Ravinder
Kumar & Anr Vs. State of Punjab [2001] Insc
449 (31 August 2001)
K.T.Thomas,
S.N.Variava Thomas, J.
Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1118 of 2001
Leave
granted.
A
railway burial was contrived for eliminating the corpse of a business broker of
Ludhiana. The coffin made for that purpose
was camouflaged as parcel container to be despatched to a distant destination.
But the parcel narrowly missed from being consigned to the railway bogie as
some employees at the Parcel Service Center smelled foul. The suspicion led to
the disinterring of a strangled body which was later identified to be that of
the aforesaid business broker. Eventually it led to the detection of an
orchestrated murder committed by the appellants. The trial court convicted the
appellants for murder of the business broker besides the offences of abducting
him and destroying the evidence. They were sentenced to imprisonment for life
on the main count and to lesser terms of imprisonment on the other two counts.
A Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana confirmed the
conviction and sentence as per the judgment which is now being challenged.
Amar
Kumar Gupta (deceased) and his wife Veena were living with their two little
daughters (Sonia and Dimple) in their house at Ludhiana. He was making his livelihood through the brokerage earned
by him in the business transactions with the manufacturers of hosiery goods. It
appears that the two appellants were manufacturers of hosiery articles at Ludhiana and the manufacturing concern was
called "M/s. Kapoor Knitting, Harbans Pura", and they had engaged the
deceased as a broker for the sale of goods manufactured in their concern. The
amount which the appellant owed to the deceased ranged around one lakh of
rupees by way of brokerage.
Now
the prosecution story can be narrated compendiously. On 2.2.1994 the appellant
visited the house of the deceased at about 11 A.M. and they had a conversation, presumably about the brokerage claimed by
the deceased or due to him. Appellants asked the deceased to go with them so
that the accounts could be settled conveniently. Reciprocating the offer the
deceased went with them. He rode on a scooter along with Mohan Lal Jain (PW-8)
who was a close relative. As they reached the place of the appellants deceased
relieved PW-8 who was in a hurry to go away for his own work.
The
vivid details of what all happened thereafter are not known except that at some
time during the day the two appellants murdered the deceased by strangulating
him with a ligature. They packed the dead body in a wooden container. It was
wrapped in a gunny bag, on the top of which they scribbled the words "To
self-Arun Goel; G-1 New Delhi". They engaged a rickshaw-puller to
transport the container to the parcel service center adjoining the Railway Station
at Ludhiana. PW-5 Daya Ram (rickshaw- puller)
collected the load from the premises of M/s. Kapoor Knitting and transported it
in his rickshaw to the aforesaid parcel service center. The box was unloaded
from the vehicle to the parcel building by the rickshaw-puller with the help of
the two appellants and another person.
Then
the two appellants approached PW-11 who was one of the partners of a parcel
service firm and wanted to do the needful for booking the goods for being despatched
to New Delhi. It was 4.30 P.M. but they learnt that the next goods train available from
that station would be only on the succeeding day. However, PW-11 agreed that
the goods would be despatched on the next day itself. But when the Parcel
Supervisor weighed the load and found it to be 152 Kgs. he felt something fishy
about it. But by that time both the appellants had left the scene. So the
container was kept outside the Parcel Office. Perhaps the staff at the parcel
section felt that the load was something suspicious and hence they wanted to
see what was inside the container.
On
4.2.1994 the Chief Parcel Supervisor intimated the police about the suspicious
container lying at their office. After the police reached, the container was
opened and all of them became stunned seeing a dead body with a ligature tied
around its neck and the legs tied up with a string stuffed inside the box. The
body was found wrapped with a black glazed paper and the box was wrapped with a
gunny bag on which the destination of the parcel was scribbled as mentioned
above. The inquest was held by PW-17 Boota Ram who was the Station House
Officer, General Railway Police Station (GRPS), Ludhiana.
The
police suspecting the appellants detailed a guard at the house of the accused
as both were absent from the scene. On 11.2.1994, the first appellant Ravinder
Kumar returned to the house but when he noticed the presence of the police in
the vicinity of his house he realised that he was within the penumbra of police
suspicion. He then ran away from the place. On the way he gulped some poison
but before he could die he was admitted in the CMC Hospital, Ludhiana. On
25.2.1994 he was arrested by the police when he was discharged by the hospital
authorities.
Appellant
Surinder Kumar was arrested in connection with some other case on 2.5.1994 by
the Jind Police. When PW-17 Boota Ram came to know of his arrest he proceeded
to that station and took over the custody of appellant Surinder Kumar after
formally arresting him in connection with this case.
The
case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence.
The
trial court and the High Court concurrently found that the circumstances proved
by the prosecution were quite sufficient to establish that the deceased was
murdered by the two appellants and that they tried to dislodge the corpse in
such a manner as to escape from anybody's suspicion.
We
have no doubt that the deceased Amar Kumar Gupta was murdered on 2.2.1994 by
ligature strangulation and his body was packed up in a wooden container which
was camouflaged as a parcel consignment. Nor has that aspect been disputed by
the appellants. The sole question which the appellants seriously disputed was
that they were the killers of the deceased. To substantiate that appellants
were the real murderers in this case prosecution has presented the following
circumstances:
(1)
Appellants had dealings with the deceased and a good sum was to be paid to the
deceased by way of brokerage.
(2) On
2.2.1994 appellants went to the house of the deceased and persuaded him to go
with them up to their house at Mohalla Taj Ganj situated in Harbans Pura.
(3) On
the same evening appellants engaged PW-5 Daya Ram (rickshaw-puller) to
transport a load wrapped in a gunny bag from the factory of the appellants at Harbans
Pura to the parcel office of the Ludhiana Railway Station.
(4)
Appellants booked the parcel to be despatched to New Delhi on the same evening. When the parcel employees asked
certain queries regarding the heavy weight of the load appellants advanced
false excuses.
(5)
The container was opened and the dead body was disintered. Since then the
appellants remained absent from the locality itself for 14 days henceforth.
(6)
The appellant Ravinder Kumar immediately on smelling that police suspected him
attempted to commit suicide.
(7) On
the information supplied by the said appellant the scooter of the deceased was
retrieved from the premises of the Railway Station, Ludhiana.
(8)
The clothes of the deceased were recovered by PW-17 Investigating Officer on
the basis of the information elicited from appellant Ravinder Kumar.
Both
the courts found that the prosecution has established the above circumstances
with convincing and reliable evidence. But learned counsel for the appellants
contended that there are some basic infirmities which did not weigh with the
two courts and those infirmities are sufficient to disrupt the chain of
circumstances. He first contended that the FIR was inordinately delayed and
that itself is a vitiating factor. His next contention was that the two courts
did not consider how a rickshaw-puller would remember, after many days, that a
particular load was transported at the instance of the appellants. Lastly, he
contended that the appellants had no motive to murder the deceased, and even
the suggestion made by the prosecution for that purpose remained
unsubstantiated. On these grounds he pleaded for interference with the
conviction and sentence passed on the appellants.
The
attack on prosecution cases on the ground of delay in lodging FIR has almost
bogged down as a stereotyped redundancy in criminal cases. It is a recurring
feature in most of the criminal cases that there would be some delay in
furnishing the first information to the police. It has to be remembered that
law has not fixed any time for lodging the FIR. Hence a delayed FIR is not
illegal. Of course a prompt and immediate lodging of the FIR is the ideal as
that would give the prosecution a twin advantage.
First
is that it affords commencement of the investigation without any time lapse.
Second is that it expels the opportunity for any possible concoction of a false
version.
Barring
these two plus points for a promptly lodged FIR the demerits of the delayed FIR
cannot operate as fatal to any prosecution case. It cannot be overlooked that
even a promptly lodged FIR is not an unreserved guarantee for the genuineness
of the version incorporated therein.
When
there is criticism on the ground that FIR in a case was delayed the court has
to look at the reason why there was such a delay. There can be a variety of
genuine causes for FIR lodgment to get delayed. Rural people might be ignorant
of the need for informing the police of a crime without any lapse of time. This
kind of unconversantness is not too uncommon among urban people also. They
might not immediately think of going to the police station.
Another
possibility is due to lack of adequate transport facilities for the informers
to reach the police station.
The
third, which is a quite common bearing, is that the kith and kin of the
deceased might take some appreciable time to regain a certain level of tranquillity
of mind or sedativeness of temper for moving to the police station for the
purpose of furnishing the requisite information. Yet another cause is, the
persons who are supposed to give such information themselves could be so
physically impaired that the police had to reach them on getting some nebulous
information about the incident.
We are
not providing an exhausting catalogue of instances which could cause delay in
lodging the FIR. Our effort is to try to point out that the stale demand made
in the criminal courts to treat the FIR vitiated merely on the ground of delay
in its lodgment cannot be approved as a legal corollary. In any case, where
there is delay in making the FIR the court is to look at the causes for it and if
such causes are not attributable to any effort to concoct a version no
consequence shall be attached to the mere delay in lodging the FIR. [Vide Zahoor
vs. State of UP (1991 Suppl.(1) SCC 372; Tara Singh
vs. State of Punjab (1991 Suppl.(1) SCC 536); Jamna vs.
State of UP (1994 (1) SCC 185). In Tara Singh
(Supra) the Court made the following observations:
"It
is well settled that the delay in giving the FIR by itself cannot be a ground
to doubt the prosecution case. Knowing the Indian conditions as they are we
cannot expect these villagers to rush to the police station immediately after
the occurrence. Human nature as it is, the kith and kin who have witnessed the
occurrence cannot be expected to act mechanically with all the promptitude in
giving the report to the police.
At
times being grief-stricken because of the calamity it may not immediately occur
to them that they should give a report. After all it is but natural in these
circumstances for them to take some time to go to the police station for giving
the report." In the present case, no doubt, there is apparently a long
delay of two days to give information to the police but the bereaved widow was
not absolutely certain that she lost her husband once and for all until her
brother-in-law confirmed to her, after identifying the dead body, that the same
was that of her husband. The initial tension and suspense, undergone by her
would have billowed up into a massive wave of grief. It is only understandable
how much time a woman, placed in such a situation, would take to reach some
level of placidity for communicating to the strangers of what she knew about
the last journey of her husband. We therefore find no merit in the contention
based on the delay of lodging the FIR.
The
second contention relates to the evidence of PW-5 Daya Ram (rickshaw-puller).
He remembered the two appellants who engaged him to carry the load in his
rickshaw up to the railway station. He also identified the wooden box in which
the load was packed, with the help of the scribblings made on it. The
contention is that it is not possible for any person, much less a
rickshaw-puller like PW5, to remember who exactly employed him to carry a
particular load on a particular day, after the lapse of several days
thereafter. This contention is raised overlooking the psychological phenomenon
that human memory is very often a conditioned characteristic. Anything which
has any special or peculiar lineament can create an impact on the human mind
lasting for long. While it is true that routine events in a man's day to day
life may not remain in his mind for being remembered later, any odd or bizarre
happenings involving him or in front of him have the tendency to stick in his
mind indelibly. If there is any cause for him to recollect such events again they
get refreshed again. That is why he is able to narrate such events with all
details when asked to do so. This applies to all witnesses in criminal cases
involving serious offences. Normally no porter or rickshaw-puller could speak
from memory as to whom or whose load he carried many days ago. But if the
carrying of a load on a particular day was soon followed by the flash of
sensational news in the locality - that the load contained the corpse of a
murdered person, the instinctive reaction of the carrier is to become
inquisitive to know whether it was in respect of the load which he himself
carried. If that inquisitiveness had turned positive it is extremely probable
that all the vivid details relating to that event would stick in his memory.
For him such event would not have been a usual occurrence but extraordinarily
odd and queer. Hence it is not likely to fade out of the canvass of his mind.
It will be unrealistic to jettison the testimony of such a witness on the mere
ground that he could not have remembered after the lapse of long period the
identity of the persons who engaged him and also of the load which he carried.
We, therefore, repel such contention.
The
third contention is that the motive alleged by the prosecution was not
established and hence the area remains gray as to what would have impelled them
to liquidate the broker. No doubt it is the allegation of the prosecution that
appellants owed a sum of Rs. one lakh to the deceased and it might not have
been possible for the prosecution to prove that aspect to the hilt. Nonetheless
some materials were produced for showing that there were transactions between
the appellants and the deceased and that they had some account to be settled.
Only thus far could be established but not further. It is generally an
impossible task for the prosecution to prove what precisely would have impelled
the murderers to kill a particular person. All that prosecution in many cases
could point to is the possible mental element which could have been the cause
for the murder. In this connection we deem it useful to refer to the
observations of this Court in State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Jeet Singh {1999 (4) SCC 370}:
"No
doubt it is a sound principle to remember that every criminal act was done with
a motive but its corollary is not that no criminal offence would have been
committed if the prosecution has failed to prove the precise motive of the
accused to commit it. When the prosecution succeeded in showing the possibility
of some ire for the accused towards the victim, the inability to further put on
record the manner in which such ire would have swelled up in the mind of the
offender to such a degree as to impel him to commit the offence cannot be
construed as a fatal weakness of the prosecution. It is almost an impossibility
for the prosecution to unravel the full dimension of the mental disposition of
an offender towards the person whom he offended." An earlier decision of
this Court in Nathuni Yadav vs. State of Bihar {1998 (9) SCC 238}, which dealt with the same aspect, has been referred
to therein and a passage therefrom has been extracted. We are, therefore, not
persuaded to change the tide on account of the inability of the prosecution to
prove the motive aspect to the hilt.
In the
result we dismiss this appeal.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 882
OF 2001 (Arising from S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 904 of 2001) S. Nagalingam .. Appellant
Sivagami .. Respondent
K.G.
BALAKRISHNAN, J.
Leave
granted.
This
appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Madras in Criminal Appeal No. 486 of 1999 reversing the order of
acquittal passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Madras. The learned Single
Judge found the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 494 IPC.
The
appellant, S. Nagalingam married respondent-complainant Sivagami on 6.9.1970.
Three children were born from that wedlock.
The
respondent alleged that the appellant started ill-treating her and on many
occasions she was physically tortured. As a result of ill-treatment and severe
torture inflicted by the appellant as well as his mother, she left her marital
home and started staying with her parents. Whille so, the respondent came to
know that the appellant had entered into a marriage with another woman on
18.6.1984, by name Kasturi, and that the marriage was performed in a Marriage
Hall at Thiruthani. The respondent then filed a criminal complaint before the
Metropolitan Magistrate against the appellant and six others. All the accused
were acquitted by the trial court. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed
criminal appeal No. 67 of 1992 before the High Court of Madras. The learned
Single Judge, by his judgment dated 1.11.1996 upheld the acquittal of accused
2-7, but as regards the acquittal of the appellant, the matter was remitted to
the trial court permitting the complainant to adduce evidence regarding the
manner in which the marriage was solemnized. Upon remand, the Priest [PW-3],
who is alleged to have performed the marriage of the appellant with the second
accused, Kasturi, on 18.6.1984, was further examined and the appellant was
allowed further cross-examination.
The
learned Metropolitan Magistrate by his judgment dated 4.3.1999 acquitted the
accused. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the respondent preferred a criminal
appeal before the High Court of Madras. By the impugned judgment, the learned
Single Judge held that the appellant had committed the offence punishable under
Section 494 IPC. This is challenged before us.
We
heard Mr. R. Sundravardan, learned senior counsel for the appellant. The
respondent Sivagami appeared in person and she filed some documents in court.
Though she was offered the assistance of a counsel, she declined to avail
herself of that opportunity.
The
short question that arises for our consideration is whether the second marriage
entered into by appellant with the second accused, Kasturi, on 18.6.1984 was a
valid marriage under Hindu Law so as to constitute an offence under Section 494
IPC.
The
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 494 IPC are
(I)
the accused must have contracted the first marriage;
(ii) whilst
the first marriage was subsisting, the accused must have contracted a second
marriage; and
(iii) both
the marriages must be valid in the sense that necessary ceremonies governing
the parties must have been performed.
Admittedly,
the marriage of the appellant with the respondent, entered into by them on
6.9.1970, was subsisting at the time of the alleged second marriage. The
Metropolitan Magistrate held that an important ceremony, namely, "Saptapadi"
had not been performed and therefore, the second marriage was not a valid
marriage and no offence was committed by the appellant . The learned Single
Judge reversing this decision in appeal held that the parties are governed by
Section 7-A of the Hindu Marriage Act as the parties are Hindus residing within
the State of Tamil Nadu. It was held that there was a valid second marriage and
the appellant was guilty of the offence of bigamy.
In the
complaint filed by the respondent, it was alleged that the appellant had
contracted the second marriage and this marriage was solemnised in accordance
with the Hindu rites on 18.6.1984 at RCC Mandapam, Tiruttani Devasthanam. To
support this contention, PWs 2 & 3 were examined. PW-3 gave detailed
evidence regarding the manner in which the marriage on 18.6.1984 was performed.
Learned
counsel for the appellant contended that as per the evidence of PW-3, it is
clear that "Saptapadi", an important ritual which forms part of the
marriage ceremony, was not performed and therefore, there was no valid marriage
in accordance with Hindu rites.
It is
undoubtedly true that the second marriage should be proved to be a valid
marriage according to the personal law of the parties, though such second
marriage is void under Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act having been
performed when the earlier marriage is subsisting. The validity of the second
marriage is to be proved by the prosecution by satisfactory evidence.
In Kanwal
Ram & Ors. vs. H.P. Administration AIR 1966 SC 614 this Court held that in
a bigamy case, the second marriage is to be proved and the essential ceremony
required for a valid marriage should have been performed. It was held that mere
admission on the part of the accused may not be sufficient.
The
question as to whether "Saptapadi" is an essential ritual to be
performed, came up for consideration of this Court in some cases.
One of
the earliest decisions of this Court is 1971 (1) SCC 864 [Smt. Priya Bala Ghosh
vs. Suresh Chandra Ghosh] wherein it was held that the second marriage should
be a valid one according to the law applicable to the parties. In that case,
there was no evidence regarding the performance of the essential ceremonies,
namely, "Datta Homa" and "Saptapadi". In paragraph 25 of
the judgment, it was held that the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court
have categorically found that "Homo" and "Saptapadi" are
the essential rites for a marriage according to the law governing the parties
and there is no evidence that these two essential ceremonies have been
performed when the respondent is stated to have married Sandhya Rani. It is
pertinent to note that in paragraph 9 of the judgment it is stated that both
sides agreed that according to the law prevalent amongst the parties,
"Homo" and "Saptapadi" were essential rites to be performed
to constitute a valid marriage. Before this Court also, the parties on either
side agreed that according to the law prevalent among them, "Homo"
and "Saptapadi" were essential rites to be performed for
solemnization of the marriage and there was no specific evidence regarding the
performance of these two essential ceremonies.
1979
(3) SCC 80 [Lingari Obulamma vs. L. Venkata Reddy & Ors.] was a case where
the High Court held that two essential ceremonies of a valid marriage, namely
"datta homa" and "sapathapathi" [taking seven steps around
the sacred fire] were not performed and, therefore, the marriage was void in
the eye of law. This finding was upheld by this Court. The appellant therein
contended that among the "Reddy" community in Andhra Pradesh, there
was no such custom of performing "datta homa" and "saptapadi",
but the High Court held that under the Hindu Law these two ceremonies were
essential to constitute a valid marriage and rejected the plea of the appellant
on the ground that there was no evidence to prove that any of these two
ceremonies had been performed. The finding of the High Court was upheld by this
Court that there was no evidence to prove a second valid marriage.
In
1991 Supp. (2) SCC 616 [Santi Deb Berma vs. Kanchan Prava Devi] also, the
appellant was acquitted by this Court as there was no proof of a valid marriage
as the ceremonial "Saptapadi" was not performed. This Court noticed
in this case also that the High Court proceeded on the footing that according
to the parties, performance of "Saptapadi" is one of the essential
ceremonies to constitute a valid marriage.
Another
decision on this point is 1994 (5) SCC 545 [Laxmi Devi vs. Satya Narayan &
Ors.] wherein, this Court, relying on an earlier decision in [1971] 1 SCC 864
(supra), held that there was no proof that "Saptapadi" was performed
and therefore, there was no valid second marriage and that no offence of bigamy
was committed.
In the
aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it has been held that if the
parties to the second marriage perform traditional Hindu form of marriage,
"Saptapadi" and "Datta Homa" are essential ceremonies and
without there being these two ceremonies, there would not be a valid marriage.
In the
instant case, the parties to the second marriage, namely the appellant, Nagalingam,
and his alleged second wife, Kasturi, are residents of the State of Tamil Nadu
and their marriage was performed at Thiruthani Temple within the State of Tamil
Nadu. In the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, there is a State Amendment by the State
of Tamil Nadu, which has been inserted as Section
7-A. The relevant portion thereof is as follows :
"7-A.
Special provision regarding suyamariyathai and seerthiruththa marriages. ---
(1)
This section shall apply to any marriage between any two Hindus, whether called
suyamariyathai marriage or seerthiruththa marriage or by any other name,
solemnized in the presence of relatives, friends or other persons –
(a) by
each party to the marriage declaring in any language understood by the parties
that each takes the other to be his wife or, as the case may be, her husband;
or
(b) by
each party to the marriage garlanding the other or putting a ring upon any
finger of the other; or
(c) by
the tying of the thali.
(2)
(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7, but subject to the other
provisions of this Act, all marriages to which this section applies solemnized
after the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act, 1967,
shall be good and valid in law.
(b)
Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7 or in any text, rule or
interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force
immediately before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment)
Act, 1967, or in any other law in force immediately before such commencement in
any judgment, decree or order of any court, but subject to sub-section (3), all
marriages to which this section applies solemnized at any time before such
commencement, shall be deemed to have been with effect on and from the date of
the solemnization of each such marriage, respectively, good and valid in law.
(3)
.............................................
(a).........................................
(i)
.....................................
(ii)
....................................
(b)
........................................
(c)
........................................
(4)
.................................................."
Section
7-A applies to any marriage between two Hindus solemnized in the presence of
relatives, friends or other persons. The main thrust of this provision is that
the presence of a priest is not necessary for the performance of a valid
marriage. Parties can enter into a marriage in the presence of relatives or
friends or other persons and each party to the marriage should declare in the
language understood by the parties that each takes other to be his wife or, as
the case may be, her husband, and the marriage would be completed by a simple
ceremony requiring the parties to the marriage to garland each other or put a
ring upon any finger of the other or tie a thali. Any of these ceremonies,
namely garlanding each other or putting a ring upon any finger of the other or
tying a thali would be sufficient to complete a valid marriage. Sub-section
2(a) of Section 7-A specifically says that notwithstanding anything contained
in Section 7, all marriages to which this provision applies and solemnized
after the commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act, 1967 shall
be good and valid in law. Sub-section 2(b) further says that notwithstanding
anything contained in Section 7 or in any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu
law or any custom or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the
commencement of the Hindu Marriage (Madras Amendment) Act 1967, or in any other
law in force immediately before such commencement or in any judgment, decree or
order of any court, all marriages to which this section applies solemnized at any
time before such commencement, shall be deemed to have been valid. The only
inhibition provided is that this marriage shall be subject to Sub-Section (3)
of Section 7-A. We need not elaborately consider the scope of Section 7-A(3) as
that is not relevant for our purpose.
The
evidence in this case as given by PW-3 clearly shows that there was a valid
marriage in accordance with the provisions of Section 7-A of the Hindu Marriage
Act. PW-3 deposed that the bridegroom brought the "Thirumangalam" and
tied it around the neck of the bride and thereafter the bride and the
bridegroom exchanged garlands three times and the father of the bride stated
that he was giving his daughter to "Kanniyathan" on behalf of and in
the witness of "Agnidevi" and the father of the bridegroom received
and accepted the "Kanniyathan". PW-3 also deposed that he performed
the marriage in accordance with the customs applicable to the parties.
Under
such circumstances, the provisions of Section 7-A, namely, the State Amendment
inserted in the Statute are applicable and there was a valid marriage between
the appellant and Kasturi. Moreover, neither complainant nor the appellant had
any case that for a valid marriage among the members of the community to which
they belong, this ceremony of "Saptapadi" was an essential one to
make it a valid marriage. Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act says that a Hindu
marriage may be solemnized in accordance with the customary rites and
ceremonies of either party thereto and where such rites and ceremonies include
the Saptapadi, i.e. the taking of seven steps by the bridegroom and the bride
jointly before the sacred fire, the marriage becomes complete and binding when
the seventh step is taken.
"Saptapadi"
was held to be an essential ceremony for a valid marriage only in cases where
it was admitted by the parties that as per the form of marriage applicable to
them that was an essential ceremony. The appellant in the instant case,
however, had no such case that "Saptapadi" was an essential ceremony
for a valid marriage as per the personal law applicable whereas the provisions
contained in Section 7-A are applicable to the parties. In any view of the
matter, there was a valid marriage on 18.6.1984 between the appellant and the
second accused, Kasturi. Therefore, it was proved that the appellant had
committed the offence of bigamy as it was done during the subsistence of his
earlier marriage held on 6.9.1970.
The
learned Single Judge was right in holding that the appellant committed the
offence of bigamy and the matter was correctly remanded to the trial court for
awarding appropriate sentence. We see no merit in this appeal and the same is
dismissed accordingly.
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