Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. Vs. Saw
Pipes Ltd [2003] Insc 236 (17 April 2003)
M.B. Shah & Arun Kumar. Shah, J.
COURT'S JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 34 OF THE
ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1966
of 518
Before dealing with the issues involved in this
appeal, we would first decide the main point in controversy, namely - the ambit
and scope of Court's jurisdiction in case where award passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal is challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") as the decision in
this appeal would depend upon the said finding. In other words - whether the
Court would have jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act to set aside an award
passed by the Arbitral Tribunal which is patently illegal or in contravention
of the provisions of the Act or any other substantive law governing the parties
or is against the terms of the contract? Learned senior counsel Mr. Ashok Desai
appearing for the appellant submitted that in case where there is clear
violation of Sections 28 to 31 of the Act or the terms of the Contract between
the parties, the said award can be and is required to be set aside by the Court
while exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
Mr. Dushyant Dave, learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of respondent - company submitted to the contrary and
contended that the Court's jurisdiction under Section 34 is limited and the
award could be set aside mainly on the ground that the same is in conflict with
the 'Public Policy of India'. According to his submission, the phrase 'Public
Policy of India' cannot be interpreted to mean that in case of violation of
some provisions of law, the Court can set aside the award.
For deciding this controversy, we would refer to
the relevant part of Section 34 which reads as under:-
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral
award –
(1) Recourse to a court against an arbitral
award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in
accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the
court only if-
(a) the party making the application furnishes
proof that-
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not
given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the
submission to arbitration;
Provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only
that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not
submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or
(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or
the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,
unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which
the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with this Part; or
(b) the court finds that-
(i) the subject-matter of the dispute is not
capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force,
or
(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the
public policy of India.
Explanation-Without prejudice to the generality of
sub-clause (ii), it is hereby declared, for the avoidance of any doubt, that an
award is in conflict with the public policy of India if the making of the award
was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of Section
75 or Section 81."
For our purpose, it is not necessary to refer to
the scope of self explanatory Clauses (i) to (iv) of sub-section (2)(a) of
Section 34 of the Act and it does not require elaborate discussion. However,
clause (v) of sub-section 2(a) and clause (ii) of sub-section 2(b) require
consideration. For proper adjudication of the question of jurisdiction, we
shall first consider what meaning could be assigned to the term 'Arbitral
Procedure'.
'ARBITRAL PROCEDURE'
The ingredients of clause (v) are as under:-
1) The Court may set aside the award:-
(i) (a) if the composition of the arbitral
Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, (b) failing
such agreement, the composition of the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance
with Part-I of the Act.
(ii) if the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with:-
a) the agreement of the parties, or
b) failing such agreement, the arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with Part-I of the Act.
However, exception for setting aside the award
on the ground of composition of arbitral tribunal or illegality of arbitral
procedure is that the agreement should not be in conflict with the provisions
of Part-I of the Act from which parties cannot derogate.
In the aforesaid sub-clause (v), the emphasis is
on the agreement and the provisions of Part-I of the Act from which parties
cannot derogate. It means that the composition of arbitral tribunal should be
in accordance with the agreement. Similarly, the procedure which is required to
be followed by the arbitrators should also be in accordance with the agreement
of the parties. If there is no such agreement then it should be in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in the Part-I of the Act i.e. Sections 2 to 43.
At the same time, agreement for composition of arbitral tribunal or arbitral
procedure should not be in conflict with the provisions of the Act from which
parties cannot derogate. Chapter V of Part-I of the Act provides for conduct of
arbitral proceedings. Section 18 mandates that parties to the arbitral
proceedings shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given full
opportunity to present his case.
Section 19 specifically provides that arbitral
tribunal is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 and parties are free to agree on the procedure to be
followed by the arbitral tribunal in conducting its proceedings. Failing any
agreement between the parties subject to other provisions of Part-I, the arbitral
tribunal is to conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate.
This power includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, the
materiality and weight of any evidence.
Sections 20, 21 and 22 deal with place of
arbitration, commencement of arbitral proceedings and language respectively.
Thereafter, Sections 23, 24 and 25 deal with statements of claim and defence,
hearings and written proceedings and procedure to be followed in case of
default of a party.
At this stage, we would refer to Section 24
which is as under:-
"24. Hearings and written proceedings-
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the
arbitral tribunal shall decide whether to hold oral hearings for the
presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or whether the proceedings shall
be conducted on the basis of documents and other materials;
Provided that the arbitral tribunal shall hold
oral hearings, at an appropriate stage of the proceedings, on a request by a
party, unless the parties have agreed that no oral hearing shall be held.
(2) The parties shall be given sufficient
advance notice of any hearing and of any meeting of the arbitral tribunal for
the purposes of inspection of documents, goods or other property.
(3) All statements, documents or other information
supplied to, or applications made to the arbitral tribunal by one party shall
be communicated to the other party, and any expert report or evidentiary
document on which the arbitral tribunal may rely in making its decision shall
be communicated to the parties." Thereafter, Chapter VI deals with making
of arbitral award and termination of proceedings. Relevant Sections which
require consideration are Sections 28 and 31. Sections 28 and 31 read as
under:-
"28. Rules applicable to substance of dispute-
(1) Where the place of arbitration is situate in
India-
(a) in an arbitration other than an
international commercial arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall decide the
dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with the substantive law for the
time being in force in India;
(b) in international commercial arbitration,-
(i) the arbitral tribunal shall decide the
dispute in accordance with the rules of law designated by the parties as
applicable to the substance of the dispute;
(ii) any designation by the parties of the law
or legal system of a given country shall be construed, unless otherwise
expressed, as directly referring to the substantive law of that country and not
to its conflict of law rules;
(iii) failing any designation of the law under
clause (a) by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law
it considers to be appropriate given all the circumstances surrounding the
dispute.
(2) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et
bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorised it
to do so.
(3) In all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall
decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account
the usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.
31. Form and contents of arbitral award-
(1) An arbitral award shall be made in writing
and shall be signed by the members of the arbitral tribunal.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), in
arbitral proceedings with more than one arbitrator, the signatures of the
majority of all the members of the arbitral tribunal shall be sufficient so
long as the reason for any omitted signature is stated.
(3) The arbitral award shall state the reasons
upon which it is based, unless-
(a) the parties have agreed that no reasons are
to be given, or
(b) the award is an arbitral award on agreed
terms under section 30.
(4) The arbitral award shall state its date and
the place of arbitration as determined in accordance with section 20 and the
award shall be deemed to have been made at that place.
(5) After the arbitral award is made, a signed
copy shall be delivered to each party.
(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time
during the arbitral proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on any matter
with respect to which it may make a final arbitral award.
(7)(a). Unless otherwise agreed by the parties,
where and in so far as an arbitral award is for the payment of money, the
arbitral tribunal may include in the sum for which the award is made interest,
at such rate as it deems reasonable, on the whole or any part of the money, for
the whole or any part of the period between the date on which the cause of
action arose and the date on which the award is made.
(b) A sum directed to be paid by an arbitral
award shall, unless the award otherwise directs, carry interest at the rate of
eighteen per centum per annum from the date of the award to the date of
payment.
(8) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties,-
(a) the costs of an arbitration shall be fixed
by the arbitral tribunal;
(b) the arbitral tribunal shall specify,-
(i) the party entitled to costs,
(ii) the party who shall pay the costs,
(iii) the amount of costs or method of
determining that amount, and
(iv) the manner in which the costs shall be
paid.
Explanation: For the purpose of clause (a),
"costs" means reasonable costs relating to,-
(i) the fees and expenses of the arbitrators and
witnesses,
(ii) legal fees and expenses,
(iii) any administration fees of the institution
supervising the arbitration, and
(iv) any other expenses incurred in connection
with the arbitral proceedings and the arbitral award."
The aforesaid provisions prescribe the procedure
to be followed by the arbitral tribunal coupled with its powers. Power and
procedure are synonymous in the present case. By prescribing the procedure, the
arbitral tribunal is empowered and is required to decide the dispute in
accordance with the provisions of the Act, that is to say, the jurisdiction of
the tribunal to decide the dispute is prescribed. In these sections there is no
distinction between the jurisdiction/power and the procedure. In Harish Chandra
Bajpai v. Triloki Singh [1957 SCR 370], while dealing with Sections 90 and 92
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (as it stood), this Court
observed thus:- "It is then argued that S. 92 confers powers on the
Tribunal in respect of certain matters, while S. 90(2) applies the CPC in
respect of matters relating to procedure that there is a distinction between
power and procedure, and that the granting of amendment being a power and not a
matter of procedure, it can be claimed only under section 92 and not under S.
90(2). We do not see any antithesis between 'procedure' in S. 90(2) and
'powers' under S. 92. When the respondent applied to the Tribunal for
amendment, he took a procedural step, and that he was clearly entitled to do
under S. 90(2). The question of power arises only with reference to the order
to be passed on the petition by the Tribunal. Is it to be held that the
presentation of a petition is competent, but the passing of any order thereon
is not? We are of opinion that there is no substance in the contention
either." Hence, the jurisdiction or the power of the arbitral tribunal is
prescribed under the Act and if the award is de hors the said provisions, it
would be, on the face of it, illegal. The decision of the Tribunal must be
within the bounds of its jurisdiction conferred under the Act or the contract.
In exercising jurisdiction, the arbitral tribunal can not act in breach of some
provision of substantive law or the provisions of the Act.
The question, therefore, which requires consideration
is - whether the award could be set aside, if the arbitral tribunal has not
followed the mandatory procedure prescribed under Sections 24, 28 or 31(3),
which affects the rights of the parties? Under sub-section (1)(a) of Section 28
there is a mandate to the arbitral tribunal to decide the dispute in accordance
with the substantive law for the time being in force in India. Admittedly,
substantive law would include the Indian Contract Act, the Transfer of Property
Act and other such laws in force. Suppose, if the award is passed in violation
of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act or in violation of the Indian
Contract Act, the question would be - whether such award could be set aside?
Similarly, under sub-section (3), arbitral tribunal is directed to decide the
dispute in accordance with the terms of the contract and also after taking into
account the usage of the trade applicable to the transaction.
If arbitral tribunal ignores the terms of the
contract or usage of the trade applicable to the transaction, whether the said
award could be interfered? Similarly, if the award is non-speaking one and is
in violation of Section 31(3), can such award be set aside? In our view,
reading Section 34 conjointly with other provisions of the Act, it appears that
the legislative intent could not be that if the award is in contravention of
the provisions of the Act, still however, it couldn't be set aside by the
Court. If it is held that such award could not be interfered, it would be
contrary to basic concept of justice. If the arbitral tribunal has not followed
the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Act, it would mean that it has
acted beyond its jurisdiction and thereby the award would be patently illegal
which could be set aside under Section 34.
The aforesaid interpretation of the clause (v)
would be in conformity with the settled principle of law that the procedural
law cannot fail to provide relief when substantive law gives the right.
Principle is - there cannot be any wrong without
a remedy. In M.V. Elisabeth and others v. Harwan Investment & Trading Pvt.
Ltd. [1993 Supp. (2) SCC 433] this Court observed that where substantive law
demands justice for the party aggrieved and the statute has not provided the
remedy, it is the duty of the Court to devise procedure by drawing analogy from
other systems of law and practice. Similarly, in Dhanna Lal v. Kalawatibai and
others [(2002) 6 SCC 16] this Court observed that wrong must not be left
unredeemed and right not left unenforced.
Result is - if the award is contrary to the
substantive provisions of law or the provisions of the Act or against the terms
of the contract, it would be patently illegal, which could be interfered under
Section 34. However, such failure of procedure should be patent affecting the
rights of the parties.
WHAT MEANING COULD BE ASSIGNED TO THE PHRASE
'PUBLIC POLICY OF INDIA'?
The next clause which requires interpretation is
clause (ii) of sub-section 2(b) of Section 34 which inter alia provides that
the Court may set aside arbitral award if it is in conflict with the 'Public
Policy of India'. The phrase 'Public Policy of India' is not defined under the
Act. Hence, the said term is required to be given meaning in context and also
considering the purpose of the section and scheme of the Act.
It has been repeatedly stated by various
authorities that the expression 'public policy' does not admit of precise
definition and may vary from generation to generation and from time to time.
Hence, the concept 'public policy' is considered to be vague, susceptible to
narrow or wider meaning depending upon the context in which it is used.
Lacking precedent the Court has to give its
meaning in the light and principles underlying the Arbitration Act, Contract
Act and Constitutional provisions.
For this purpose, we would refer to few
decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. While dealing
with the concept of 'public policy, this Court in Central Inland Water
Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another
[(1986) 3 SCC 156] has observed thus: - "92. The Indian Contract Act does
not define the expression "public policy" or "opposed to public
policy".
From the very nature of things, the expressions
"public policy", "opposed to public policy", or
"contrary to public policy" are incapable of precise definition.
Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular government. It connotes
some matter which concerns the public good and the public interest. The concept
of what is for the public good or in the public interest or what would be
injurious or harmful to the public good or the public interest has varied from
time to time. As new concepts take the place of old, transactions which were
once considered against public policy are now being upheld by the courts and
similarly where there has been a well recognized head of public policy, the
courts have not shirked from extending it to the new transactions and changed
circumstances and have at times not even flinched from inventing a new head of
public policy.
There are two schools of thought- "the
narrow view" school and "the broad view" school. According to
the former, courts cannot create new heads of public policy whereas the latter
countenances judicial law-making in this area. The adherents of "the
narrow view" school would not invalidate a contract on the ground of
public policy unless that particular ground had been well- established by
authorities. Hardly ever has the voice of the timorous spoken more clearly and
loudly than in these words of Lord Davey in Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated
Gold Mines Ltd. [(1902) AC 484, 500] :
"Public Policy is always an unsafe and
treacherous ground for legal decision". That was in the year 1902.
Seventy-eight years earlier, Burrough, J., in Richardson v. Mellish [(1824) 2
Bing 229, 252] described public policy as "a very unruly horse, and when
once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you." The
Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, however, was not a man to shy away from
unmanageable horses and in words which conjure up before our eyes the picture
of the young Alexander the Great taming Bucephalus, he said in Enderby Town
Football Club Ltd. v. Football Assn. Ltd. [(1971) Ch. 591, 606]; "With a
good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control. It can jump
over obstacles". Had the timorous always held the field, not only the
doctrine of public policy but even the Common Law or the principles of Equity
would never have evolved. Sir William Holdsworth in his "History of
English Law", Volume III, page 55, has said:
In fact, a body of law like the common law,
which has grown up gradually with the growth of the nation, necessarily
acquires some fixed principles, and if it is to maintain these principles it
must be able, on the ground of public policy or some other like ground, to
suppress practices which, under ever new disguises, seek to weaken or negative
them.
It is thus clear that the principles governing
public policy must be and are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or
modification. Practices which were considered perfectly normal at one time have
today become obnoxious and oppressive to public conscience.
If there is no head of public policy which
covers a case, then the court must in consonance with public conscience and in
keeping with public good and public interest declare such practice to be
opposed to public policy.
Above all, in deciding any case which may not be
covered by authority our courts have before them the beacon light of the
Preamble to the Constitution.
Lacking precedent, the court can always be
guided by that light and the principles underlying the Fundamental Rights and
the Directive Principles enshrined in our Constitution.
93. The normal rule of Common Law has been that
a party who seeks to enforce an agreement which is opposed to public policy
will be non-suited. The case of A. Schroeder Music Public Co. Ltd. v. Macaulay
[(1974) 1 WLR 1308], however, establishes that where a contract is vitiated as
being contrary to public policy, the party adversely affected by it can sue to
have it declared void.
The case may be different where the purpose of
the contract is illegal or immoral. In Kedar Nath Motani v. Prahlad Rai [(1960)
1 SCR 861], reversing the High Court and restoring the decree passed by the
trial court declaring the appellants' title to the lands in suit and directing
the respondents who were the appellants' benamidars to restore possession, this
Court, after discussing the English and Indian law on the subject, said (at
page 873):
The correct position in law, in our opinion, is
that what one has to see is whether the illegality goes so much to the root of
the matter that the plaintiff cannot bring his action without relying upon the
illegal transaction into which he had entered.
If the illegality be trivial or venial, as
stated by Williston and the plaintiff is not required to rest his case upon
that illegality, then public policy demands that the defendant should not be
allowed to take advantage of the position. A strict view, of course, must be
taken of the plaintiff's conduct, and he should not be allowed to circumvent
the illegality by resorting to some subterfuge or by misstating the facts. If,
however, the matter is clear and the illegality is not required to be pleaded
or proved as part of the cause of action and the plaintiff recanted before the
illegal purpose was achieved, then, unless it be of such a gross nature as to
outrage the conscience of the court, the plea of the defendant should not
prevail.
The types of contracts to which the principle
formulated by us above applies are not contracts which are tainted with
illegality but are contracts which contain terms which are so unfair and
unreasonable that they shock the conscience of the court. They are opposed to
public policy and require to be adjudged void." Further, in Renusagar
Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. [1994 Supp. (1) SCC 644], this Court
considered Section 7(1) of the Arbitration (Protocol and Convention) Act, 1937 which
inter alia provided that a foreign award may not be enforced under the said
Act, if the Court dealing with the case is satisfied that the enforcement of
the award will be contrary to the Public Policy. After elaborate discussion,
the Court arrived at the conclusion that Public Policy comprehended in Section
7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 is
the 'Public Policy of India' and does not cover the public policy of any other
country. For giving meaning to the term 'Public Policy', the Court observed
thus:- "66. Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention of 1958 and Section
7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act do not postulate refusal of recognition
and enforcement of a foreign award on the ground that it is contrary to the law
of the country of enforcement and the ground of challenge is confined to the
recognition and enforcement being contrary to the public policy of the country
in which the award is set to be enforced. There is nothing to indicate that the
expression "public policy" in Article V(2)(b) of the New York
Convention and Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act is not used in the
same sense in which it was used in Article I(c) of the Geneva Convention of
1927 and Section 7(1) of the Protocol and Convention Act of 1937. This would
mean that "public policy" in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) has been used in a
narrower sense and in order to attract to bar of public policy the enforcement
of the award must invoke something more than the violation of the law of India.
Since the Foreign Awards Act is concerned with
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards which are governed by the
principles of private international law, the expression "public
policy" in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act must necessarily
be construed in the sense the doctrine of public policy is applied in the field
of private international law. Applying the said criteria it must be held that
the enforcement of a foreign award would be refused on the ground that it is
contrary to public policy if such enforcement would be contrary to
(i) fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(ii) the interests of India; or
(iii) justice or morality."
The Court finally held that:- "76. Keeping
in view the aforesaid objects underlying FERA and the principles governing
enforcement of exchange control laws followed in other countries, we are of the
view that the provisions contained in FERA have been enacted to safeguard the
economic interests of India and any violation of the said provisions would be
contrary to the public policy of India as envisaged in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of
the Act." This Court in Murlidhar Agarwal and another v. State of U.P. and others [1974 (2)
SCC 472] while dealing with the concept of 'public policy' observed thus:-
"31. Public policy does not remain static in any given community. It may
vary from generation to generation and even in the same generation. Public
policy would be almost useless if it were to remain in fixed moulds for all
time.
32 The difficulty of discovering what public
policy is at any given moment certainly does not absolve the Judges from the
duty of doing so. In conducting an enquiry, as already stated, Judges are not
hide-bound by precedent. The Judges must look beyond the narrow field of past
precedents, though this still leaves open the question, in which direction they
must cast their gaze.
The Judges are to base their decision on the
opinions of men of the world, as distinguished from opinions based on legal
learning. In other words, the Judges will have to look beyond the jurisprudence
and that in so doing, they must consult not their own personal standards or
predilections but those of the dominant opinion at a given moment, or what has
been termed customary morality.
The Judges must consider the social consequences
of the rule propounded, especially in the light of the factual evidence
available as to its probable results. .... The point is rather that this power
must be lodged somewhere and under our Constitution and laws, it has been
lodged in the Judges and if they have to fulfil their function as Judges, it
could hardly be lodged elsewhere." Mr. Desai submitted that the narrow
meaning given to the term 'public policy' in Renusagar's case is in context of
the fact that the question involved in the said matter was with regard to the
execution of the award which had attained finality. It was not a case where
validity of the Award is challenged before a forum prescribed under the Act. He
submitted that the scheme of Section 34 which deals with setting aside the
domestic arbitral award and Section 48 which deals with enforcement of foreign
award are not identical. A foreign award by definition is subject to double
exequatur. This is recognized inter alia by Section 48 (1) and there is no
parallel provision to this clause in Section 34. For this, he referred to Lord Mustill
& Stewart C. Boyd QC's "Commercial Arbitration" 2001 wherein [at
page 90] it is stated as under:- "Mutual recognition of awards is the glue
which holds the international arbitrating community together, and this will
only be strong if the enforcing court is willing to trust, as the convention
assumes that they will trust, the supervising authorities of the chosen venue.
It follows that if, and to the extent that the award has been struck down in
the local court it should be a matter of theory and practice be treated when
enforcement is sought as if to the extent it did not exist." He further
submitted that in foreign arbitration, the award would be subject to being set
aside or suspended by the competent authority under the relevant law of that
country whereas in the domestic arbitration the only recourse is to Section 34.
The aforesaid submission of the learned senior
counsel requires to be accepted. From the judgments discussed above, it can be
held that the term 'public policy of India' is required to be interpreted in the context
of the jurisdiction of the Court where the validity of award is challenged
before it becomes final and executable. The concept of enforcement of the award
after it becomes final is different and the jurisdiction of the Court at that
stage could be limited. Similar is the position with regard to the execution of
a decree. It is settled law as well as it is provided under Code of Civil
Procedure that once the decree has attained finality, in an execution
proceeding, it may be challenged only on limited grounds such as the decree
being without jurisdiction or nullity. But in a case where the judgment and
decree is challenged before the Appellate Court or the Court exercising revisional
jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of such Court would be wider.
Therefore, in a case where the validity of award
is challenged there is no necessity of giving a narrower meaning to the term
'public policy of India'. On the contrary, wider meaning is required to be given so that
the 'patently illegal award' passed by the arbitral tribunal could be set
aside. If narrow meaning as contended by the learned senior counsel Mr. Dave is
given, some of the provisions of the Arbitration Act would become nugatory.
Take for illustration a case wherein there is a specific provision in the
contract that for delayed payment of the amount due and payable, no interest
would be payable, still however, if the Arbitrator has passed an award granting
interest, it would be against the terms of the contract and thereby against the
provision of Section 28(3) of the Act which specifically provides that
"arbitral tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the
contract". Further, where there is a specific usage of the trade that if
the payment is made beyond a period of one month, then the party would be
required to pay the said amount with interest at the rate of 15 per cent.
Despite the evidence being produced on record for such usage, if the arbitrator
refuses to grant such interest on the ground of equity, such award would also
be in violation of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 28. Section 28(2)
specifically provides that arbitrator shall decide ex aequo et bono [according
to what is just and good] only if the parties have expressly authorised him to
do so. Similarly, if the award is patently against the statutory provisions of
substantive law which is in force in India or is passed without giving an
opportunity of hearing to the parties as provided under Section 24 or without
giving any reason in a case where parties have not agreed that no reasons are
to be recorded, it would be against the statutory provisions. In all such
cases, the award is required to be set aside on the ground of 'patent
illegality'.
The learned senior counsel Mr. Dave submitted
that the Parliament has not made much change while adopting Article 34 of
UNCITRAL Model Law by not providing error of law as a ground of challenge to
the arbitral award under Section 34 of the Act. For this purpose, he referred
to Sections 68, 69 and 70 of the Arbitration Act, 1996 applicable in England and submitted that if
the legislature wanted to give a wider jurisdiction to the Court, it would have
done so by adopting similar provisions.
Section 68 of the law applicable in England provides that the award
can be challenged on the ground of serious irregularities mentioned therein.
Section 68 reads thus: - "68. Challenging the award: serious irregularity-
(1) A party to arbitral proceedings may (upon
notice to the other parties and to the tribunal) apply to the court challenging
an award in the proceedings on the ground of serious irregularity affecting the
tribunal, the proceedings or the award.
A party may lose the right to object (see
Section 73) and the right to apply is subject to the restrictions in section
70(2) and (3).
(2) Serious irregularity means an irregularity
of one or more of the following kinds which the court considers has caused or
will cause substantial injustice to the applicant-
(a) failure by the tribunal to comply with
section 33 (general duty of tribunal);
(b) the tribunal exceeding its powers (otherwise
than by exceeding its substantive jurisdiction: see section 67);
(c) failure by the tribunal to conduct the
proceedings in accordance with the procedure agreed by the parties;
(d) failure by the tribunal to deal with all the
issues that were put to it;
(e) any arbitral or other institution or person
vested by the parties with powers in relation to the proceedings or the award
exceeding its powers;
(f) uncertainty or ambiguity as to the effect of
the award;
(g) the award being obtained by fraud or the
award or the way in which it was procured being contrary to public policy;
(h) failure to comply with the requirement as to
the form of the award; or
(i) any irregularity in the conduct of the
proceedings or in the award which is admitted by the tribunal or by any
arbitral or other institution or person vested by the parties with powers in
relation to the proceedings or the award.
(3) If there is shown to be serious irregularity
affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award, the court may-
(a) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or
in part, for reconsideration;
(b) set the award aside in whole or in part, or
(c) declare the award to be of no effect, in whole or in part.
The Court shall not exercise its power to set
aside or to declare an award to be of no effect, in whole or in part, unless it
is satisfied that it would be inappropriate to remit the matters in question to
the tribunal for reconsideration.
(4) The leave of the Court is required for any
appeal from a decision of the court under this section." Similarly,
Section 69 provides that appeal on point of law would be maintainable and the
procedure thereof is also provided.
Section 70 provides supplementary provisions.
It is true that Legislature has not incorporated
exhaustive grounds for challenging the award passed by the arbitral tribunal or
the ground on which appeal against the order of the Court would be
maintainable.
On this aspect, eminent Jurist & Senior
Advocate Late Mr. Nani Palkhivala while giving his opinion to 'Law of
Arbitration and Conciliation' by Justice Dr. B.P. Saraf and Justice S.M. Jhunjhunuwala,
noted thus:- "I am extremely impressed by your analytical approach in
dealing with the complex subject of arbitration which is emerging rapidly as an
alternate mechanism for resolution of commercial disputes. The new arbitration
law has been brought in parity with statutes in other countries, though I wish
that the Indian law had a provision similar to section 68 of the English
Arbitration Act, 1996 which gives power to the Court to correct errors of law
in the award.
I welcome your view on the need for giving the
doctrine of "public policy" its full amplitude. I particularly
endorse your comment that Courts of law may intervene to permit challenge to an
arbitral award which is based on an irregularity of a kind which has caused
substantial injustice.
If the arbitral tribunal does not dispense
justice, it cannot truly be reflective of an alternate dispute resolution
mechanism. Hence, if the award has resulted in an injustice, a Court would be
well within its right in upholding the challenge to the award on the ground
that it is in conflict with the public policy of India." From this discussion it would be
clear that the phrase 'public policy of India' is not required to be given a narrower
meaning. As stated earlier, the said term is susceptible of narrower or wider
meaning depending upon the object and purpose of the legislation.
Hence, the award which is passed in
contravention of Sections 24, 28 or 31 could be set aside. In addition to
Section 34, Section 13(5) of the Act also provides that constitution of the
arbitral tribunal could also be challenged by a party. Similarly, Section 16
provides that a party aggrieved by the decision of the arbitral tribunal with
regard to its jurisdiction could challenge such arbitral award under Section
34.
In any case, it is for the Parliament to provide
for limited or wider jurisdiction to the Court in case where award is
challenged. But in such cases, there is no reason to give narrower meaning to
the term 'public policy of India' as contended by learned senior counsel Mr. Dave. In our
view, wider meaning is required to be given so as to prevent frustration of
legislation and justice. This Court in Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz
Jung (Dead) By LRs and others [(1991) 3 SCC 67], this Court observed thus:-
"17. .. It cannot be disputed that a
contract which has a tendency to injure public interests or public welfare is
one against public policy. What constitutes an injury to public interests or
welfare would depend upon the times and climes. ... The legislature often fails
to keep pace with the changing needs and values nor as it realistic to expect
that it will have provided for all contingencies and eventualities. It is,
therefore, not only necessary but obligatory on the courts to step in to fill
the lacuna. When courts perform this function undoubtedly they legislate
judicially. But that is a kind of legislation which stands implicitly delegated
to them to further the object of the legislation and to promote the goals of
the society. Or to put it negatively, to prevent the frustration of the
legislation or perversion of the goals and values of the society." Learned
senior counsel Mr. Dave submitted that the purpose of giving limited
jurisdiction to the Court is obvious and is to see that the disputes are
resolved at the earliest by giving finality to the award passed by the forum
chosen by the parties. As against this, learned senior counsel Mr. Desai
submitted that in the present system even the arbitral proceedings are delayed
on one or the other ground including the ground that the arbitrator is not free
and the matters are not disposed of for months together. He submitted that the
legislature has not provided any time limit for passing of the award and this
indicates that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent
has no bearing in interpreting Section 34.
It is true that under the Act, there is no
provision similar to Sections 23 and 28 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which specifically
provided that the arbitrator shall pass award within reasonable time as fixed
by the Court. It is also true that on occasions, arbitration proceedings are
delayed for one or other reason, but it is for the parties to take appropriate
action of selecting proper arbitrator(s) who could dispose of the matter within
reasonable time fixed by them. It is for them to indicate the time limit for
disposal of the arbitral proceedings. It is for them to decide whether they
should continue with the arbitrator(s) who cannot dispose of the matter within
reasonable time. However, non-providing of time limit for deciding the dispute
by the arbitrators could have no bearing on interpretation of Section 34.
Further, for achieving the object of speedier disposal of dispute, justice in
accordance with law cannot be sacrificed. In our view, giving limited
jurisdiction to the Court for having finality to the award and resolving the
dispute by speedier method would be much more frustrated by permitting patently
illegal award to operate.
Patently illegal award is required to be set at
naught, otherwise it would promote injustice.
Therefore, in our view, the phrase 'Public
Policy of India' used in Section 34 in context is required to be given a wider
meaning. It can be stated that the concept of public policy connotes some
matter which concerns public good and the public interest. What is for public
good or in public interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public
good or public interest has varied from time to time. However, the award which
is, on the face of it, patently in violation of statutory provisions cannot be
said to be in public interest.
Such award/judgment/decision is likely to
adversely affect the administration of justice. Hence, in our view in addition
to narrower meaning given to the term 'public policy' in Renusagar's case
(supra), it is required to be held that the award could be set aside if it is
patently illegal. Result would be - award could be set aside if it is contrary
to: -
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law; or
(b) the interest of India; or
(c) justice or morality, or
(d) in addition, if it is patently illegal.
Illegality must go to the root of the matter and
if the illegality is of trivial nature it cannot be held that award is against
the public policy.
Award could also be set aside if it is so unfair
and unreasonable that it shocks the conscience of the Court. Such award is
opposed to public policy and is required to be adjudged void.
NOW ON FACTS:-
The brief facts of the case are as under:-
Appellant - ONGC which is a Public Sector Undertaking, has challenged the
arbitral award dated 2nd May, 1999 by filing Arbitration Petition No. 917/1999 before the High
Court of Bombay.
Learned Single Judge dismissed the same. Appeal
No.256/2000 preferred before the Division Bench of the High Court was also
dismissed. Hence, the present appeal.
It is stated that in response to a tender,
respondent-Company which is engaged in the business of supplying equipment for
Offshore Oil exploration and maintenance by its letter dated 27th December,
1995 on agreed terms and conditions, offered to supply to the appellants
26" diameter and 30" diameter casing pipes. The appellant by letter
of intent dated 3rd June, 1996 followed by a detailed order accepted the offer
of the respondent-Company. As per terms and conditions, the goods were required
to be supplied on or before 14th November, 1996.
It was the contention of the respondent that as
per clause (18) of the agreement, the raw materials were required to be
procured from the reputed and proven manufacturers/suppliers approved by the
respondent as listed therein. By letter dated 8th August, 1996, respondent
placed an order for supply of steel plates, that is, the raw material required
for manufacturing the pipes with Liva Laminati, Piani S.P.A., Italian suppliers
stipulating that material must be shipped latest by the end of September 1996
as timely delivery was of the essence of the order. It is also their case that
all over Europe including Italy there was a general strike of the steel mill
workers during September/October 1996. Therefore, respondent by its letter
dated 28th October, 1996 conveyed to the appellant that Italian suppliers had
faced labour problems and was unable to deliver the material as per agreed
schedule. Respondent, therefore, requested for an extension of 45 days time for
execution of the order in view of the reasons beyond its control. By letter
dated 4th December, 1996, the time for delivery of the pipes was extended with
a specific statement inter alia that the amount equivalent to liquidated damages
for delay in supply of pipes would be recovered from the respondent. It is the
contention of the respondent that the appellant made payment of the goods
supplied after wrongfully deducting an amount of US $ 3,04,970.20 and
Rs.15,75,559/- as liquidated damages. That deduction was disputed by the
respondent and, therefore, dispute was referred to the arbitral tribunal. The
arbitral tribunal arrived at the conclusion that strikes affecting the supply
of raw material to the claimant are not within the definition of 'Force Majeure'
in the contract between the parties, and hence, on that ground, it cannot be
said that the amount of liquidated damages was wrongfully withheld by the
appellant. With regard to other contention on the basis of customs duty also,
the arbitral tribunal arrived at the conclusion that it would not justify the
delay in the supply of goods. Thereafter, the arbitral tribunal considered
various decisions of this Court regarding recovery of liquidated damages and
arrived at the conclusion that it was for the appellant to establish that they
had suffered any loss because of the breach committed by the respondent in not
supplying the goods within the prescribed time limit. The arbitral tribunal
thereafter appreciated the evidence and arrived at the conclusion that in view
of the statement volunteered by Mr. Arumoy Das, it was clear that shortage of
casing pipes was only one of the other reasons which led to the change in the
deployment plan and that it has failed to establish its case that it has
suffered any loss in terms of money because of delay in supply of goods under
the contract. Hence, the arbitral tribunal held that appellant has wrongfully
withheld the agreed amount of US $ 3,04,970.20 and Rs.15,75,559/- on account of
customs duty, sales tax, freight charges deducted by way of liquidated damages.
The arbitral tribunal further held that the respondent was entitled to recover
the said amount with interest at the rate of 12 per cent p.a. from 1st April
1997 till the date of the filing of statement of claim and thereafter having
regard to the commercial nature of the transaction at the rate of 18 per cent
per annum pendente lite till payment is made.
For challenging the said award, learned senior
counsel Mr. Desai submitted that:-
(1) the award is vitiated on the ground that
there was delay on the part of respondent in supplying agreed goods/ pipes and
for the delay, appellant was entitled to recover agreed liquidated damages i.e.
a sum equivalent to 1% of the contract price for whole unit per week of such
delay or part thereof. Thereby, the award was contrary to Section 28(3) which
provides that the arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with
the terms of the contract;
(2) the award passed by the arbitrator is on the
face of it illegal and erroneous as it arrived at the conclusion that the
appellant was required to prove the loss suffered by it before recovering the
liquidated damages. He submitted that the arbitral tribunal misinterpreted the
law on the subject;
(3) in any set of circumstances, the award
passed by the arbitrator granting interest on the liquidated damages deducted
by the appellant is, on the face of it, unjustified, unreasonable and against
the specific terms of the contract, namely clause 34.4 of the agreement, which
provides that on 'disputed claim', no interest would be payable.
As against this, learned senior counsel Mr. Dave
submitted that it is settled law that for the breach of contract provisions of
Section 74 of the Contract Act would be applicable and compensation / damages
could be awarded only if the loss is suffered because of the breach of
contract. He submitted that this principle is laid down by the Privy Council as
early as in 1929 in Bhai Panna Singh and others v. Bhai Arjun Singh and others
[AIR 1929 PC 179], wherein the Privy Council observed thus: - "The effect
of S. 74, Contract Act of 1872, is to disentitle the plaintiffs to recover simplicitor
the sum of Rs.10,000/- whether penalty or liquidated damages. The plaintiffs
must prove the damages they have suffered." He submitted that this Court
has also held that the plaintiff claiming liquidated damages has to prove the
loss suffered by him. In support of this contention, he referred to and relied
upon various decisions. In any case, it is his contention that even if there is
any error in arriving at the said conclusion, the award cannot be interfered
with under Section 34 of the Act.
At this stage, we would refer to the relevant
terms of the contract upon which learned counsel for the appellant has based
his submissions, which are as under: - "11. Failure and Termination
Clause/Liquidated Damages:- Time and date of delivery shall be essence of the
contract. If the contractor fails to deliver the stores, or any installment
thereof within the period fixed for such delivery in the schedule or at any
time repudiates the contract before the expiry of such period, the purchaser
may, without prejudice to any other right or remedy, available to him to
recover damages for breach of the contract:-
(a) Recovery from the contractor as agreed
liquidated damages are not by way of penalty, a sum equivalent to 1% (one
percent) of the contract price of the whole unit per week for such delay or
part thereof (this is an agreed, genuine pre- estimate of damages duly agreed
by the parties) which the contractor has failed to deliver within the period
fixed for delivery in the schedule, where delivery thereof is accepted after
expiry of the aforesaid period. It may be noted that such recovery of
liquidated damages may be upto 10% of the contract price of whole unit of
stores which the contractor has failed to deliver within the period fixed for
delivery, or
(e) It may further be noted that clause (a)
provides for recovery of liquidated damages on the cost of contract price of
delayed supplies (whole unit) at the rate of 1% of the contract price of the
whole unit per week for such delay or part thereof upto a ceiling of 10% of the
contract price of delayed supplies (whole unit). Liquidated damages for delay
in supplies thus accrued will be recovered by the paying authorities of the
purchaser specified in the supply order, from the bill for payment of the cost
of material submitted by the contractor or his foreign principals in accordance
with the terms of supply order or otherwise.
(f) Notwithstanding anything stated above,
equipment and materials will be deemed to have been delivered only when all its
components, parts are also delivered. If certain components are not delivered
in time the equipment and material will be considered as delayed until such
time all the missing parts are also delivered.
12. Levy of liquidated damages (LD) due to delay
in supplies. LD will be imposed on the total value of the order unless 75% of
the value ordered is supplied within the stipulate delivery period. Where 75%
of the value ordered has been supplied within stipulated delivery period. LD
will be imposed on the order value of delayed supply(ies). However, where in
judgment of ONGC, the supply of partial quantity does not fulfill the operating
need, LD will be imposed on full value of the supply order.
34.4 Delay in Release of Payment: - In case
where payment is to be made on satisfactory receipt of materials at destination
or where payment is to be made after satisfactory commissioning of the
equipment as per terms of the supply order.
ONGC shall make payment within 60 days of
receipt of invoice / claim complete in all respects. Any delay in payment on
undisputed claim / amount beyond 60 days of the receipt of invoice / claim will
attract interest @ 1% per month. No interest will be paid on disputed claims.
For interest on delayed payments to small scale
and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings, the provisions of the "Interest of
delayed payments to small scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993
will govern." Mr. Desai referred to the decision rendered by this Court in
Delta International Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Ganeriwalla and another [(1999) 4 SCC
545] and submitted that for the purpose of construction of contracts, the
intention of the parties is to be gathered from the words they have used and
there is no intention independent of that meaning.
It cannot be disputed that for construction of
the contract, it is settled law that the intention of the parties is to be gathered
from the words used in the agreement. If words are unambiguous and are used
after full understanding of their meaning by experts, it would be difficult to
gather their intention different from the language used in the agreement. If
upon a reading of the document as a whole, it can fairly be deduced from the
words actually used therein that the parties had agreed on a particular term,
there is nothing in law which prevents them from setting up that term. {Re: Modi
& Co. v. Union of India [(1968) 2 SCR 565]}. Further, in construing a
contract, the Court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are
such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If
the words are clear, there is very little the court can do about it. {Re: Provash
Chandra Dalui and another v. Biswanath Banerjee and another [1989 Supp (1) SCC
487]}.
Therefore, when parties have expressly agreed
that recovery from the contractor for breach of the contract is pre-estimated
genuine liquidated damages and is not by way of penalty duly agreed by the
parties, there was no justifiable reason for the arbitral tribunal to arrive at
a conclusion that still the purchaser should prove loss suffered by it because
of delay in supply of goods.
Further, in arbitration proceedings, the
arbitral tribunal is required to decide the dispute in accordance with the
terms of the contract. The agreement between the parties specifically provides
that without prejudice to any other right or remedy if the contractor fails to deliver
the stores within the stipulated time, appellant will be entitled to recover
from the contractor, as agreed, liquidated damages equivalent to 1% of the
contract price of the whole unit per week for such delay. Such recovery of
liquidated damage could be at the most up to 10% of the contract price of whole
unit of stores. Not only this, it was also agreed that:-
(a) liquidated damages for delay in supplies
will be recovered by paying authority from the bill for payment of cost of
material submitted by the contractor;
(b) liquidated damages were not by way of
penalty and it was agreed to be genuine, pre-estimate of damages duly agreed by
the parties;
(c) This pre-estimate of liquidated damages is
not assailed by the respondent as unreasonable assessment of damages by the
parties.
Further, at the time when respondent sought
extension of time for supply of goods, time was extended by letter dated
4.12.1996 with a specific demand that the clause for liquidated damages would
be invoked and appellant would recover the same for such delay.
Despite this specific letter written by the
appellant, respondent had supplied the goods which would indicate that even at
that stage, respondent was agreeable to pay liquidated damages.
On this issue, learned counsel for the parties
referred to the interpretation given to Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian
Contract Act in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. The Century Spinning
and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. [1962 Supp. (3) SCR 549], Fateh Chand v. Balkishan Das
[(1964) 1 SCR 515 at 526], Maula Bux v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 554] Union of India v. Rampur Distillery and Chemical
Co. Ltd. [(1973) 1 SCC 649] and Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry [(1974) 2 SCC 231].
Relevant part of Sections 73 and 74 of Contract
Act are as under:- "73. Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach
of contract:- When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such
breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract,
compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally
arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties
knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of
it.
Such compensation is not to be given for any
remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.
74. Compensation for breach of contract where
penalty stipulated for.- When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in
the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract
contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the
breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been
caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract
reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may
be, the penalty stipulated for.
Explanation.- A stipulation for increased interest
from the date of default may be a stipulation by way of penalty." From the
aforesaid Sections, it can be held that when a contract has been broken, the
party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive compensation for any
loss which naturally arise in the usual course of things from such breach.
These sections further contemplate that if parties knew when they made the
contract that a particular loss is likely to result from such breach, they can
agree for payment of such compensation. In such a case, there may not be any
necessity of leading evidence for proving damages, unless the Court arrives at
the conclusion that no loss is likely to occur because of such breach. Further,
in case where Court arrives at the conclusion that the term contemplating
damages is by way of penalty, the Court may grant reasonable compensation not
exceeding the amount so named in the contract on proof of damages. However,
when the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous then its meaning is to
be gathered only from the words used therein. In a case where agreement is
executed by experts in the field, it would be difficult to hold that the
intention of the parties was different from the language used therein.
In such a case, it is for the party who contends
that stipulated amount is not reasonable compensation, to prove the same.
Now, we would refer to various decisions on the
subject. In Fateh Chand's case (supra), the plaintiff made a claim to forfeit a
sum of Rs.25000/- received by him from the defendant. The sum of Rs.25000/-
consisted of two items - Rs.1000/- received as earnest money and Rs.24000/-
agreed to be paid by the defendant as out of sale price against the delivery of
possession of the property. With regard to earnest money, the Court held that
the plaintiff was entitled to forfeit the same. With regard to claim of
remaining sum of Rs.24000/-, the Court referred to Section 74 of Indian
Contract Act and observed that Section 74 deals with the measure of damages in
two classes of cases
(i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in
case of breach, and
(ii) where the contract contains any other
stipulation by way of penalty.
The Court observed thus: - "The measure of
damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by S. 74
reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for.
In assessing damages the Court has, subject to
the limit of the penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such compensation as
it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract
is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; but compensation has to be
reasonable, and that imposes upon the Court duty to award compensation
according to settled principles. The section undoubtedly says that the
aggrieved party is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken
the contract, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been
caused by the breach. Thereby it merely dispenses with proof of "actual
loss or damages"; it does not justify the award of compensation when in
consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted, because
compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good loss or damage
which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew
when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach.
The Court further observed as under: - .... Duty
not to enforce the penalty clause but only to award reasonable compensation is
statutorily imposed upon courts by S. 74. In all cases, therefore, where there
is a stipulation in the nature of penalty for forfeiture of an amount deposited
pursuant to the terms of contract which expressly provides for forfeiture, the
court has jurisdiction to award such sum only as it considers reasonable, but
not exceeding the amount specified in the contract as liable to
forfeiture." From the aforesaid decision, it is clear that the Court was
not dealing with a case where contract named a sum to be paid in case of breach
but with a case where the contract contained stipulation by way of penalty.
The aforesaid case and other cases were referred
to by three Judge Bench in Maula Bux's case (supra) wherein the Court held
thus: - "... It is true that in every case of breach of contract the
person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage
suffered by him before he can claim a decree, and the Court is competent to
award reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is
proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of contract. But the
expression "whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been
caused thereby" is intended to cover different classes of contracts which
come before the Courts. In case of breach of some contracts it may be
impossible for the Court to assess compensation arising from breach, while in
other cases compensation can be calculated in accordance with established
rules. Where the Court is unable to assess the compensation, the sum named by
the parties if it be regarded as a genuine pre- estimate may be taken into
consideration as the measure of reasonable compensation, but not if the sum
named is in the nature of a penalty. Where loss in terms of money can be
determined, the party claiming compensation must prove the loss suffered by
him." In Rampur Distillery and Chemical Co. Ltd.'s (supra) also, two Judge
Bench of this Court referred to Maula Bux's case and observed thus: - "
... It was held by this Court that forfeiture of earnest money under a contract
for sale of property does not fall within Section 70 of the Contract Act, if the
amount is reasonable, because the forfeiture of a reasonable sum paid as
earnest money does not amount to the imposition of a penalty. But, "where
under the terms of the contract the party in breach has undertaken to pay a sum
of money or to forfeit a sum of money which he has already paid to the party
complaining of a breach of contract, the undertaking is of the nature of a
penalty." In Raman Iron Foundry's case (supra), this Court considered
clause 18 of the Contract between the parties and arrived at the conclusion
that it applied only where the purchaser has a claim for a sum presently due
and payable by the contractor. Thereafter, the Court observed thus: - "11.
Having discussed the proper interpretation of Clause 18, we may now turn to
consider what is the real nature of the claim for recovery of which the
appellant is seeking to appropriate the sums due to the respondent under other
contracts. The claim is admittedly one for damages for breach of the contract
between the parties.
Now, it is true that the damages which are
claimed are liquidated damages under Clause 14, but so far as the law in India is concerned, there is
no qualitative difference in the nature of the claim whether it be for
liquidated damages or for unliquidated damages. Section 74 of the Indian
Contract Act eliminates the somewhat elaborate refinements made under the
English common law in distinguishing between stipulations providing for payment
of liquidated damages and stipulations in the nature of penalty. Under the
common law a genuine pre- estimate of damages by mutual agreement is regarded
as a stipulation naming liquidated damages and binding between the parties : a
stipulation in a contract in terrorem is a penalty and the Court refuses to
enforce it, awarding to the aggrieved party only reasonable compensation. The
Indian Legislature has sought to cut across the web of rules and presumptions
under the English common law, by enacting a uniform principle applicable to all
stipulations naming amounts to be paid in case of breach, and stipulations by
way of penalty, and according to this principle, even if there is a stipulation
by way of liquidated damages, a party complaining of breach of contract can
recover only reasonable compensation for the injury sustained by him, the stipulated
amount being merely the outside limit. It, therefore, makes no difference in
the present case that the claim of the appellant is for liquidated damages. It
stands on the same footing as a claim for unliquidated damages.
Now the law is well settled that a claim for unliquidated
damages does not give rise to a debt until the liability is adjudicated and
damages assessed by a decree or order of a Court or other adjudicatory
authority. When there is a breach of contract, the party who commits the breach
does not eo instanti incur any pecuniary obligation, nor does the party
complaining of the breach becomes entitled to a debt due from the other party.
The only right which the party aggrieved by the breach of the contract has is
the right to sue for damages." Firstly, it is to be stated that in the
aforesaid case Court has not referred to earlier decision rendered by the five
Judge Bench in Fateh Chand's case or the decision rendered by the three Judge
Bench in Maula Bux's case. Further, in M/s H.M. Kamaluddin Ansari and Co. v.
Union of India and others [(1983) 4 SCC 417], three Judge Bench of this Court
has over-ruled the decision in Raman Iron Foundry's case (supra) and the Court
while interpreting similar term of the contract observed that it gives wider
power to Union of India to recover the amount claimed by appropriating any sum
then due or which at any time may become due to the contractors under other
contracts and the Court observed that clause 18 of the Standard Contract
confers ample powers on the Union of India to withhold the amount and no
injunction order could be passed restraining the Union of India from
withholding the amount.
In the light of the aforesaid decisions, in our
view, there is much force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for
the appellant. However, the learned senior counsel Mr. Dave submitted that even
if the award passed by the arbitral tribunal is erroneous, it is settled law
that when two views are possible with regard to interpretation of statutory
provisions and or facts, the Court would refuse to interfere with such award.
It is true that if the arbitral tribunal has
committed mere error of fact or law in reaching its conclusion on the disputed
question submitted to it for adjudication then the Court would have no
jurisdiction to interfere with the award. But, this would depend upon reference
made to the arbitrator:
(a) If there is a general reference for deciding
the contractual dispute between the parties and if the award is based on
erroneous legal proposition, the Court could interfere;
(b) It is also settled law that in a case of
reasoned award, the Court can set aside the same if it is, on the face of it,
erroneous on the proposition of law or its application;
(c) If a specific question of law is submitted
to the arbitrator, erroneous decision in point of law does not make the award
bad, so as to permit of its being set aside, unless the Court is satisfied that
the arbitrator had proceeded illegally.
In the facts of the case, it cannot be disputed
that if contractual term, as it is, is to be taken into consideration, the
award is, on the face of it, erroneous and in violation of the terms of the
contract and thereby it violates Section 28(3) of the Act. Undisputedly,
reference to the arbitral tribunal was not with regard to interpretation of
question of law. It was only a general reference with regard to claim of
respondent. Hence, if the award is erroneous on the basis of record with regard
to proposition of law or its application, the Court will have jurisdiction to
interfere with the same.
Dealing with the similar question, this Court in
M/s Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. The Union of India [(1960) 2 SCR 793]
observed that the extent of jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the award on
the ground of an error in making the award is well defined and held thus:-
"The award of an arbitrator may be set aside on the ground of an error on
the face thereof only when in the award or in any document incorporated with
it, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrators, stating the reasons
for his decision, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of
the award and which is erroneous-Champsey Bhara and Company v. Jivaraj Balloo
Spinning and Weaving Company Limited [L.R. 50 IA 324]. If however, a specific
question is submitted to the arbitrator and he answers it, the fact that the
answer involves an erroneous decision in point of law, does not make the award
bad on its face so as to permit of its being set aside-In the matter of an
arbitration between King and Duveen and others [LR (1913) 2 KBD 32] and
Government of Kelantan v. Duff Development Company Limited [LR 1923 AC 395].
Thereafter, the Court held that if there was a
general reference and not a specific reference on any question of law then the
award can be set aside if it demonstrated to be erroneous on the face of it.
The Court, in that case, considering Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act held
that the Indian Contract Act does not enable a party to a contract to ignore
the express provisions thereof and to claim payment of consideration for
performance of the contract at rates different from the stipulated rates, on
some vague plea of equity and that the arbitrators were not justified in
ignoring the expressed terms of the contract prescribing the remuneration
payable to the agents. The aforesaid law has been followed continuously. {Re.
Rajasthan State Mines & Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engineering Enterprises
and another [(1999) 9 SCC 283], Sikkim Subba Associates v. State of Sikkim
[(2001) 5 SCC 629] and G.M., Northern Railway and another v. Sarvesh Chopra
[(2002) 4 SCC 45]}.
There is also elaborate discussion on this
aspect in Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram [(1964) 3 SCR 164] wherein the
Court succinctly observed as under:- ".. But it is now firmly established
that an award is bad on the ground of error of law on the face of it, when in
the award itself or in a document actually incorporated in it, there is found
some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous.
An error in law on the face of the award means : "you can find in the
award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note
appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal
proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is
erroneous. It does not mean that if in a narrative a 'reference is made to a
contention of one party, that opens the door to setting first what that
contention is, and then going to the contract on which the parties' rights
depend to see if that contention is sound" Champsey Bhara and Company v. Jivraj
Balloo Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd. [(1932) L.R. 50 I.A. 324] But this
rule does not apply where questions of law are specifically referred to the
arbitrator for his decision; the award of the arbitrator on those questions is
binding upon the parties, for by referring specific questions the parties
desire to have a decision from the arbitrator on those questions rather than
from the Court, and the Court will not unless it is satisfied that the
arbitrator had proceeded illegally interfere with the decision." The Court
thereafter referred to the decision rendered in Seth Thawardas Pherumal v. The
Union of India [(1955) 2 SCR 48] wherein Bose, J. delivering the judgment of
the Court had observed:
"Therefore, when a question of law is the
point at issue, unless both sides specifically agree to refer it and agree to
be bound by the arbitrator's decision, the jurisdiction of the Courts to set an
arbitration right when the error is apparent on the face of the award is not
ousted. The mere fact that both parties submit incidental arguments about point
of law in the course of the proceedings is not enough." The learned Judge
also observed at p. 59 after referring to F.R. Absalom Ltd. v. Great Western
(London) Garden Village Society [1933] AC 592, 616:
Simply because the matter was referred to
incidentally in the pleadings and arguments in support of, or against, the
general issue about liability for damages, that is not enough to clothe the
arbitrator with exclusive jurisdiction on a point of law." The Court also
referred to the test indicated by Lord Russell of Killowen in F.R. Absalom Ltd.
v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd., and observed that the
said case adequately brings out a distinction between a specific reference on a
question of law, and a question of law arising for determination by the
arbitrator in the decision of the dispute. The Court quoted the following
observations with approval: - " .. it is, I think, essential to keep the
case where disputes are referred to an arbitrator in the decision of which a
question of law becomes material distinct from the case in which a specific
question of law has been referred to him for decision. x x x x The authorities
make a clear distinction between these two cases, and, as they appear to me,
they decide that in the former case the Court can interfere if and when any
error of law appears on the face of the award, but that in the latter case no
such interference is possible upon the ground that it so appears that the
decision upon the question of law is an erroneous one." Further, in Maharashtra
State Electricity Board v. Sterilite Industries (India) and Another [(2001) 8
SCC 482], the Court observed as under:- "9. The position in law has been
noticed by this Court in Union of India v. A.L. Rallia Ram [AIR 1963 SC 1685]
and Madanlal Roshanlal Mahajan v. Hukumchand Mills Ltd. [(1967) 1 SCR 105] to
the effect that the arbitrator's award both on facts and law is final that
there is no appeal from his verdict; that the court cannot review his award and
correct any mistake in his adjudication, unless the objection to the legality
of the award is apparent on the face of it. In understanding what would be an
error of law on the face of the award, the following observations in Champsey Bhara
& Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spg and Wvg. Co. Ltd, [(1922-23) 50 IA 324] a
decision of the Privy Council, are relevant (IA p. 331) "An error in law
on the face of the award means, in Their Lordship's view, that you can find in
the award on a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note
appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal
proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is
erroneous."
10. In Arosan Enterprises Ltd. v. Union of India
[1999 (9) SCC 449], this Court again examined this matter and stated that where
the error of finding of fact having a bearing on the award is patent and is
easily demonstrable without the necessity of carefully weighing the various
possible viewpoints, the interference in the award based on an erroneous
finding of fact is permissible and similarly, if an award is based by applying
a principle of law which is patently erroneous, and but for such erroneous
application of legal principle, the award could not have been made, such award
is liable to be set aside by holding that there has been a legal misconduct on
the part of the arbitrator." Next question is - whether the legal proposition
which is the basis of the award for arriving at the conclusion that ONGC was
not entitled to recover the stipulated liquidated damages as it has failed to
establish that it has suffered any loss is erroneous on the face of it? The
arbitral tribunal after considering the decisions rendered by this Court in the
cases of Fateh Chand, Maula Bux and Rampur Distillery (supra) arrived at the
conclusion that "in view of these three decisions of the Supreme Court, it
is clear that it was for the respondents to establish that they had suffered
any loss because of the breach committed by the claimant in the supply of goods
under the contract between the parties after 14th November, 1996. In the words
we have emphasized in Maula Bux decision, it is clear that if loss in terms of
money can be determined, the party claiming the compensation 'must prove' the
loss suffered by him".
Thereafter the arbitral tribunal referred to the
evidence and the following statement made by the witness Das:
"The re-deployment plan was made keeping in
mind several constraints including shortage of casing pipes." Further, the
arbitral tribunal came to the conclusion that under these circumstances, the
shortage of casing pipes of 26" diameter and 30" diameter pipes was
not the only reason which led to redeployment of rig Trident II to Platform B
121. The arbitral tribunal also appreciated the other evidence and held that
the attempt on the part of the ONGC to show that production of gas on Platform
B 121 was delayed because of the late supply of goods by the claimant failed.
Thereafter, the arbitral tribunal considered the
contention raised by the learned counsel for the ONGC that the amount of 10%
which had been deducted by way of liquidated damages for the late supply of
goods under the contract was not by way of penalty. In response thereto, it was
pointed out that it was not the case of learned counsel Mr. Setalwad on behalf
of the claimants that "these stipulations in the contract for deduction of
liquidated damages was by way of penalty".
Further, the arbitral tribunal observed that in
view of the decisions rendered in Fateh Chand and Maula Bux cases, "all
that we are required to consider is whether the respondents have established
their case of actual loss in money terms because of the delay in the supply of
the Casing Pipes under the contract between the parties". Finally, the
arbitral tribunal held that as the appellant has failed to prove the loss
suffered because of delay in supply of goods as set out in the contract between
the parties, it is required to refund the amount deducted by way of liquidated
damages from the specified amount payable to the respondent.
It is apparent from the aforesaid reasoning
recorded by the arbitral tribunal that it failed to consider Sections 73 and 74
of the Indian Contract Act and the ratio laid down in Fateh Chand's case
(supra) wherein it is specifically held that jurisdiction of the Court to award
compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the
maximum stipulated; and compensation has to be reasonable. Under Section 73,
when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is
entitled to receive compensation for any loss caused to him which the parties
knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it.
This Section is to be read with Section 74, which deals with penalty stipulated
in the contract, inter alia [relevant for the present case] provides that when
a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to
be paid in case of such breach, the party complaining of breach is entitled,
whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused, thereby to receive
from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not
exceeding the amount so named.
Section 74 emphasizes that in case of breach of
contract, the party complaining of the breach is entitled to receive reasonable
compensation whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused by such
breach. Therefore, the emphasis is on reasonable compensation. If the
compensation named in the contract is by way of penalty, consideration would be
different and the party is only entitled to reasonable compensation for the
loss suffered. But if the compensation named in the contract for such breach is
genuine pre- estimate of loss which the parties knew when they made the
contract to be likely to result from the breach of it, there is no question of
proving such loss or such party is not required to lead evidence to prove
actual loss suffered by him. Burden is on the other party to lead evidence for
proving that no loss is likely to occur by such breach.
Take for illustration: if the parties have
agreed to purchase cotton bales and the same were only to be kept as a stock-in-trade.
Such bales are not delivered on the due date and thereafter the bales are
delivered beyond the stipulated time, hence there is breach of the contract.
Question which would arise for consideration is - whether by such breach party
has suffered any loss. If the price of cotton bales fluctuated during that
time, loss or gain could easily be proved. But if cotton bales are to be
purchased for manufacturing yarn, consideration would be different.
In Maula Bux's case (supra), plaintiff - Maula Bux
entered into a contract with the Government of India to supply potatoes at the
Military Head Quarters, U.P. Area and deposited an amount of Rs.10000/- as
security for due performance of the contract. He entered into another contract
with the Government of India to supply at the same place poultry eggs and fish
for one year and deposited an amount of Rs.8500/- for due performance of the
contract. Plaintiff having made persistent default in making regular and full
supplies of the commodities agreed to be supplied, the Government rescinded the
contracts and forfeited the amounts deposited by the plaintiff, because under
the terms of the agreement, the amounts deposited by the plaintiff as security
for the due performance of the contracts were to stand forfeited in case
plaintiff neglected to perform his part of the contract. In context of these
facts, Court held that it was possible for the Government of India to lead
evidence to prove the rates at which potatoes, poultry, eggs and fish were
purchased by them when the plaintiff failed to deliver "regularly and
fully" the quantities stipulated under the terms of the contracts and
after the contracts were terminated. They could have proved the rates at which
they had to be purchased and also the other incidental charges incurred by them
in procuring the goods contracted for. But no such attempt was made.
Hence, claim for damages was not granted.
In Maula Bux's case (supra), the Court has
specifically held that it is true that in every case of breach of contract the
person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage
suffered by him before he can claim a decree and the Court is competent to
award reasonable compensation in a case of breach even if no actual damage is
proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of contract. The
Court has also specifically held that in case of breach of some contracts it
may be impossible for the Court to assess compensation arising from breach.
Take for illustration construction of a road or
a bridge. If there is delay in completing the construction of road or bridge
within stipulated time, then it would be difficult to prove how much loss is
suffered by the Society / State. Similarly, in the present case, delay took
place in deployment of rigs and on that basis actual production of gas from
platform B-121 had to be changed. It is undoubtedly true that the witness has
stated that redeployment plan was made keeping in mind several constraints
including shortage of casing pipes.
Arbitral Tribunal, therefore, took into consideration
the aforesaid statement volunteered by the witness that shortage of casing
pipes was only one of the several reasons and not the only reason which led to
change in deployment of plan or redeployment of rigs Trident-II platform B-121.
In our view, in such a contract, it would be difficult to prove exact loss or
damage which the parties suffer because of the breach thereof. In such a
situation, if the parties have pre-estimated such loss after clear
understanding, it would be totally unjustified to arrive at the conclusion that
party who has committed breach of the contract is not liable to pay
compensation. It would be against the specific provisions of Section 73 and 74
of the Indian Contract Act.
There was nothing on record that compensation
contemplated by the parties was in any way unreasonable. It has been
specifically mentioned that it was an agreed genuine pre-estimate of damages
duly agreed by the parties. It was also mentioned that the liquidated damages
are not by way of penalty. It was also provided in the contract that such
damages are to be recovered by the purchaser from the bills for payment of the
cost of material submitted by the contractor. No evidence is led by the
claimant to establish that stipulated condition was by way of penalty or the
compensation contemplated was, in any way, unreasonable. There was no reason
for the tribunal not to rely upon the clear and unambiguous terms of agreement
stipulating pre-estimate damages because of delay in supply of goods. Further,
while extending the time for delivery of the goods, respondent was informed
that it would be required to pay stipulated damages.
From the aforesaid discussions, it can be held
that:-
(1) Terms of the contract are required to be
taken into consideration before arriving at the conclusion whether the party
claiming damages is entitled to the same;
(2) If the terms are clear and unambiguous
stipulating the liquidated damages in case of the breach of the contract unless
it is held that such estimate of damages/compensation is unreasonable or is by
way of penalty, party who has committed the breach is required to pay such
compensation and that is what is provided in Section 73 of the Contract Act.
(3) Section 74 is to be read along with Section
73 and, therefore, in every case of breach of contract, the person aggrieved by
the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him
before he can claim a decree. The Court is competent to award reasonable
compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been
suffered in consequences of the breach of a contract.
(4) In some contracts, it would be impossible
for the Court to assess the compensation arising from breach and if the
compensation contemplated is not by way of penalty or unreasonable, Court can
award the same if it is genuine pre-estimate by the parties as the measure of
reasonable compensation.
For the reasons stated above, the impugned award
directing the appellant to refund the amount deducted for the breach as per
contractual terms requires to be set aside and is hereby set aside.
WHETHER THE CLAIM OF REFUND OF THE AMOUNT
DEDUCTED BY THE APPELLANT FROM THE BILLS IS DISPUTED OR UNDISPUTED CLAIM?
As the award directing the appellant to refund
the amount deducted is set aside, question of granting interest on the same
would not arise. Still however, to demonstrate that the award passed by the
arbitral tribunal is, on the face of it, erroneous with regard to grant of
interest, we deal with the same.
Arbitral Tribunal arrived at the conclusion that
the appellant wrongfully withheld/deducted the aggregate amount of US $
3,04,970.20 on account of delay in supply of goods and amount of Rs.15,75,559/-
on account of excise duty, sales tax, freight charges deducted as and by way of
liquidated damages from the amount payable by the respondent and thereafter
arrived at the conclusion that the said amount was deducted from undisputed
invoice amount, therefore, the said claim of the respondent cannot be held to
be 'disputed claim'.
It is apparent that the claim of the contractor
to recover the said amount was disputed mainly because it was agreed term
between the parties that in case of delay in supply of goods appellant was
entitled to recover damages at the rate as specified in the agreement. It was
also agreed that the said liquidated damages were to be recovered by paying
authorities from the bills for payment of the cost of material submitted by the
contractor. If this agreed amount is deducted and thereafter contractor claims
it back on the ground that the appellant was not entitled to deduct the same as
it has failed to prove loss suffered by it, the said claim undoubtedly would be
a 'disputed claim'. The arbitrators were required to decide by considering the
facts and the law applicable, whether the deduction was justified or not? That
itself would indicate that the claim of the contractor was 'disputed claim' and
not 'undisputed'. The reason recorded by the arbitrators that as the goods were
received and bills are not disputed, therefore, the claim for recovering the
amount of bills cannot be held to be 'disputed claim' is, on the face of it,
unjust, unreasonable, unsustainable and patently illegal as well as against the
expressed terms of the contract. As quoted above, clause 34.4 in terms provides
that no interest would be payable on 'disputed claim'. It also provides that in
which set of circumstances, interest amount would be paid in case of delay in
payment of undisputed claim. In such case, the interest rate is also specified at
1% per month on such undisputed claim amount. Despite this clause, the arbitral
tribunal came to the conclusion that it was undisputed claim and held that in
law, appellant was not entitled to withhold these two payments from the invoice
raised by the respondent and hence directed that the appellant was liable to
pay interest on wrongful deductions at the rate of 12% p.a. from 1.4.1997 till
the date of filing of the statement of claim and thereafter having regard to
the commercial nature of the transaction at the rate of 18% p.a. pendente lite
till payment.
It is to be reiterated that it is the primary
duty of the arbitrators to enforce a promise which the parties have made and to
uphold the sanctity of the contract which forms the basis of the civilized society
and also the jurisdiction of the arbitrators. Hence, this part of the award
passed by the arbitral tribunal granting interest on the amount deducted by the
appellant from the bills payable to the respondent is against the terms of the
contract and is, therefore, violative of Section 28(3) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS:-
In the result, it is held that:- A.
(1) The Court can set aside the arbitral award
under Section 34(2) of the Act if the party making the application furnishes
proof that:-
(i) a party was under some incapacity, or
(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or
(iii) the party making the application was not
given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral
proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or
(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration,
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to
arbitration;
2) The Court may set aside the award:-
(i) (a) if the composition of the arbitral
tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties,
(b) failing such agreement, the composition of
the arbitral tribunal was not in accordance with Part-I of the Act.
(ii) if the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with:-
(a) the agreement of the parties, or
(b) failing such agreement, the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with Part-I of the Act.
However, exception for setting aside the award
on the ground of composition of arbitral tribunal or illegality of arbitral
procedure is that the agreement should not be in conflict with the provisions
of Part-I of the Act from which parties cannot derogate.
(c) If the award passed by the arbitral tribunal
is in contravention of provisions of the Act or any other substantive law
governing the parties or is against the terms of the contract.
(3) The award could be set aside if it is
against the public policy of India, that is to say, if it is contrary to:-
(a) fundamental policy of Indian law;
(b) the interest of India; or
(c) justice or morality, or
(d) if it is patently illegal.
(4) It could be challenged:-
(a) as provided under Section 13(5); and
(b) Section 16(6) of the Act.
B. (1) The impugned award requires to be set
aside mainly on the grounds:-
(i) there is specific stipulation in the
agreement that the time and date of delivery of the goods was the essence of
the contract;
(ii) in case of failure to deliver the goods
within the period fixed for such delivery in the schedule, ONGC was entitled to
recover from the contractor liquidated damages as agreed;
(iii) it was also explicitly understood that the
agreed liquidated damages were genuine pre-estimate of damages;
(iv) on the request of the respondent to extend
the time limit for supply of goods, ONGC informed specifically that time was
extended but stipulated liquidated damages as agreed would be recovered;
(v) liquidated damages for delay in supply of
goods were to be recovered by paying authorities from the bills for payment of
cost of material supplied by the contractor;
(vi) there is nothing on record to suggest that
stipulation for recovering liquidated damages was by way of penalty or that the
said sum was in any way unreasonable.
(vii) In certain contracts, it is impossible to
assess the damages or prove the same. Such situation is taken care by Sections
73 and 74 of the Contract Act and in the present case by specific terms of the
contract.
For the reasons stated above, the impugned award
directing the appellant to refund US $ 3,04,970.20 and Rs.15,75,559/- with
interest which were deducted for the breach of contract as per the agreement
requires to be set aside and is hereby set aside. The appeal is allowed
accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs.
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