Nilangshu
Bhusan Basu Vs. Deb K. Sinha & Ors [2001] Insc 447 (31 August 2001)
S.R.Babu,
Brijesh Kumar Brijesh Kumar, J.
Special Leave Petition (civil) 15062 of 1998
The
present appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated September 18, 1998 passed by a Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court, allowing the writ petition and setting aside the selection
of the appellant for the post of Chief Municipal Engineer (Civil) of the
Calcutta Municipal Corporation.
Whereas
the S.L.P. No.. 15062/98 is preferred against another judgment of the Calcutta
High Court dated August
11, 1998, dismissing
the writ petition filed by Subhendu Maiti & Ors. challenging the same
selection though on different grounds. Since both the matters relate to the
same selection and for the same post, they have been listed and heard together.
Hence, common order.
The
post of Chief Municipal Engineer (Civil) fell vacant in Calcutta Municipal
Corporation. The recruitment to such posts is made in accordance with the
provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act 1980 and Calcutta
Municipal Corporation (Recruitment of officers appointed by Mayor-in- Council)
Rules 1985. Section 14 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act (`Act' for
short) deals with officers and employees of the Corporation. Clause (f) of
Section 14 (1) provides for such number of Deputy Municipal Commissioners and
Chief Municipal Engineers as the Mayor-in-Council may, from time to time,
determine. Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 14 of the Act are quoted below:
"(3)
The other officers referred to in clauses (e) to (j) of sub-section (1) shall
be appointed - (a) by the Mayor-in-Council in consultation with the State
Public Service Commission, or (b) by the State Government in consultation with
the Mayor-in- Council, by notification, from amongst persons who are or have
been in the service of Government, if the Mayor-in- Council so decides.
(4)
The method of, and the qualifications required for , recruitment, and the terms
and conditions of service including conduct, discipline and control of officers
appointed by the Mayor-in-Council shall be such as may be prescribed.
The
posts of Chief Municipal Engineers are referable to clause (f) of sub-section
(1) of Section 14. Hence the appointment to the said posts is to be made in
accordance with clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 14.
The Calcutta Municipal (Recruitment of officers
appointed by Mayor-in-Council) Rules 1985 (For short, "Rules") lay
down the qualification and other conditions for recruitment of the officers of
the Municipal Corporation. The post of Chief Municipal Engineer (Civil) is at Sl.
No.8 of the Appendix VII to the Rules. It lays down qualification for selection
and appointment of Chief Municipal Engineer (Civil) by direct recruitment as
well as for appointment by promotion. These qualifications are as follows:
"8.
Chief Municipal Engineer (Civil) Rs.2000-125/2-2,2375:
Qualifications
and age under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the said Act:- (A)
For direct recruitment - Essential
(a) A
citizen of India.
(b) (A
degree in Civil Engineering from a recognized University or its equi- valent.
(c) 12
years' experience as an Engineer in a responsible post or posts in Government
service or Statutory Bodies or in an Engineering or Construction concerns of
repute, last basic pay drawn being not less than Rs.1,800/-;
(d)
Age not more than 45 years on the 1st day of January of the year of
recruitment, relaxable for well- qualified or well experienced candidates. .
Desirable:
A post graduate degree or diploma in Civil Engineering Public Health
Engineering, B. For promotion:
(a)
From officers possessing 2 years experience in the post immediately below and
total 10 years experience in Municipal Engineering Service with a Civil
Engineering degree or diploma from a recognized University or its equivalent;
(b) No
age bar. "
The
Corporation proceeded to select a candidate for the post of Chief Municipal
Engineer (Civil) by direct recruitment, in consultation with the Public Service
Commission. The selection was held and the present appellant (Respondent No.5
in the Writ Petition) was duly selected. The High Court has set aside the
selection on the ground that recruitment to the post of Chief Municipal
Engineer (Civil) can either be by direct recruitment or by promotion. It has
been held that there is no guideline as to in what circumstances recruitment
should be through process of direct selection or by promotion. Therefore, there
is an element of arbitrariness in deciding as to which mode of recruitment
should be adopted. The High Court was of the view when both modes are
available, process for recruitment by promotion from amongst the departmental
candidates should be resorted to first and in case suitable candidates are not
available, method of direct recruitment should be adopted otherwise it will
amount to arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of power as against the
departmental officers as the departmental candidates also have some legitimate
expectations of being considered for appointment to the higher posts. The
relevant observations and the findings of the High Court is quoted below:
"....We
have no hesitation in saying and holding that whenever such an eventuality
arises or may arise, the Corporation should first consider the case of appointment
by promotion and, only when it decides in consultation with the Commission that
appointment by promotion is not desirable or feasible or not required for any
purpose or reason, it will have the option of adopting the method of direct
recruitment for filling up such post. There is a logic behind exercising first
option in favour of promotion. The logic is that when you have a whole lot of
officers down below in the hierarchy available to you, is it not your duty to
first consider their worth, merit and suitability, in consultation with the
Commission and only then to decide whether any one of them is worthy and
suitable of holding that office and, only after such decision is taken and you
find that none is suitable to be promoted, to go in for direct
recruitment." The provisions of the Act or the Rules do not substantiate
the above proposition, as laid. According to the High Court, taking a decision
straightaway for direct recruitment without first examining the worth of the
departmental candidates, is arbitrary. It has also been held that the Public
Service Commission should have been consulted by the Corporation while taking a
decision as to whether recruitment should be by direct recruitment or by
promotion.
We
feel that once the rules permit recruitment to a post either by direct
recruitment or by promotion leaving the decision to the appropriate authority,
it will be difficult to say or lay down that process of recruitment by
promotion must necessarily be adopted first. As a matter of fact, it would
amount to legislating a provision in the Statute.
In
absence of any rules to that effect, it would be an administrative function of
the appointing/ appropriate authority to take a decision as to which method
should be adopted for recruitment on any particular post. It may depend on
various factors relevant for the purpose e.g. status of the post, its
responsibilities and job requirement, the suitable qualifications as well as
the age as may be desirable may also be taken into consideration while making such
an administrative decision. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant- the
selected candidate a decision reported in AIR 1989 S.C. 2060 State of Andhra Pradesh and another versus Sadanandam and
others has been relied upon. It has been observed as also quoted in the
impugned judgment "...We need only point out that the mode of recruitment
and the category from which the recruitment to a service should be made are all
matters which are exclusively within the domain of the executive. It is not for
the judicial bodies to sit in judgment over the wisdom of the executive in
choosing the mode of recruitment or the categories from which the recruitment
should be made as they are matters of policy decision falling exclusively
within the purview of the executive." From the above observations it is
clear that such a decision is purely administrative in nature. The High Court
on perusal of the record found that the matter was considered, and has also
reproduced an official note in that connection from the record of the
Corporation. The note of the Municipal Commissioner is also quoted. It is dated
26.3.1997 and reads as follows:
"As
discussed in MIC, we should go in for selection of the best candidate through
open competition" The above note of the Municipal Commissioner indicates
that the question of mode of recruitment to the post of Chief Municipal
Engineer (Civil), was discussed by the Mayor-in-Council and thereafter and on
the basis thereof it was decided to have best candidate through open
competition. It is difficult for the Court and also not feasible to further go
into the matter doubting the 'note' quoted above or about the sufficiency of
the discussion in the MIC or correctness of the decisions taken. The fact thus
remains that the Mayor-in-Council discussed the matter and decided to go in for
direct recruitment. It has not been submitted before us that the MIC had no
authority to take such a decision or that the decision taken suffers from mala-fides.
There is no basis to come to a conclusion that process of promotion must
necessarily be adopted first and in the event of non-availability of suitable
candidate, the direct recruitment can be resorted to.
So far
the contention that Mayor-in-Council should have consulted the Public Service
Commission, in taking a decision as to whether recruitment is to be made by
direct recruitment or by promotion, in our view has no force. All that is
provided in clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 14 is that appointment to
the given posts shall be made by Mayor-in-Council in consultation with the
State Public Service Commission and clause (b) provides for appointment by
State Government in consultation with Mayor-in-Council from among the persons
who are or have been in the service of the Government, if the Mayor-in-Council
so decide.
A
reading of sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 14 by no means leads us to the
conclusion that Public Service Commission is to be consulted for taking a
decision as to which mode of recruitment should be adopted. In this connection
learned counsel for the Respondent has referred to a decision reported in 1994
Supp (1) S.C.C. 44 K. Narayanan and others versus State of Karnataka and others. Our attention has been
particularly drawn to Paragraph 6 of the judgment where it is observed :
"The word `recruitment' is comprehensive to include any method provided
for inducting a person into a public service. Appointment, selection,
promotion, deputation are all well-known methods of recruitment".
This
observation only indicates the extent of the meaning of the word `recruitment'
which may include appointment as well within its folds besides other steps
necessary for making an appointment. But in Section 14 (3) it is provided that
such officers shall be "appointed" by the Mayor-in-Council in
consultation with the State Public Service Commission. The word `recruitment'
has not been used. Therefore, the observations made in the case of Narayanan
& Ors. (Supra) would not help the respondents in support of their
contention that the State Public Service Commission should have been consulted
even for taking the decision as to which mode of recruitment namely, direct
recruitment or by promotion, should be adopted.
It is
also to be noticed that another mode of appointment is provided in clause (b)
of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act, namely, the State Government in
consultation with the Mayor-in-Council may make an appointment from amongst
persons who are or have been in the service of the Government.
This
method of appointment would be adopted if "the Mayor-in-Council so
decides" (emphasis supplied). It may further be pointed out that
sub-section (4) of Section 14 of the Act, amongst other things, provides that
method of recruitment shall be such as may be prescribed. The provisions
indicated above namely sub- sections (3) it clauses (a) and (b) and sub-section
(4) of Section 14, leave no scope for the argument that Mayor-in-Council should
have consulted the Public Service Commission before taking a decision as to
whether the appointment is to be made by direct recruitment or by promotion.
It has
next been submitted that the departmental officers have been discriminated
against since only those departmental officers could apply who responded to the
qualification laid down for the candidates for direct recruitment more
particularly about the age, since maximum age limit was 45 years.
In
this connection it may be observed that the qualifications have been prescribed
in the rules including the upper age limit for an applicant. It is informed
that there were forty outside candidates and eight others working in the
Department. From amongst the 48 candidates, the appellant was selected, who is
said to have been working as an Executive Engineer in the department. According
to the learned counsel for the respondent he would become senior and an officer
even higher to the Dy. Chief Engineer, who have either not been selected or
were not able to apply because of the age bar or for any such reason. It is
submitted that ignoring the senior officers working in the department or
placing junior officers above them would lead to only unreasonable results. It
may be observed that method of direct recruitment was adopted as permissible
under the rules. Anyone responding to the qualification was free to apply
including the departmental candidates. Some of the petitioners in the other
Writ Petition are those who had applied but remained unsuccessful. It was an
open selection based on merit and not seniority.
Therefore,
it cannot be argued that method of direct recruitment as adopted brought about
any unreasonable results or it was discriminatory. In this connection it may
also be mentioned here that learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
post graduate qualification was one of the desirable qualification prescribed
under the rules. It is further submitted that the appellant was the only
candidate who possessed the post graduate qualification. We are however not on
the merit of the selection. The Selection Committee made the selection of the
candidate whom it thought to be the best among the applicants. We therefore
find no force in this submission too as raised on behalf of the respondents.
We
don't find that there has been violation of Article 16 of the Constitution in
any manner as sought to be argued on behalf of the respondents. We further find
no ground for the High Court to have held that first the process for promotion
should be resorted to and in case no candidate fit to be promoted was available
then alone direct recruitment could be resorted to. It is not a correct approach.
The order of the High Court is not sustainable.
We may
now advert to Special Leave Petition NO.15062 of 1998. It may be noted that all
the appellants in the S.L.P. took chance and participated in the selection but
they remained unsuccessful.
According
to the petitioners, the experience as required for being eligible for
consideration should be on a responsible post meaning thereby on a post below
the one for which the recruitment is being made, that is in the present on the
post of the Deputy Municipal Chief Engineer (Civil). The other contention was
that at the time of interview there has not been any break- up of marks for
different factors. Both these contentions had been rejected by the learned
Single Judge and that order has been upheld by the Division Bench in appeal.
Learned
counsel for the petitioner failed to substantiate the submission that
experience on a "responsible post" would mean experience on the just
below post. He referred to a Circular dated April 1, 1992 issued by the Municipal Corporation
(Personnel Department) . It relates to recruitment to `A' Category post like
that of Medical Officer, Assistant Engineer and Deputy Assessor Collector,
Deputy Treasurer etc. It has been provided that experience on supervisory post
would mean the post immediately below the post to which promotion is to be
made, for example experience on the post of Assistant Assessor/Assistant
Collector/Assistant Treasurer etc.
would
be experience on a supervisory post for promotion to the post of Deputy
Assessor, Deputy Collector, Deputy Treasurer etc. We hardly find that this
Circular would be applicable in the case in hand. It is specific about `A'
category posts and not for all categories and ranks. Another Circular dated
21.6.1988 has been referred to which relates to recruitment on the post of
Deputy Chief Engineer (Civil) , Deputy Chief Engineer (Mechanical) etc. By
means of the said circular experience on the post of Executive Engineer or on
any similar post was required. It firstly relates to the recruitment to the
post of Deputy Chief Engineer. It cannot be applied for recruitment to the post
of Chief Municipal Engineer (Civil). Such a condition is not contained in terms
of required qualification for the post of Chief Municipal Engineer (Civil).
Wherever experience on a post just below is needed, such a provision is
specifically contained. On this basis it cannot be generally held that for
every post in any rank or category the `responsible post' must necessarily mean
the post next below the post for which recruitment is to be made.
Then
our attention has been drawn to Annexure `Z' to the petition dated August 11, 1998. It is a notice issued by the
Municipal Secretary conveying the information that meeting of the Calcutta
Municipal Corporation was to be held on August 18, 1998 at 1.00 P.M. It then indicates the agenda according to which
recommendations of the MIC were to be considered as also the proposal of the
DMC (HQ) regarding framing of recruitment regulation for the post of CMC
(P&D).
At
internal Page 5 of Annexure `Z' proposed qualification have been indicated and
in clause (ii) it is proposed that there should be twelve years experience as
an engineer in a Government/semi-government or a statutory body etc. with at
least five years experience on a senior post in the rank of Deputy Chief
Engineer in the State Government or its equivalent. It is further provided that
last scale of pay drawn should not be less than that of Deputy Chief Engineer,
Govt. of West Bengal or its equivalent post. This document relied upon by the
petitioner is nothing but a mere agenda for consideration containing certain
recommendations to frame regulations for recruitment. It was in the state of
proposal. Another fact which is noticeable is that even in the proposal no such
qualification is suggested for recruitment to the post of Chief Municipal
Engineer (Civil). In our view the petitioner have completely failed to
substantiate through any of the documents referred to above that the expression
"experience on the responsible post" would mean, in the present case,
experience on the post of Deputy Chief Engineer which is next below the post of
Chief Municipal Engineer (Civil). We find no force in this submission made on
behalf of the petitioner.
The
other grievance is that no break up of the marks in the interview had been made
for different factors taken into consideration for selecting a candidate. We
find no substance in this submission also. The Selection Committee awarded the
marks to the different candidates as would be evident on perusal of the
judgment of the High Court.
The
selected candidate had got the highest marks.
The
selection was by the Public Service Commission.
All
the candidates responded to the qualifications as prescribed. In our view the
selection cannot be thrown out merely on such contentions as raised by the
petitioner viz. there was no break up of the marks or it was not as it should
have been according to the petitioners. All candidates possessed the required
qualification and experience, and they must have been working in different
organizations. The assessment of their merit on the basis of their work and
experience and personal interview by the expert body cannot be discarded on
such grounds. The S.L.P. has thus no force.
In
view of the discussion held above, we allow the Civil Appeal No.6356 of 1998
and set aside the judgment passed by the Division Bench of the Calcutta High
Court dated September
18, 1998. The Special
Leave Petition (Civil) No.15062 preferred against the judgment of the Calcutta
High Court dated August
11, 1998 is dismissed.
Costs
easy.
Back