Santosh
Hazari Vs. Purushottam Tiwari [2001] Insc 76 (8 February 2001)
Cji,
R.C. Lahoti, & Briijesh Kumar. R.C. Lahoti, J.
L.T.J
Leave
granted.
On
4.3.1983, the plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for declaration of title and
recovery of possession and issuance of permanent preventive injunction
restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff
over the suit property described as khasra No.41/1 area 1.09 acres (0.441
hectares) situated in Village Patharia, District Damoh. According to the
plaintiff, the defendant had illegally dispossessed the plaintiff from his
possession over 110x80 ft. area of land out of the suit property on 20.8.1981.
The defendant in his written statement denied all material averments and in
addition submitted that the defendant has been in possession of the suit
property since 1940-41, i.e. since the times of his grand father. The suit
filed by the plaintiff was alleged to have been barred by limitation in view of
the same having been filed more than 12 years after the date of dispossession
of the plaintiff. A plea of the defendant having acquired title by adverse
possession was also raised in the written statement.
The
trial Court, on an evaluation of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the
parties, found that ownership in the suit property vested in the plaintiff and
the defendant had forcibly occupied the disputed area of 110x80 ft. sometime in
the year 1980-81. The defendants plea of adverse possession was negatived and
the suit filed by the plaintiff was held to have been filed within the period
of limitation. On these findings the suit was decreed in its entirety.
The
defendant preferred an appeal. The learned additional district Judge held that
in so far as ownership over the suit land is concerned, the same vested in the
plaintiff. However, he found that the possession of the land was given to the
plaintiff by the State Government on 6.11.68 but the plaintiff has not shown to
have taken any steps for dispossessing the defendant and the plea raised by the
plaintiff of the defendant having forcibly occupied the land in dispute on
20.8.1981 did not appear to be tenable.
On
these findings the appeal was allowed and in reversal of the judgment and decree
of the trial Court the suit was directed to be dismissed.
The
plaintiff preferred a second appeal which has been dismissed in limine by the
High Court passing a brief order that the matter stood concluded by findings of
fact and no substantial question of law arose for determination. The aggrieved
plaintiff has filed this appeal by special leave.
On
4.5.1999 this Court directed a notice to be issued to the defendant-respondent
on the limited question as to why the matter should not be remanded to the High
Court for deciding the appeal after framing the question of law.
We
have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments of the
trial Court and the first appellate Court. We have also perused the application
dated 12.1.2001 filed in this Court on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant
setting out the substantial questions of law which in his submission arose in
the case and on which the High Court ought to have heard the appeal.
What
is a substantial question of law involved in the case? Section 100 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter, the code, for short) as substituted by
the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976 (104 of 1976) w.e.f. 1.2.1977
reads as under:- 100. Second Appeal.
(1)
Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other
law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from
every decree passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if
the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of
law.
(2) An
appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In
an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state
the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4)
Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is
involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5)
The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent
shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not
involve such question:
Provided
that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the
power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other
substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the
case involves such question.
The
High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the
substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts
illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court. The
existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise
of the jurisdiction under the amended Santosh Kumar Purkait & Ors., (1997)
5 SCC 438, Panchugopal (1999) 3 SCC 722].
At the
very outset we may point out that the memo of second appeal filed by the
plaintiff-appellant before the High Court suffered from a serious infirmity.
Section 100 of the Code, as amended in 1976, restricts the jurisdiction of the
High Court to hear a second appeal only on substantial question of law involved
in the case. An obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the
memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and
which the appellant proposes to urge before the High Court. The High Court must
be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and
such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. Such questions or
question may be the one proposed by the appellant or may be any other question
which though not proposed by the appellant yet in the opinion of the High Court
arises as involved in the case and is substantial in nature. At the hearing of
the appeal, the scope of hearing is circumscribed by the question so formulated
by the High Court. The respondent is at liberty to show that the question
formulated by the High Court was not involved in the case. In spite of a
substantial question of law determining the scope of hearing of second appeal
having been formulated by the High Court, its power to hear the appeal on any
other substantial question of law, not earlier formulated by it, is not taken
away subject to the twin conditions being satisfied:
(i) the
High Court feels satisfied that the case involves such question, and
(ii) the
High Court records reasons for its such satisfaction.
Even
under the old Section 100 of the Code (pre-1976 amendment), a pure finding of
fact was not open to challenge before the High Court in second appeal. However
the Law Commission noticed a plethora of conflicting judgments. It noted that
in dealing with second appeals, the Courts were devising and successfully
adopting several concepts such as, a mixed question of fact and law, a legal
inference to be drawn from facts proved, and even the point that the case has not
been properly approached by the Courts below. This was creating confusion in
the minds of the public as to the legitimate scope of second appeal under S.100
and had burdened the High Courts with an unnecessarily large number of second
appeals. Section 100 was, therefore, suggested to be amended so as to provide
that the right of second appeal should be confined to cases where a question of
law is involved and such question of law is a substantial one.
(See
Statement of Objects and Reasons). The Select Committee to which the Amendment
Bill was referred felt that the scope of second appeals should be restricted so
that litigations may not drag on for a long period. Reasons, of course, are not
required to be stated for formulating any question of law under sub-section(4)
of Section 100 of the Code; though such reasons are to be recorded under
proviso to sub-section (5) while exercising power to hear on any other
substantial question of law, other than the one formulated under sub-
section(4).
The
phrase substantial question of law, as occurring in the amended Section 100 is
not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying question of law,
means - of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or
considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with -
technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is
clear that the Legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of substantial
question of law by suffixing the words of general importance as has been done
in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a)
of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal
shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general
1928 Privy Council 172, the phrase substantial question of law as it was
employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 110 of the C.P.C.
(since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and Their
Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general
importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case as
between the parties. In Spinning and Manufacuring Co., Ltd., (1962) Supp.3 SCR
549, the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken
by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in 264:- ..when a question of law is
fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or where
the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and
discuss alternative view, then the question would be a substantial question of
law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision
of the highest Court or if the general principles to be applied in determining
the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those
principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial
question of law.
and
laid down the following test as proper test, for determining whether a question
of law raised in the case is substantial:- The proper test for determining
whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our
opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly
and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is
either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this
Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from
difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is
settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in
determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of
applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the
question would not be a substantial question of law.
In
Deputy Commr., Hardoi, in charge Court of Wards, 521, also it was held that a
question of law of importance to the parties was a substantial question of law
entitling the appellant to certificate under (the then) Section 110 of the
Code.
A
point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but
cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law
must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding
precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if
answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are
concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a
foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the
sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be
necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the
case.
An
entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a
question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It
will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a
question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the
paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance
between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling
necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis.
A
perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that it has extensively dealt
with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the
issues on which the parties
went to trial. It also found that in support of his plea of adverse possession
on the disputed land, the defendant did not produce any documentary evidence
while the oral evidence adduced by the defendant was conflicting in nature and
hence unworthy of reliance. The first appellate Court has, in a very cryptic
manner, reversed the finding on question of possession and dispossession as
alleged by the plaintiff as also on the question of adverse possession as
pleaded by the defendant.
The
appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial
Court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by
law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and
law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious
application of mind, and record findings supported by reasons, on all the
issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties
for decision of the appellate Court. The task of an appellate Court affirming
the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate Court agreeing
with the view of the trial Court need not restate the effect of the evidence or
reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court; expression of general agreement
with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal, would Bijendra
Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124). We would, however, like to sound a note of
caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the
judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate
Court for shirking the duty cast on it. While writing a judgment of reversal
the appellate Court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the
findings of fact based on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial Court
must weigh with the appellate Court, more so when the findings are based on
oral evidence recorded by the same presiding Judge who authors the judgment.
This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate
Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial
Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court
suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on
conjectures and surmises, the appellate Court is entitled to interfere with the
finding of fact (See 114). The rule is __ and it is nothing more than a rule of
practice __ that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any
matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then
unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness
which has escaped the trial Judges notice or there is a sufficient balance of
improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the
appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a Jwaleshwari
Pratap Narain Singh & Ors., AIR 1951 SC 120).
Secondly,
while reversing a finding of fact the appellate Court must come into close
quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial Court and then assign its own
reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the Court
hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty
expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate Courts of the
additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100
substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be
a final Court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge
before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate Court is also a
final Court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if
erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because
the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct
the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate Court even
on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one.
Reverting
back to the facts of the case at hand, prima facie we find the first appellate Court
did not discharge the duty cast on it as a Court of first appeal. The High
Court having noticed failure on the part of the appellant in not discharging
the statutory obligation cast on him by sub-section (3) of Section 100 of the
Code, on account of the substantial question of law involved in the appeal
having not been stated, much less precisely, in the memorandum of second
appeal, ordinarily an opportunity to frame such question should have been
afforded to the appellant unless the deficiency was brought to the notice of
the appellant previously by the High Court Registry or the court and yet the
appellant had persisted in his default.
That
was not done. In our opinion, the following substantial question of law does
arise as involved in the case and worth being heard by the High Court:- Whether
on the pleadings and the material brought on record by the defendant, the first
appellate Court was right in holding that the case of adverse possession was
made out by the defendant and the suit filed by the plaintiff was liable to be
dismissed as barred by time under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, more
so when such finding was arrived at in reversal of the findings of the trial
Court? The appeal is allowed. The case is remitted back to the High Court for
hearing and deciding the second appeal afresh. We make it clear that we have
not expressed any opinion either way on any of the issues arising for decision
in the case. We also make it clear that our framing the question of law
involved in the appeal shall not take away the jurisdiction of the High Court
vesting in it under provisio to sub-section(5) of Section 100 of the C.P.C. to
formulate any other question of law involved in the case The second appeal
shall be decided by the High Court uninfluenced by any of the observations made
hereinabove which have been made solely to support our opinion that the appeal
did not merit a summary dismissal by the High Court.
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