Rathi Menon
Vs. Union of India [2001] Insc 134 (13 March 2001)
K.T.
Thomas & R.P. Sethi. Thomas, J.
Leave
granted.
L.T.J
Misfortunes
do not come single is an old adage but even the author of that adage would not
have imagined that multiplicity of misfortunes would visit the same person in a
series on the same night, that too within the same hour.
One
may ask aghast, can the destiny be so cruel to a damsel.
Rathi Menon,
a Commerce graduate of 22 years, was thrown off from a running train during the
night of a jinxed train journey as the consequence of a sudden jerk of the
train.
In the
impact her spinal cord was ruptured and in a trice she turned a paraplegic.
After she fell down, the wheels of the train ran over her right arm severing it
from the shoulder point forever. The train, not knowing what it did to one of
its lawful and innocent passengers, continued its running leaving the
paraplegic on the track itself on that dreadful night.
It was
physiologically impossible for the young lady to move her leg from the position
where she fell. Her right leg happened to remain on the rail-track, and unless
a Good Samaritan had passed by that track during the night she had to remain
there unmoved. As none like that came the poor female human being remained on
the track bleeding and unattended by anyone.
Alas,
within half an hour another train came along the same track which, without
knowing that a badly mauled human being was lying ahead, ran over her right leg
causing a sudden amputation of that leg also. Thus, within the span of less
than an hour, she became a one-handed and one-legged paraplegic. All those
disasters happened during the night of 3.9.1996. While she remained on the
track unattended by any one she happened to be spotted by an engine driver who
was shunting a railway engine. He got her removed from that scene to the
district hospital, and then to a Medical College Hospital where she had to undergo a long period of hospitalisation.
However, she remained immovable forever.
Though
she was unable to move by herself she was able to make two petitions before the
Railway Claims Tribunal on 27.6.1997, in respect of the aforesaid two
accidents. The Claims Tribunal awarded a total amount of six lakhs of rupees
with the regret that it could not award more due to the ceiling imposed by the
statutory rules. However the Claims Tribunal directed interest to accrue on the
amount at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of default.
The
Railways Department, mindless as it was, dragged the helpless lady to the High
Court of Kerala before which the Administration filed an appeal challenging the
award passed by the Claims Tribunal only on the ground that the amount awarded
was excessive according to law of the Administrations interpretation.
The
misfortune spree which was haunting the unfortunate lady bubbled up once again
when a Division Bench of the High Court had chosen to slash down substantially
the compensation amount awarded to her, on the premise that the amount granted
by the Claims Tribunal could not have been awarded as the disaster had not
visited her after 1.11.1997.
The
Division Bench expressed the helplessness of law in helping the hapless female
in her misery of the superlative dimension.
Though
her body was disabled due to the paraplegia afflicted consequent to the rupture
of the spinal cord, and though she became limbless in a major measure, she
collected morale to approach the apex Court to ask whether the limbs of law
could be so stretched as to give the limbless girl solace at least in the form
of pecuniary compensation. We, therefore, heard Mr. K. Sukumaran, learned
senior counsel for the appellant and Mrs. Rekha Pandey, learned counsel for the
Railway Administration.
There
is no dispute on the factual position of which the following are some more
details. Rathi menon lost her father earlier, and her mother became a widow.
She passed her degree in commerce and secured a job in Bangalore. In her early twenties she was in
search of better career prospects and it earned some response. She was called
for an interview at Trichur. It was that trip which turned out the most cursed
one in her life. On her way back to Bangalore on 3.9.1996 she boarded the Island Express (bound for Bangalore) at 8.00 p.m. from Palakkad Railway Station.
After
the train started moving and when it collected momentum her ill-luck prompted
her to have a face wash for which she moved to the wash basin situated next to
the door of the train. While washing her face the train jerked violently at a
turning and in that impact she was thrown out of the train. What happened
thereafter has been summarized earlier and cannot be repeated over again.
As the
above facts are not disputed by the Railway Administration appellant was
relieved of the burden to prove those facts averred in her claim petition.
Thus, the only question which remained for the Claims Tribunal to decide was
regarding the amount of compensation payable to her.
Now
the only question remaining is whether the High Court was so helpless that
learned Judges could not confirm the amount awarded to her by the Claims
Tribunal.
Appellants
claim for the compensation was based on Section 124A of the Railways Act 1989
(for short the Act).
The
said Section itself was introduced as per Railway (Amendment) Act 28 of 1994.
The Section provided for awarding compensation to victims of any untoward
incident which occurs in the course of working of a railway. The expression
untoward incident was alien to Railways Act before Parliament inserted such an
expression in the statute as per the Amendment Act 28 of 1994. Prior to it the
Railways could have granted compensation only to the victims of accident. As
the definition of accident in the Act did not embrace instances of other types
of disasters which frequently happened during train journeys, the Parliament in
its wisdom, decided to insert a new category of disasters, both man- made and
otherwise, to be the causes of action for claiming compensation.
It was
in compliance of the aforesaid intention of the Parliament that the category
untoward incident was included by defining its contours in section 123 of the
Act.
The
Sections consists of two segments. In the first segment acts such as terrorists
acts, riotous attacks, robbery and decoity which visit the passengers in the
train as well as those who wait within the precincts of Railway Station are
included. In the second segment, which is the relevant part for the purpose of
this case, is included the accidental falling of any passenger from a train
carrying passengers.
Now we
have to see Section 124A which is the provision imposing liability on the
Railway Administration to pay compensation to the victims of untoward
incidents. Its proviso excludes from its purview persons who committed or
attempted to commit suicide, persons who inflicted injury by self, and those
who committed criminal acts or acts done in a state of intoxication or insanity
and also the cases affected by any natural cause of disease etc. After
excluding such persons and cases, Section 124A can be read thus:
When
in the course of working a railway an untoward incident occurs, then whether or
not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the
railway administration such as would entitle a passenger, who has been injured
or the dependant of a passenger who has been killed, to maintain an action and
recover damages in respect thereof, the railway administration shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, be liable to pay
compensation to such extent as may be prescribed and to that extent only for
loss occasioned by the death of, or injury to a passenger as a result of such
untoward incident.
The
liability of the Railway Administration in such a case would be to pay
compensation, but the extent of such compensation is as may be prescribed which
means prescribed by the rules made under the Act. Section 129 of the Act
empowered the Central Government to make such rules.
The
Railway Accident Compensation Rules 1990 (for short the Rules) were made by the
Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by Section 129 of
the Act.
Rule
3(1) says that the amount of compensation payable in respect of death or
injuries shall be as specified in the Schedule. The Rules as well as the
Schedule were amended with effect from 1.11.1997. After the amendment Rule 3(2)
reads thus:
The
amount of compensation payable for an injury not specified in Part II or Part
III of the Schedule but which in the opinion of the claims Tribunal, is such as
to deprive a person of all capacity to do work, shall be Rupees four lakhs.
Item
No.2 of Part III of the Schedule relates to amputation below shoulder with
stump less than 8 from tip of acromion for which an amount of Rs.3.20 lakhs is
shown as the compensation.
Item
20 in Part III of the Schedule relates to amputation below knee with stump
exceeding three and a half inch but not exceeding five inches, for which an
amount of Rupees two lakhs is shown as compensation.
Before
the said amendment of the Rules and the Schedule which came into effect on
1.11.1997 the above amounts were respectively two lakhs (instead of rupees four
lakhs) and 1.40 lakhs (instead of 3.20 lakhs) and one lakh (instead of two lakhs).
Such amounts were revised by the Central Government in 1990. The revision of the
rates was made after 8 years and thus the new rates were incorporated by
amending the Schedule.
Learned
judges of the Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala, for reaching the
conclusion that appellant is not entitled to the amount indicated in the Rules
as they stand now on account of the fact that the accident happened prior to
1.11.1997, considered among other things the effect of Section 126 of the Act.
That Section enables an applicant to claim interim relief. Sub-section (2) of
that section empowers the Claims Tribunal to pay to the applicant who has
sustained the injury such sum as it considers reasonable for affording such
relief, so however, that the sum paid shall not exceed the amount of
compensation payable at such rates as may be prescribed." The Division
Bench thereafter concluded thus:
The
wording of sub-section (2) of Section 126 would show that the liability is
saddled as soon as the accident happens, not when the quantum is determined.
The wording of section 124 and 124A also would clearly show that the liability
of the Railway Administration to pay compensation arises as soon as the
accident or untoward incident, as the case may be, happens. But the quantum of
compensation is to be as prescribed.
Prescription
is under the Rules. Therefore, it is clear that the liability to pay
compensation is to the extent prescribed under the Rules in force at the time
of the accident or the untoward incident, as the case may be.
It was
on the above premise that the Division Bench of the High Court slashed down the
compensation amount considerably from what the Claims Tribunal awarded. In our
perception the provision for payment of interim relief indicated in Section 126
of the Act has no utility for deciding as to what should be the total amount of
compensation payable to the injured or other claimant. The right of the injured
to claim compensation as well as the liability of the Railway Administration
are both reposed in Section 124A of the Act. The right is to maintain an action
and recover the damages. The liability is to pay compensation to such extent as
may be prescribed.
The
collocation of the words as may be prescribed in Section 124A of the Act is to
be understood as to mean as may be prescribed from time to time. The relevance
of the date of untoward incident is that the right to claim compensation from
the Railway Administration would be acquired by the injured on that date. The
statute did not fix the amount of compensation, but left it to be determined by
the Central Government from time to time by means of rules. This delegation to
the Central Government indicates that it was difficult for the Parliament to
fix the amount because compensation amount is a varying phenomenon and the
Government would be in a far advantageous position to ascertain what would be
the just and reasonable compensation in respect of a myriad different kinds of
injuries by taking into account very many factors. What the legislature wanted
was that the victim of the accident must be paid compensation and the amount
must represent a reality which means the amount should be fair and reasonable
compensation.
Government
have the better wherewithals to ascertain and fix such amount. It is for the
said reason that the Parliament left it to the Government to discharge that
function.
Sections
124 and 124A of the Act speak the same language that the Railway Administration
shall be liable to pay compensation. As pointed above, it is the liability of
the Railway Administration to pay compensation to such extent as may be
prescribed. Hence the time of ordering payment is more important to determine
as to what is the extent of the compensation which is prescribed by the rules
to be disbursed to the claimant.
In
this context a reference to Section 129 of the Act appears useful. The Central
Government is empowered by the said provision to make rules by notification to
carry out the purposes of this chapter. It is evident that one of the purposes
of this chapter is that the injured victims in railway accidents and untoward
incidents must get compensation. Though the word compensation is not defined in
the Act or in the Rules it is the giving of an equivalent or substitute of
equivalent value. In Blacks Law Dictionary, compensation is shown as equivalent
in money for a loss sustained; or giving back an equivalent in either money
which is but the measure of value, or in actual value otherwise conferred; or
recompense in value for some loss, injury or service especially when it is
given by statute. It means when you pay the compensation in terms of money it
must represent, on the date of ordering such payment, the equivalent value.
In
this context we may look at Section 128(1) also. It says that the right of any
person to claim compensation before the Claims Tribunal as indicated in Section
124 or 124A shall not affect the right of any such person to recover
compensation payable under any other law for the time being in force. But there
is an interdict that no person shall be entitled to claim compensation for more
than once in respect of the same accident. This means that the party has two
alternatives, one is to avail himself of his civil remedy to claim compensation
based on common law or any other statutory provision, and the other is to apply
before the Claims Tribunal under Section 124 or 124A of the Act. As he cannot
avail himself of both the remedies he has to choose one between the two. The
provisions in Chapter XIII of the Act are intended to provide a speedier remedy
to the victims of accident and untoward incidents. If he were to choose the
latter that does not mean that he should be prepared to get a lesser amount. He
is given the assurance by the legislature that Central Government is saddled
with the task of prescribing fair and just compensation in the rules from time
to time. The provisions are not intended to give a gain to the Railway
Administration but they are meant to afford just and reasonable compensation to
the victims in a speedier measure. If a person files a suit the amount of
compensation will depend upon what the court considers just and reasonable on
the date of determination. Hence when he goes before the Claims Tribunal
claiming compensation the determination of the amount should be as on the date
of such determination.
The
asinine consequence of accepting the interpretation placed by the Division
Bench of the High Court can be demonstrated through an illustration. If a
person sustained injury as described in Rules 3(2) of the Rules, in an accident
in a train on 31.10.1997, and another person sustains the same kind of injury
in another accident in a train the next day i.e. 1.11.1997, when both persons
made separate applications before the same Claims Tribunal for compensation,
the Tribunal can award Rs.2 lakhs only in the first case and Rs. 4 lakhs in the
second case. What a woeful discrimination, if not a glaringly unfair
differentiation. See the interval between the two accidents of identical
features. It was only a few hours, but the difference in the compensation
amount is enormously high.
Any
court should avert an interpretation which would lead to such a manifestly
absurd fall out, unless the court is compelled otherwise by any mandatory
provision.
Why
the Central Government decided to make such a vast variation in the amount of
compensation while exercising the powers conferred by Section 129 of the Act.
It cannot be conceived that the Government wanted to make a discrimination
between those victims who suffered the accident prior to 1.11.1997 and those
who suffered the identical injury in a similar accident on or after that date.
The raison detre for making such variation is easily discernible. The Central
Government wanted to update the compensation amount. Rupee value is not an
unchanging unit in the monitory system. Students of economic history know that
currency value remained static before the Second World War. But the post World
War II witnessed the new phenomenon of vast fluctuations in money value of
currency notes in circulation in each nation. When the U.S. Dollar has
registered a steep upward rise, currencies in many other countries made
downward slip. What was the value of one Hundred rupees twenty years ago is
vastly different from what it is today. This substantial change has caused its
impact on the cost of living also.
The
Central Government while changing the figure in the compensation amount after
an interval of a decade was only influenced by the desire to update the money
value of the compensation. In other words, what you were to pay ten years ago
to one person cannot be the same if it is paid today in the same figure of
currency notes. It is for the purpose of meeting the reality that Central
Government changed the figures.
The
unjust consequence resulting from the interpretation which the Division Bench
placed can be demonstrated in another plane also. If a person who sustained
injury in a railway accident or in an untoward incident was disabled from
making an application immediately and he makes the application a few years
hence, is he to get the compensation in terms of the money value which prevailed
on the date of the accident? Suppose a Tribunal wrongly dismissed a claim after
a few years of filing the application and the claimant approaches the High
Court in appeal. As it happens quite often now, some High Courts could take up
such an appeal only after the lapse of many years and if the appeal is decided
in favour of the claimant after so many years, what a pity if the amount
awarded is only in terms of the figure indicated on the date of the accident.
From
all these, we are of the definite opinion that the Claims Tribunal must
consider what the rules prescribed at the time of making the order for payment
of the compensation.
Learned
Judges of the Division Bench in the High Court referred to the decisions of
this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo vs. Srinivas Sabata and anr. {1976 (1)
SCC 289}, P.A. Narayanan vs. Union of India and ors. {1998 (3) SCC 67} and Maghar
Singh vs. Jashwant Singh {1998 (9) SCC 134}, in order to gain support for the
conclusion arrived at in the impugned judgment. Among them P.A. Narayanan vs.
Union
of India arose from a writ petition filed for compensation in respect of the
death of claimants wife in a railway accident which happened on 3.1.1981. The
High Court dismissed the writ petition against the claimant and approached this
Court by special leave. A plea was made that compensation could be granted in
accordance with the rates prescribed by the rules under Railways Act, 1989. The
counsel for the Railway Administration disputed the said contention on the
ground that the said Act cannot have any retrospective operation. A two-Judge
Bench of this Court (Dr. A.S. Anand, as His Lordship then was, and S. Rajendra Babu,
J) acceded to the said plea and granted a sum of Rs.2 lakhs as compensation,
which is the sum prescribed in the Rules then in force, despite the fact that
the Act itself came into force only in 1990. The said decision, instead of
supporting the view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court, is more in
support of the approach we have made above.
In the
other two decisions referred to by the Division Bench the claims made under the
Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 (W.C. Act, for short) were the subject matter.
In Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) the claimant workman sustained injuries and
one of his arms was amputated in the course of his employment on 6.7.1968, the
Commissioner under the Act passed an order on 6.5.1969 directing the employer
to pay compensation together with penalty and interest for delayed payment. The
employer challenged the said order before the High Court contending that
penalty and interest could not be awarded as his liability to pay had arisen
only when the Commissioner passed the order and not earlier. The High Court
repelled such a contention. Against this the employer approached this Court by
special leave. A four- Judge Bench of this Court held thus: The employer
therefore became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid
personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly
arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is therefore futile to
contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioners
order dated May 6, 1969 under Section 19. On the aforesaid order this Court
further held that the Commissioner under the Act was fully justified in making
the order for payment of interest and penalty. In Maghar Singh vs. Jashwant
Singh (supra) the claim made under the W.C. Act was dealt with and the findings
or the observations therein have no bearing on the question involved in this
appeal.
The
scheme of the provision under the W.C. Act is materially different from the
scheme indicated in Chapter XIII of the Railways Act. In the former,
compensation payable is fixed in the Act itself through the schedule
incorporated thereto. Section 4 of the W.C. Act shows that such compensation is
to be linked with the monthly wages of the workman concerned. It also provides
that the liability to pay compensation on the employer would arise not when the
Commissioner passes the order but on the date of sustaining the injury itself.
A provision is made in Section 4A of W.C. Act that where any employer is in
default of paying the compensation due within one month the Commissioner shall
direct the employer to pay not only interest but in appropriate cases a penalty
ranging up to 50% of the amount payable. The said scheme cannot be equated with
the scheme in Chapter XIII of the Railways Act, as the principles involved have
differences.
Shri
K. Sukumaran, learned senior counsel relied on the decision of another Division
Bench of the Kerala High Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Asokan
{1997 (1) Kerala Law Times 608} in which a decision of this Court is quoted.
That decision of this Court is dated 6.11.1996, rendered by a two-Judge Bench (Kuldip
Singh and Saghir Ahmad, JJ) of this Court (C.A. Nos.16904-09 of 1996).
Later
we came across that the said decision is reported in New India Assurance Co.
Ltd. vs. V.K. Neelakandan and ors. {1999 (8) SCC 256). The said decision was
also under the W.C. Act. This is what the two-Judge Bench said:
We are
finally determining the rights of the workmen today. The Act is a special
legislation for the benefit of the labour.
Keeping
in view the scheme of the Act we are of the view that the only interpretation
which can be given to the amendment is that if any benefit is conferred on the
workmen and the said benefit is available on the date when the case is finally
adjudicated, the said benefit should be extended to the workmen.
A
three-Judge Bench of this Court in Kerala State Elelctricity Board and anr. vs.
Valsala K. and anr. {1999 (8) SCC 254} has referred to the aforesaid decision
and held that it was wrongly decided in view of the four-Judge Bench decision
of this Court in Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra). Nonetheless, in appropriate
cases the principle of taking advantage of the beneficial legislation,
subsequently enacted, is not dissented from by the larger Bench.
In the
result, we allow these appeals and set aside the impugned judgment of the High
Court. We direct the Railway Administration to pay the amount awarded by the
Claims Tribunal to the appellant (if not already paid) within three months from
today together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum from 27.6.1997 (the
date of the order passed by the Claims Tribunal).
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