M/S.
Sunil Industries Vs. Ram Chander Pradhan & ANR [2000] INSC 570 (14 November 2000)
S.N.Variava,
S.R.Babu
L.I.T.J
This
Appeal is against an Order dated 7th May, 1997 by which the first appeal filed by the appellant has been
dismissed in limine. Briefly stated the facts are as follows: The Petitioner is
a sole proprietory concern. It runs its workshop of shaping steel sheets into
various shapes and forms. The 1st Respondent was, at the relevant time, working
as a press operator with the Appellant. On 27th January, 1993 while working on a press, the 1st
Respondent sustained injuries to his right index finger and thumb. The
Appellant rushed the 1st Respondent to the Civil Hospital at Gurgaon (Haryana). The injuries
necessitated amputation of 2.5 x 0.5 Cms. of the index finger. On 14th June, 1993, the 1st Respondent filed a claim
under the@@ JJJ Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 claiming compensation in@@
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25,000/- with interest thereon @ 16% per annum. The Appellant in his reply,
inter alia, claimed that the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act would
not apply to his establishment. On 15th October 1996 the Commissioner held that the
Workmen's Compensation Act applied and that the Appellant was liable to pay
compensation in a sum of Rs.29,814/- together with Rs.5,000/- as penalty and
interest at 12% per annum. The Appellant preferred an Appeal under Section 30
of the Worken's Compensation Act before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.
That Appeal came to be dismissed in limine by the impugned order dated 7th May, 1997. It is admitted that the 1st
Respondent was working as a press operator with the Appellant at the relevant
time. It is admitted that the accident did took place on 27th January, 1993 and that it resulted in injuries to
the right index finger and thumb of the 1st Respondent and that this
necessitated amputation of
2.5 x
0.5 Cms. of the index finger. Mr. Vasdev however, submitted that the Workmen's
Compensation Act did not apply to the Appellant's establishment. He submitted
that Section 2(n) (ii) of the Wormen's Compensation Act provides that a workman
is a person employed in a capacity specified in Schedule II. He then referred
to Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act and pointed out that under
item 2 of Schedule II a person would be a workman provided he is employed in
any premises where a manufacturing process as defined in clause (k) of Section
2 of the Factories Act 1948 was being carried on. He submitted that this showed
that the provisions of the Factories Act were being incorporated into the
Workmen's Compensation Act. He submitted that this is also clear from the fact
that over the years there have been a number of amendments to the Workmen's
Compensation Act incorporating therein provision of the Factories Act or
provisions similar thereto. He then referred to Section 2(k) and 2 (m) of the
Factories Act and submitted that under the Factories Act the manufacturing
process must be in a factory where ten or more workers are working (if the
manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power) or twenty or
more persons are working (if the manufacturing process is being carried on
without the aid of power). He submitted that a joint reading of all these
provisions makes it clear that even for the purposes of the Workmen's
Compensation Act only those persons who are employed in a factory within the
meaning of the Factories Act, 1948 would be entitled to make a claim under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. We are unable to accept the submissions of the
learned counsel. It is true that the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 has been
amended on a number of occasions. However inspite of numerous amendments the Legislature
has purposely omitted to specifically provide that only a workman who is
employed in a factory, as defined in the Factories Act, could make a claim. All
that has been done is that in Schedule II of the Workmen's Compensation Act it
is inter alia clarified that persons employed, otherwise than in a clerical
capacity, in any premises wherein a manufacturing process as defined in clause
(k) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948, are workmen. Significantly the
definition of the term "Factory" as appearing in clause (m) of
Section 2 of the Factories Act 1948 has not been incorporated in the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Thus it is clear that for the Workmen's Compensation Act to
apply it is not necessary that the workman should be working in a Factory as
defined in the Factories Act, 1948.
It has
not been denied that the workshop of the Appellant would fall under clause (k)
of Section 2 of the Factories Act. Therefore, the 1st Respondent would be a
Workman within the meaning of the term as defined in the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Under the circumstances, we see no merit in the Appeal. The same stands
dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
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