The
State of Tripura & Anr Vs. Roopchand Das &
Ors [2002] Insc 508 (3
December 2002)
Doraiswamy
Raju & Shivaraj V. Patil. Raju, J.
These
two appeals involve common and identical questions of law and are dealt with
together. In C.A.No. 3515 of 1997, the challenge is to the judgment dated
21.1.97 of the Gauhati High Court, Agartala Bench, made in Civil Rule No.12 of
1997, whereunder the High Court, applying the earlier decision rendered in
Civil Rule 10 of 1997, directed, while setting aside the order dated 18.9.96 of
the Land Acquisition Collector, the said Collector to consider the petitions
filed by the respondent-landowners under Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "The Act'') on merits and in
accordance with law, holding them to be within the period of limitation
stipulated therefor. The appeal in C.A. No.3516/1997 is against the above
noticed earlier decision in Civil Rule 10 of 1997 dated 21.1.97.
So far
as C.A. No.3515 of 1997 is concerned, relying upon the Reference Court's Award dated 19.9.94 in case Nos.
Misc. L.A.29/92 and 30/92, the respondents sought by a petition filed on
16.12.94 for re-determination of the compensation for their lands invoking
Section 28-A of the Act. The Land Acquisition Collector rejected the claim by
his order dated 18.9.96 on the ground that the same was not filed within the
stipulated period of three months inasmuch as, according to the Collector, the
period of limitation had to be calculated from 25.5.94, an earlier Award of the
Reference Court in respect of the lands covered by the same Notification under
Section 4 (1) of the Act and not with reference to the latest or subsequent
Awards of the Reference Court. So far as the appeal in C.A. 3516 of 1997 is
concerned, the Land Acquisition Collector, was moved by the land- owners for
re-determination of compensation in respect of their lands invoking Section
28-A of the Act, with reference to an award of the Reference Court made on
5.5.94 in respect of cases Misc.L.A. 34- 36/1992 and on 8.6.94 in Misc. Cases
Nos.40, 41, 45 & 46/1992.
The
petition was filed on 1.8.94. But the Land Acquisition Collector by his order
dated 18.9.96, rejected the same as time-barred on the view that in respect of
the lands covered by the very same Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act,
there was an earlier Award passed by the Reference Court on 21.12.93 itself in
Misc. Case Nos.37, 38, 39, 42, 43 and 44/1992 and that the period of limitation
has to be calculated from the earliest of the Awards, which in this case, as
per Collector, was on 21.12.93.
The
fact that if the latest Awards are taken into account, the claim made under
Section 28-A of the Act is well within time, is not in controversy and the Land
Acquisition Collector himself noticed the said aspect. But in view of his
opinion that of the Awards by the Reference Court when more than one passed on
different dates are available in respect of lands covered by the same
Notification, for purposes of computing the three months period stipulated in
Section 28-A of the Act, the date of the earliest one would be relevant and not
the subsequent or latest, the claims came to be rejected. It was this reasoning
of the Land Acquisition Collector that did not meet with the approval of the
High Court, in our view rightly too, in the light of the decision of this Court
in Union of India and Anr. vs. Pradeep Kumari and Ors. [(1995) 2 SCC 736].
Heard,
the learned counsel appearing on either side, who reiterated the stand taken
for the respective parties before the High Court. This Court in the decision in
Pradeep Kumari and Ors. (supra) categorically held that "the right to make
the application under Section 28-A of the Act arises from the award of the
Court on the basis of which the person making the application is seeking re-
determination of the compensation. There is nothing in Sub-section (1) of
Section 28-A to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest
award that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section
28-A." Any construction to the contra introducing such words, not found
engrafted in the very provision would amount to curtailing the amplitude of the
provision resulting virtually in restricting a benefit conferred, particularly
of a beneficent provision normally not permissible by judicial interpretation.
It was also held therein that there is nothing in the wordings of Section 28-A
to indicate that the legislature intended to confer any such limited benefit thereunder
which would have the inevitable consequence of denying the benefit of higher
amount on the basis of the subsequent award. Such an interpretation as would
restrict the benefit of Section 28-A to the first of the Award in the series
and in point of time, was also considered to result more in the perpetuation of
the inequality in the payment of compensation, which the legislature
specifically intended to remove by enacting the provision and that, therefore,
the object underlying Section 28-A would be better served and achieved by
giving the word "an award" in Section 28-A its natural meaning, as
meaning any one of the award(s) made by the court under Part-III, after the
coming into force of Section 28-A. That apart, in our view, even the later part
of Section 28-A which stipulates, "require that the amount of compensation
payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation
awarded by the Court", leaves the choice to the person making such an
application for re- determination, without confining or restricting the area of
choice of such person to any one or the other, though it could be availed of
only once and not as many number of times as there are so many awards.
The
principles laid down by a bench of three learned Judges of this Court in Pradeep
Kumari and Ors. (supra) was also followed in yet another decision of a bench of
three learned Judges in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese and Anr. vs. Land
Acquisition Collector and Anr. [(1996) 6 SCC 746], observing as hereunder:
"4.
We may now refer to the case-law. A two- Judge Bench of this Court in Babua Ram
vs State of U.P. dealt with this precise question and held that the period of
limitation begins to run from the date of the first award made on a reference
under Section 18 of the Act, and successive awards cannot save the period of
limitation; vide paragraphs 19 and 20 of the reporter. This view was reiterated
by the same Bench in Union of India vs Karnail Singh wherein this Court held
that the limitation of three months for an application for redetermination of
compensation must be computed from the date of the earliest award made by a
civil court, and not the judgment rendered by an appellate court. This was
followed by the decision of a three-Judge Bench in Union of India vs Pradeep Kumari
wherein it was held that the benefit under Section 28-A can be had within three
months from the date of the award of the Reference Court on the basis whereof redetermination
is sought. The earlier two decisions in the case of Babua Ram1 and Karnail
Singh2 were overruled on the limited question that they sought to confine the
right to seek redetermination to the earliest award made by the Court under
Section 18 of the Act after the introduction of Section 28-A into the Act.
There
is, however, no doubt that the period of limitation has to be computed from the
date of the Court's award under Section 18 on the basis whereof redetermination
is sought.
Admittedly,
in both the cases at hand, the applications for redetermination of compensation
under Section 28-A were made long after the expiry of three months from the
date of the award of the Court which constituted the basis for seeking redetermination.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was right in taking the
view that both the applications were time- barred." (Emphasis supplied)
The correctness of Pradeep Kumari's case (supra) on this aspect when sought to
be raised before the Constitution Bench in the batch of cases, including the
appeals before us in Union of India & Another vs. Hansoli Devi & Others
reported in [(2002) 7 SCC 273], it was observed, "But since that question
has neither been referred to us under the order of reference made in the
present case nor does it arise in the case in hand, we refrain from answering
the same." A Review Petition filed by the appellants herein before the Constitution
Bench in these appeals, viz., R.P.(C) 1437-38 of 2002, has also been dismissed.
In the light of the above, we see no merit in the challenge made to the orders
of the High Court. The appeals, consequently, fail and shall stand dismissed.
No costs.
Back