Bhimrao
@ Ramesh Pandhari Bhade & Ors Vs. State of Maharashtra [2003] Insc 61 (6
February 2003)
N.Santosh
Hegde & B.P.Singh Santosh Hegde,J.
In
regard to an incident which took place on 8.10.1991 at about 3 p.m. in the
house of one Prabhakar Gawande, 37 accused persons were charge-sheeted for
offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149, Section 427 read
with Section 149, Section 323 read with Section 149 and Sections 148, 395 and
396 IPC. In that case the learned Sessions Judge, Akola while acquitting 16 of the accused,
convicted accused No.1 under Section 302 IPC along with certain other charges
and awarded him life imprisonment. In regard to others, he found them guilty
principally under Section 302 read with Section 149 and surprisingly awarded
only 8 years RI. In appeal the High Court confirmed the conviction under
Section 302 awarded to A-1 and in regard to some of the accused persons who
were appellants before him it altered the conviction to one under Section 304
Part II read with Section 149 and awarded 7 years R.I. While in regard to the
appellants before us, it altered the conviction to one under Section 326 read
with 149 and sentenced them to undergo RI for three years.
The
appeal of A-1 who is convicted under Section 302 and other appellants whose
sentence was altered to one under Section 304 Part II have since been dismissed
by this Court. In the present appeal, only those accused who have been
convicted under Section 326 read with Section 149 are before us as appellants.
The prosecution
case briefly stated is that on 8.10.1991 at about 3.00 p.m. all these accused persons along with some others formed an
unlawful assembly with a common object of committing the murder of one Prabhakar
Gawande. With that object, they went to his house. At that place some of the
members of the unlawful assembly entered the house of said Prabhakar and
assaulted him causing grievous injuries, consequent to which he died about six
days later. It is the further case of the prosecution that while Prabhakar was
being assaulted inside the house the appellants herein stood outside the house
and did not take part in the assault on the deceased, nor was any grievous
injury caused to anyone by them.
It is
on the basis of this prosecution case, the learned Sessions Judge while
acquitting 16 of the accused who were charge-sheeted, convicted A-1 under
Section 302 and others under Section 302 read with Section 149.
In
appeal, the High Court, on re-appreciation of the evidence, came to the
conclusion that on the said date of incident while accused persons did form an
unlawful assembly, the common object of the said unlawful assembly was only to
cause assault on said Prabhakar and with that object in mind the group had
proceeded towards the house of the said Prabhakar and when they reached the
house, some of the accused entered the house while the appellants now before us
stayed outside the house. The High Court also came to the conclusion that those
members of the unlawful assembly who had entered the house attacked Prabhakar
causing him grievous injuries did something more than the original object of
the assembly. It, therefore, came to the conclusion that the common object of
the assembly of persons who remained outside was not the same as the common
object that was subsequently formed by the members of the assembly who went
inside the house of Prabhakar. On that basis, it distinguished the case of two
groups, and on that basis the High Court found those members of the unlawful
assembly who entered the house guilty of an offence punishable under Section
304 Part II and sentenced them to 7 years RI while it found the appellants who
were outside the house guilty of an offence punishable under Section 326 read
with Section 149 IPC and sentenced them to three years.
Shri U.R.Lalit,
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants in these appeals contended
that the High Court having come to the conclusion that the original common
object of the unlawful assembly was only to assault Prabhakar pursuant to which
these appellants had gone to his house and they having not done anything beyond
that, the High Court erred in finding them guilty of offence punishable under
Section 326 read with 149 IPC.
He
contended that at the most these appellants could be found guilty of offence
punishable under Section 352 read with 149 IPC.
This
the learned counsel argued on the basis of the finding of the High Court
itself.
Dr.R.B.Masodkar,
learned counsel appearing for the State, however, contended that the High Court
was in error in bifurcating the common object of a single unlawful assembly
into two and coming to the conclusion that the present appellants did not share
the common object of the other members of the unlawful assembly who entered the
house and assaulted the deceased. According to the learned counsel, the common
object of all the members of the unlawful assembly was only to cause death of Prabhakar
and it is with that object in mind all the members of the unlawful assembly
carrying deadly weapons had proceeded to the house of the deceased, therefore,
all the members of the unlawful assembly should be attributed the same common
object.
We
have heard the arguments of the learned counsel and perused the records. The
High Court after considering the material on record came to specific conclusion
that the common object of unlawful assembly when it proceeded towards the house
of Prabhakar was only to assault the said Prabhakar. It also gave a finding
that those accused who entered the house of Prabhakar had developed a different
common object after entering the house of Prabhakar and with that intention the
members of the said group had assaulted Prabhakar, while the members of the
original unlawful assembly who did not enter the house and who are now
appellants before us did not share the subsequent common object of the group
which attacked Prabhakar. It is in this context of the finding of the High
Court, the learned counsel for the appellants had contended that if the
original common object of the unlawful assembly was only to assault Prabhakar
there was no material before the High Court to have attributed the common
object of causing grievous hurt to Prabhakar to these appellants. We find
substantial force in the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants. Having perused the material on record, we are inclined to hold that
the High Court having rightly given a specific finding that the original common
object of the assembly was only to assault deceased Prabhakar and also having
given a finding that the said common object got changed only in regard to those
members of the unlawful assembly who entered the house, we are unable to accept
the later finding of the High Court that the appellants herein though they did
not share the later common object of those accused who entered the house, will
still be liable for conviction under Section 326 read with 149 IPC. In the
absence of any material to the contrary, it should be presumed that those
members of the original unlawful assembly who only shared the common object of
assaulting deceased Prabhakar cannot be attributed with the subsequent change
in the common object of some of the members of the assembly who entered the
house of Prabhakar and caused grievous injuries to him. So far as the present
appellants are concerned, who stood outside the house of the deceased and who
could not have known what actually transpired inside the house, the act of
those members of the original unlawful assembly who entered the house, cannot
be attributed, hence, as contended by the learned counsel for the appellants at
the most these appellants will be liable to be punished for sharing the
original common object which is only to assault the deceased, therefore, they
can be held guilty of an offence punishable under Section 352 read with Section
149 only.
For
the reasons stated, these appeals succeed, the conviction awarded to the
appellants under Section 326 read with 149 IPC by the High Court is modified to
one under Section 352 read with 149 IPC and a sentence of 3 months RI is
awarded to these appellants.
Learned
counsel for the appellants submit that all the appellants have already
undergone sentence exceeding the period of three months, if that be so, they
will be entitled for remission of the said period already undergone.
With
the above modifications, these appeals partly succeed and the same are allowed
to that extent.
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