Secretary,
Thirumurugan Co-Operative Vs. M. Lalitha & Ors [2003] Insc 627 (11 December 2003)
Shivaraj
V. Patil & D.M. Dharmadhikari. Shivaraj V. Patil J.
The
respondents, being the members of the appellant-society, had pledged paddy bags
for obtaining loan. The appellant-society issued notices to the respondents
demanding payment of loan amount with interest thereon. The respondents filed
petitions in the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Thiruchirapally
seeking direction to the appellant to release the paddy bags pledged on receipt
of the loan amount or in the alternative to direct the appellant to pay the
market value of the baddy bags with interest thereon from the date of pledging
till the date of release and also to pass an order for compensation for mental
agony and suffering. The appellant contested the claims of the respondents
before the District Forum raising a preliminary objection that Consumer Forum
had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute between members and cooperative
society in view of Section 90 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983
(for short `the Act'). The District Forum, in the light of the pleadings of the
parties, raised the following points for determination:-
"1)
Whether the complainants are consumers and whether there is any consumer
disputes within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act and whether this
Forum has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaints of this nature and decide
the issue?
2)
Whether there is any deficiency in service and negligence on the part of the
opposite party in all the complaints?
3)
Whether the complainants in all the complaints are entitled to the reliefs
prayed for?" The District Forum answered the points 1 and 2 in favour of
the respondents and granted relief.
The
appellant took up the matters in appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission. The respondents also filed appeal to the extent they were aggrieved
in regard to payment of interest from 14.9.1992. The State Commission, by the
common order, allowed the appeals filed by the appellant and dismissed the
appeals filed by the respondents. The State Commission held that complaints
filed by the respondents were themselves not maintainable having regard to
Section 90 of the Act. Hence, the State Commission did not deal with the other
contentions.
Aggrieved
by the order of the State Commission, the respondents approached the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission by filing revision petition. The
National Commission, after hearing the learned counsel for the parties and
dealing with the contentions advanced by them, found fault with the order of
the State Commission. Consequently, the revision petition was allowed. The
order of the State Commission was set aside restoring the order passed by the
District Forum. Hence, this appeal.
The
learned counsel for the appellant urged that
(1)
Section 90 of the Act impliedly ousts the jurisdiction of all courts and
tribunals including that of a civil court under Section 9 CPC and the Consumer
Forum created under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short `the 1986
Act') from adjudicating upon the issues falling within the scope of said
Section; on the facts of the present case, the dispute is covered by the said
Section. For this purpose, he relied on Section 156 of the Act;
(2)
the Act being a special enactment and when specific provisions are made
exclusively to deal with the disputes between a cooperative society and its
members, the disputes raised before District Forum by the respondents were not
maintainable;
(3)
The Act read with the Rules creates special rights and liabilities for the
members and the management and lays down that all questions about the said
rights and liabilities are to be determined by the Registrar and that has the
provisions for appeal, revision and review. Hence the case in any event is
covered by the proposition (2) set out at page 682 in Dhulabhai and others vs.
The State of Madhya Pradesh and another [1968 (3) SCR 662]; and (4) If the
argument of the respondents is accepted a situation may arise where one party
may approach a forum under the 1986 Act and the other under the Act, or the
same party may approach two forums one after the other or simultaneously. In
such a situation there is likelihood of conflict of decisions, which should be
avoided. He drew our attention to certain provisions of the Act and the 1986
Act. He cited few decisions in support of his submissions. He alternatively
submitted that in case his contentions are not accepted, the State Commission
having not decided other contentions on merit in the appeal filed by the
appellant, the matter may be remanded to the State Commission to adjudicate the
issues other than the issue of maintainability.
In
opposition, the learned senior counsel, who assisted the Court at our request
in the absence of any representation despite service of notice on the
respondents, supported the impugned order, contending that Section 3 of the
1986 Act clearly shows that the remedy available under the 1986 Act is in
addition to and not in derogation of the other remedies available; having
regard to the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the purpose sought to be
served by the 1986 Act, it cannot be said that District Forum had no
jurisdiction to decide the disputes. He submitted that even under Section 156
of the Act, the jurisdiction of the District Forum is not barred; if at all, it
is only the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of certain matters is
barred. He added that a consumer may include a member of cooperative society; reliefs
that can be granted under the 1986 Act are wider beside being speedy. He also
drew our attention to certain provisions of both the Acts and placed reliance
on few decisions in support of his submissions.
We
have carefully considered the submissions made on either side. The provisions
of the Act to the extent they are relevant are:
"Section
90. Disputes (1) If any dispute touching the constitution of the board or the
management or the business of a registered society (other than a dispute
regarding disciplinary action taken by the competent authority constituted
under sub-section (3) of Section 75 or the Registrar or the Society or its
board against a paid servant of the society) arises
(a) among
members, past members and persons claiming through members, past members and
deceased members, or
(b)
between a member, past member or person claiming through a member, past member
or deceased member and the society, its board or any officer, agent or servant
of the society, or
(c)
between the society or its board and any past board, any officer, agent or
servant, or any past officer, past agent or past servant, or the nominee, heirs
or legal representatives of any deceased officer, deceased agent, or deceased
servant of the society, or
(d) between
the society and any other registered society, such disputes shall be rendered
to the Registrar for decision.
Explanation For the purpose of this section, a
dispute shall include
(i) a
claim by a registered society for any debt or demand due to it from a member, past
member or the nominee, heir or legal representative of the deceased member
whether such debt or demand be admitted or not.
(ii) A
claim by a registered society against a member, past member or the nominee,
heir or legal representative of a deceased member for the delivery of
possession to the society of land or other immovable property resumed by it for
breach of the conditions of assignment or allotment of such land or other
immovable property, and
(iii) a
decision by the board under sub-section (3) of Section 34:
Provided
that no dispute relating to, or in connection with, any election shall be
referred under this sub-section till the date of the declaration of the result
of such election." Section 156 "Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts
- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in
force no order or award passed, decision or action taken or direction issued
under this Act by an arbitrator, a liquidator, the Registrar or an officer
authorized or empowered by him, the Tribunal or the Government or any officer
subordinate to them, shall be liable to be called in question in any court and
no injunction shall be granted by any court in respect of anything which is
done or intended to be done by or under this Act." Section 3 of the 1986
Act reads:- "Section 3. Act not in derogation of any other law The
provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the
provisions of any other law for the time being in force." Before
proceeding further, it is useful to know the background, the objects and
reasons and purpose for which the 1986 Act is enacted. Consequent upon
Industrial Revolution and vast development and expansion in the field of
international trade and commerce, variety of consumer goods entered the market
to meet the needs of the consumers and most of services like insurance,
transport, electricity, housing, entertainment, finance and banking have been
made available to the consumers. Well-organized sectors of manufacturers and
traders with better energy and markets have emerged affecting relationship
between the traders and consumers. With the help and aid of media both
electronic and print, the advertisements of goods and services in television,
newspapers and magazines have created great impact and influence on the demand
for the same by the consumers though there may be manufacturing defects or
deficiencies or short-comings in the quality, quantity and the purity of the
goods or there may be deficiency in the services rendered. In the interest of the
public and to protect the consumers, it became necessary to check adulterated
and substandard articles in the market. Despite various other statutes such as
Indian Contract Act, 1972, Sale of Goods Act, 1930, the Indian Penal Code,
1960, The Standard of Weights and Measures Act, 1976 and the Motor Vehicles Act,1988
etc. being in operation, very little could be achieved in the field of consumer
protection. Though the MRTP Act 1969 and the Prevention of Adulteration Act,
1954 provide relief to the consumers yet it became necessary to protect the
consumers from the exploitation and to save them from adulterated and
substandard goods and deficiency in services and to safeguard their interest.
In
General Assembly a Consumer Protection Resolution No.39/248 was passed and India is a signatory to this Resolution.
The
United Nations had passed a resolution in 1985 indicating certain guidelines
under which the governments could make laws for better protection of the
interest of the consumers and such laws were more necessary in developing
countries to protect the consumer from hazardous to their health and safety and
to make them available speedier and cheaper redress. With this background, the
1986 Act was enacted. The Statement of objects and reasons show that the Consumer
Protection Bill 1986 sought to provide for better protection of the interest of
the consumers and for the purpose, to make provision for the establishment of
consumer council and other authorities in the settlement of consumer disputes
and for matters connected therewith. It seeks, interalia, to promote and
protect the rights of consumers such as protection against marketing of goods
which are hazardous to life and property; the right to be informed about the
quality, quantity, potency, purity, standard and price of goods to protect the
consumer against unfair trade practices; the right to be assured, wherever
possible, access to an authority of goods at competitive prices; the right to
be heard and to be assured that the interest of consumers will receive due
consideration at appropriate forums; the right to seek redressal against unfair
trade practices or unscrupulous exploitation of consumers and right to consumer
education. The object is also to provide speedy and simple redressal to
consumer disputes, a quasi judicial machinery is sought to be set up at the
district, State and Central levels. These Quasi Judicial bodies will observe
principles of natural justice and have been empowered to give relief of
specific nature and to award, wherever appropriate, compensation to consumers.
Penalties for non-compliance of orders given by Quasi Judicial bodies have also
been provided.
The
preamble of the Act declares that it is an Act to provide for better protection
of the interest of consumers and for that purpose to make provision for the
establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumers
disputes and matters connected therewith. In Section 3 of the Act in clear and
unambiguous terms it is stated that the provisions of 1986 Act shall be in
addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of the any other law for
the time being in force.
From
the statement of objects and reasons and the scheme of 1986 Act, it is apparent
that the main objective of the Act is to provide for better protection of the
interest of the consumer and for that purpose to provide for better redressal,
mechanism through which cheaper, easier, expeditious and effective redressal is
made available to consumers. To serve the purpose of the Act, various quasi
judicial forums are set up at the district, State and National level with wide
range of powers vested in them.
These
quasi judicial forums, observing the principles of natural justice, are
empowered to give relief of a specific nature and to award, wherever
appropriate, compensation to the consumers and to impose penalties for
non-compliance of their orders.
As per
Section 3 of the Act, as already stated above, the provisions of the Act shall
be in addition to and not in derogation to any other provisions of any other
law for the time being in force. Having due regard to the scheme of the Act and
purpose sought to be achieved to protect the interest of the consumers, better
the provisions are to be interpreted broadly, positively and purposefully in
the context of the present case to give meaning to additional/extended
jurisdiction, particularly when Section 3 seeks to provide remedy under the Act
in addition to other remedies provided under other Acts unless there is clear
bar.
The
view we are taking is supported by the earlier decisions of this Court. In Lucknow
Development Authority vs. M.K. Gupta [(1994) 1 SCC 243], this Court observed,
thus: - "We therefore come straight away to the legal issue involved in
these appeals. But before doing so and examining the question of jurisdiction
of the District Forum or State or National Commission to entertain a complaint
under the Act, it appears appropriate to ascertain the purpose of the Act, the
objective it seeks to achieve and the nature of social purpose it seeks to
promote as it shall facilitate in comprehending the issue involved and assist
in construing various provisions of the Act effectively. To begin with the
preamble of the Act, which can afford useful assistance to ascertain the
legislative intention, it was enacted, 'to provide for the protection of the
interest of consumers'. Use of the word 'protection' furnishes key to the minds
of makers of the Act. Various definitions and provisions which elaborately
attempt to achieve this objective have to be construed in this light without
departing from the settled view that a preamble cannot control otherwise plain
meaning of a provision. In fact the law meets long felt necessity of protecting
the common man from such wrongs for which the remedy under ordinary law for
various reasons has become illusory. Various legislations and regulations
permitting the State to intervene and protect interest of the consumers have
become a haven for unscrupulous ones as the enforcement machinery either does
not move or it moves ineffectively, inefficiently and for reasons which are not
necessary to be stated. The importance of the Act lies in promoting welfare of
the society by enabling the consumer to participate directly in the market
economy. It attempts to remove the helplessness of a consumer which he faces
against powerful, business, described as, 'a network of rackets' or a society
in which, 'producers have secured power' to 'rob the rest' and the might of
public bodies which are degenerating into storehouses of inaction where papers
do not move from one desk to another as a matter of duty and responsibility but
for extraneous consideration leaving the common man helpless, bewildered and
shocked. The malady is becoming so rampant, widespread and deep that the society
instead of bothering, complaining and fighting against it, is accepting it as
part of life. The enactment in these unbelievable yet harsh realities appears
to be a silver lining, which may in course of time succeed in checking the
rot." In Fair Air Engineers Pvt. Ltd. And another vs. N.K. Modi [(1996) 6
SCC 385], this Court, after referring to Lucknow Development Authority case
(supra), held that the provisions of the Act are to be construed widely to give
effect to the object and purpose of the Act. It went on to say that "It is
seen that Section 3 envisages that the provisions of the Act are in addition to
and are not in derogation of any other law in force. It is true, as rightly
contended by Shri Suri, that the words "in derogation of the provisions of
any other law for the time being in force" would be given proper meaning
and effect and if the complaint is not stayed and the parties are not relegated
to the arbitration, the Act purports to operate in derogation of the provisions
of the Arbitration Act. Prima facie, the contention appears to be plausible but
on construction and conspectus of the provisions of the Act we think that the
contention is not well founded. Parliament is aware of the provisions of the
Arbitration Act and the Contract Act, 1872 and the consequential remedy
available under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., to avail of
right of civil action in a competent court of civil jurisdiction. Nonetheless,
the Act provides the additional remedy." Further, dealing with the jurisdiction
of the forums under the 1986 Act in paragraph 16 this Court has stated, thus: -
"16. It would, therefore, be clear that the legislature intended to
provide a remedy in addition to the consentient arbitration which could be
enforced under the Arbitration Act or the civil action in a suit under the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereby, as seen, Section 34 of the
Act does not confer an automatic right nor create an automatic embargo on the
exercise of the power by the judicial authority under the Act. It is a matter
of discretion. Considered from this perspective, we hold that though the
District Forum, State Commission and National Commission are judicial
authorities, for the purpose of Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, in view of the
object of the Act and by operation of Section 3 thereof, we are of the
considered view that it would be appropriate that these forums created under
the Act are at liberty to proceed with the matters in accordance with the
provisions of the Act rather than relegating the parties to an arbitration
proceedings pursuant to a contract entered into between the parties. The reason
is that the Act intends to relieve the consumers of the cumbersome arbitration
proceedings or civil action unless the forums on their own and on the peculiar
facts and circumstances of a particular case, come to the conclusion that the
appropriate forum for adjudication of the disputes would be otherwise those
given in the Act." (emphasis supplied) Again in Spring Meadows Hospital
and another vs. Harjol Ahluwalia through K.S. Ahluwalia and another [(1998) 4
SCC 39], this Court, having taken note of the background in which the 1986 Act
came to be placed on the statute book, observed that the Act creates a
framework for speedy disposal of consumer disputes and an attempt has been made
to remove the existing evils of the ordinary court system. The Act being a
beneficial Legislation should receive a liberal construction.
A
Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in a recent decision in State of
Karnataka vs. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. Society and others [(2003) 2
SCC 412], expressed the view that the 1986 Act was brought into force in view
of the long-felt necessity of protecting the common man from wrongs wherefor
the ordinary law for all intent and purport had become illusory and that in
terms of the said Act, a consumer is entitled to participate in the proceedings
directly as a result whereof his helplessness against a powerful business house
may be taken care of. Referring to the Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. Case
(aforementioned) the Court stated that the provisions of the said Act are
required to be interpreted as broadly as possible. On the question of
jurisdiction it is stated that the forums under the Act have jurisdiction to
entertain a complaint despite the fact that other forums/courts would also have
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the lis. It is also noticed that the Act
provides for a further safeguard to the effect that in the event a complaint
involves complicated issues requiring recording of evidence of experts, the
complainant would be at liberty to approach the civil court for appropriate
relief.
The
learned counsel for the appellant strongly relied on the decision of this Court
in Chairman, Thiruvalluvar Transport Corporation vs. Consumer Protection
Council [(1995) 2 SCC 479]. A deeper look at the facts of that case and
question considered therein make it clear that it governs the fact of that case
having regard to the specific provisions contained in the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988. In brief the facts of the case are that a person was traveling in an omni
bus, the driver of the bus tried to overtake a bullock-cart due to which the
bullocks got panicky whereupon the driver swerved the bus to the left and
applied brakes. In this situation the person, who was sitting in the rear seat,
was thrown in the front and hit against the iron bar sustaining a serious head
injury and subsequently succumbed to the injury. The legal representatives of
the deceased victim did not file claim petition before the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. After expiry of
the period of limitation for filing claim petition before the Motor Accidents
Claims Tribunal, the LRs of the deceased filed a complaint claiming Rs.20 lakhs
before the National Commission. As can be seen from paragraph 6 of the
judgment, the question that arose for consideration was whether the National
Commission had jurisdiction to entertain the claim application and award
compensation in respect of an accident involving the death of a person caused
by the use of a motor vehicle. Taking note of the fact that the Claims
Tribunals constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 had jurisdiction to
entertain claim for compensation which clearly fell within the ambit of Section
165 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, held that the 1988 Act can be said to be a
special Act in relation to claims of compensation arising out of the use of a
motor vehicle. It is observed that the accident occurred had nothing to do with
service provided to the deceased, if one reads the provision along with the
definition of complaint in Section 2(1)(c) and service in Section 2(1)(o) of
the 1986 Act. This Court held that the complaint in that case could not be said
to be in relation to any service hired or availed by the consumer because the
injury sustained by the consumer had nothing to do with the service provided or
availed by him. That was a case in which it was found that the National
Commission had no jurisdiction at all. That was not a case of additional remedy
available before a forum created under the 1986 Act. In our view the said
decision does not advance the case of the appellant in any way.
The
decision in Dhulabhai case (supra) also does not help the appellant. The
present case is not one where the question to be considered is as to the
exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court in view of the provisions of Section
90 read with Section 156 of the Act. Provisions of 1986 Act, as already made
clear above, apply in addition to the other provisions available under other
enactments. It follows that the remedies available under the 1986 Act for redressal
of disputes are in addition to the available remedies under the Act. Under the
1986 Act we have to consider as regards the additional jurisdiction conferred
on the forums and not their exclusion. In Dhulabhai case consideration was
whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was excluded.
Propositions
(1) and (2) indicate that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of
the special tribunals the jurisdiction of civil courts must be held to be
excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally
do in a suit.
Further,
where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination
of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of
the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the
jurisdiction of the civil court. The remedies that are available to an
aggrieved party under the 1986 Act are wider. For instance in addition to
granting a specific relief the forums under the 1986 Act have jurisdiction to
award compensation for the mental agony, suffering, etc., which possibly could
not be given under the Act in relation to dispute under Section 90 of the Act.
Merely because the rights and liabilities are created between the members and
the management of the society under the Act and forums are provided, it cannot
take away or exclude the jurisdiction conferred on the forums under the 1986
Act expressly and intentionally to serve a definite cause in terms of the
objects and reasons of the Act, reference to which is already made above.
When
the decision of Dhulabhai's case was rendered the provisions similar to 1986
Act providing additional remedies to parties were neither available nor
considered. If the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is
accepted it leads to taking away the additional remedies and forums expressly
provided under the 1986 Act, which is not acceptable.
The
question of conflict of decisions may not arise. If the parties approach both
the forums created under the Act and the 1986 Act, as indicated in the case of
Fair Air Engineers (P) Ltd. (supra), it is for the forum under the 1986 Act to
leave the parties either to proceed or avail the remedies before the other
forums, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Thus,
having regard to all aspects we are of the view that the National Commission
was right in holding that the view taken by the State Commission that the
provisions under the Act relating to reference of disputes to arbitration shall
prevail over the provisions of the 1986 Act is incorrect and untenable. The
National Commission, however, did not take note of the fact that the State
Commission had not decided the other contentions raised in the appeals on
merits. We are inclined to accept the alternative submission made on behalf of
the appellant for remanding the case to the State Commission for deciding the
other issues on merits while affirming that the complaints before the district
forum made by the respondents were maintainable and the district forum had
jurisdiction to deal with the disputes. In this view, while affirming the order
of the National Commission as to the maintainability of the disputes before the
forum under the Act, we remand the appeals to the State Commission for their
adjudication on other issues on merits without going to the question of
maintainability of the disputes before the forum under the 1986 Act.
Before
parting with the case we place on record our appreciation of the assistance
given by Shri T.L.V. Iyer, learned senior counsel.
The
appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
No
costs.
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