakala Devi's case (supra)
and P.H. Alphonso's case (supra).
in the instant case the question was as to whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case a concluded contract can be said to have been arrived
at. Having regard to the discussions made hereinbefore, we have no hesitation
in holding that the agreement of sale in question could not have been
specifically enforced and in that view of the matter the question is as to
whether the Original Defendant No.1 had an absolute right to dispose of the
property in question in exercise of his power as an Executor of the Will or not
takes a back seat.
event, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case and in
particular the subsequent events as well the conduct of Plaintiff No.1, we are
of the opinion that it is not a fit case where a discretionary jurisdiction of
this Court in terms of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, Angammal and
Others, (2002) 3 SCC 316 and Nirmala Anand vs. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd. and
Others, (2002) 8 SCC 146].
appeal being devoid of any merit is, therefore, dismissed but without any order
as to costs.