Hamlet
@ Sasi & Ors Vs. State of Kerala [2003] Insc
395 (21 August 2003)
N.Santosh
Hegde & B.P.Singh. Santosh Hegde,J.
These
criminal appeals are filed by the convicted accused persons against the
judgment of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam dated 7th November, 2001 whereby the High Court confirmed
the sentence imposed on these appellants by the trial court under Sections 302
and 324 read with Section 149 IPC. Since particulars of the punishment imposed
on other accused is not relevant for the purpose of considering these appeals,
we will not advert to it unless necessary in any particular context. The
appellants before us are A-1 to A-3 before the trial court.
The
prosecution case is that Yugine @ Sajiv and others, some of whom were
prosecution witnesses in this case, were active followers of the Indian
National Congress Party. The accused were stated to be followers of Communist
Party of India (Marxist). It is stated that at about 3 p.m. on 1.10.1991, 44
accused entered into a criminal conspiracy to commit the murder of Yugine
(deceased), Jose (PW-2) and others as also to commit dacoity and mischief in
the houses of the followers of Congress-I. In pursuance of that common object,
at about 4 p.m. on 1.10.1991 the accused formed
themselves into members of an unlawful assembly, armed with deadly weapons. It
is alleged that they chased deceased Yugine and PW-2 who were returning from
the shop of PW-15 situated at Anjuthengu on a public road. In that process at a
place near Manjamoodu junction A-1 to A-4, A-24 and five others wrongfully
confined the deceased and PW-2 from proceeding in any direction. The
prosecution further alleges that the 1st accused caught hold of Yugine by his waist,
lifted him up and threw him on the ground.
Thereafter,
he kicked the deceased on the stomach and A-2 and another accused beat the
deceased with iron bar, while A-3, A-4 and two others beat the deceased and
PW-2 with Oars. The prosecution alleges that PW-1, brother of the deceased,
came running to the place of occurrence and he was also beaten up by the
accused. Subsequently, A-5 to A-7, A-9 and A-10 to A-23 and other accused
joined in attacking the deceased and PW-2. The further case of the prosecution
is that A-6, A-7 and four other persons attacked PW-4 and inflicted injuries on
him with an intention to kill him. The prosecution also alleges that the
accused persons trespassed into the houses of certain prosecution witnesses and
committed robbery.
After
the said attack the deceased, PW-2 and PW-4 were taken to the Taluka Head Quarters Hospital and from there to Medical College Hospital, Trivandrum. While undergoing treatment, Yugine
succumbed to the injuries at 11.20 p.m. on
1.10.1991. In the meanwhile, PW-1 at about 4 p.m. had lodged a complaint
Ext.P-1 in the Police Station which was registered for offences punishable
under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120-B, 450, 451, 452, 342, 359, 397, 427, 323,
324, and 307 IPC. After investigation a final report was filed by the police
against 44 persons when offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 was
included. Out of these 44 accused, A-25, A-26 and A-37 died and out of the
other accused persons mentioned in the final report only 24 persons were tried
by the trial court, therefore, those persons against whom the trial could not proceed
were treated as "other accused persons".
The
learned IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Thiruvananthapuram acquitted A-5, A-9,
A-10 and A-17 while he convicted A-1 to A-4, A-6, A-7 and A-24 for offences
punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 342, 427, 450, 451, 452, 461, 395,
397, 324, 307 and 302 IPC read with Section 149 IPC. He sentenced all these
accused persons to undergo rigorous imprisonment for various terms and for
various offences while for the offence punishable under Section 302 he directed
the said accused to undergo imprisonment for life.
As
stated above, in an appeal filed by the convicted accused persons the High
Court while confirming the sentence imposed on A-1 to A-4 under Section 302 as
well as under Sections 143, 147, 148 and 324 acquitted A-6 and A-7 of the
offence punishable under Section 302 but convicted them of an offence
punishable under Section 324 IPC. So far as A-24 is concerned he was acquitted
of all the charges.
It is
against the said judgment of the High Court, 4 appellants are before us who
have been convicted of an offence punishable under Section 302 read with
Section 149 IPC and for certain other offences.
Shri
Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended that the
High Court having rightly disbelieved the prosecution case in regard to the
attack on PW-4, as also the prosecution case against other acquitted accused,
the High Court ought to have extended the said benefit of doubt to the
appellants also. He also contended that even according to the finding of the
High Court the prosecution has been able to establish the overt act of only 4
accused in regard to the assault on the deceased, therefore, the High Court
fell in error in convicting the accused persons with the aid of Section 149 IPC
because the number of people identified by the High Court in regard to the
assault on the deceased was less than 5 as required under Section 141 of IPC.
Hence, in the absence of any material to show that apart from these appellants
there were some more accused who formed the unlawful assembly, the High Court
could not have convicted the appellants for a charge under Section 302 with the
aid of Section 149 IPC. He, of course, also attacked the evidence led by the
prosecution in regard to the incident itself which according to him was full of
contradictions and improbabilities. Alternatively the learned counsel argued
that even assuming that the prosecution has been able to establish the attack
on the deceased by these appellants, the nature of injuries suffered by the
deceased were such that these appellants can not be attributed with the
intention to kill the deceased nor could they be held to have had knowledge
that the injuries caused by them in the ordinary course would lead to Yugine's
death, hence, at the most the appellants can be held guilty of an offence under
Section 324 IPC.
Shri
John Mathew, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State supported the
impugned judgment and contended that from the material produced by the
prosecution, it is clear that Accused 1 to 4, 6, 7 and 24 along with 5 other
persons had attacked the deceased with iron rods etc. and some of the injuries
suffered by the deceased were such as would cause death in the ordinary course.
Therefore, assuming that the High Court was justified in acquitting A-6, A-7
and A-24 of the offence punishable under Section 302, still it could be seen
from the finding of the High Court that A-1 to A-4 and 5 others had attacked
the deceased, therefore, Section 149 is rightly relied on the High Court to
convict the appellants. He submitted that because of the political rivalry
between the two groups of people, deceased Yugine was done to death and the
nature of injuries would clearly show the intention of the accused was to
commit murder, therefore, the conviction under Section 302 read with Section
149 was justified.
We do
notice that both the courts below have rejected the prosecution case of
conspiracy punishable under Section 120-B of IPC. The High Court has also found
that the prosecution has not established its case under Section 307, 395 etc.
We also notice that the High Court has specifically come to the conclusion that
A-5, A-6 and A-24 were not the members of the unlawful assembly the object of
which was to commit the murder of the deceased.
Therefore,
bearing in mind the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants, we will
examine the evidence on record as also the findings of the two courts below.
The trial court in this regard came to the following conclusion :
"It
is further found that the death of the deceased was caused by A1, A2, A3 A4,
A6, A7 and A24. After discussing points No.17, 18 & 19, I have found that
A1, A2, A3, A4, A6, A7 and A24 committed the aforesaid acts in furtherance of
their common object.
Even
though the presence of other accused persons at the scene of occurrence was
spoken to by PW-1, specific overt acts are alleged only against A1, A2, A3, A4,
A6, A7 and A24 in committing the aforesaid acts." Based on this finding
the trial court convicted the said accused of an offence punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 149 among some other offences.
From
the above finding of the trial court, we notice that the members of the
unlawful assembly were identified by their individual overt acts and not by
their mere presence. On this basis, according to the learned Sessions Judge,
the unlawful assembly which attacked the deceased and which had the common
object of committing the murder of the deceased consisted only of A-1 to A-4,
A-6, A-7 and A-24, that is, an assembly of 7 members. Whereas the High Court in
regard to the persons who constituted the unlawful assembly to attack the
deceased held thus in its judgment :
"So
the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that the prosecution has succeeded in
establishing that A1 to A4 are guilty of the offences under Section 302 read
with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code is correct and is confirmed. But
there is no evidence to hold that A6, A7 and A24 also inflicted any injuries on
Yugine or they were aware that common object of the unlawful assembly is to
eliminate Yugine or there is likelihood to commit such offence." From the
above observations of the High Court, we notice that even the High Court
proceeded on the basis of accepting the prosecution case as to the members of
the unlawful assembly only based on the overt act of the accused persons and
not by their presence. It is in this process the High Court found that the
prosecution has not established that A-6, A-7 and A-24 had inflicted any injury
on Yugine, therefore, it held that these three accused persons were not members
of the unlawful assembly.
Consequence
of such a conclusion of the High Court would be that it is only A-1 to A-4 who
attacked the deceased, therefore, they alone can be found to be members of the
unlawful assembly and none other. However, without elaborating any further on
the prosecution evidence and without naming or identifying or even coming to a
final conclusion that there were persons other than A-1 to A-4 who together
formed the unlawful assembly with the common object of committing the murder of
the deceased.
The
High Court came to the following conclusion :
"We
have already found that the evidence adduced only proves the identity of A1 to
A4 as members of unlawful assembly.
So we
hold that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing that an unlawful
assembly was formed at 4
p.m. on 1.10.1996 and
A1 to A4 were members of that unlawful assembly. The evidence also shows that
they were armed with deadly weapons and committed the offence of rioting. So
the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that A1 to A4 are guilty of the
offences punishable under Sections 143, 147 and 148 of the Indian Penal Code is
correct and confirmed………. But the finding of the court below that A6, A7 and
A24 are guilty of the offences under Sections 143, 147 and 148 of Indian penal
Code are set aside and they are acquitted of that offences." From the
above, we find an element of contradiction in the judgment of the High Court in
regard to its conclusion as to who were the members of the unlawful assembly,
while in an earlier part of the judgment it did observe that A-1 to A-4 and
five others attacked the deceased, later on, while coming to the conclusion as
to who were the members of the unlawful assembly the High Court rests satisfied
with A-1 to A-4 alone as being members of the unlawful assembly. If that be so,
we think the High Court was not justified in invoking Section 149 to convict
the appellants of an offence under Section 302 because the said number falls short
of the minimum number required to form an unlawful assembly under Section 141
IPC. It is true that this Court in any number of cases has held that there can
be an unlawful assembly of less than five named accused so long as there is
material to come to the conclusion that the prosecution has established that
apart from these named accused there were also others who were unnamed but who
were members of such assembly and shared the common object of that unlawful
assembly. In the instant case it is true that originally the complaint stated
that about 50 persons formed unlawful assembly, that number came down to 44
when the final report of the investigating was filed before the trial court out
of which only 24 persons were brought to trial. Out of these 24 accused, the
Sessions Judge came to the specific conclusion that only A-1 to A-4, A-6, A-7
and A-24 together formed an unlawful assembly which would number seven in
total, while the High Court came to the conclusion that out of these seven
persons three accused namely A-6, A-7 and A-24 could not have been the members
of the unlawful assembly thus leaving only A-1 to A-4 as the members of the
unlawful assembly.
Therefore,
in the absence of a specific finding that there were other members also in the
said unlawful assembly, the invocation of Section 149 will be untenable.
Learned counsel for the State contended that it is the prosecution case that
apart from the appellants and others accused there were other persons also who
formed the unlawful assembly and finding of the trial court that only seven
members formed the unlawful assembly was erroneous. Similarly, he contended
that the High Court also committed an error in holding that A-6, A-7 and A-24
were not the members of the unlawful assembly, therefore, we should consider
the prosecution case de hors the findings of the courts below and only in the
background of the complaint and evidence produced in this case which would
indicate that apart from these four accused even Accused 6, 7 and 24 and many
others were members of the unlawful assembly. We cannot accede to this request
of the learned counsel for the respondent-State because all other accused
except A-1 to A-4 have been acquitted by either the trial court or the High
Court and there is no appeal against their acquittal, therefore, the question
of re-appreciation of the evidence in these cases as against the acquitted
persons does not arise at all at this stage even for the limited purpose of
finding out whether A-1 to A-4 were members of an unlawful assembly as required
under Section 141 IPC.
The
learned counsel for the State then pointed out from the judgment of the High
Court that it had come to the conclusion that it is A-1 to A-4 and five others
who were involved in the attack on Yugine, therefore, we should proceed on the
basis that apart from A-1 to A-4 there were five others who were also members
of the unlawful assembly. We are unable to accept this argument because though
from the judgment of the High Court we notice that there is an observation of
the High Court that A- 1 to A-4 and five others were involved, this was only an
observation and not a finding of the High Court. The finding of the High Court
in regard to the members of the unlawful assembly is found in that part of the
judgment which is extracted by us herein above wherein the High Court came to a
definite conclusion that so far as the attack on the deceased is concerned it
is only A-1 to A-4 who were the members of the unlawful assembly. To fortify
this conclusion of ours at the cost of repetition, we once again extract that
part of the judgment which runs as follows :
"We
have already found that the evidence adduced only proves the identity of A-1 to
A-4 as members of unlawful assembly. So we hold that the prosecution has
succeeded in establishing that an unlawful assembly was formed at 4 p.m. on
1.10.1996 and A-1 to A-4 were members of that unlawful assembly." From the
reading of this part of the judgment of the High Court, we find that the High
Court has confined the members of the unlawful assembly only to A-1 to A-4.
Therefore,
we can not accede to the argument of the learned counsel for the
respondent-State. In that view of the matter, we cannot accept the finding of
the High Court that A-1 to A-4 can be found guilty of an offence punishable
under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.
The
question then would be : Will the appellants be entitled to an acquittal of the
charge under Section 302 because the prosecution has failed to prove that the
unlawful assembly did contain more than five persons entertaining the same
common object ? This Court in Nethala Pothuraju vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
(1992 1 SCC 49) has held that the non applicability of Section 149 IPC is no
bar in convicting the accused under section 302 read with Section 34 IPC if the
evidence discloses commission of an offence in furtherance of the common
intention of such accused. This is because both Sections 149 and 34 IPC deal
with a combination of persons who become liable to be punished as sharers in
the commission of offences. Therefore, in cases where the prosecution is unable
to prove the number of members of the unlawful assembly to be five or more,
courts can convict the guilty persons with the aid of Section 34 IPC provided
that there is evidence on record to show such accused shared the common
intention to commit the crime.
While
doing so the courts will have to bear in mind the requirement of Section 34. It
is well known that to establish the common intention of several persons to
attract Section 34 of the IPC the following two fundamental facts have to be
established –
(i) common
intention
(ii)
participation of the accused in commission of the offences.
If the
above two ingredients are satisfied even overt act on the part of some of the
persons sharing in the common intention is not necessary. [See: Jai Bhagwan
& Ors. vs. State of Haryana (1999 3 SCC 102)]. Bearing in mind
the above principles and applying the same to the facts of the present case, we
notice that on the date of incident a large number of people, which included
A-1 to A-4 came in a group which the prosecution alleged had the object of
causing the murder of the deceased and to assault PW-2 and PW-4 among other
illegal intentions. Of course, the prosecution has failed to establish many of
these charges.
However,
from the facts of this case it proved atleast that A-1 to A-4 formed a separate
group and targeted the deceased and PW-2 against whom there was a specific
motive for these appellants to attack him. The prosecution has also proved in
that attack the deceased died and PW-2 suffered injuries. The question then is:
What was the common intention of these persons in attacking the deceased ?
While the learned counsel for the appellants contended that the common
intention at the most was only to cause hurt, while the learned counsel for the
respondent- State vehemently submitted that it was to cause the death of Yugine
and grievous hurt to PW-2. In this context, if we examine the prosecution case,
we notice that A-1 caught hold of the deceased by his waist and threw him on
the ground causing him grievous injuries on the back side of his head and
thereafter A-1 assaulted the deceased by kicking him on various parts of the
body and A-2 to A-4 attacked him with iron rods and Oars which caused among
other injuries, a lacerated wound on the neck of the right elbow leading to
fractures of the humorous, a contusion on the left ankle leading to fracture of
the fibula, apart from nearly 12 other injuries on different parts of the body.
Consequent
to the throw deceased suffered a head injury because of which there was
cerebral bleeding. The participation of these accused persons in the assault of
the deceased even after he was thrown down to the ground by A-1 clearly shows
that the further attack by A-2 to A-4 was in furtherance of a common intention
they shared with A-1, therefore, in our opinion, Section 34 is clearly
attracted to the facts of this case.
But
then the question would be: What was the common intention shared by these
accused persons in the attack on the deceased ? While the learned counsel for
the appellant contended that from the nature of injuries and the manner in
which the assault was committed, it could be nothing more than to cause hurt to
the deceased, whereas the learned counsel for the State contended that it is
clear from the injury No.4 suffered on the head of the deceased that all these
persons had the knowledge that by such injuries, the victim would suffer death
in the normal course, but in spite of the same, all these accused proceeded to
attack the deceased, causing more injuries, which would show that each one of
these persons had acted in furtherance of a common intention to cause death of
the deceased.
We
have noted that the medical report showed that the deceased has suffered about
14 injuries out of which injury Nos.1 and 2 caused fractures and injury No.4
was a head injury leading to subdural haemorrhage on the left part of the
temporal lobe which seems to be the most serious of all wounds which ultimately
led to the Yugine's death. After examining the entire prosecution evidence, we
notice none of these accused used any deadly weapon carried by them on any
vital part of the body like the head.
Injury
No.4 which led to the death of the deceased was caused by the fall caused by
A-1. It is very difficult to come to the conclusion if really A-1 had the
intention to kill Yugine, he would have only thrown him to the ground without
attacking him the iron rod available to him to be used. The fact that he only
kicked the deceased after the fall also supports this inference of ours.
Similarly, even according to the prosecution A-2 to A-4 used the iron rods and
oars to hit the deceased on his limbs only and not on any vital part of the
body. All these facts show that these appellants did share a common intention,
the same was only to cause grievous hurt to the deceased and not to cause his
death.
Therefore,
we are of the opinion that the High Court was wrong in convicting the
appellants for an offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149
IPC.
We,
however, find the appellants guilty of causing grievous hurt by dangerous
weapons punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC. We sentence
these appellants for the said offence to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7
years and further impose a fine of Rs.1,000/- each, in default, the appellants
shall undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one month each.
The
High Court has also convicted the appellants herein for an offence punishable
under section 324 read with Section 149 IPC and has awarded 2 years' RI on this
count to the appellants. We alter this conviction also to one under Section 324
read with Section 34 IPC, and maintain the same sentence awarded by the High
Court for the said offence under Section 324. We direct the sentences imposed
by us to run concurrently, and the appellants shall be entitled to remission of
the sentence for the period already undergone, if any. The appeals are allowed
partly.
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