Balchandra
Anantrao Rakvi & Ors Vs. Ramchandra Tukaram (Dead) by Lrs. & Anr [2001]
Insc 520 (3 October
2001)
Syed
Shah Mohammed Quadri & S.N. Phukan Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J.
Appeal (civil) 6960 of 2001
Leave
is granted in SLP(C) No.4897 of 1980.
These
appeals, by special leave, arise from the common judgment of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay in Special Civil Application
Nos.1897 of 1973 and 1901 of 1973 dated March 15, 1979. In the appeals the
appellants-landlords are common but the first respondent-tenant is different.
To
appreciate the question involved in these cases, it will suffice to refer to
the facts in Civil Appeal No.568 of 1981.
The
dispute arises under the Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (for
short, the Act) and relates to agricultural lands bearing Survey Nos.661/3,
675/1, 692/1, 693/2, 695/5, 691/1 and 702/2 of village Bhayandar District Thana,
Maharashtra State, out of which an extent of Acres 2 = 31 guntas (hereinafter
referred to as, the lands in dispute), is the subject-matter of Civil Appeal
No.568 of 1981. They are inam lands. The appellants were initially the tenants
of the lands in dispute under the Inamdar. The case of the appellants is that
the first respondent, being their close relative, was permitted to cultivate
the lands in dispute. He, however, claimed to be the tenant of the lands in
dispute. He died during the pendency of the case before the High Court and his
heirs and legal representatives, respondent Nos.1A to 1J, were brought on
record (hereinafter referred to as, the first respondent). The second
respondent, namely, M/s. Estate Investment Company (hereinafter referred to as,
the Investment Company) is said to be the purchaser of the lands in dispute
from the Inamdar.
The
Act came into force in December 1948. The State Government assumed the
management of the lands in dispute and announced this fact in R.D. Notification
No.4603/45-III (B) dated December
19, 1949. However, by
Notification No.MGT/2356/20023/M dated October 1, 1957, issued under Section 61 of the
Act, the management of the Government was terminated. It is a common ground
that the lands in dispute were in possession of the first respondent even when
they were under the management of the Government.
It
appears, in 1968, the first respondent filed an application under Section 32-G
of the Act before the Additional Tehsildar for fixation of the purchase price
of the lands in dispute. The appellants contested that application on the
ground that it was barred by limitation. It was alleged that being closely
related to them, the first respondent was permitted to cultivate the said lands
and that he was not the tenant of the lands in dispute. The Investment Company
claimed ownership of the said lands and admitted the tenancy of the first
respondent. The Additional Tehsildar on consideration the material placed
before him found that the first respondent was not the tenant of the lands in
dispute and that he had not exercised his option to purchase them within the
time permitted by clause (b) of the proviso to clause (d) of sub-section (1) of
Section 88 of the Act therefore he had lost the right to purchase them. On April 15, 1970, on those findings, he dismissed
the application; however he also ordered that the name of the Investment
Company be removed from the village records.
Against
that order of the Additional Tehsildar the first respondent and the Investment
Company filed T.A.No.51/70, 52/70, 68/70 and 69/70 before the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Thana Division, (appellate authority under the Act). On September 25, 1971, while allowing the appeals, the
appellate authority held the first respondent to be the tenant of the lands in
dispute and ordered that the name of the second respondent be restored in the
column of other rights in the revenue record. However, it declined to consider
the effect of the first respondent not exercising the right to purchase the
lands in dispute within one year under the afore-mentioned provision treating
that aspect as irrelevant. The order of the appellate authority was assailed by
the appellants in two revisions (T.A.Nos.107 & 108 of 1972) before the Maharashtra
Revenue Tribunal. The Tribunal took the view that after the termination of the
management of the lands in dispute by the Government the first respondent being
a tenant became the deemed purchaser as such the question of exercise of option
to purchase the lands in dispute by him did not arise. In that view the
Tribunal dismissed the revisions by a common order passed on December 6, 1972, which was assailed by the appellants
in the afore-mentioned special civil applications in the High Court.
Holding
that all the foregoing provisions (Sections 2 to 87-A) of the Act applied to
the lands in dispute on release from the management of the Government; that the
first respondent was the tenant and it was not necessary for him to give an
intimation with regard to the exercise of the right to purchase the lands in
dispute under clause (b) of the first proviso to clause (d) of Section 88(1) of
the Act, either to the landlord or to the Tribunal, within the period specified
therein, the High Court dismissed both the applications by a common order of
March 17, 1979. That order is brought under challenge by the appellants in
these appeals.
Mr.
Anil B.Diwan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants,
contended that mere declaration that the first respondent was the tenant would
not make him a deemed purchaser of the lands in dispute and that the High Court
had gone beyond the scope of the lis in the application in creating the rights
of a deemed purchaser in the first respondent.
Section
88(1)(d) of the Act, submitted Mr.Diwan, was not properly construed by the High
Court and therefore the order, under challenge, was liable to be set aside. Mr.V.N.Ganpule,
the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant in the connected appeal
while adopting the arguments of Mr. Diwan, argued that the first respondent,
not having intimated his option to purchase the lands in dispute within the
specified time of one year under the first proviso to clause (d) of sub-section
(1) of Section 88 of the Act, had lost the right to purchase the lands.
Mr.Shanti
Bhushan, the learned senior counsel appearing for the Investment Company,
disputed the entitlement of the first respondent to purchase the lands in
dispute without exercising option to purchase the land within the specified
period. He fairly conceded that the rights of the appellants and the Investment
company could not be decided in these appeals.
He
submitted that he was arguing the case on the footing that the management of
the Government stood terminated on the date of notification under Section 61 of
the Act issued on October 1, 1957 and prayed that no observation on merit in
regard to the entitlement of the company which would prejudice the rights of
the Investment Company, might be made by this Court.
Mr.V.A.Mohta,
the learned senior counsel appearing for the first respondent, canvassed the
claim of the first respondent in both the appeals. He contended that the first
respondent who had been in possession of the lands in dispute from 1930-1940
became the deemed purchaser from the date when the management of the Government
of the lands in dispute came to an end on October 1, 1957. He argued that clause (b) of
proviso to Section 88(1)(d) of the Act did not provide as to how the tenant
should exercise option to purchase the land while other provisions like
Sections 35-F, 32-O specifically contained a provision for exercising the right
to purchase the land by the tenant. He emphasised that Section 32 of the Act
did not speak of the tenant giving any intimation of purchasing the lands in
dispute to the landlord and the Tribunal and there was no mention of Section
88(1) in Section 32-P of the Act. According to the learned counsel the intention
of the legislature is to make the tenant a deemed purchaser under Section 32 of
the Act from the Tillers Day or some other date as specified therein. He
pleaded that the view taken by the High Court was being consistently followed
by a catena of decisions and if this court were to take a different view of the
matter, it would unsettle the legal position in the State of Maharashtra.
Mr.D.M.Nargolkar,
the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in the connected
appeal, while supporting the stand taken by Mr. Mohta, submitted that Section
88 of the Act was not referred to in Section 32-P and that after the Act came
into force the tenant could not remain a mere tenant of the land for all times
to come; he must either become a purchaser under the scheme of the Act or would
cease to be a tenant of the land.
At the
outset we make it clear that the parties have proceeded on the assumption that
the management of the land in dispute by the Government stood terminated on October 1, 1957 -- the date of notification under
Section 61 of the Act.
On the
above contentions of the learned counsel, the interesting and important
question that arises for our consideration is :
Whether
by not indicating his intention to avail the right to purchase the lands in
dispute under section 32, conferred on the first under clause (b) of the
proviso to clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 88 of the Act, within the
specified period, will he lose the right? Since the resolution of the question
under consideration depends upon the true interpretation of the last mentioned
provision, it will be necessary to quote Section 88 here :
88.
Exemption to Government lands and certain other lands.
(1)
Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), nothing in the foregoing
provisions of this Act shall apply, -- (a) to (c) *** *** *** (d) to an estate
or land taken under management by the State Government under Chapter IV or
section 65 except as provided in the said Chapter IV or section 65, as the case
may be, and in section 66, 80A, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86 and 87 :
Provided
that from the date on which the land is released from management, all the
foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply thereto; but subject to the
modification that in the case of a tenancy, not being a permanent tenancy, which
on that date subsists in the land –
(a) the
landlord shall be entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31 (or under
section 33B in the case of a certificated landlord) within one year from such
date; and
(b) within
one year from the expiry of the period during which the landlord or
certificated landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy as aforesaid, the
tenant shall have right to purchase the land under section 32 (or under section
33C in the case of an excluded tenant) ; and
(c)
the provisions of sections 31 to 31D, both inclusive (or sections 33A and 33B
in the case of a certificated landlord) and sections 32 to 32R, (both
inclusive) (or sections 33A and 33C in the case of an excluded tenant) shall,
so far as may be applicable, apply to the termination of a tenancy or the right
to purchase the land, as aforesaid :
Provided
further that,
(a) in
the case of a permanent tenancy the permanent tenant shall be entitled to
purchase the land held by him on permanent tenancy, --
(i) within
one year from the date on which the estate or land is released from management,
or
(ii)
where such estate or land was released from management after tillers day but
before the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands
(Amendment) Act, 1960, within one year from such commencement and
(b)
where such permanent tenant is desirous of exercising the right conferred on
him under this proviso, he shall accordingly inform the landlord and Tribunal
in the prescribed manner within the said period of one year and the provisions
of sections 32 to 32R shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to the right of
the permanent tenant to purchase the land.
(2) If
any land held on lease from Government or any part thereof -- (i) and (ii) ***
*** *** A plain reading of sub-section (1) of Section 88 discloses that except
in cases covered by sub-section (2), which is not relevant here, the provisions
of Sections 2 to 87-A shall have no application to cases falling under clauses
(a) to (d) thereof.
Here,
we are concerned with clause (d) which contains an exclusionary clause
pertaining to any estate or land taken under management by the State Government
under Chapter IV or Section 65 except as provided in the said Chapter IV or
Section 65, as the case may be, and in Sections 66, 80-A, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86
and 87. The proviso to clause (d) says that from the date on which the land is
released from the management, all the foregoing provisions (Sections 2 to 87-A)
shall apply to such land but subject to the modification which applies if a
tenancy, not being a permanent tenancy, on that date, subsists in the land. The
modification embodies two options - one incorporated in clause (a) of the
proviso in favour of the landlord and the other in favour of the tenant
embodied in clause (b) of the proviso. The landlord is given an opportunity to
terminate the tenancy of the tenant under Section 31 (or under Section 33-B in
the case of certificated landlord) within one year from the date of termination
of the management of the land by the Government. The opportunity given to the
tenant is that he shall have the right to purchase the land under Section 32
(or under Section 33-C in the case of an excluded tenant) within one year from
the expiry of the period during which the landlord or the certificated
landlord, as the case may be, is entitled to terminate the tenancy as
aforesaid. In regard to termination of tenancy by the landlord the provisions
of Sections 31 to 33-D (both inclusive) or of Section 33-A or 33-B (in the case
of a certificated landlord) shall apply, so far as may be applicable. And the
provisions of Sections 32 to 32-R (both inclusive) or Section 33-A or 33-C (in
the case of an excluded tenant) shall, so far as may be applicable, apply in
regard to the right of the tenant to purchase the land from the landlord.
The
issue in these cases relates to consequence of non- exercise of the right of
the tenant to purchase the land under Section 32, within one year from the
expiry of the period during which the landlord or certificated landlord is
entitled to terminate the tenancy, as postulated in clause (b) of the proviso
to clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 88 of the Act. It is true that in
Section 88, there is no specific provision as to how the tenant should exercise
his right to purchase the land under Section 32 of the Act though there is a
provision in each of Sections 32-F, 32-O, 33-C and 43-1D of the Act requiring
the tenant desirous of purchasing the land, in exercise of the right conferred
on him, to give an intimation of his intention to purchase the land to the
landlord and the Tribunal within the prescribed period. Here the question that
confronts us is : will the absence of a provision prescribing the mode to
exercise the right to purchase the land, result in converting a tenant who is
entitled to purchase the land into a deemed purchaser of the land under Section
32? The High Court answered the question in the affirmative. For the reasons
that follow, in our view, the answer to the question cannot but be in the negative.
The
scheme of the Act as could be gathered from its relevant provisions, is to give
effect to the policy land for the tiller by clothing all the tenants with the
right of ownership of the lands cultivated by them personally. A two-fold
strategy is adopted in the Act - first, by making every tenant a deemed
purchaser of the land personally cultivated by him under Section 32 of the Act
and secondly, by conferring on the tenant, in specified cases, the right to
purchase the land from the landlord, under Section 32 of the Act, held by him
under personal cultivation.
The
cases falling under the first category, namely, treating the tenant as a deemed
purchaser, are noted hereunder :
(1)
under sub-section (1) of Section 32, every tenant shall be deemed to have purchased
from his landlord the land held by him as a tenant with effect from April 1,
1957 which is referred to as, the Tillers Day;
(2) under
the first proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 32 providing that a tenant
shall be deemed to have purchased the land with effect from the postponed date;
(3) under
the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 32 making the tenant a deemed
purchaser of the land with effect from April 1, 1958;
(4) a
tenant is treated as a deemed purchaser of the land from the date mentioned in
the following provisions :
(i) under
clause (a) of sub-section (1A) of Section 32 of the Act,
(ii) under
clause (b) of sub-section (1A) of Section 32 of the Act,
(iii) under
sub-section (1B) of Section 32 of the Act, and
(iv) under
Section 32-I;
(5) in
cases where Section 88-C applies the tenant is treated as a deemed purchaser
from a date different from the Tillers Day :
(i) under
sub-section (1) of Section 33-C with effect from April 1, 1962,
(ii) under
proviso to sub-clause (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section 33-C, the deemed
purchase of the land by the tenant will come into effect with effect from
different dates mentioned therein;
(iv) under
clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 33-C, and
(v) under
clause (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 33-C.
In
contra distinction to the deemed purchase from the landlord of the land held by
the tenant under his personal cultivation under different provisions, referred
to above, the cases falling under the second category speak of the right of the
tenant to purchase the land from the landlord under Section 32 in the following
cases :
(1) under
Section 32-F,
(2) under
Section 32-O,
(3) under
sub-section (3) of Section 33-C which relates to an excluded tenant;
(4) under
proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 33-C; (5) under sub-section (1) of
Section 43-1D;
(6)
under clause (b) of the proviso to clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 88
of the Act; and (7) under sub-section (2) of Section 88-D.
Obviously,
the content of these two rights - right to purchase the land and the right to
own the land as a deemed purchaser - is entirely different. A tenant who is
given a right to purchase from the landlord the land held by him for personal
cultivation cannot be equated with a tenant who is declared to be the deemed
purchaser of the land held by him. In the former case till the tenant exercises
his right to purchase the land within the specified period and fulfills the
requirements of the relevant provisions of the Act, he remains a tenant only; while
in the latter case until the deemed purchase of the land becomes ineffective
under the relevant provisions of the Act, he remains an owner being a deemed
purchaser of the land. Just as the right of the landlord to terminate the
tenancy in the absence of exercise of the right within the specified period,
cannot result in automatic termination of the tenancy so also the right to
purchase from the landlord the land held by the tenant in the absence of
exercise of the right within the specified period by the tenant, will not
result in an automatic deemed purchase of the land by the tenant. Further by
not exercising the right to terminate the tenancy within one year the landlord
forfeits his right and in the same way by not exercising his right to purchase the
land from the landlord, the tenant will also lose his right. He cannot by his
default acquire a better position of a deemed purchaser. It would, therefore,
be incorrect to hold that on the landlord not terminating the tenancy within
the prescribed period, the tenant will be deemed to have exercised his right to
purchase the land and became a deemed purchaser.
It is
apposite to note here that clause (c) of the proviso to clause (d) of
sub-section (1) of Section 88 lays down, inter alia, that provisions of Sections
32 to 32-R shall, so far as may be applicable, apply to the right to purchase
the land under the said clause (b). In our view, it hardly makes any difference
whether the provision of clause (c) of the proviso to clause (d) of sub-
section (1) of Section 88 is incorporated in clause (b) thereof or is enacted
as a separate clause. Be that as it may, we shall refer to Section 32-F and
Section 32-O whereunder an identical right is conferred on the tenant. Each of
the said sections contain sub-section (1A) which says that a tenant desirous of
exercising the right conferred on him, namely, the right to purchase the land
under Section 32, shall give an intimation in that behalf to the landlord and
the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the specified period. A harmonious
construction of the aforementioned provisions leads to the conclusion that
giving of an intimation to the landlord and the Tribunal is a concomitant of
the exercise of the right to purchase the land by the tenant even though the
requirement of giving such intimation is not embodied in clause (b). The
purpose underlying the requirement of giving of the intimation is that the
landlord who is vitally affected by the exercise of the right to purchase the
land from the landlord is made aware of the fact of purchase of the land by the
tenant and the Tribunal which has to fix the price of the land, should take
steps for that purpose.
From a
perusal of Section 32-G, it may be noticed that the Tribunal is entrusted with
the duty of determining the purchase price suo motu as soon as may be either
after the Tillers Day or after the postponed date. There is no provision in
Section 33-G for a tenant to invoke that provision for determination of the
purchase price of the land by filing an application for that purpose. A
conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions indicates that where the
tenant is treated as a deemed purchaser, the Tribunal shall itself, after the
specified dates, determine the price of the land in question and where
determination of price of the land is necessitated upon the exercise of option
by the tenant to purchase the land, the Tribunal shall do so after receiving
the intimation of exercise of the right to purchase the land from the tenant.
It is perhaps for this reason that a tenant who enjoys the right to purchase
the land under the Act, is obliged to intimate to the landlord and the Tribunal
that he is desirous of purchasing the land in exercise of that right.
There
is no merit in the contention that Section 32 of the Act does not provide for
giving any intimation, therefore, a tenant who exercises his option to purchase
the land under clause (b) of the proviso to clause (d) of Section 88(1) of the
Act, is not required to give any intimation. We have already pointed out above
that giving of an intimation is a concomitant of the exercise of the right to
purchase the land under Section 32 by the tenant -- a right which is conferred
on the tenant in specified cases under the Act -- and it is only thereafter the
tenant becomes a deemed purchaser whereas Section 32, without anything more by
the tenant, declares every tenant a deemed purchaser.
We are
unable to agree with the view that the period of limitation of one year
prescribed in the said clause (b) of the proviso, within which the tenant is
entitled to purchase the land, is for the purpose of initiating proceeding. In
our view, the tenant has to exercise the right to purchase the land and
intimate that fact to the landlord and the Tribunal within the prescribed
period. After the expiry of that period the exercise of that right by the
tenant, if any, will be ineffective.
It is
next contended that after the Act has come into force no person can remain a
tenant of the land; he must either become the owner of the land or the land has
to be disposed of in the manner provided in Section 32-P and in as much as
Section 32-P does not refer to Section 88(1), the first respondent must be
treated as a deemed purchaser. We are afraid we cannot accept the contention.
In our view the premise itself is not correct. In cases falling under Section
37, a tenant remains a tenant as no deemed purchase or right to purchase is
conferred on him under the said provision. Even otherwise merely because
Section 88(1)(d) is not included in Section 32- P, it does not follow that the
first respondent will become the owner of the lands in dispute even when he
fails to comply with the requirements of clause (b) of proviso to clause (d) of
sub- section (1) of Section 88. In our view, the High Court is not correct in
holding that when the landlord fails to terminate the tenancy the proviso to
Section 32 will be attracted and the tenant automatically becomes a deemed
purchaser. Such a conclusion runs counter to the express words of clause (b) of
the proviso to clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 88 set out alone. It
says that within one year from the expiry of the period during which the
landlord or certificated landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy as
aforesaid, the tenant shall have the right to purchase the land under Section
32 (or under Section 33-C in the case of an excluded tenant). The words the
tenant shall have the right to purchase land under Section 32 are plain and
lucid. Literally construed they speak that the tenant has the right to purchase
the land. By importing an analogy from the contents of the proviso to Section
32, the said words cannot be read as the tenant shall be deemed to have
purchased the land under Section 32. This would be nothing but substituting the
provision in the enactment, which is clearly impermissible. In West Derby Union
vs. Metropolitan Life Assurance Co. [(1897) AC 647], Lord Herschell (as he then
was) observed :
I
decline to read into any enactment words which are not to be found there and
which would alter its operative effect because of provisions to be found in any
proviso Relying on the said dicta Lord Goddard in Bretherton vs.United Kingdom Totalisator
Co. Ltd. [(1945) 2 All.E.R. 202] held :
A
proviso is not to be construed as an enacting provision enabling something to
be done which is not to be found in the statute itself.
Respectfully
agreeing with the learned law Lords, we hold that in the said clause (b) the
right to purchase the land from the landlord cannot be construed as a deemed
purchase of the land from the landlord under Section 32 in view of the proviso
thereto.
It
will not be out of place to refer to Section 88 of the Gujarat Act which is in pari
materia with Section 88 of the Maharashtra Act. By amending proviso to clause
(d) of sub- section (1) of Section 88 of the Gujarat Act the words shall be
deemed to have purchased were substituted for the words shall have the right to
purchase. The amended provision will yield the desired result of making the
tenant a deemed purchaser of the land from the landlord under Section 32 on the
expiry of the period during which the landlord is entitled to terminate the
tenancy under Section 31 of the Act.
The
correct way to understand a proviso is to read it in the context and not in
isolation. We may with advantage refer to the following observations of Moulton
L.J. in R. vs. Dibdin [1910 Probate 57] :
The
fallacy of the proposed method of interpretation is not far to seek. It sins
against the fundamental rule of construction that a proviso must be considered
with relation to the principal matter to which it stands as a proviso. It
treats it as if it were an independent enacting clause instead of being
dependent on the main enactment. The courts, as, for instance, in Ex p. Partington
[(1844) 6 Q.B. 649]., Re Brocklebank [(1889) 23 Q.B.D.461], and Hill v. East
and West India Dock Co. [(1884) 9 App.Cas.448], have frequently pointed out
this fallacy, and have refused to be led astray by arguments such as these
which have been addressed to us, which depend solely on taking words absolutely
in their strict literal sense, disregarding the fundamental consideration that
they appear in the proviso.
Thus
read, it becomes explicit that sub-section (1) of Section 32 declares every
tenant a deemed purchaser from April 1, 1957 and the provisos thereto in the
circumstances mentioned therein modify the date mentioned in sub-section (1)
from which the tenant will be a deemed purchaser. The said proviso can have no
application to clause (b) of the proviso to clause (d) of sub- section (1) of
Section 88.
If
this be the true interpretation of clause (d) read with the proviso to
sub-section (1) of Section 88 the fact that a different interpretation has
prevailed for quite sometime in the State of Maharashtra, is no ground not to
give effect to the correct position in law. Though it was urged that in various
decisions the High Court held that the right to purchase the land under clause
(d) of the proviso was treated as a deemed purchase, only one judgment of the
High Court which could be secured by us is the one relied upon by the High
Court in the impugned order, Rambhau Keshav Mhatre vs. Kashinuth G.Patil
[Tenancy Law Reporter Vol.XIX (1971) at page 84].
We
have perused that judgment. The question before the High Court was whether
Section 32-O applied to the lands which were released from the management of
the Government.
It was
held that the tenancy was subsisting on the date of cessation of Government
management so Section 32-O did not apply and by virtue of the proviso to
Section 88(1)(d) the provisions with regard to purchase of the land
automatically applied under Section 32 of the Act and, therefore, the fixation
of price under Section 32-G followed as a matter of course. It appears to us
that the learned Judge failed to appreciate the distinction between a tenant
declared as a deemed purchaser under Section 32 and a tenant who is conferred
with a mere right to purchase the land within the specified period of one year
and also the relevant provisions of Section 88 of the Act.
For
the above reasons we cannot endorse the interpretation of the said provision by
the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court.
The
lands in dispute were taken under the management of the Government under
Section 44 of the Act on December 19, 1949, so from that date the provisions of
Sections 2 to 87-A did not apply to the lands in dispute. However, from October
1, 1957, when the management of the Government of the lands in dispute was
terminated, the tenancy of the first respondent which was not a permanent tenancy
was subsisting in the said lands. Therefore from that date, the aforesaid
provisions applied thereto but subject to the modification that (i) the
appellant had the right to terminate the tenancy under Section 31 till
September 30, 1958; and (ii) the first respondent had the right to purchase the
lands in dispute under Section 32 till October 1, 1959. For working out the
rights of the parties the provisions of Sections 31 to 31-D (both inclusive)
and Sections 32 to 32-R (both inclusive), so far as may be applicable, applied
to the termination of tenancy or the right to purchase the lands in dispute as
aforesaid. Admittedly, the appellant did not terminate the tenancy of the first
respondent under the aforesaid provisions before September 30, 1958, therefore,
the first respondent had the right to purchase the lands in dispute till
October 1, 1959. The first respondent also did not exercise that right and it
is a common ground that he did not give any intimation of exercise of the right
to purchase the lands in dispute to the landlord and the Tribunal. However, the
first respondent filed application under Section 32-G in 1968 for fixation of
the price of the lands in dispute. Not having exercised the right to purchase
the lands in dispute from the landlord within the statutory period of one year,
the first respondent has lost the right to purchase the land in dispute and
therefore he cannot have the price of the land fixed under Section 32-G after
about 10 years of the expiry of the statutory period. On this aspect the order
of the High Court, under challenge, is liable to be set aside.
For
the afore-mentioned reasons, the order under challenge, to the extent indicated
above, cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. The appeals are partly
allowed there shall be no order as to costs.
..........................J.
(Syed
Shah Mohammed Quadri) ..........................J.
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