Gaya Prasad Vs. Shri Pradeep Srivastava
 Insc 70 (7
Thomas & Doraiswamy Raju. Thomas, J.
Appeal (civil) 1072 of 2001
case presents a sample scenario of the tormenting plight of an average litigant
who approaches the court with all expectations of getting relief for his urgent
need. But the snail paced litigation creeping through all the tiers of the
judicial hierarchical forums would have frustrated all his expectations, though
others could admire the tenacity with which he persisted with the cause. Twenty
three years ago, the litigant in this case wanted accommodation for his son,
who then became a medical graduate, to start a clinic so that from the stage of
a fledgling in the profession of medicine he could fly higher up. His father
who owns the building moved for eviction of the tenant from the building for
the said purpose. Although he won the battle at all tiers the urgently needed
eviction is till now eluding him as a mirage.
is the tenant of a shop building situate at Khalsa Gali, Agra. In 1978, the respondent-landlord filed an
application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the U.P. Act) on a twin need.
One is that his son who passed his medical examination wanted to carry on
medical practice and this building was needed for housing his clinic. The other
is, the landlord himself had just retired from Railway service and he too did
not want to waste his time, talent and energy and hence he wanted to start a
radio repairing work which he thought could be performed by using a portion of
the building. The first forum, called the Prescribed Authority, where the
application was filed, found the claim bona fide and ordered eviction on
25.3.1982. It was further found by the said authority that the tenant has
alternative accommodation in the same city for doing his business.
filed an appeal but it took only 3 years for the appellate court to dismiss the
appeal on 10.10.1985.
three years of pendency of an appeal is too much for a litigant it is not
considered unduly long by the standards now developed regarding the pendency
position of cases in the courts in India.
lengthiest leap which appellant secured was thereafter when he approached the
High Court. He filed a writ petition challenging the order of eviction before
the High Court of Allahabad in 1985 and the High Court after entertaining the
writ petition granted stay of operation of the eviction order. With the said
initial dosage administered by the High Court at the entry stage, the
hibernated writ petition seemed to have been consigned to records where it
remained in torpidity for a record period of 15 years. The dust stricken writ
petition was taken up and disposed of only thereafter and the High Court found
no ground to interfere with the order challenged before it.
who gained such a record time did not hesitate to make a plea to the High Court
to grant him six months time more to vacate and that too was acceded to on a
condition that appellant should give an undertaking before original authority
that he would vacate the premises within six months.
appellant who lost at all levels and yet succeeded during all these years by
keeping the order of eviction at bay, lately discovered that the landlords son,
for whom the eviction was sought, joined the Provincial Medical Service after
12 years of the institution of the lis. On that premise appellant ventured to
move the same High Court once again, and this time for a review of the order.
However, the review petition was dismissed by the High Court as per its order
which is also impugned now.
appeal petition filed in this Court appellant stated that the son of the
landlord who joined the Provincial Medical Service is posted at a place
situated 200 kilometers from Agra, whereat the building is situate, and that he
is now getting a pay of Rs.15,000/- per month.
point sought to be urged is that, subsequent developments may also be taken
into account in eviction proceedings, particularly when the eviction is sought
by a landlord on the ground that he bona fide needs the building for his own
use or for the use of any member of his family.
21(1) of the U.P. Act deals with proceedings for release of building under
occupation of tenant. Clause (a) of the sub-section alone is germane in the
present proceedings. The said clause is, therefore, extracted below:
prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf,
order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified
part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists
namely- (a) required either in its existing form or after demolition and new
construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his
family, or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for
residential purposes or that the building is bona fide for purposes of any
profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public
charitable trust, for the objects of the trust;
have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the
requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The
antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date
of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition
period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the
requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as
the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists.
During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his
son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain
idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any
new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the
building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation
the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long
interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on
that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the
proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during
the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted,
patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact.
All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious,
and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of
his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the
litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite,
because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly
cannot forget that while considering the bona fides of the need of the landlord
the crucial date is the date of petition. In Remesh Kumar vs. Kesho Ram [1992 Suppl.
(2) SCC 623] a two-Judge Bench of this Court (M.N. Venkatachalia, J., as he
then was, and N.M. Kasliwal, J.) pointed out that the normal rule is that
rights and obligations of the parties are to be determined as they were when
the lis commenced and the only exception is that the court is not precluded
from moulding the reliefs appropriately in consideration of subsequent events
provided such events had an impact on those rights and obligations.
the learned Chief Justice observed therein is this:
normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties
are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is
subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a
material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects
which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from
taking a cautious cognizance of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould
Court reiterated the same principle in Kamleshwar Prasad vs. Pradumanju Agarwal
[1997 (4) SCC 413] that the crucial date normally is the date of filing the
that case, a two-Judge Bench (K. Ramaswamy and G.B. Pattanaik, JJ) has held
that even the subsequent event of death of the landlord who wanted to start a
business in the tenanted premises is not sufficient to dislodge the bona fide
need established by him earlier. This is what Pattanaik J. has observed for the
apart, the fact that the landlord needed the premises in question for starting
a business which fact has been found by the appellate authority, in the eye of
law, it must be that on the day of application for eviction which is the
crucial date, the tenant incurred the liability of being evicted from the
premises. Even if the landlord died during the pendency of the writ petition in
the High court the bona fide need cannot be said to have lapsed as the business
in question can be carried on by his widow or any other son.
opinion, the subsequent events to overshadow the genuineness of the need must
be of such nature and of such a dimension that the need propounded by the
petitioning party should have been completely eclipsed by such subsequent
events. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu vs. Motor
and General Traders [1975 (1) SCC 770] which pointed to the need for re-moulding
the reliefs on the strength of subsequent events affecting the cause of action
in the field of rent control litigation, forewarned that cognizance of such
subsequent events should be taken very cautiously. This is what learned Judges
of the Bench said then:
affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party
just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current
realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of
events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceedings
provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed.
next three-Judge Bench of this Court, which approved and followed the above
decision, in Hasmat Rai vs. Raghunath Prasad [1981 (3) SCC 103] has taken care
to emphasise that the subsequent events should have wholly satisfied the
requirement of the party who petitioned for eviction on the ground of personal
requirement. The relevant passage is extracted below:
it is now incontrovertible that where possession is sought for personal
requirement it would be correct to say that the requirement pleaded by the
landlord must not only exist on the date of the action but must subsist till
the final decree or an order for eviction is made. If in the meantime events
have cropped up which would show that the landlords requirement is wholly
satisfied then in that case his action must fail and in such a situation it is
incorrect to say that as decree or order for eviction is passed against the
tenant he cannot invite the court to take into consideration subsequent events.
supplied) The judicial tardiness, for which unfortunately our system has
acquired notoriety, causes the lis to creep through the line for long long
years from the start to the ultimate termini, is a malady afflicting the
system. During this long interval many many events are bound to take place
which might happen in relation to the parties as well as the subject matter of
the lis. If the cause of action is to be submerged in such subsequent events on
account of the malady of the system it shatters the confidence of the litigant,
despite the impairment already caused.
course a two-Judge Bench (K. Ramaswamy and D.P. Wadhwa, JJ) pointed out in
another case Ansuyaben Kantilal Bhatt vs. Rashiklal Manilal Shah [1997 5 SCC
457] that the pendency of a lis for a record period of thirty one years has
transformed a middle aged landlord to advanced stage of gerenry and at that
stage he could not start a new business venture. After lamenting over the
system which caused a whopping delay of thirty-one years the Bench made two
directions. The first was that the son of the landlord who by that time had
four and a half years more to go for reaching the superannuation age could
consider starting the business in the tenanted premises after retirement. The
second was that in the meanwhile the rent for the building would stand enhanced
from Rs.101/- to Rs.3500/- per month.
all the aforesaid decisions, we are of the definite view that the subsequent
events pleaded and highlighted by the appellant are too insufficient to
overshadow the bona fide need concurrently found by the fact finding courts.
wish to add, as an epilogue, that this case can provide a catalytic agent for
the High Courts to evolve some concrete schemes for winching to the fore
similar long pending matters, lying in torpidity at the bottom of the crammed
list of pending cases in the High Courts after passing the initial orders,
keeping the operative part of decrees in abeyance. It is worth considering
whether a cell can be set up in each of such High Courts where the piles of
backlog are a stirring problem, to pick out such cases to be brought to the
notice of the Chief justice of the High Court concerned so that he could take
appropriate steps in the matter.
above is not an advice, but only a suggestion. If any alternative suggestion
would appear better the same can be resorted to. The time is running out for
doing something to solve the problem which has already grown into monstrous
form. If a citizen is told that once you resort to legal procedure for realisation
of your urgent need you have to wait and wait for 23 to 30 years, what else is
it if not to inevitably encourage and force him to resort to extra legal
measures for realising the required reliefs. A Republic, governed by rule of
law, cannot afford to compel its citizens to resort to such extra legal means
which are very often contra legal means with counter-productive results on the
maintenance of law and order in the country.
dismiss these appeals.