Union of India & Ors Vs. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers College [2002] Insc 438 (23 October 2002)
G.B.
Pattanaik & Ruma Pal. Pattanaik, J.
With
Civil Appeal Nos. 6040, 6043, 6044, 6038, 6046, 6042, 6041, 6039, 6045, 6049,
6047, 6048 and 6050 of 2001 and C.A. No. 3225 of 2002.
This
Appeal by the Union of India is directed against the Judgment of Rajasthan High
Court allowing the Writ Petition filed before it. A private educational
institution conducting courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Education
filed a Writ petition challenging the order passed by the Northern Regional
Committee of National Council for teachers education rejecting the application
of the institution for recognition of the B.Ed (Vacation Course). The
institution was directed not to admit students in the vacation course from
1999-2000 onwards. In the Writ Petition, the constitutional validity of the
National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 (Act 73 of 1993, hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') was also challenged. The High Court by the impugned
judgment came to hold that the order de-recognising the vacation course is bad
in law. The High Court also struck down Section 17(4) of the Act.
The
parliament enacted the Act and provided for the establishment of a council for
teacher education with a view to achieving planned and coordinated development
of the teacher education system throughout the country and for regulation of
proper maintenance of norms and standards in the teacher education system.
Section
17 of the Act, with which we are concerned in the present case, is extracted
herein below:
Section
17. "Contravention of provisions of the Act and consequences thereof.
(1)
Where the Regional Committee is, on its own motion or on any representation
received from any person, satisfied that a recognised institution has
contravened any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules, regulations orders
made or issued thereunder, or any condition subject to which recognition under
sub-section (3) of section 14 or permission under sub-section 15 was granted,
it may withdraw recognition of such recognised institution for reasons to be
recorded in writing:
Provided
that no such order against the recognised institution shall be passed unless a
reasonable opportunity of making representation against the proposed order has
been given to such recognised institution:
Provided
further that the order withdrawing or refusing recognition passed by the
Regional Committee shall come into force only with effect from the end of the
academic session next following the date of communication of such order.
(2) A
copy of every order passed by the Regional Committee under sub-section (1),-
(a) shall be communicated to the recognised institution concerned and a copy
thereof shall also be forwarded simultaneously to the university or the
examining body to which such institution was affiliated for cancelling
affiliation; and (b) shall be published in the Official Gazette for general
information.
(3)
Once the recognition of a recognised institution is withdrawn under sub-section
(1), such institution shall discontinue the course or training in teacher
education, and the concerned University or the examining body shall cancel
affiliation of the institution in accordance with the order passed under
sub-section (1), with effect from the end of the academic session next
following the date of communication of the said order.
(4) If
an institution offers any course or training in teacher education after the
coming into force of the order withdrawing recognition under sub-section (1),
or where an institution offering a course or training in teacher education
immediately before the appointed day fails or neglects to obtain recognition or
permission under this Act, the qualification in teacher education obtained
pursuant to such course or training or after undertaking a course or training
in such institution, shall not be treated as a valid qualification for purposes
of employment under the Central government, any State Government or University,
or in any school, college or other educational body aided by the Central
Government or any State Government." On and from the date of enforcement
of the Act, every institution, offering or intending to offer the course or
training in teacher education, was required to make application to the Regional
Committee in such form and manner as may be determined by the regulations as
provided in Section 14 of the Act. In accordance with the said provision the
respondent institution made an application for grant of recognition to the
Bachelor of Education (vacation course).
This
application, having been rejected by the Northern Regional Committee of the
Council, the respondent had approached the High Court. Having regard to the
Entry 66 of the List I of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, the High
Court did record a conclusion that the Parliament has the legislative
competence for enacting the Act with a view for achieving planned and
coordinated development of the teacher education system. But so far as Section
17(4) of the Act is concerned, the High Court held that the Parliament cannot
make law prescribing qualification for entry into the service under the State
Government and such law can be made only under the Proviso to Article 309 of
the Constitution. In the opinion of the High Court, when NCTE cannot force a
State or State funded institution to employ only teachers having a particular
qualification like B.Ed or B.P.Ed. or it cannot force the State Government for
the employee to have B.Ed degree then it cannot have power under any law to
de-recognize any such degree for the purpose of employment and as such
Sub-section (4) of Section 17 is unconstitutional and ultra-vires of the
Constitution. Having struck down Section 17 (4) of the Act, the High Court
further directed the NCTE to issue certificate of recognition to the B.Ed
(vacation course) of the institution since the regulation of B.Ed course
imparted by the same institution was recognised by the council.
It is
contended, on behalf of the council, that sub-section (4) of Section 17 is in
fact a law dealing with coordinated development of the teacher education system
to provide consequences if an institution, without obtaining recognition or
after the recognition being withdrawn, offers any course or training in teacher
education.
According
to the learned counsel, the legislation in pith and substance is a legislation
dealing with the topic of coordination and determination of standards in
institutions for higher education coming within the legislative Entry 66 of the
List I of the Seventh Schedule and even if it is construed to be an
encroachment relating to service under a State Government the same is merely
consequential and, therefore, the legislation cannot be declared to be ultra-vires.
Mr. Sanghi,
appearing for the respondent, on the other hand contended that though it would
be within the competence of the Parliament to make law for coordinated
development of education but if the law deals with the question of minimum
qualification for the service under the State Government the same would be a
law referable to Article 309 of the Constitution and not referable to a law
dealing with coordinated development of the teacher education system and
therefore, sub-section (4) of Section 17 must be held to be ultra-vires of the
Constitution.
In
view of the rival submissions at the bar, the question that arises for
consideration is whether the impugned legislation can be held to be a law
dealing with coordinated development of education system within Entry 66 of the
List I of the Seventh Schedule or it is a law dealing with the service
conditions of an employee under the State Government. The power to legislate is
engrafted under Article 246 of the Constitution and the various entries for the
three lists of the Seventh Schedule are the "fields of legislation".
The different entries being legislative heads are all of enabling character and
are designed to define and delimit the respective areas of legislative
competence of the Union and the State legislatures. They
neither impose any restrictions on the legislative powers nor prescribe any
duty for exercise of the legislative power in any particular manner. It has
been a cardinal principle of construction that the language of the entries
should be given the widest scope of which their meaning is fairly capable and
while interpreting an entry of any List it would not be reasonable to import
any limitation therein. The rule of widest construction, however, would not
enable the legislature to make a law relating to a matter which has no rational
connection with the subject matter of an entry. When the vires of enactment is
challenged, the court primarily presumes the constitutionality of the statute
by putting the most liberal construction upon the relevant legislative entry so
that it may have the widest amplitude and the substance of the legislation will
have to be looked into. The Court sometimes is duty bound to guard against
extending the meaning of the words beyond their reasonable connotation in
anxiety to preserve the power of the legislature.
It is
further a well-settled principle that entries in the different lists should be
read together without giving a narrow meaning to any of them. Power of the
Parliament as well as the State legislature are expressed in precise and
definite terms. While an entry is to be given its widest meaning but it cannot
be so interpreted as to over-ride another entry or make another entry
meaningless and in case of an apparent conflict between different entries, it
is the duty of the court to reconcile them. When it appears to the Court that
there is apparent overlapping between the two entries the doctrine of
"pith and substance" has to be applied to find out the true nature of
a legislation and the entry within which it would fall. In case of conflict
between entries in List I and List II, the same has to be decided by
application of the principle of "pith and substance". The doctrine of
"pith and substance" means that if an enactment substantially falls
within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature
which enacted it, it cannot be held to be invalid, merely because it
incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature.
When a
law is impugned as being ultra-vires of the legislative competence, what is
required to be ascertained is the true character of the legislation. If on such
an examination it is found that the legislation is in substance one on a matter
assigned to the legislature then it must be held to be valid in its entirety
even though it might incidentally trench on matters which are beyond its
competence. In order to examine the true character of the enactment, the entire
Act, its object and scope and effect, is required to be gone into. The question
of invasion into the territory of another legislation is to be determined not
by degree but by substance. The doctrine of "pith and substance" has
to be applied not only in cases of conflict between the powers of two
legislatures but in any case where the question arises whether a legislation is
covered by particular legislative power in exercise of which it is purported to
be made.
Bearing
in mind the aforesaid principles of rule of construction, if the provisions of
the impugned statute, namely, the National Council of Teacher Education Act,
1993 are examined and more particularly Section 17(4) thereof which we have
already extracted, the conclusion is irresistible that the statute is one
squarely dealing with coordination and determination of standards in
institutions for higher education within the meaning of Entry 66 of List I of
the Seventh Schedule. Both Entries 65 and 66 of List I empower the Central
Legislature to secure the standards of research and the standards of higher
education. The object behind being that the same standards are not lowered at
the hands of the particular State or States to the detriment of the national
progress and the power of the State legislature must be so exercised as not to
directly encroach upon power of Union
under Entry 66. The power to coordinate does not mean merely the power to evaluate
but it means to harmonise or secure relationship for concerted action. A
legislation made for the purpose of coordination of standards of higher
education is essentially a legislation by the Central legislature in exercise
of its competence under Entry 66 of List I of the Seventh Schedule and
sub-section (4) of Section 17 merely provides the consequences if an
institution offers a course or training in teacher education in contravention
of the Act though the ultimate consequences under sub-section (4) of Section 17
may be that unqualified teacher will not be entitled to get an employment under
the State or Central Government or in a university or in a college. But by no
stretch of imagination the said provision can be construed to mean a law
dealing with employment as has been held by the High Court in the impugned
Judgment.
In our
considered opinion, the High Court committed gross error in construing the
provisions of sub-section(4) of Section 17 of the Act to mean that it is a
legislation dealing with recruitment and conditions of services of persons in
the State service within the meaning of Proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution The High Court committed the aforesaid error by examining the
provisions of sub- section (4) on its plain terms without trying to examine the
true character of the enactment which has to be done by examining the enactment
as a whole, its object and scope and effect of the provisions. Even, the High
Court does not appear to have applied the doctrine of "pith and substance"
and, thus, committed the error in interpreting the provisions of sub-section
(4) of Section 17 to mean to be a provision dealing with conditions of service
of an employee under the State Government.
In the
aforesaid premises, the conclusion of the High Court that Section 17(4) is
ultra-vires being beyond the competence of the Union legislature cannot be
sustained and the said conclusion is accordingly set aside. On examining the
statute as a whole and on scrutiny of the object and scope of the statute, we have
no manner of doubt that even sub-section (4) of Section 17 is very much a law
dealing with the coordination and determination of standards in institution for
higher education coming within Entry 66 of the List III of the Seventh Schedule
and, thus, the Union legislature did have the competence for enacting the said
provision.
We are
also of the further opinion that the de-recognition of the B.Ed (Vacation
course) cannot be nullified on the ground of failure to comply with the
principle of natural justice. In the judgment under challenge, the High Court
has held also that when the institution is imparting the B.Ed (Vacation Course)
then National Council for Teacher Education could not have refused to recognise
the said course. We are unable to accept this reasoning inasmuch as the NCTE is
an expert body created under the provisions of the National Council for Teacher
Education Act, 1993 and the Parliament has imposed upon such expert body the
duty to maintain the standards of education, particularly, in relation to the teachers
education.
Education
is the backbone of every democracy and any deterioration in the Standard of
teaching in the B.Ed course would ultimately produce sub-standard prospective
teachers who would be teaching in schools and colleges throughout the country
and on whose efficiency the future of the country depends. Inasmuch as the
teacher himself has received a sub-standard education it is difficult to expect
from him a higher standard of teaching to the students of the schools or other
institutions. It is from this perspective, the conclusion of an expert body
should not be lightly tinkered with by court of law without giving due weightage
to the conclusion arrived at by such expert body. From this standpoint, we are
of the considered opinion that the High Court committed error in holding that
there was no reasonable justification for not recognising the B.Ed (Vacation
Course) which was being imparted by the institution of Shah Goverdhan Lal Kabra Teachers College. In the aforesaid premises, we set
aside the impugned Judgment of the High Court and allow this appeal.
In
other Civil Appeals which have been filed by the State of Rajasthan, the respondents having been denied
employment to them, had approached the High Court for issuance of mandamus. The
High Court allowed the same in view of its judgment in Shah Goverdhan Lal Kabra Teachers College case striking down Section 17 (4)
of the Act. Since the appeal of the Union Government against the said Judgment
has been allowed, Section 17(4) of the Act has been held by us to be intra-vires,
the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The counsel appearing for the
respondents, however, contended before us that there are several other grounds
which are required to be examined and since the impugned judgment proceeded
because of invalidity of the Section 17(4) of the Act, in Shah Goverdhan Lal Kabra
Teachers College case and the said judgment of the High Court having been
reversed by this Court the matter should be remitted back to the High Court for
reconsideration of other grounds. We are not in a position to appreciate as to
what other grounds are to be urged. However, since the impugned judgment
proceeds because of Section 17(4) of the Act having been struck down, and the
judgment of the High Court in Shah Goverdhan Lal Kabra teachers college case
having been reversed by us, we set aside the impugned judgment in each of the
appeals and allow the Civil Appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan.
We,
however, remit the Writ Petitions back to the High Court for being considered
if any other point survives for consideration.
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