H.S. Ahammed
Hussain & Anr Vs. Irfan Ahammed & Anr [2002] Insc 283 (9 July 2002)
R.C.Lahoti,
B.N.Agrawal. B.N.Agrawal, J.
Irfan Ahammed & Anr. Appeal (civil) 3671 of 2002
Leave
granted.
By the
impugned judgments rendered by Karnataka High Court in two separate appeals
jointly preferred by the insurer as well as the insured, the same have been
partly allowed and compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
has been reduced viz. in one case from Rs. 3,13,000/- to Rs. 1,71,000/- and in
another from Rs. 3,49,000/- to Rs. 1,83,000/-. While disposing of the appeals,
the High Court directed that out of the compensation awarded, 25% shall be
payable to fathers of the respective victims and 75% to their mothers together
with proportionate interest. It was further directed that out of the amount of
compensation payable to the mothers of the victims, Rs. 50,000/- shall be kept
in fixed deposit in a nationalised bank for a period of five years with liberty
to draw the interest.
The
short facts are that one Irfan Ahammed-respondent No. 1 owned a lorry bearing
No. CNG-6409 and Vazeer Ahamed and Rafeeq Ahamed , sons of the appellants of
these appeals were working as a coolie therein. On Ist June, 1996, when
respondent No. 1 was driving the said vehicle in which the aforesaid two
persons were also travelling as coolie, the same met with an accident at 10.00
a.m. as a result of rash and negligent driving of the respondent No.1 resulting
into the deaths of Vazeer and Rafeeq, for which two claims petitions were filed
before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal by parents of each of the victims for
awarding compensation in their favour on account of death of their sons under
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').
Age of
victim Rafeeq was 21 years and his father's age was 45 years whereas that of
his mother was 40 years. The age of another victim Vazeer was 22 years and that
of his father and mother was 53 years and 45 years respectively at the time of
the accident. The claimants in both the petitions claimed the income of their
respective sons to be Rs. 4500/- per month. The claim was contested by the
owner as well as the insurance company on grounds, inter alia, that the
accident had not taken place on account of any rash or negligent act on the
part of the owner in driving the vehicle. Both the cases were heard together.
On behalf of the claimants, two witnesses were examined. Father of Rafeeq was
examined as PW1 and that of Vazeer as PW2 and in their evidence, they stated
that the monthly income of their sons was Rs. 3,000/-. The owner of the vehicle
was examined as RW1 who, in his deposition, denied payment of Rs. 3,000/- per
month to each of the victims. The Tribunal by a common judgment having found
the income of each of the victims to be Rs. 3,000/- per month, awarded
compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,49,000/- in favour of the parents of Rafeeq
and Rs. 3,13,000/- in favour of those of Vazeer together with interest thereon
at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realisation.
Two different appeals were preferred before the High Court against awards of
the Tribunal and each of the appeals was jointly filed by insurer as well as
the insured. The High Court was of the view that the evidence in relation to
income of the two victims was neither reliable nor satisfactory but found their
income to be Rs. 18,000/- per annum which was little more than Rs. 1500/- per
month that was prescribed as notional income as a non-earning person under the
Second Schedule to the Act. After deducting 1/3rd towards personal and living
expenses of the deceased, the contribution towards family was assessed at Rs.
12,000/- per annum. According to the High Court in selecting multiplier, the
age of younger out of the two parents was required to be taken into
consideration. As the age of the mother of Rafeeq was found to be 40 years, the
High Court held that the multiplier to be applicable was 14 and compensation
was reduced to Rs. 1,83,000/- from Rs. 3,49,000/-. So far Vazeer is concerned,
as the age of his mother was found to be 45 years, it was held that the
multiplier applicable would be 13 and consequently the compensation awarded by
the Tribunal to the tune of Rs. 3,13,000/- was reduced to Rs. 1,71,000/-. It
was directed that 25% of compensation shall be paid to the father of each of
the victims and 75% to their mothers and the compensation payable to the
mothers shall be kept in fixed deposit in a nationalised bank for a term of
five years with liberty to draw the interest. Hence, these appeals by special
leave.
Ms. Kiran
Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in these two
appeals submitted that the High Court was not justified in entertaining and
allowing joint appeals preferred by insured and insurer both challenging the
quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal as insurer was entitled to
raise only such defences as are enumerated in Section 149(2) of the Act and
quantum of compensation is not a ground available to the insurer under Section
149(2) of the Act, therefore, allowing such appeals would defeat the very
purpose engrafted under Section 149(2) of the Act. A reference in this
connection was made to a decision of this Court in the case of Chinnama George
and others v. N.K.Raju and another (2000) 4 SCC 130 wherein against the quantum
of compensation, joint appeal was preferred before the High Court by the
insurer as well as the insured and the same was allowed in part and
compensation awarded by the Tribunal was reduced. When the matter was brought
to this Court in appeal on a special leave, the same was allowed and order of
the High Court was set aside on the ground that the joint appeal by the insurer
as well as the insured was not maintainable in view of the provisions of
Section 149(2) of the Act.
On the
other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents heavily
relied upon two decisions of this Court in the cases of Narendra Kumar and
another v. Yarenissa and others (1998) 9 SCC 202 and United India Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Bhushan Sachdeva and others (2002) 2 SCC 265. In Narendra Kumar
(supra), which was a case under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939(hereinafter
referred to as '1939 Act'), against the award of the Tribunal, a joint appeal
was preferred by the insurer as well as the insured challenging the quantum of
compensation. A Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court dismissed the same on
the ground that such appeal was not maintainable in view of the fact that under
Section 96(2) of the 1939 Act which is similar to Section 149(2) of the Act,
only certain grounds were available to the insurer and quantum of compensation
is not a ground enumerated under Section 96(2) of the 1939 Act. The decision of
the Single Judge was affirmed by Division Bench of the High Court. Thereafter,
when the matter was brought to this Court, reference was made to the provisions
of Section 110-C(2-A) of 1939 Act which provides that where in the course of
inquiry, the claims Tribunal is satisfied that there is collusion between the
person making the claim and the person against whom it is made, or the person
against whom the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing, direct that the insurer, who may be
liable in respect of such claim, be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and
the insurer so impleaded shall thereupon have the right to contest the claim on
all or any of the grounds available to the person against whom the claim was
made. Ultimately, the court found that even in the case of a joint appeal by
insurer and the insured if an award has been made against the tortfeasors as
well as the insurer even though an appeal filed by the insurer is not
competent, it may not be dismissed as such. The tortfeasor can proceed with the
appeal after the cause title is suitably amended by deleting the name of the
insurer.
Even
though, this Court held that the appeal of the insured could proceed on merit
and could not have been dismissed merely because the insurer joined therein, as
it did not find any ground to interfere with the quantum of compensation on
merit, order of the High Court was not upset. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd.(supra),
which was a case under the Act against the order awarding compensation, no
appeal was preferred by the insured but only the insurer filed petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court. During the pendency
of the said petition, a motion was made for the stay of execution of the award
but the High Court had only chosen to issue notice to show cause why the
revision petition be not entertained. Against the said order, when the matter
was brought to this Court, it was directed that the petition under Article 227
of the Constitution filed by the insurer should be treated to be an appeal
under Section 173 of the Act. The Court relied upon the provisions of Section
170 of the Act which lays down that where in the course of inquiry, the Claims
Tribunal is satisfied that there is collusion between the person making the
claim and the person against whom the claim is made, or the person against whom
the claim is made has failed to contest the claim, it may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, direct that the insurer who may be liable in respect of
such claim, shall be impleaded as a party to the proceeding and the insurer so impleaded
shall thereupon have, without prejudice to the provisions contained in
sub-section (2) of Section 149, the right to contest the claim on all or any of
the grounds that are available to the person against whom the claim has been
made.
This
Court laid down that if the insured failed to prefer any appeal against the
award of the Tribunal, that would also amount to failure to contest the claim
within the meaning of Section 170 of the Act. Therefore, the decisions of this
Court in the cases of Narendra Kumar (supra) and Chinnama George (supra) were
distinguished on facts. That apart the case of Chinnama George (supra) is
otherwise also distinguishable as in that case, on behalf of the insured, no
argument was addressed whereas the appeal was argued only on behalf of the
insurer. That apart the provisions of Section 170 of the Act which have been
taken notice of in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra) were not
considered therein. In the present case, appeal was whole hog pressed on behalf
of the insured challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
Thus, the decision of this Court in the case of Chinnama George and others(supra)
can be of no avail to the appellant and we do not find any merit in the
submission that joint appeal by the insurer as well as the insured was not
maintainable. In such an eventuality, the course which a Court should adopt is
as noticed in the case of Narendra Kumar (supra) to delete name of the insurer
from the cause title and proceed with appeal of the insured and decide the same
on merit.
Learned
counsel next submitted that the High Court was not justified in interfering
with finding recorded by the Tribunal to the effect that income of the two
victims was Rs. 3,000/- per month and holding that their income was Rs. 1500/-
per month. It appears that after taking into consideration the evidence adduced
by the parties, as the High Court did not find evidence adduced on behalf of
the claimants reliable and satisfactory, it fixed their income at Rs. 1500/-
per month and this being a question of fact, it is not possible to interfere
with the same especially when it could not be pointed out that there was any
error therein.
Learned
counsel then submitted that under Second Schedule to the Act providing
compensation based on a formula, the multiplier which was applicable was 15 and
not 13 as age of mother of victim Vazeer was 45 years in which case the correct
multiplier should have been 15 and not 13 whereas in the case of victim Rafeeq,
as age of his mother being 40 years, the correct multiplier should have been 16
and not 14. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents submitted that compensation has been awarded in accordance with the
Second Schedule. It is well settled that life expectancy of the deceased or the
beneficiaries whichever is shorter is an important factor.
Reference
in this connection may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of C.K.Subramonia
Iyer and others v. T.Kunhikuttan Nair and others AIR 1970 SC 376. In the case
of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. M/s Swaranlata Das and others 1993 Suppl. (2)
SCC 743, it was observed that "the appropriate method of assessment of
compensation is the method of capitalisation of net income choosing a multiplier
appropriate to the age of the deceased or the age of the dependants whichever
multiplier is lower." According to the Second Schedule, if the age is
above 40 years but not exceeding 45 years, the multiplier applicable is 15 and
if the age is above 35 years but not exceeding 40 years, the multiplier would
be 16 but the High Court has taken the multiplier as 13 and14 instead of 15 and
16 respectively. In the case of compensation to the parents of Vazeer, the
multiplier 15 should have been adopted instead of 13 and the compensation
should not have been reduced from Rs. 3,13,000/- to Rs. 1,71,000/- but the same
should have been reduced to Rs. 1,95,000/-. In the case of compensation to the
parents of Rafeeq, the correct multiplier should have been 16 and not 14 and
the High Court was not justified in reducing the compensation from Rs.
3,49,000/- to Rs. 1,83,000/- which should have been reduced to Rs. 2,07,000/-.
Thus, we hold that the parents of Vazeer are entitled to total compensation to
the tune of Rs. 1,95,000/- and that of Rafeeq to the tune of Rs. 2,07,000/-.
Learned
counsel thereafter submitted that the High Court was not justified in upholding
award of interest at the rate of 6% per annum and the same should have been
awarded at the rate of 9% per annum. Reliance in this connection was placed
upon a decision of this Court in the case of Kaushnuma Begum (Smt.) and others
v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and others(2001) 2 SCC 9 wherein this Court
noticed that "earlier, 12% was found to be the reasonable rate of simple
interest. With a change in the economy and the policy of Reserve Bank of India the interest rate has been lowered.
The nationalised banks are now granting interest at the rate of 9% per annum
from the date of the claim." Therefore, it was directed in that case that
the claimant was entitled to interest at the rate of 9% per annum. In our view,
the submission is well founded and must be accepted. Accordingly, we hold that
the claimants shall be entitled to interest on the aforesaid amount at the rate
of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the petitions till realisation.
Learned
counsel for the appellant lastly submitted that the amount of compensation
payable to mothers of the victims should not have been directed to be kept in
fixed deposit in a nationalised bank. In the facts and circumstances of the
present case, we are of the view that the amount of compensation awarded in favour
of the mothers should not be kept in fixed deposit in a nationalised bank. In
case the amounts have not been already invested, the same shall be paid to the
mothers, but if, however, invested by depositing the same in fixed deposit in a
nationalised bank, there may be its premature withdrawal in case the parties so
intend.
In the
result, the appeals are allowed in part and the judgments of the High Court are
modified to the extent as indicated above. In the circumstances of the case,
parties shall bear their own costs.
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