Golakonda
Venkateswara Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
[2003] Insc 345 (1
August 2003)
Doraiswamy
Raju & H.K.Sema. Sema,J.
The
appellant was put to trial for an offence punishable under Sections 376, 302
and 201 IPC before Sessions Judge, Krishna Division at Machilipatnam in
Sessions Case No 110 of 1998. After the trial, the learned Sessions Judge found
the appellant not guilty under Sections 376 and 201 IPC and he was accordingly
acquitted of the charges under the aforesaid Sections. The learned Sessions
Judge, however, found the appellant guilty under Section 302 IPC and sentenced
him to undergo imprisonment for life and also to pay a fine of Rs.100/- and in
default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The conviction and the
sentence recorded by the learned Sessions Judge were confirmed by the High
Court by the impugned judgment under challenge.
Briefly
stated the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal are that the
appellant, a resident of Sultanagaram and a neighbour of the deceased – Devanaboyina
Lakshmi, stated to be a minor girl aged 15-16 years accosted the deceased about
two months prior to the incident on 14.7.1996. It is stated that the deceased
went to graze goats at water canal bund. The appellant noticed the deceased
going towards the water canal bund, followed her, and began to talk with her
with an evil eye. This fact is stated to have been witnessed by PW-5 Sala Ankamma.
It is also stated that having found no one present around the area, the
appellant caught the deceased, dragged her to a nearby unused shed, gagged her
mouth and committed rape on her against her will. It is also alleged that all
the resistance put up by the victim girl went in vain and the accused over-
powered the girl. It is further disclosed, in the process of struggle the upper
and inner langa of the deceased were torn. When the appellant left the deceased
alone and was about to part from the place of occurrence, the deceased
allegedly was said to have told the appellant that she would bring the matter to
the notice of villagers and police. Being frightened by this disclosure, it is
alleged, the appellant chased her, caught her and threw her into the well
situated in the northeastern corner of the dibba. The appellant also kept a
stone in the well so as to prevent the body from floating and also put some caveltry
creepers (Guprapu Dekka) with an intention to hide the offence. It is also
alleged that the appellant had buried the torn clothes of the deceased. Since
the deceased did not return by the evening, her kith and kin started searching
for her without any result. Finally, PW-1 (author of FIR and foster father of
the deceased), to whom the deceased was given in adoption by PW-2, came to know
through PW-5 Sala Ankamma that two months prior to the date of missing i.e.
14.7.1996 she noticed the appellant talking with the deceased. Upon this
information being given, PW-1 approached the village elders, one of whom, Rajarao
was examined as PW- 4. On being asked by the village elders the appellant
allegedly confessed the guilt of committing rape on the deceased and throwing
her into the well. It is only after this information, PW-1 lodged the FIR
(Exhibit P-1). In course of investigation the prosecution examined as many as
12 PWs and marked Exhibits P-1 to P-29 and M.Os. 1-8. None of the DWs were
examined on behalf of the appellant. He, however, pointed out three
contradictions in the evidence of PW-5 marked Exhibits D-6 to D-8. After the
conclusion of the trial, the learned Sessions Judge found the appellant guilty
as noticed above.
Undisputedly,
there is no eyewitness to the occurrence and conviction of the appellant is
solely based on the circumstantial evidence.
The
learned Sessions Judge, and in our view correctly, has formulated the following
circumstantial evidence appearing against the appellant on appreciation of
evidence:
(i)
"The identity of the deceased was established;
(ii)
The deceased was last seen in the company of the accused;
(iii)
The accused made an extra judicial confession before P.W.4 and another village
elder to the effect that he committed rape on the victim, killed her and threw
her in the well;
(iv)
Recovery of the articles and skeletal remains of the deceased pursuant to the
disclosures of the information furnished by the accused himself; and
(v)
The accused failed to adduce any evidence to the contra to prove the so-called
oblique motive of P.Ws. 4 and 6 to implicate him in a false case nor state
anything mitigating in his Sec.313 Cr.P.C. a false wholesale denial."
The
learned Sessions Judge having regard to and after considering the evidence on
record and exhibits found circumstances nos. 1, 2 and 4 well established
against the appellant.
By now
it is well settled principle of law that in cases where the evidence is purely
circumstantial in nature, the facts and circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is sought to be drawn must be fully established beyond any reasonable
doubt and such circumstances must be consistent and unerringly point to the
guilt of the accused and the chain of circumstances must be established by the
prosecution.
Mr. Mahendra
Anand, learned senior counsel, vehemently submits that the prosecution has not
established the aforesaid circumstances appearing against the appellant beyond
all reasonable doubts. It is his contention that the identity of the deceased
was not established beyond all reasonable doubts inasmuch as the Assistant
Director (F.S.L), who issued Exhibit P-29, was not examined. Undisputedly,
Exhibit P-29 Superimposition Report was sent to the Regional Forensic Science
Laboratory, Vijayawada. The Assistant Director, who issued
Exhibit P-29 certified that the skull in item 1(one) could have belonged to the
person in the photograph in item No.2(two). Court would not be oblivious of the
fact that the identity of the deceased was got tested by superimposition of the
skeletal remains of the deceased conducted with reference to the photograph of
the deceased. PW-12 deposed that he had sent the photograph of the deceased for
superimposition test by the Forensic Science Laboratory, Hyderabad. PW-7 Dr.S.Rama Brahmam, conducted
the post-mortem examination of skeletal remains (Exhibit P-7). In the said
report he gave the age of the deceased between 15 – 16 years based on his
medical knowledge.
PW-9 Dr.P.Vijaya
Kumar, a professor and scientist, working in the forensic laboratory examined
the skeletal remains in the court and stated that they showed the feminine
characteristics and the age of the person concerned would be around 15 to 16
years. This apart, Exhibit P-9 is the opinion of the forensic expert which also
makes it abundantly clear that the skull belonged to a human-being of female
sex aged 15 or 16 years. In the facts and circumstances stated above, we have
no doubt in our mind, that the identity of the deceased is well established
beyond all reasonable doubts and non- examination of Assistant Director who
issued Exhibit P-29 would itself throw away the otherwise reliable and
trustworthy evidence of PWs 7, 9 and 12. We have no reason to take a view
different from the view taken by two courts concurrently.
The
next contention of Mr. Anand, learned senior counsel, is that last seen of the
deceased with the appellant by PW-5 has not been established by convincing
evidence having regard to the discrepancies appearing in the testimony of PW-5.
It is the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that in the FIR
lodged by PW-1 (Exhibit P-1) it is stated that two months prior of her death
she was missing and this information was given to them by PW-5 Sala Ankamma
that about 11.00 A.M. she saw the deceased talking with the appellant at Puranamvari
Cheruvu whereas PW-5 Sala Ankamma when examined before the Court has stated as
under:- "The deceased died about 3 years ago. The deceased was found missing
3 months prior to her death. At that time at about 3-00 P.M., I had been to
canal bank for collecting firewood. There I found the accused and the deceased
talking with each other. I told the fact of seeing the accused and the deceased
talking with each other two months ago to the parents of the deceased."
Learned Counsel contended that there is discrepancy in Exhibit P-1 and in the
statement of PW-5 between 3 months and 2 months and also 11.00 A.M. and 3 P.M. Apart,
the discrepancy as pointed out is not of a substantial character which would
throw out the prosecution story, as unbelievable. The fact remains that the
incident said to have occurred on 14.7.1996 and PW-5 was examined on 23.5.2000
after a long gap of four years be taken note of. It is not expected from a
rustic village woman to have remembered the incident that had taken place after
a lapse of four years with mathematical precision. It is but quite natural that
human memories are apt to blur with the passage of time. This witness
subsequently had admitted that she does not remember the day on which the
appellant and the deceased were talking to each other but she however
reaffirmed that they were talking to each other sitting at the place. The fact
remains that PW-5 last saw the deceased and the appellant together and this
fact has not been demolished and remains unimpeached. The appellant, as already
noticed, brought to the notice of the Court three contradictions in the
evidence of PW-5 marked as Exhibits D-6 to D-8. Exhibit D-6 is with regard to
contradiction in the evidence of PW-5 that PW-5 saw the deceased last being in
the company of the accused three months ago whereas in Exhibit P-1, PW-1 has
stated that the deceased was found missing only two months prior to the
discovery of death. Exhibits D-7 and D-8 relate to the contradictions in the
statement of PW-5 which suggest that her mother, herself and her sister
happened to be at the place of incident whereas in her cross-examination she
stated that she alone had seen the deceased and the accused together at that
point of time.
We
have gone through the contents of Exhibits D-6 to D-8 which have been placed on
record and we are in full agreement with the concurrent finding of two courts
that the contents of Exhibits D-6 to D-8 do not relate to PW-5 having seen the
deceased and the appellant together. Therefore, Exhibits D- 6 to D-8 do not in
any way detract from the truth of the assertion of PW-5 that she alone had
seen. The trial court has not placed reliance on the extra judicial confession
while convicting the appellant. This question, therefore, do not detain us any
longer.
The
next important circumstance, which weighed with the trial court to base the
conviction, is the recovery of MOs 1-8 at the disclosure statement furnished by
the accused. The recovery of MOs is preceded by the disclosure statement made
by the appellant (Exhibit P-2) which is in his mother tongue (Telgu). The
disclosure statement given by the appellant is carved out from the mediator's
report. The translated version of admissible portion quoted by the learned
Trial Judge reads as follows:- "If you come with me, the day how Lakshmi
was raped at the bank of Puranam Lake and how Lakshmi was forcibly thrown in
the well and killed and at that place in what clothes she was and which Lange (Paiticot)
she wear and Lange's pieces were digged and close down in the earth and that
place I can show as he said…" (It is stated in the court that translation
is not happily drafted) Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that
only so much of the information as distinctly relates to the fact thereby
discovered is admissible. In the instant case the recovery (Exhibit P-2) was
made on the basis of the disclosure statement furnished by the appellant. The
disclosure statement (Exhibit P-2) is proved by the mediator examined as PW-6
who is the village Administrative Officer and also the Inspector of Police
examined as PW-12. PW-6 has stated that on the basis of disclosure statement
(Exhibit P-2) the accused led the party to a place called "Purnamvari Dibba"
where they found a dilapidated tin roofed shed and a well. From inside the well
hair, hairpins, bangles were recovered and the police seized those articles
under the cover of Ext.P-3. M.O.3 is the hair, MO.4 is the cement pole piece
MO.5 is the bones. Then the accused led the party to a spot behind the tin
roofed shed. The accused then dug out and unearthed the piece of langa. M.O.6
is the piece of blue langa and M.O.7 is the pieces of green langa. MO.8 is the
pieces of mithai coloured langa.
PW-12
arrested the appellant and questioned him. He stated that on being interrogated
in the presence of PW-6 the appellant offered to show the place of occurrence
and also where the dead body was thrown. He also offered to show the clothes of
the deceased. Pursuant to the disclosure, he took the party to the well and
disclosed that the body had been thrown into the well where there was a water
level of 6-1/2 feet and with the help of swimmers the body was recovered from
the well marked as M.O.3 and M.O.5 i.e. hair and skeletal remains respectively.
They also recovered white plastic bangles and M.O.1 Jacket. They also recovered
cement pole piece (survey stone) M.O.4. The said stone stated to have been kept
to prevent the body from floating. He further stated that the accused then led
them to a place towards western side of nearby shed and dug out a spot from
where pieces of langa were retrieved marked as MO2, MO-6 and MO-8.
PW-3,
who is no other than the foster mother of the deceased has stated that when the
deceased left the house for the last time she was wearing clothes MO.1 and
MO.2. It is a matter of common knowledge that women have an inherent sense of
identifying the wearing apparels of their daughters who are attached to the
mother, particularly commonly attire worn by them in the house. We have no
doubt in our mind, therefore, that wearing apparels of the deceased dug out
from the place at the disclosure of the appellant and identified by PW-3 are
the wearing apparels of the deceased at the time she left the house and
subsequently missing.
Learned
counsel for the appellant, contended that the disclosure statement and recovery
of the articles is doubtful and no reliance can be placed on such disclosure
statement and recovery of the MOs. He further contended that the materials
recovered were not sealed by the police.
Hairpin
and bangles said to have been recovered were not produced before the Court and
these circumstances will make, all the more. recovery doubtful. Counsel relied
on the decision of this Court rendered in Jackaran Singh vs State of Punjab
(AIR 1995 SC 2345), wherein in paragraph 8 at page SC 2347, it was pointed out
that the disclosure statement inspires no confidence because none of the two panch
witnesses Yash Pal and Sukhdev Singh have been examined at the Trial and
secondly because the disclosure statement does not bear the signatures or the
thumb impression of the appellant and also the recovery memo does not bear the
signatures or thumb impression of the accused. Every case has to be decided on
its own facts. The facts of that case do not fit in the facts of the case at
hand. In the present case as already noticed PW-6 and PW-12 were examined to
prove the disclosure as well as the recovery pursuant to the disclosure
statement of the appellant. In the instant case, while it is true that neither
the disclosure statement nor the recovery memo bear the signatures of the
accused but the fact remains that pursuant to the disclosure statement MOs have
been recovered from the well and dug out from a place which is pointed out by
the appellant leaves no manner of doubt that the recovery of MOs has been made
on the basis of voluntary disclosure statement. In Jackaran Singh's case
(supra) the recovery memo Ex.P.9/A relates to revolver and the cartridges.
There the appellant had denied the ownership of the crime revolver and the
prosecution had led no evidence to show that the crime weapon belonged to the
appellant. The observation of this Court was in that context. In the instant
case, as already noticed, the recovery is pursuant to the disclosure statement
offered by the appellant. The fact that the recovery is in consequence of the
information given is fortified and confirmed by the discovery of wearing
apparel and skeletal remains of the deceased which leads to believe that
information and the statement cannot be false.
The
provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are based on the view that if a
fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee
is afforded thereby that the information was true and consequently the said
information can safely be allowed to be given in evidence because if such an
information is further fortified and confirmed by the discovery of articles or
the instrument of crime and which leads to the belief that the information
about the confession made as to the articles of crime cannot be false. (See S.C.Bahri
vs. State of Bihar, (AIR 1994 SC 2420 at page SC
2448). As already noticed M.O.3, M.O.4 and M.O.5 were retrieved from the well
with the help of swimmers, as there was a water level of 6-1/2 feet. MO.2 MO.6
and MO.8 are the pieces of langa dug out and unearthed at the disclosure of the
appellant. These materials were not found lying on the surface of the ground
but they were found inside the well, which is 6-1/2 deep of water, with the
help of swimmers and were found after being dug out and unearthed only after
the place was pointed out by the appellant. It is not found from the place
where public can have free access.
Therefore,
there is no reasonable apprehension with the material exhibits being planted to
rope in the appellant with the crime.
Mr. Anand
next contended that the Investigating Officer PW-12 did not have fixed the Lac
seal on the particulars so recovered and no evidentiary value can be attached
to the recovery. We are unable to countenance with the contention of the
learned counsel because no where in the statement of PW-12 he has stated that
he has not fixed a seal on the material so seized. This question was also not put
to PW-12 in his cross- examination. At the same time PW-6 has stated that the
police took away all the articles seized along with them one hour after
completing Ext.P-3. In Ext.P-3 there is a mention about the pieces of langa
being packed there itself and affixing the chits with the signatures of the
mediators on that packet.
Lastly,
it is contended by Mr. Anand that hair pins and bangles so recovered at the
disclosure statement of the appellant were not produced before the Court.
Non-production of hairpins and bangles before the Court would not by itself
disclose tampering of evidence with regard to the recovery of MOs inasmuch as
MOs 1-8 as noticed above have been proved beyond all reasonable doubts.
Non-production of hairpins and bangles before the Court during the course of
trial in the facts and circumstances as aforestated become inconsequential. No
prejudice also seems to have been caused to the appellant for non-production of
hairpins and bangles.
For
the aforestated reasons we do not find any infirmity in the order under
challenge. The appeal, therefore, fails and stands dismissed.
Back