Hiten
P. Dalal Vs. Bratindranath Banerjee [2001] Insc 314 (11 July 2001)
Ruma
Pall, Brijesh Kumar, B.N.Kirpal Ruma Pal, J
The
appellant was found guilty of an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 by the Special Court set up under the Special Court
(Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (referred
to as, the "Act"). The appellant was sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for a term of one year and a fine for a sum of Rs. 1 lakh, in
default to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a term of three months.
Aggrieved by the judgment and order of the Special Court, the appellant has preferred this appeal.
In the
course of the hearing of the appeal before this Court, learned counsel for the
appellant raised a preliminary issue based on the language of sub Section 2 of
Section 3 of the Act. It was contended that the jurisdiction of the Special Court was limited to offences committed
between 1. 4. 1991 and on or before 6.6.1992 and the offence alleged having
taken place after 6.6.92, the Special Court
had no jurisdiction to try it. The Bench then hearing the appeal, recorded in
its order dated 7.9.1999:
"...
... ... Prima Facie we are not in agreement with the contention raised by the
learned counsel for the appellant on first principles but the learned counsel
for the appellant has brought to our notice a judgment of this Court in the
case of Minoo Mehta vs. Sharak D. Mehta (1998) 2 SCC 418. In the aforesaid
judgment on facts of that case this question possibly did not arise for
consideration but even otherwise Their Lordships in paragraph 12 have come to
the conclusion :
'Therefore,
every offence pertaining to any transaction in securities which is covered by
the sweep of the Act, that is if such transaction has taken place between
1.4.1991 and on or before 6.6.1992 would be subjected to the provisions of the
Act regarding trial of such an offence.' Having held so in the later part of
the said paragraph the Lordships have come to the conclusion:
'The
offence referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 3 which is within the sweep
of Section 7 of the Act must be on offence committed by any person and must
have the following two characteristics:
1.
Such offence must relate to transactions in securities; and 2 Such offence
should be alleged to have been committed between 1.4.1991 and on or before
6.6.1992'.
This
statement of law is contrary to what their Lordships have said in the earlier
paragraph as referred to earlier and we are not in agreement with the enunciation
made in the second part of paragraph 12 quoted above. In this view of the
matter, we think it appropriate that this appeal should be placed before a
3-Judge Bench." The matter was thereafter placed before this Bench and
heard.
The
apparently contradictory observations in Minoo Mehta V. Shavak D. Mehta, need
resolution with reference to the provisions of the Act.
The
Act was promulgated on 6.6.92 to "provide for the establishment of a Special Court for the trial of offences relating
to transactions in securities and for matters connected therewith or incidental
thereto." The jurisdiction of the Special Court was specified in Section 7 and was limited to offences
referred to in section 3(2) of the Act. Section 3(2) insofar as it is relevant
provides:
".......
Any offence relating to transactions in securities after the 1st day of April
1991 and on and before 6th
June 1992....."
The question is - does the period specified qualify the word
"offence" or the word "transactions" ? If it is the former,
the jurisdiction of the Special
Court would be, as
contended by the appellant, limited to offences committed within the period
specified whenever the transactions may have taken place. The respondent has
however contended that the period qualifies the word 'transactions' and that
this was not only clear from the language of the statutory provisions but also
supported by authority.
In our
view the respondent's submission is correct and must be accepted. The Statement
of Objects and Reasons of the Act gives the background and the focus of the Act
as :
"large
scale irregularities and malpractices were noticed in transactions in both the
Government and other securities, indulged in by some brokers in collusion with
the employees of various banks and financial institutions." The preamble
to the Act also makes it clear that the purpose of the enactment was to deal
with those particular transactions in securities. In sub-section (2) of Section
3 the statutory period occurs after the word transaction. If the period were to
qualify the word 'offence' the section would have read "any offence after
the 1st day of April and on or before 6th June 1992" From the language
used it is apparent that the period relates to the transaction in securities
and that the date of the offence is immaterial. Other sections of the Act also
show that the object of the Act is those particular transactions which were
carried out during a particular period of time. Thus Section 4 of the Act
allows the Custodian, under certain circumstances to cancel "any contract
or agreement entered into at any time after the first day of April 1991 and on
or before the 6th June of 1992".
The
position has been further clarified by Section 9-A(1)(b) (introduced by way of
amendment in 1994) which confers on the Special Court all the jurisdiction,
powers and authority as were exercisable immediately before the commencement of
the amended Act by any civil court in relation to, inter-alia, any matter or
claim - "arising out of transactions in securities entered into after the
1st day of April 1991, and on or before the 6th day of June, 1992, in which a
person is notified under sub- section (2) of Sec. 3 is involved as a party,
broker, intermediary or in any other manner." In these circumstances the
inevitable conclusion is that the ambit of the Special Courts jurisdiction,
whether in criminal proceedings or in civil disputes is in respect of the
transactions in securities entered into after the 1st day of April 1991 and on
or before 6th day of June, 1992.
That
the period mentioned in Section 3(2) refers to the transactions and not to the
offence is a view which found favour with this Court in Harshad Shantilal Mehta
V.
Custodian
and Others A Bench of three-Judges of this Court after considering the various
sections of the Act held "Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Special Court in civil as well as criminal
matters is in respect of transactions during the statutory period of 1.4.1991
to 6.6.1992; and in relation to the properties attached, of a notified person.
The entire operation of the said Act, therefore, revolves around the
transactions in securities during this statutory period." In our opinion
the decision in Mino Mehta V. Shavak D. Mehta (supra), does not decide to the
contrary. In that case shares had been lodged with the accused by the
complainant in December 1991. The accused was to arrange the sale of the shares
and to pay the sale proceeds to the complainant. In January, 1992 the accused
sold the shares and misappropriated the sale proceeds. Thus the transactions in
securities as well as the offence of misappropriation had both taken place
during the period specified in Section 3 sub-section (2). The only issue before
the Court was whether the Special Court
would have jurisdiction to deal with offences even if the accused was not
notified by the Custodian. The learned Judges decided the issue in the
affirmative.
While
reaching its conclusion, the Court observed:
"
................The scheme of Section 7, in the light of the Preamble of the
Act and the main purpose for enactment of the Act, appears to be that all
criminal proceedings pertaining to prosecutions in connection with the accused
involved in transactions in securities during the relevant period will lie
before the Special Court and not before ordinary courts as the section starts
with a non obstante clause stating that notwithstanding anything contained in
any other law, only Special Courts will have exclusive jurisdiction to try such
offences." Because the offence and the transactions overlapped, the
learned Judges did not make a distinction between the transaction and the
offence when they summed up their conclusions by saying :
"The
offence referred to in, sub-section (2) of Section 3, which is within the sweep
of Section 7 of the Act must be an offence committed by any person and must
have the following two characteristics:
1.
Such offence must relate to transactions in securities; and
2.
Such offence should be alleged to have been committed between 1.4.1991 and on
or before 6.6.1992."
The
use of the word 'offence' in item 2 was an obvious error because what was meant
has been made clear by the Court in paragraph 15 of the judgment which reads:
"Before
parting with this case we may state that the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant also submitted that the offence alleged against the appellant was not
relating to any transaction in securities during the relevant time but qua the
sale consideration alleged to have been received by the appellant out of the
said transaction and for which alleged offence under Section 409 prosecution is
sought to be launched against the appellant. It is difficult to agree with this
contention. A conjoint reading of the recitals in the complaint which obviously
must be assumed to be true at this stage would show that the accused is alleged
to have entered into transaction in securities, namely, the shares during the
relevant period and out of the said transaction is alleged to have received
sale proceeds which he has not handed over or transmitted to the complainant
who claims to be entitled to the said amount. Thus the offence alleged is
certainly relating to the transaction in securities as said to have been
entered into by the accused during the relevant period." It is clear
therefore that the summing up did not correctly reflect the actual view of the
Court.
In the
present case the four cheques which are the subject matter of the criminal
proceedings were admittedly executed by the appellant on 24.12.1991,
26.12.1991, 17.2.1992, and 27.3.1992 i.e. within the statutory period.
The cheques
were drawn on the Andhra Bank in favour of the Standard Chartered Bank (briefly
referred to as 'the Bank') for the sums of Rs.27 Crores, Rs.14.5 Crores, Rs.17 Crores,
and Rs.19,95,75,000/- respectively. According to the Bank the cheques were
issued for payment of loss suffered by the Bank arising out of transactions in
securities entered into by the Bank through or at the instance of the appellant
during the statutory period. According to the Bank on 21.5.1992 all four cheques
were returned dishonoured by the Andhra Bank with the remark "Not arranged
for". The Bank served notices on the appellant under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act on 31.5.1992 and 1.6.1992 calling upon the appellant
to make payment in respect of the four cheques within 15 days from the date of
the receipt of the notices. The appellant did not pay. The transactions as
alleged being within the statutory period, the Special Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and the
preliminary objection of the appellant is, in the circumstances, rejected.
On the
merits of the case also, we do not find any reason to interfere with the
decision of the Special
Court. In the
complaint filed on behalf of the Bank by one Bratindranath Banerjee (the
respondent herein), on 14th
July, 1992, it was
alleged that the appellant was acting as a broker in respect of security
transactions between the Bank and other banks and financial institutions.
According to the complaint the appellant had issued the four cheques in
discharge of his liabilities to the Bank. The four cheques were presented to
Andhra Bank but were dishonoured. A First Information Report was lodged against
the appellant and others. In the written statement filed by the appellant under
Section 247 of the Code of Criminal Procedure it was said that pursuant to an
oral information from the Bank's officer that the Bank was working on some new
scheme and methods of augmenting its income and request for assistance for the
same, the appellant agreed to "certain formalities and adjustments as and
when required". Pursuant to this arrangement, the appellant had executed
and sent several cheques to the bank including the four cheques (Ext. B, C, D
& E) which related to certain intended transactions of purchase of security
by the appellant from the Standard Chartered Bank. According to the appellant
none of these intended transactions actually materialised and as a result the cheques
were never to be acted upon or encashed. It was denied that the appellant was
liable to make any payment in respect of the four cheques. According to the
appellant although the transactions had not taken place and the cheques should
have been returned the four cheques were not returned back to the appellant by
the Bank through oversight.
It is
unnecessary to consider the various preliminary stages of the Trial before the Special Court except to note that charges were
framed on 26th August
1992 by the Special Court against the appellant under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
That
the four cheques were executed by the appellant in favour of the Standard
Chartered Bank (hereafter referred to as the Bank), has not been denied nor was
it in dispute that the cheques were dishonoured because of insufficient funds
in the Appellants' account with the drawee, viz.
Andhra
Bank. Because of the admitted execution of the four cheques by the appellant,
the Bank was entitled to and did in fact rely upon three presumptions in
support of its case, namely, under Sections 118, 138 and 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. Section 118 provides, inter-alia, that until the contrary is
proved it shall be presumed that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn
for consideration, and that every such instrument when it has been accepted,
indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or
transferred for consideration. The presumption which arises under Section 138
provides more specifically that where any cheque drawn by a person on an
account for payment of any amount of money for the discharge in whole or in
part of any debt or other liability, is returned by the drawee bank unpaid,
either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is
insufficient to honour the cheque, such persons shall be deemed to have committed
an offence and shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. The nature of the presumption
under Section 138 is subject to the three conditions specified relating to
presentation, giving of the notice and the non payment after receipt of notice
by the drawer of the cheque. All three conditions have not been denied in this
case.
The
appellant's submission that the cheques were not drawn for the 'discharge in
whole or in part of any debt or other liability' is answered by the third
presumption available to the Bank under Section 139 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act. This section provides that "it shall be presumed, unless
the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the
nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of
any debt or other liability". The effect of these presumptions is to place
the evidential burden on the appellant of proving that the cheque was not
received by the Bank towards the discharge of any liability Because both
Sections 138 and 139 require that the Court "shall presume" the
liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques
are drawn, as noted in State of Madras vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61,
it is obligatory on the Court to raise this presumption in every case where the
factual basis for the raising of the presumption had been established. "It
introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal
cases and shifts the onus on to the accused" (ibid). Such a presumption is
a presumption of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which
describes provisions by which the court "may presume" a certain state
of affairs. Presumptions are rules of evidence and do not conflict with the
presumption of innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that the
prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
The
obligation on the prosecution may be discharged with the help of presumptions
of law or fact unless the accused adduces evidence showing the reasonable
possibility of the non-existence of the presumed fact.
In
other words, provided the facts required to form the basis of a presumption of
law exists, no discretion is left with the Court but to draw the statutory
conclusion, but this does not preclude the person against whom the presumption
is drawn from rebutting it and proving the contrary. A fact is said to be
proved when, "after considering the matters before it, the Court either
believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man
ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the
supposition that it exists" . Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be
conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the Court in
support of the defence that the Court must either believe the defence to exist
or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of
reasonability being that of the 'prudent man'.
Judicial
statements have differed as to the quantum of rebutting evidence required. In Kundan
Lal Rallaram vs Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay AIR 1961 SC 1316, this
Court held that the presumption of law under Section 118 of Negotiable Instruments
Act could be rebutted, in certain circumstances, by a presumption of fact
raised under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The decision must be limited to
the facts of that case. The more authoritative view has been laid down in the
subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desai vs
State of Maharashtra AIR 1964 SC 575, where this Court reiterated the principle
enunciated in State of Madras vs Vaidyanath Iyer (Supra) and clarified that the
distinction between the two kinds of presumption lay not only in the mandate to
the Court, but also in the nature of evidence required to rebut the two. In the
case of a discretionary presumption the presumption if drawn may be rebutted by
an explanation which "might reasonably be true and which is consistent
with the innocence" of the accused.
On the
other hand in the case of a mandatory presumption "the burden resting on
the accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is where a
presumption is raised under S.114 of the Evidence Act and cannot be held to be
discharged merely by reason of the fact that the explanation offered by the
accused is reasonable and probable. It must further be shown that the
explanation is a true one. The words 'unless the contrary is proved' which
occur in this provision make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted
by 'proof' and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. A fact is
said to be proved when its existence is directly established or when upon the
material before it the Court finds its existence to be so probable that a
reasonable man would act on the supposition that it exists.
Unless,
therefore, the explanation is supported by proof, the presumption created by
the provision cannot be said to be rebutted......" [See also V.D. Jhingan
vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 1762; Sailendranath Bose vs. The State
of Bihar AIR 1968 SC 1292 and Ram Krishna Bedu Rane vs. State of Maharashtra
1973 (1) SCC 366.] We will therefore have to consider whether in the case
before us, the appellant had supported his defence by any proof sufficient to
rebut the presumption drawn against him.
At the
trial three witnesses were examined in support of the Bank's case. The first
was a Mr. Derek Reed (PW 1), the Bank's Group Security Adviser. Mr. Reed
deposed that he had come to India with
instructions from the Bank to investigate the fraud which appeared to have been
perpetrated in Bombay in which several banks including
the Bank were involved. In the course of investigation he found the four cheques
Ext. B, C, D & E from the desk of an officer of the Bank who has since been
dismissed because of his involvement in the fraud.
The
Bank's second witness was Mr. S. Gyananavinayagam (PW2).He was the Manager,
Operations in Andhra Bank. He deposed that the four cheques were dishonoured on
the ground of insufficient funds in the appellant's account. The third witness
Mr. Bratindra Nath Banerjee (PW 3) was the Director of the Bank in-charge of
the India Task Force set up by the Bank to investigate the fraud. His was the
primary evidence relied upon by the Bank. Broadly speaking, Mr. Banerjee
deposed that there were two main areas of fraud perpetrated by the appellant.
According
to him the first fraud committed by the appellant related to large amounts paid
by the Bank at the instance of the appellant or through him, for which the Bank
had failed to receive any security or valid bank receipts. The second fraud
pertained to the actual purchase and sale of securities at the instance of the
appellant and the failure of the appellant to pay the Bank the difference
between the contract rate and delivery rate of the securities. He verified the
statements pertaining to the transactions between the appellant and the Bank
prepared on the basis of the Bank's books of account and other records
maintained in the usual course of the business of the Bank. All the statements
(Ex. O, P Q and T) were tendered in evidence and marked as exhibits without any
objection by the appellant.
The
first statement pertained to the period between 8.11.1991 and 18.12.1991 and
showed the contract rates, delivery rates, the rates of difference and the
amount of difference of securities mentioned. The statement along with the deal
slips, cost memos, instruction issued by the Reserve Bank of India and entry in a clearing sheet in
respect of four deal slips were marked as Ext. 'O'. Out of Ext. 'O', difference
of rates covered by four deal slips had been settled by the appellant by giving
a cheque for Rs.15 crores. The balance amount on this account was Rs.45,77,40,250/-.
The
second statement prepared and vouched for by Mr. Banerjee was Ext. 'P' prepared
in connection with transactions between 28.12.1991 and 17.2.1992. The statement
was supported by 18 deal slips. The liability of the appellant on this account
was claimed to be Rs.56,50,50,000/-. Ext. 'P' was subsequently corrected by
Ext. 'T' which gave the figure of appellant's liability for the period covered
by Ext. 'P' as Rs.39,50,50,000/-.
The
third statement was marked as Ext. 'Q'. This gave particulars of the claim for
the period 21.2.1992 to 27.3.1992. The appellants liability for this period was
claimed to be Rs.30,97,34,135/-. Ext. 'Q' was supported by five deal slips.
All
the deal slips which were printed forms and serially numbered showed the
contract rate and the delivery rates..
They
were prepared by dealers of the Bank. Mr. Banerjee also stated that the use of
the abbreviation 'DIR' in the column which required the name of the Broker,
referred to the Appellant. The witness also showed that in respect of certain
transactions where the contract rate was less than the delivery rate, the
appellant was paid by the Bank. In dealing with the appellant's case namely
that the cheques had been given for intended deals which had never taken place,
Mr. Banerjee said that he had gone through all the deal slips which had been
brought with him to the Court and that there was no evidence of any
cancellation of any deal between the appellant and the Bank.
In the
course of his examination, Mr. Banerjee also gave evidence of payment made by
the Bank to the appellant amounting to Rs.1240 crores and of the loss suffered
by the Bank on account of the non-furnishing of bank receipts/securities.
Two
further witnesses were produced by the Bank.
One
proved the appellant's account with the Bank and the second proved the
Appellant's account with Andhra Bank for the relevant period.
As far
as the appellant's defence was concerned, he did not enter the witness box to
support his case that the four cheques in particular had been given in respect
of any arrangement or in respect of any transactions which did not materialise.
The four witnesses called by the Appellant apart from those subpoenaed to
produce documents, were Mr. Ramesh Laxman Kamat (DW 1) Mr. S.R. A. Rao (DW 2),
Mr. G. D. Bhalla (DW 3) and Mr. G. CKC Talukdar (DW.4). The Special Court found
that the evidence of DW 1 was not credit-worthy and that "almost all
points including inconsequential points and points which could not be denied,
(he) prevaricated ....... (and) ...... sought to deny the truth until truth
could no longer be denied." DW 1 was then a Deputy General Manager of the
State Bank of India (referred to as SBI). He had sought
to contend that a number of transactions mentioned in the four statements viz. Exs.
O, P and Q were ready forward transactions between the Bank and SBI, and did
not reflect the sale and purchase of securities. It was a case which he was
unable to substantiate with reference to the documents already on record or
produced from the custody of the CBI. The documents produced by the witness
himself were found by the Special Court
to be suspect.
The
second witness for the defence, Mr. SRA Rao also sought to establish that one
transaction in Ex.O was non- existent or a dummy transaction. The third defence
witness,Mr. G.D. Bhalla, Branch Manager of Andhra Bank, proved that the
appellant had made payments of several crores to the Bank.
The
fourth witness, G.K. Talukdar, a staff officer of the Reserve Bank of India produced a list stipulating
contract rates of several securities, in an attempt to show that the contract
rates claimed by the Bank were not correct. It was not stated that the list
applied to the Bank or that other rates could not be contracted for.
The
brunt of the evidence given by the appellant's witnesses was as to the nature
of the transactions between the appellant and the Bank. However, not one of the
defence witnesses gave any evidence in support of the only defence of the
Appellant, namely that the four cheques in question had been given towards
intended transactions which did not take place. No one said why the appellant
had executed and delivered the particular cheques to the Bank or that the
appellant had not given the four cheques to discharge his debts to the Bank.
Nor did any defence witness claim that the cheques were given an account of any
ready forward transactions. In fact, DW 1 in cross- examination admitted that
it was not the practice of a purchasing party to hand over cheques in advance.
The appellant alone could have said why he had admittedly executed the four cheques,
handed them over to the Bank and never asked for their return. He did not
choose to do so.
As
said by the Special Court :
"Thus
according to the Accused, the cheques Exs. B and C were delivered on 23rd December 1991. This ostensibly was for intended
purchases of 2 crores and 1.08 crores Units. According to him the cheque Ex. D
was given on 17th
February 1992. This
ostensibly for intended purchase of 1,22,50,000 Units. The Ex. E was allegedly
given on 27th March
1992 for intended
purchase of 7 crore Units of Can Star and 10 crore Units of Can Premium. Apart
from what is stated in the Written Statement there is no evidence or proof in
support of this case." The burden was on the appellant to disapprove the
presumptions under Ss. 138 and 139 a burden which he failed to discharge at
all. The averment in the written statement of the appellant was not enough.
Incidentally, the defence in the written statement that the four cheques were
given for intended transactions was not the answer given by the Appellant to
the notice under Section 138. Then he had said that the cheques were given to
assist the Bank for restructuring (Ex.H). It was necessary for the appellant at
least to show on the basis of acceptable evidence either that his explanation
in the written statement was so probable that a prudent man ought to accept it
or to establish that the effect of the material brought on the record, in its
totality, rendered the existence of the fact presumed, improbable.
761 ).
The appellant has done neither. In the absence of any such proof the
presumptions under Sections 138 and 139 must prevail.
We may
also mention here that in proceedings initiated by the Bank to recover monies
from the appellant in connection with the first area of fraud mentioned by B. Banerjee
(PW 3), this Court in Standard Chartered Bank vs. Custodian (2000 (6) SCC 427)
upholding the decision of the Special Court, found that the appellant was
liable to pay the Bank a sum of Rs.280.00 crores which is several times the
amount covered by the four cheques in question.
The
argument of the Appellant before the Special Court that no offence under section 138 had in fact been
committed because he could not have paid within the period of 15 days after
receipt of the notice even if he wanted to, was rightly rejected. The
appellant's submission was based on the fact that he had been notified by the
Custodian under section 3 of the Act and all his properties had consequently
stood attached. But, as observed by the Learned Special Court, the Special
Court had before it a
number of applications by a number of parties asking for permission to fulfill
their obligations under contracts. In some cases the Court had granted them.
There was nothing which prevented the Appellant from applying to the Special Court for permission to fulfill his
obligations or to pay off his debts under the cheques Exs. B, C, D & E. No
attempt had been make by the Appellant to make any payment towards the dishonoured
cheques. The appellant would not have paid even if he could have. This is clear
not only from the correspondence, and the appellant's conduct but also from his
defence of total denial of liability. The argument was therefore wholly
academic.
The Special Court found the appellant's defence
improbable and the evidence adduced at his instance flawed and unbelievable.
After meticulously scanning both the oral and documentary evidence and
ultimately drawing on the presumptions statutorily provided under sections 118,
138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the appellant was found guilty.
For the reasons stated earlier, there is no ground for us to decide differently
and to differ from the view taken by the Special Court in holding the appellant guilty of the offence with which
he was charged. We therefore affirm the conviction and sentence imposed on the
appellant by the Special
Court and dismiss the
appeal with costs assessed at Rs.10,000/-.
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