Ramashraya
& Anr Vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh [2001] Insc
108 (23 February 2001)
U.C.
Banerjee & K.G. Balakrishnan K.G. Balakrishnan, J.
L.T.J
The
appellants herein challenge their conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC
read with Section 34 IPC.
They
were tried by the Fourth Addl. Sessions Judge, Raipur, alleging that they caused the death of one Ajeet. The
prosecution case was that on 19.12.1987 when the deceased Ajeet and his son, Laljee,
were doing some work in their paddy field, the appellants came there in their
bullock cart. Deceased Ajeet was grazing his buffaloes near his field and a
little away, his son Laljee, was collecting bundles of paddy. It seems that the
appellants wanted to drive their bullock cart through the Tewda field of the
deceased. Deceased Ajeet, objected to this and there ensued a quarrel between Ajeet
and the appellants. Appellant Kripa Ram tried to hit the deceased on his head
but the blow fell on the shoulder of the deceased. Seeing this, Laljee came
near the deceased to save him, but Ajeet shouted, "Run away son, they are
waiting for you, do not come this way." According to the prosecution, both
the appellants inflicted severe injuries on the deceased Ajeet and he fell down
on the ground. Seeing the altercation and beating being given to his father, Laljee
ran away and on the way met Hirday Kumar. They returned to the place of
incident and saw Ajeet lying dead on the ground. Later, the matter was reported
to the Police. The Inquest Report was prepared and the body of Ajeet was
subjected to post- mortem. The recovery report was also prepared. Two broken
pieces of the tooth of Ajeet were recovered from the place of incident along
with blood stained earth and the 'lathi' alleged to have been used to kill the
deceased.
PW-1, Laljee;
PW-2, Sukalu; and PW-6, Basant are the witnesses who were examined on the
prosecution side. PW-1 narrated the whole incident in detail. PW-2 only spoke
about the presence of the accused at the place of the incident. PW-6, Basant
deposed that he had heard Ajeet shouting that he was being killed and saw the
appellants assaulting him with 'lathi'. The evidence of these witnesses was
satisfactorily proved by the prosecution.
We
heard the learned counsel for the appellants, who contended that these
witnesses were interested-witnesses and the courts below erred in placing
reliance on these witnesses. We do not find much force in this contention.
The
learned counsel further contended that the offence, if at all committed by the
appellants, will not come within the definition of 'murder', but only 'culpable
homicide' and the appellants are liable to be punished under Section 304 Part
II, IPC. It was urged by learned counsel that there was no pre-meditation and
the quarrel took place all of a sudden pursuant to a wordy altercation between
the appellants and the deceased and that the appellants had not taken undue
advantage of the situation. It was also urged that there was no intention on
the part of the appellants to cause the death of the deceased. The learned
counsel submitted that the circumstances of the case do not also indicate that
there was knowledge on the part of the appellants that the injuries caused by
them were likely to cause death. Reference was made to a series of decisions by
learned counsel for the appellants in support of her contention.
In
State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Jhaddu & Ors. 1991 Supp.
(1) SCC 545, this Court held that there was no intention to kill, but the
accused could be imputed with the knowledge that death was the likely result
and therefore the conviction of the accused under Section 304 Part II IPC was
affirmed. The deceased had sustained injuries on the chest resulting in
fracture of ribs and laceration of lungs leading to death. This was on the
basis of the nature of injuries that such a finding was recorded.
Morcha
vs. State of Rajasthan ( 1979) 1 SCC 161 was a case where the accused husband
went to fetch his wife at his in-laws village and on her refusal to accompany
him immediately attacked her causing fatal injuries. The trial court held that
the accused had no intention to kill and convicted him under Section 304 Part
II. On appeal by the State, the High Court converted the conviction to that
under Section 302. This Court held that the circumstances show that the
appellant went armed with a dagger and despite the willingness expressed by the
wife to accompany him next morning the accused inflicted two injuries on her
person and the evidence indicated that the wound on the posterior axillary line
caused injury to the liver and perforation of the large colon and was
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and it was held that
the whole affair appeared to be pre-planned and pre-meditated. That the accused
intended to cause the death of the deceased is further clear from the fact that
he inflicted such a severe injury.
In Madanlal
vs. State of Punjab 1992 Supp (2) SCC 233, the accused caused serious injuries
to the deceased with the handle of a pump due to which the deceased died 3 days
thereafter. The motive of the crime was that the accused was hungry for three
days and when he demanded food from the deceased 'Sewadar' of the 'Dera', where
free food was being served, the deceased refused and consequently, the accused,
in a fit of anger, attacked the deceased suddenly on being deprived of the
power of self-control. This Court held that the offence would come under
Section 304 Part II IPC instead of 302.
Maharashtra
AIR 1995 SC 1453, there was only one injury on the deceased. The accused had
given a single blow by knife on the abdomen of the deceased while the latter
was trying to intervene to save her brother being attacked by the accused. This
Court held that the accused could be clothed with knowledge and not intention
that the injury was likely to cause death and, therefore, the offence fell
under Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 300 IPC.
In Santosh
vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 727, the Sessions Judge, relying on an
earlier case in AIR 1956 SC 654 (Kapur Singh vs. State of Pepsu) convicted the
appellant under Section 304 Part-I IPC on the ground that the injuries were
inflicted on the limbs of the 3 men who died of bleeding, but infliction of
injuries on vital parts of the body was deliberately avoided and, therefore, an
intention to murder was not established. This Court held that the learned
Sessions Judge appeared to have overlooked the various clauses of Section 300
IPC. An intention to kill is not required in every case. Knowledge that the
natural and probable consequences of an act would be death will suffice for a
conviction under Section 302 IPC.
In W. Slaney
vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh AIR 1956 SC
116, the accused, a 22 years old, was in love with the sister of the deceased
who did not like this intimacy. On the day of occurrence there was a quarrel
between the deceased and the accused and the accused was asked to get away from
the house of the sister. Shortly afterwards, the accused returned with his
younger brother and called the sister to come out. Instead, the deceased came
out and there was a heated exchange of words. The accused slapped the deceased
on the cheek. The accused lifted his fist.
The
accused snatched a hockey stick from his younger brother and gave one blow on
the head of the deceased with the result that his skull was fractured. The
deceased died in the hospital ten days later. It was held that where the
accused, causing the death of another, had no intention to kill, then the
offence would be murder only if
(i) the
accused knew that the injury inflicted would be likely to cause death or
(ii) that
it would be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or
(iii) that
the accused knew that the act must in all probability cause death. On the facts
and circumstances of the case, it was held that the offence fell under Section
304 Part -II IPC and not under Section 302 as there was no pre-meditation and
there was a sudden fight. The nature of the injury was such that the accused
could not be attributed with the special knowledge required by Section 300 IPC,
nor was the injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
Reference
was also made to the decisions of this Court in AIR 1960 SC 1390 (Laxman Kalu
vs. State of Maharashtra); 1994 Supp.(1) SCC 116 (Ramesh
Kumar vs. State of Bihar & Ors.); and AIR 1964 SC 1263 (Afrahim Sheikh
& Ors. vs. State of West
Bengal).
In all
the cases referred to above, the facts and circumstances show that the
occurrence took place all of a sudden and there was no pre-meditation on the
part of the accused. From the nature of the injury also, it would be observed
that the accused had only the knowledge that the injury was likely to cause
death, but intention as such cannot be attributed to them. The second part of Section
304 speaks of 'knowledge' and does not refer to 'intention', which has been
segregated in the first part. But the knowledge is knowledge of the likelihood
of death. In order to bring the offence under clause (3) of Section 300, the
prosecution must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present
and the nature of injury must be proved.
In Virsa
Singh vs. State of Punjab
AIR 1958 SC 465, it
was held as under :
"In
considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have been
inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example,
whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and
whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been
inflicted. It is, of course, not necessary to enquire into every last detail
as, for instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the bowels fall out, or
whether he intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart.
Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted, for,
if he does not know that there is a heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot be
said to have intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of
enquiry. It is broad-based and simple and based on commonsense: the kind of
enquiry that "twelve good men and true" could readily appreciate and
understand.
To put
it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring
a case under S. 300 "thirdly";
First,
it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;
Secondly,
the nature of injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly,
it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily
injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that
some other kind of injury was intended.
Once
these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further,
and, Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described
made up of the three-element set out above is sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature.
This
part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do
with the intention of the offender.
Once
these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the
burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S.300
"thirdly". It does not matter that there was no intention to cause
death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury
of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature
(not that there is any real distinction between the two).
It
does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will
be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury
actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely
objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely object
inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are
sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they
are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face
the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably
deduced, that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional."
Argument of the appellants' counsel is that the incident happened pursuant to a
sudden quarrel and the appellants had no pre-meditation to cause the death of the
deceased and therefore, the offence would come under 'culpable homicide'
punishable under Section 304 IPC. In order to decide the question, the nature
of the injuries sustained by the deceased and the circumstances under which the
incident took place are relevant factors. From the nature of the injuries and
the origin and genesis of the incident, it could be spelt out that all the
ingredients of the offence of murder defined under Section 300 IPC are made out
and it is not possible to bring the offence within any of the five exceptions
of Section 300 IPC. Therefore, Section 304 IPC cannot be invoked. The argument
of the appellants' counsel that there was no intention on the part of the
accused to cause the death of the deceased cannot be accepted in view of the
nature of injuries sustained by the deceased. Though the quarrel between the
accused and the deceased ensued after a wordy altercation, a series of injuries
were caused by the accused on the skull and all over the body of the deceased.
Both the appellants had brutally attacked the deceased. Having regard to the
nature of the injuries and the circumstances under which the injuries came to
be inflicted, it is clearly established that the appellants had the intention
to cause the death of the deceased and the injuries caused were sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The appellants have been rightly
convicted under Section 302 IPC. We see no merit in these appeals, which are
dismissed.
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