Vs. Palanisamy (D) by Lrs & Ors  Insc 454 (31 October 2002)
Variava & Arun Kumar. Arun Kumar, J.
appeals are directed against a common judgment dated 24.12.1999 of the High
Court disposing of two Revision Petitions. Briefly the facts giving rise to the
present appeals are that the appellant was a tenant in the suit premises since
before its purchase by the respondent- landlords. In May 1990, by mutual
consent of the parties rent of the suit premises was enhanced to Rs.500/- per
month. Admittedly, rent up to October, 1990 was received by the landlords,
thereafter as per the case of the respondents, tenant defaulted in payment of
rent. The appellant filed suit for injunction in the Civil Court praying that the landlords be restrained
from threatening to dispossess the appellant from suit premises. In the said
suit, an interim injunction was granted in favour of the appellant. On 1st November, 1993, the landlords issued a default
notice alleging that the tenant had committed default in payment of rent and
was, therefore, liable to eviction. The tenant replied to the said notice on 20th November, 1993 denying any default on his part in
payment of rent. Ultimately, on 7th February, 1994, an eviction petition was filed before the Rent Controller
by the landlords on two grounds viz., (i) default in payment of rent and (ii)
personal need of the landlords for occupying the premises.
On 15th March, 1994, the tenant made an application
under Section 8 (5) of The Tamil Nadu Building (Lease & Rent Control Act),
1960 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), for permission to
deposit the amount of rent in Court. The Rent Controller allowed the said
application vide order dated 25th April, 1995.
The Eviction Petition filed by the landlords was dismissed on the same date.
The Rent Controller held that it could not be said that tenant had committed
default in payment of rent.
Rent Controller further observed that even assuming there was default on the
part of the tenant, it could not be said to be willful default, therefore, the
eviction petition was dismissed. No finding was given on the second ground for
eviction regarding personal need of the landlords for occupying the premises.
The landlords filed appeals before the Rent Control Appellate Authority against
both the orders of the Rent Controller.
the appeals were allowed by the Appellate Authority. The Appellate Authority
held that the tenant had committed default in payment of rent. It relied on
admission on the part of the tenant himself as available in the evidence of the
tenant that at least from May, 1993, no rent had been paid. The tenant is said
to have deposited the rent in Court during the pendency of the proceedings.
However, the question for consideration before the Appellate Authority was
whether the tenant had committed default in payment of rent? The Appellate
Authority held that the tenant had committed default, and therefore, the
eviction petition was allowed. It was observed by the Appellate Authority that
even after the petition had been filed by the landlords, the tenant did not
think of offering the rent to the landlords. Further the tenant did not issue
notice as required under Section 8(2) of the Act calling upon the landlords to
notify the Bank where the tenant could make the deposit of rent. On the basis
of the evidence on record, the Appellate Authority held that the tenant had
committed default in payment of rent, and therefore, the eviction petition was
finding was however recorded on the second ground of eviction.
on the failure of the tenant to follow procedure and deposit rent of suit
property under Section 8(2) of the Act it was held that the tenant having
failed to comply with the procedure prescribed in that behalf under the Act the
decree for eviction had to follow. The tenant filed Civil Revision Petitions
against both the orders of the Rent Control Appellate Authority in the High
Court. Both the revision petitions were dismissed by the High Court vide the
impugned judgment dated 24.12.1999. Hence the present appeals by the tenant.
sole question for consideration in these appeals is whether the provisions of
Section 8 of The Tamil Nadu Building (Lease & Rent Control Act), 1960 are
to be strictly complied with by the tenant before he can seek benefit under the
said provisions regarding deposit of rent in the Court. In this connection,
relevant provisions of Section 8 of the Act need to be quoted :
8 : [Landlord liable to give receipt for rent or advance] :
Where a landlord refuses to accept, or evades the receipt of, any rent lawfully
payable to him by a tenant in respect of any building, the tenant may, by
notice in writing, require the landlord to specify within ten days from the
date of receipt of the notice by him, a bank into which the rent may be
deposited by the tenant, to the credit of the landlord.
that such bank shall be one situated in the city, town or village in which the
building is situated of if there is no such bank in such city, town or village,
within (five kilometers) of the limits thereof.
It shall be open to the landlord to specify from time to time by a written
notice to the tenant and subject to the proviso aforesaid, a bank different
from the one already specified by him under this sub-section.
the landlord specifies a bank as aforesaid, the tenant shall deposit the rent
in the bank and shall continue to deposit in it any rent which may subsequently
become due in respect of the building.
the landlord does not specify a bank as aforesaid, the tenant shall remit the
rent to the landlord by Money Order, after deducting the money order
the landlord refuses to receive the rent remitted by Money Order under
sub-section (4), the tenant may deposit the rent before the Controller and
continue to deposit with him any rent which may subsequently become due in
respect of the building." It would be seen from the above provisions that
while the landlord is required to issue a notice of default, on refusal by
landlord to accept rent, the tenant is required to call upon the landlord by
way of a notice to specify the name of a Bank in which rent could be deposited
by the tenant to the credit of the landlord. If the landlord specify the name
of the Bank to deposit the rent, there is an obligation on the part of the
tenant to make the deposit of arrears of rent in the account of the landlord.
However, if the landlord does not specify the name of a Bank inspite of being
called upon by the tenant through a notice, the tenant is required to send the
amount of arrears through a money order to the landlord after deducting the
commission payable on the money order. If the landlord still refuses to accept
the rent, the tenant is entitled to file an application before the Rent
Controller seeking permission to deposit the arrears of rent under sub- section
(5) of Section 8 of the Act.
the learned counsel for the appellant argued that since the appellant-tenant
had deposited the arrears of rent in Court, it should be taken as compliance of
Section 8 of the Act. This would mean there is no default on the part of tenant
in payment of rent and therefore, no eviction order could have been passed
against the appellant on that ground. According to the learned counsel, the
Court should not take a technical view of the matter and should appreciate that
it was on account of refusal of the landlords to accept the rent sent by way of
money orders that the tenant was driven to move the Court for permission to
deposit the arrears of rent. Since there is a substantial compliance of Section
8 in as much as the arrears of rent stand deposited in Court, a strict or
technical view ought not to have been taken by the High Court. We are unable to
accept this contention advanced on behalf of the appellant by the learned
counsel. The rent legislation is normally intended for the benefit of the
tenants. At the same time, it is well-settled that the benefits conferred on
the tenants through the relevant statutes can be enjoyed only on the basis of
strict compliance of the statutory provisions. Equitable consideration have no
place in such matters. The statute contains express provisions.
prescribes various steps which a tenant is required to take. In Section 8 of
the Act, the procedure to be followed by the tenant is given step by step. An
earlier step is a pre-condition for the next step. The tenant has to observe
the procedure as prescribed in the statute. A strict compliance of the
procedure is necessary. The tenant cannot straight away jump to the last step
i.e. to deposit rent in court. The last step can come only after the earlier
steps have been taken by the tenant. We are fortified in this view by the
decisions of this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal & Another reported
in 1996 (1) SCC 243 and M.Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu reported in 1996 (6)
counsel for appellant did not dispute that the tenant had not fulfilled the
conditions prescribed in Section 8 of the Act before making deposit of rent in
Court. Hence similar circumstances and while dealing with almost similar
provisions contained in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction)
Act 1950, this Court in Kuldeep Singh v. Ganpat Lal & Another (supra) held:
In the present case, the appellant is seeking to avail of the benefit of the
legal fiction under Section 19-A (4) of the Act. It is settled law that a legal
fiction is to be limited to the purpose for which it is created and should not
be extended beyond that legitimate field. [See: Bengal Immunity Co.Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603 at p.646. The appellant can avail of the
benefit of Section 19-A (4) if the deposit of Rs.3600 made by him in the Court
of Munsif (South), Udaipur, on 29.10.1982, by way of rent for the months of May
1982 to October 1982, can be treated as a payment under Section 19-A (3) (c) so
as to enable the appellant to say that he was not in default in payment of
rent. Under Section 19-A (3) (c) the tenant can deposit the rent in the court
only if the conditions laid down in the said provision are satisfied. It is the
admitted case of the appellant that these conditions are not satisfied in the
present case. The deposit which was made by the respondent in court on
29.10.1982 cannot, therefore, be regarded as a deposit made in accordance with
clause (c) of sub-section (3) of Section 19-A and the appellant cannot avail of
the protection of sub-section (4) of Section 19-A and he must be held to have
committed default in payment of rent for the months of May 1982 to October 1982.
This means that the decree for eviction has been rightly passed against the
appellant on account of default in payment of rent for the period of six
months." Again in M. Bhaskar v. J. Venkatarama Naidu, (supra) with
reference to similar provisions contained in the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent
and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, this Court observed that when the landlord is
evading payment of rent, the tenant has to follow the procedure prescribed
under Section 8 of the Act i.e. to issue notice to the landlord to name the
Bank and if he does not name the Bank, the tenant has to file application
before the Rent Controller for permission to deposit rent. The tenant did not
follow that procedure. Omission to avail of the prescribed procedure
disentitles the tenant to plead that there was no willful default on his part.
The landlord was, therefore, entitled to seek eviction on the ground of willful
default in payment of rent on the part of the tenant.
the tenant did not follow the procedure prescribed under Section 8. The only
submission that was advanced on behalf of the appellant was that since the
deposit of rent had been made, a lenient view ought to be taken. We are unable
to agree with this. The appellant failed to satisfy the conditions contained in
Section 8. Mere refusal of the landlord to receive rent cannot justify the
action of the tenant in straightaway invoking Section 8 (5) of the Act without
following the procedure contained in the earlier sub-sections i.e. sub-sections
(2), (3) and (4) of Section 8. Therefore, we are of the considered view that
the eviction order passed against appellant with respect to the suit premises
on the ground of default in payment of arrears of rent needs no interference.
The impugned judgment of the High Court, therefore, does not call for
interference. These appeals are dismissed. We are informed that the landlords
have already taken possession of the suit premises in pursuance of the High