Mr.K.Ramakrishna
& Ors Vs. State of Bihar & ANR [2000] INSC 492 (22 September 2000)
D.P. Mohapatra,
& R.P. Sethi. SETHI, J.
L.I.T.J
The appellants, who are senior officers of the United Bank of India, have been
arraigned as accused persons in the charge-sheet submitted by the CBI in the
Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Patna, for the offences punishable
under Sections 467, 468, 420 and 120B IPC. They filed a petition under Section
239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying for being discharged as,
according to them, no case was disclosed either in the FIR or in the documents
accompanying the final report submitted under Section 173 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The Magistrate, vide his order dated 6.7.1996, rejected the
application and directed the presence of the appellants in the court for
framing of charges. Feeling aggrieved the appellants moved the High Court under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with prayer for quashing the
order of the Magistrate. Their prayer was rejected vide the order impugned,
hence this appeal.
Mr.Altaf
Ahmad, the learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the appellants
submitted that the averments made in the FIR do not make out any case against
his clients, inasmuch as none of them have even been named therein. He further
submitted that without disputing the validity of the allegations made in the
FIR and the accompanying documents, including the statements of witnesses
recorded under Section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, no case is made out
against anyone of the appellant under any penal law. Learned counsel appearing
for the respondents has, however, submitted that the Judicial Magistrate has
taken note of the case diaries and other record produced before him and found
on facts, that as the appellants were posted on different administrative and
responsible posts in the Bank at the time of occurrence which took place during
their tenure, to their direct or indirect knowledge and in that commission, the
possibility of their involvement in criminal conspiracy could not be ruled out.
He has also drawn our attention towards paras 48, 63, 64, 71, 79, 82, 83, 84,
86, 110 and 112 of the case diaries to impress upon that there existed evidence
against the appellants which justified the passing of the impugned orders. It
is contended that this Court cannot re-evaluate the evidence at this stage for
the purposes of prima-facie finding out as to whether the appellants had
committed the offences with which they are directed to be charged.
The
inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure can be exercised to quash proceedings, in appropriate cases either to
prevent the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice. Ordinarily the criminal proceedings which are instituted against the
accused must be tried and taken to logical conclusions under the Code of
Criminal Procedure and the High Court should be reluctant to interfere with the
proceedings at an interlocutory stage. However, there may be cases where the
inherent jurisdiction to quash proceedings can and should be exercised. Where
there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the criminal
proceedings in respect of the alleged offence, the High Court should not be
reluctant to exercise the inherent jurisdiction. Similarly where the
allegations in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face
value do not constitute the offence alleged, or without appreciating the
evidence but only merely by looking at the complaint or the FIR or the
accompanying documents, the offence alleged is not disclosed, the person
proceeded against in such a frivolous criminal litigation has to be saved.
The
Trial Court under Section 239 and the High Court under Section 482 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure is not called upon to embark upon an enquiry as to
whether evidence in question is reliable or not or evidence relied upon is
sufficient to proceed further or not. However, if upon the admitted facts and
the documents relied upon by the complainant or the prosecution and without
weighing or sifting of evidence, no case is made out, the criminal proceedings
instituted against the accused are required to be dropped or quashed. As
observed by this Court in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi & Ors. [1999
(3) SCC 259], the High Court or the Magistrate are also not supposed to adopt a
strict hyper-technical approach to sieve the complaint through a cullendar of
finest gauzes for testing the ingredients of offence with which the accused is
charged.
Such
an endeavour may be justified during trial but not during the initial stage.
In
view of the legal position, as noticed above, it has to be seen whether the FIR
or the documents accompanying the final report under Section 173 of the
Criminal Procedure Code including the statements recorded by the prosecution
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, discloses the commission
of any offence against the appellants. The charge-sheet (Annexure B) filed does
not refer to any withness or circumstance which the prosecution intends to use
against the appellants. From the record it appears that for irregularities in
the affairs of the Branch of the Bank, various complaints were lodged with the
local police and the CBI against one Abhay Kant Jha in the years 1983, 1985 and
1987. In its report submitted on 30th November, 1987, the CBI recommended prosecution of
said Shri Abhay Kant Jha along with Shri Sanjay Kumar Roy, respondent No.2 herein.
To counter blast and ward off his involvement, the said Shri Sanjay Kumar Roy
filed a complaint in the year 1987 with the Gandhi Maidan Police Station, Patna making accusations only against
said Shri Abhay Kant Jha. However, while narrating the facts therein, he
submitted that some of the appellants had approached him and his father for
amicable payments of the bank's dues. It may be noticed that the CBI, after
detailed investigations, addressed a confidential report to the bank
recommending prosecution of Shri Abhay Kant Jha and 8 other persons including
the aforesaid Sanjay Kumar Roy. None of the appellants was found to be, in any
way, connected with the commission of the offences alleged in the complaint. As
noticed earlier, the Trial Court on perusal of some paras in the case diary
found that there existed evidence by which the appellants could be connected
with the commission of the crime with which they were charged. We have perused
all those paras and other parts of the case diary and find that the Trial
Magistrate was not justified in his observations so far as the appellants are
concerned. In paragraph 48 of the case diary the investigation officer has
mentioned the fact of his visiting the branch office of the United Bank of India on 29.11.1987 at 11 a.m. where despite notice, the officers of the bank were
not present. Thereafter he served notice upon the Assistant Manager asking him
to cause the presence of all the officers in the police station on 15.12.1987.
In paragraph 63 a fact is mentioned about the presence of the officers of the
bank at the police station. In Paragraphs 64 and 71 the statement of appellant
No.1 is stated to have been recorded. In paragraph 79 it is recorded,
"diary should be perused because documents of United Bank has not been
received and proceedings is being initiated for finding it". In paragraph
82 it is mentioned that on number of occasions person was sent to the United
bank, Bokaro for getting the papers of the case but papers were not received.
In
paragraph 83 a mention is made of "documents or papers have been received
about which the proceedings should be initiated after the discussion with the ASP City".
Paragraph
84 mentions the compliance of order of ASP
City.
Paragraph
86 records that the documents received were shown to S/Shri Balakrishna Rai and
Ram Kishore Rai who after seeing the papers and documents told that they do not
bear the signature of Shri Sanjay Kumar Roy. In paragraph 110 it is recorded
that IO reached the office of the bank at Bokaro and searched Shri Ram Deo Yadav,
Branch Manager but what was recovered upon search is not noticed. In paragraphs
112-113, the IO has recorded "I proceeded from Dhanbad in connection with
the investigation of other case". On perusal of the other paragraphs of
the case diaries we noticed not an iota of evidence against any appellants. We
are conscious of the fact that in the normal circumstances, this Court or the
High Court while deciding the sufficiency of the evidence would not resort to
the perusal of the case diary and sit in appeal over the judgment of the
investigating officer but as the Trial Magistrate is apparently shown to have
recorded wrongly with respect to the facts allegedly noticed in the case diary,
this Court vide order dated 17.7.1998 had no option but to direct the counsel
of the respondent-State to produce the documents referred to in the report
filed under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On perusal of FIR,
the final report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and all other
documents accompanying it, we are satisfied that no case is made out against
any of the appellants and the pendency of the proceedings against them before
the Magistrate is an abuse of process of court. The appeal is allowed and the
order of the High Court dated 8th April, 1997
and Magistrate dated 6.7.1996 are quashed and the appellants discharged in
terms of Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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