C.I.T.,
Trivandrum Vs. M/S Anand Theatres [2000] INSC
332 (12 May 2000)
M.B.Shah,
A.P.Misra Shah, J.
Leave
granted in SLP (Civil) Nos.4373-74 of 1999.
Question
involved in these appeals is whether building which is used as a hotel or a
cinema theatre can be considered to be apparatus or a tool for running the
business so that it can be termed as a plant and depreciation can be allowed
accordingly or whether it remains a building wherein either hotel business or
business for cinema could be conducted? The aforesaid question is to be decided
in the background of the specific provisions granting depreciation to
buildings, machinery and plant under Section 32 of Income Tax Act, 1961 (herein
after referred to as the Act). And also to decide whether time has come to have
a fresh look at the old precedents and to lay down the law with the changed
perceptions keeping in view the provisions of the Act? Further, to what extent
are we required to follow and adopt artificial and largely judge-made sense of
the word plant, which is given inclusive meaning under Section 43(3) and in
context of the Scheme of Section 32? In this batch of civil appeals, some
appeals are filed by the Revenue and some by the assessees. Since the question
involved in all these appeals is similar, we would deal with the facts in Civil
Appeal No. 4758 of 1998 for convenience. For the assessment year 1986-87 the
assessee claimed depreciation at 15% on the theatre building claiming it to be
a plant. The assessing officer by order dated 27.9.1988 rejected the claim and
allowed depreciation only at 5%. The appeal filed by the assessee before the
Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Trivandrum was allowed by order dated 21.7.1989 holding that the theatre building
is to be treated as a plant. Being aggrieved, the Revenue filed appeal ITA
No.748/Coch/89 before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Cochin Bench, Cochin. It was contended by the Revenue
that the theatre building is not a plant and even if it is to be construed as
plant only that part of the building housing the auditorium and furniture and
fittings found therein should be construed as plant and not the entire
building. The Tribunal by order dated 29.9.1994 held that the entire theatre
building should be construed as plant for the purposes of granting depreciation
and further allowed the claim of assessee for extra shift allowance.
Revenue
filed Reference Application No.264 of 1994 before Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal, Cochin Bench, Cochin requesting the Tribunal to draw up
a statement of case and refer the questions, arising out of the order of
Tribunal passed in ITA No.748 [Coch]/1989 dated 29.9.1994, for opinion of the
High Court of Kerala. After hearing both the sides, the Tribunal referred
following questions to the High Court of Kerala.
(1) Whether
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the theatre building can be
considered as a plant? (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the
case, the assessee is entitled to higher rate of depreciation on the theatre?
The High Court of Kerala in ITR No.85 of 1996 considered the above questions
and after relying upon its earlier decision in CIT, Trivandrum v. M/s Abhilash Theatre, Kottayam
answered in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. [Against the
decision rendered in Abhilash Theatres case, Civil Appeal No.5198-5199 of 1998
is pending before this Court being disposed of by this judgment] The question
considered by the High Court in Abhilash Theatres case (Supra) was whether
hotel building and theatre building can be considered as a plants. With regard
to the hotel, the Court considered whether hotel building is merely a setting
or premises or whether that plays an important role in running the hotel,
meaning thereby whether the building is such without which business of hotel
cannot be conceived; and if a building is an integral part of hotel business,
that is some thing more than merely a place, accommodating some requisites of
hotel, then that would partake the character of plant. For this purpose, the
High Court considered the decisions in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Barclay,
Curle & Co. Ltd.
[(1969)
1 WLR 675] and Scientific Engineering House P. Ltd.
v.
Commissioner of Income-Tax, A.P. [(1986) 157 ITR 86 SC]. The Court observed
that the principle that can be deducted is that if a building is merely a
setting or place to accommodate some apparatus, then that will not be held as
plant but if a building which does not merely accommodate something or which
cannot be regarded merely as a setting or premises, but if that plays an
important role in carrying on the business, then that would fall within the
inclusive definition of the plant. Thereafter, the Court observed thus: - The
hotel building in our opinion, cannot be equated with a residential building,
which provides shelter to the people living therein. Building is essential to
run the business of hotel. Without befitting building it is ideal to think of
an hotel business. A good hotel requires amenities and a building which is so
erected as to fulfill the requisite norms of hotel. A building simply
accommodating machinery or other apparatus to run a factory is different from
the hotel building, which is specially designed, suiting to the hotel
requirements. So specifically erected building cannot be said to be a mere
setting or premises. No hotel can function without a suitable building
satisfying the norms of hotel.
The
Court further observed: - Building and plant are not mutually exclusive. When
dry dock a concrete dry structure can be held a plant because the whole dock
was used for carrying on the entire operation, we fail to understand why the
hotel building specially erected for that purpose, cannot be held as plant. As
a specially erected building for hotel is used for carrying on the hotel
operation, it must come within the inclusive definition of the plant.
The
High Court further considered the case of Scientific Engineering House (P) Ltd.
(Supra) and applying the functional test held that the hotel building is a tool
of the assessees business. Plant cannot necessarily be confined to an apparatus
which is used for mechanical operations or process or is employed in industrial
operations. The Court further held that terms building and plant occurring in
Section 32(1) are not mutually exclusive and a building depending on its nature
and peculiarity can be held as plant. The High Court disagreed with the
decisions in C.I.T. v. Lake Palace Hotels & Motels P. Ltd. [(1997) 226 ITR
561 Rajasthan] and CIT v.
Damodar
Corporation Hotel Pankay, [(1997) 137 ITR 574 Kerala] but agreed with the
decision of Karnataka High Court in C.I.T. v. Dr. B. Venkata Rao, [(1991) 202
ITR 302] and the decision of Calcutta High Court in S.P. Jaiswal Estates (P)
Ltd. v. CIT, [(1995) 216 ITR 145 Calcutta].
The
High Court finally held that the hotel building is plant entitled to
depreciation applicable to plant under the rules framed under the Act. Further
with regard to the theatre building, the Court referred to the decision of
Allahabad High Court in S.K. Tulsi and Sons v. C.I.T.
[(1991)
187 ITR 685] and held that what holds good for the hotel building, that equally
applies to a theatre building.
Being
aggrieved, the Revenue has filed the present appeal by special leave.
VARIOUS
RELEVANT DECISIONS RENDERED BY THIS COURT AND THE HIGH COURTS ON THE ISSUE.
(A)
DECISIONS OF THIS COURT In CIT, Andhra Prdesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel [(1971) 82 ITR
44 (SC)] this Court considered that the sanitary and pipeline fittings fell
within the definition of plant in section 10(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and
therefore, the assessee was entitled to development rebate in respect thereof.
The Court further held that the fact that the assessee claimed depreciation on
the basis that sanitary and pipeline fittings fell under furniture and fittings
in Rule 8(2) of the Income Tax Rules 1922 did not detract from this position as
the Rules cannot take away what is controlled by the Act or whittle down its
effect. After considering the contentions raised by the Revenue, the Court
observed as under: - It cannot be denied that the business of a hotelier is
carried on by adapting a building or premises in a suitable way to be used as a
residential hotel where visitors come and stay and where there is arrangement
for meals and other amenities are provided for their comfort and convenience.
To have sanitary fittings etc., in a bath room is one of the essential
amenities or conveniences which are normally provided in any good hotel, in the
present times. If the partitions in Jarrolds case [(1963) 1 W.L.R.
214]
could be treated as having been used for the purpose of the business of the
trader, it is incomprehensible how sanitary fittings can be said to have no
connection with the business of the hotelier. He can reasonably expect to get
more custom and earn large profit by charging higher rates for the use of rooms
if the bath rooms have sanitary fittings and similar amenities.
(Emphasis
supplied) Thereafter, the Court further held if the dictionary meaning of the
word plant were to be taken into consideration on the principle that the literal
construction of a statute must be adhered to unless the context renders it
plain that such a construction cannot be put on the words in questionthis is
what is stated in Websters Third New International Dictionary: Land, buildings,
machinery, apparatus and fixtures employed in carrying on trade or other
industrial business.
It is,
however, unnecessary to dwell more on the dictionary meaning because, looking
to the provisions of the Act, we are satisfied that the assets in question were
required by the nature of the hotel business which the assessee was carrying
on. They were not merely a part of the setting in which hotel business was
being carried on.
In
Scientific Engineering House P. Ltd. (Supra) this Court considered that the
drawings, designs, charts, plans, processing data and other literature
comprises in the documentation service as specified in clause (3) constituted a
book which fell within the definition of plant in section 43(3) of the Income
Tax Act. The Court held that these documents did not perform any mechanical
operations or processes, but that cannot militate against their being a plant
since they were in a sense the basic tools of the assessees trade having a
fairly enduring utility. The Court further held that capital assets acquired by
the assessee, namely, the technical know how in the shape of drawings, designs,
charts, plans, processing data and other literature falls within the definition
of plant and therefore a depreciable asset. The Court also referred to the
functional test referred by Lord Guest in Barclays case and observed as under:
In other words, the test would be: Does the article fulfil the function of a
plant in the assessees trading activity? Is it a tool of his trade with which
he carries on his business? If the answer is in the affirmative, it will be a
plant.
We
would add that the learned counsel for the assessees on 3rd May, 2000 has filed
an additional submission pointing out the decision rendered by this Court in
CIT v. Dr. B. Venkata Rao, [(2000) 243 ITR 81], wherein this Court dismissing
the appeal filed by the revenue held that the nursing home building was
specially equipped as a plant for the assessees business. The Court observed:
What is to be determined is whether the particular nursing home building was equipped
as to enable the assessee to carry on the business of a nursing home therein or
whether it is just any premises utilised for that object.
We
find from the order of the Tribunal as also the assessment order that the
assessees nursing home is equipped to enable the sterilisation of surgical
instruments and bandages to be carried on. It is reasonable to assume in the
circumstances, particularly having regard to the Tribunals order which states
that the sterilisation room covers about 250 sq. ft. that the nursing home is
also equipped with an operation theatre. In the circumstance, we think that the
finding of the High Court should be accepted.
This
decision is based on the facts found by the Tribunal and the High Court wherein
it was held that nursing home was equipped to enable sterilisation of surgical
instruments and bandages to be carried on and that room covered 250 sq. fts.
and hence was a plant As such, no legal contentions were raised and considered
by the Court and the matter is decided solely on the facts as quoted above
without any discussion. Hence, this decision would not be of any assistance in
determining the question involved.
(B)
DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE HIGH COURTS In C.I.T. Lucknow v. Kanodia Cold Storage
[(1975) 100 ITR 155] the Allahabad High Court arrived at the conclusion that
where a building with insulated walls is used as a freezing chamber, though it
is not machinery or part thereof, it is part of the air conditioning plant of
the cold storage of the assessee and will be entitled to special depreciation
at 15% on its written down value.
In
S.K. Tulsi and Sons v. C.I.T. [(1991) 187 ITR 685], the Allahabad High Court
arrived at the conclusion that the cinema building constructed and used as a
cinema along with its fittings and fixtures and wherein cinema business was
carried on constitute a plant.
In
C.I.T. v. Hotel Luciya [(1998) 231 ITR 492] the Full Bench of Kerala High Court
held that for deciding whether a building is plant or not Court must apply what
is called functional tests and further held that hotel building and theatre
building are plant within the meaning of Section 43(3) of the Act and
accordingly entitled to depreciation as applicable to the plant [Against this
decision, Civil Appeal No.15 of 1999 is pending before this Courtbeing disposed
of by this judgment] Further, in CIT Patiala II v. Yamuna Cold Storage [(1981)
129 ITR 728], Punjab & Haryana High Court held that the building with
insulated walls of the cold storage was a plant and was entitled to depreciation
at 15%. Allahabad High Court in Leela Movies v. CIT [191 ITR 113] and Tulsi
Theatre v. CIT [(1991) 190 ITR 575] held that the cinema building constitute
plant within the meaning of Section 43(3). Andhra Pradesh High Court in CIT v.
Warner Hindustan Ltd. [(1991) 117 ITR 15] held that the well dug in the factory
by the assessee for the purpose of carrying on its business was a plant within
the meaning of Section 43(3) and, therefore, the assessee was entitled to
depreciation and development rebate on the cost of digging the well. Bombay
High Court in CIT v. Caltax Oil Refinding (India) Ltd. [(1979) 116 ITR 404] held that the fencing round the refinery
processing unit constitutes plant and was entitled to depreciation and
development rebate. Karnataka High Court in CIT v. Dr. B. Venkatarao [(1993)
202 ITR 303] held that building which was used as nursing home was a plant.
Similarly, in CIT, Karnataka v. Woodlands Hotel Pvt. Ltd. [IRTC No.48 & 49
of 1993 dt.16th June, 1997] [Against this decision, Civil Appeals No.4373-74 of
1999 are pending before this Courtbeing disposed of by this judgment] and in
CIT v. Hotel Rama Pvt. Ltd. [(1998) 146 CTR 243] held that building in which
hotel business is carried on is a plant for the purpose of grant of
depreciation. Madras High Court in Additional CIT v.
Madras
Cement Ltd. [110 ITR 281] held that the special reinforced concrete foundation
for the purpose of locating or installing the rotary kiln in the factory would
come within the scope of the expression plant and is entitled to development
rebate.
In
C.I.T. v. Krishna Botttlers P Ltd. [(1989) 175 ITR 154] the Andhra Pradesh High
Court held that bottles were essential tools of the trade for it was through
them that soft drink was passed on from the assessee to the customers and,
therefore, were plant for the purpose of Income-tax. In that case, Court
exhaustively considered various decisions including the decisions of the Courts
in England and inter alia held that the building or the setting in which the
business is carried on cannot be plant; in considering whether a structure is
plant or premises, one must look at the finished product and not at the bits
and pieces as they arrive from the factory. The fact that a building or part of
a building holds the plant in position does not convert the building into
plant. A piecemeal approach is not permissible and the entire matter must be
considered as a single unit unless of course, the component parts can be
treated as separate units having different purposes and the functional test is
a decisive test.
In CIT
v. Lawly Enterprises (P) Ltd., [1997 (225) ITR 154] the High Court of Patna
considered whether the hotel is a plant within the meaning of section 43(3) of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 and depreciation at the rate of 15 per cent is admissible
to it? The Court observed that a building intended to be used or in fact used
earlier as a residential accommodation can be converted any time into a lodge
and used for running a hotel business. On the other hand, there are hotels,
self-contained in many ways and having a small world of their own; and it is
possible that the buildings housing such hotels may have certain special design
and features and those buildings may be said to form an integral part of the
business of running that hotel and in those cases, the buildings may qualify as
plant but that would depend upon the facts of each case.
In
S.P. Jaiswal Estates (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax [(1995) 216 ITR
145], the Calcutta High Court considered similar questions and observed as under:
(Page 151}: - the hotel building owned by the assessee and used for the purpose
of carrying on its hotel business was an apparatus with which the assessees
hotel business was carried on. It cannot be treated as a setting, within which
or a canopy under which, the assessee carried on its business. The hotel
building is to be treated as plant for the purpose of depreciation allowance
under Section 32.
(C)
Judgments expressing contrary views: - In CIT v. Damodar Corporation Hotel
Pankay, [(1997) 137 ITR 574] the Kerala High Court held that a hotel in its
entirely is not a plant for the purpose of depreciation and observed as under:
- a perusal of the said statutory provisions of Section 32- A of the Act would
show that the words machinery and plant have been separately with an exclusive
character from each other finds place in the concerned enactments of the
Section. The statutory provision also of other requirements for entitlement to
investment allowance on the count.
In
R.C.Chemical Industries v. CIT, New Delhi [(1982) 134 ITR 330 (Delhi)], the
Delhi High Court held that the definition of word plant given under Section
43(3) should be given a wide meaning as it is inclusive definition. It held
that assessee who constructed a building having atmospheric controls, namely
moisture, temperature and provision for filtered air, which were required for
manufacturing of saccharine, would not come within the expression plant. It
observed that the mere fact that manufacture of saccharine would be better
carried on in this type of building would not convert the building from the
setting to the means for carrying on the business. Such a building which is
free from atmospheric vagaries might have certain advantages as compared with a
normal construction, but it remained the space or shelter where the business of
manufacturing saccharine was carried on as opposed to the means.
In
Siemens India Ltd. v. CIT, [(1996) 217 ITR 622 (Bombay)] the Court observed
that an item would not qualify to be plant even if it satisfied the functional
test, if on an application of premises test it is found to be used as or part
of the premises or place upon which the business was conducted.
In
C.I.T. v. Lake Palace Hotels & Motels P. Ltd.
[(1997)
226 ITR 561] the Rajasthan High Court considered similar questions and after
perusal of various judgments and dictionary meanings observed that the
Legislature has by subsequent amendments made it clear that hotel and cinema
premises will fall within the definition of building and summarised various principles
emerging from various decisions of different courts as under:- (i) The
functional test is a decisive test.
(ii)
An item which falls within the category of building cannot be considered to be
plant. Buildings with particular specification for atmospheric control like
moisture temperature are not plant.
(iii)
In order to find out as to whether a particular item is a plant or not, the
meaning which is available in the popular sense, i.e., the people conversant
with the subject-matter would attribute to it, has to be taken.
(iv)
The term plant would include any article or object, fixed or movable, live or
dead, used by a businessman for carrying on his business and it is not
necessarily confined to any apparatus which is used for mechanical operations
or process or is employed in mechanical or industrial business. The article
must have some degree of durability.
(v)
The building in which the business is carried on cannot be considered to be a
plant.
(vi)
The item should be used as a tool of the trade with which the business is
carried on. For that purpose the operations it performs have to be examined.
On the
basis of aforesaid principles, the Court came to the conclusion that: - the
building of hotel is a building. Simply because some special fittings or controlling
equipments are attached, it will not take it out of the category of building.
Even if a particular building falls within the category of plant then it could
not be considered to be a plant and will be considered as building because the
golden rule of interpretation is that if a particular item is more near to one
category, then by stretching it should not be considered to fall in a category
which is far off.
The
Court further observed: - The building which is used in the business of hotel
remains a building inspite of the fact that it is decoratedIf the skeleton of
the building without decoration is building then the items by which it is
decorated would not change the character of building. The item may, however, be
considered as plant subject to its use. The use of the building is as a
setting. Building is not used as a tool of the trade.
Different
rates of depreciation for building have been provided which also makes the
legislative intent clear that the different types of buildings remain as building.
The amendment of Section 32(1)(v) has only clarified the legislative intent
that the building of hotel is a building, though by amendment a higher rate of
deprecation is provided for it. In an industry no production can be normally
carried on without a building where the plant and machinery is installed but
for that reason the building cannot be considered as plant when there is a
separate entry for buildings for purpose of depreciation. Buildings may
accommodate plant and machinery or living persons. It remains a building If the
building of a five star hotel is a plant there is no reason why the building of
an ordinary hotel should be treated differently only on account of the charges
for extra facilities. The difference of charges is because of extra service
facilities, etc., provided and the role of the building in the two types of
hotels remains the same and at the same time even better services are provided
in a number of guest houses.
The
building which is used for accommodating the cinema-goers remains a building
even if specially designed.
If the
functional test is applied, it would be found that it accommodates the
machinery for exhibition of the film like any other factory where production is
carried on and provides the accommodation to the public for viewing the picture
and cannot be taken out from the definition of building. The building is not
used as a tool of the trade as it is used for accommodating the customers as a
setting.
In
respect of cinema the work is carried on by the projector which displays the
film on screen.
The
Court lastly held that looking to the common parlance meaning and the specific
use of the word building in section 32 of the Act, the building of a hotel is a
building and not a plant.
SUBMISSIONS:
- On the basis of the aforesaid judgments, the learned counsel for the revenue
as well as assessee have made elaborate submissions. Mr. S. Ganesh, learned
senior counsel for the appellant-revenue submitted: (i) Section 32(1) of the
Income Tax Act draws a clear line of distinction between a building used for
the purpose of business and plant/machinery used for the same purpose. A
building though specially designed for use in a particular business does not,
therefore, cease to be a building. Every building used for the purpose of a
particular business would contain special features which make the building
suitable for that particular business use. Further, without the building, the
business cannot be carried on. That does not lead to the conclusion that the
building becomes plant.
Otherwise,
every building would become plant and the dividing line between plant and
building would get obliterated which is not permissible. (ii) Section 43(3)
defines plant in inclusive terms. Each item included in Section 43(3) is
movable. Section 43(3) does not, therefore, contemplate immovable property like
a building being considered as plant. The ejusdem generis and noscitor a socis
principles are relevant in this connection. (iii) Section 32(i)(ii), Section
32-A and the Appendix to the Income Tax Rules speak of plant and machinery
being installed and of building being erected.
This
again brings out the distinction clearly. (iv) Section 32(i)(v) unequivocally
provides that a new building used as hotel is regarded as a building for
purpose of depreciation.
In
other words, a building which is specially designed and constructed for use as
a hotel is nevertheless a building, for the purpose of depreciation. (v)
Section 32(1)(iia) and Section 33(1)(b)(B)(ii) and the Appendix to the Income
Tax Rules speak of plant and machinery installed in premises used as a hotel,
thereby clearly, establishing that the hotel premises are not machinery or
plant, but are only a building. The same principle would also apply to a
theatre building. Section 32(i)(iv) makes it clear that even
structures/buildings which are constructed in compliance with the requirements
of the Factories Act and Rules are buildings for the purpose of depreciation.
Mr.
B.B. Ahuja and Mr. Joseph Vellapally, learned senior counsel for the assessee submitted:
(i) From the ratio of the various judgments of this Court and that of the House
of Lords and Court of Appeal, it is clear that the words buildings, machinery,
plant and furniture in S. 32(1) are not mutually exclusive. It follows that a
particular item could fall under both the heads, buildings as well as plant on
functional test and the assessee would be entitled to depreciation under the
head more beneficial to it. In other words, buildings and structures can also
be considered as plant provided they fulfil the functional test, that is, they
are part of whole apparatus with which the trade is carried on as opposed to
the place or setting where it is carried on. (ii) In the modern era, the
theatre building including auditorium, stage projection room etc. are a tool of
the trade, the theatre building is an integral part of the operation of theatre
business and cannot be said to merely a setting in which the business is
carried on. It is their contention that most of the High Courts in India have followed
the functional test propounded while determining as to whether a structure is a
building or plant. The High Courts have taken the view that structures which
forms part of the apparatus with which the business is carried on are not mere
settings for the business and hence ought to be considered as plant for the
purposes of allowance of depreciation under S.32(1). According to them, on this
functional test, a modern theatre building and a hotel building will qualify as
a plant. (iii) After the judgments in Kanodia Cold Storage and S.K.Tulsi &
Sons cases (supra) following the decision in Taj Mahal Hotels case, the
Legislature amended the definition of plant in Section 43(3) of the Act by
Finance Act of 1995. The amending section clearly shows that the legislative
intent was never to exclude cinema and hotel buildings which satisfy the
functional test from the meaning of the word plant. (iv) Use of the word
installed or erection has no bearing on the issue. (v) The subject of
determination whether a hotel building or a cinema theatre can be held to be a
plant is not free from difficulty and it is difficult to draw a clear line for
plant or building in some cases. Despite this as legislature or Central Board
of Direct Taxes adopted by various has not issued any clarification on the
subject, the view High Courts requires to be accepted.They submitted that
cinema theatre or a hotel building is to be considered as one unit with all
attendant apparatus for running the business and if they are construed as one
unit it would be a plant. Secondly, these buildings are to be considered not on
their own but in relation to the business carried on by the assessee namely
running of hotel or cinema. In support of this contention, the learned counsel
heavily relied upon Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Barclay, Curle & Co.
Ltd.
[(1969)
1 WLR 675also reported in (1970) 76 ITR 62] and other decisions stated above.
Hence,
the controversial question for consideration iswhether building used for
running hotel or cinema business could be held a plant as provided under
Section 43(3) of the Act? We would first refer to the judgment in Barclay,
Curle & Co. case (supra) upon which most of the judgments of the High
Courts are based for arriving at the conclusion that building which is used for
running the hotel business or cinema theatre would be a plant. In the said
case, the House of Lords considered whether a dry dock constructed by a Company
for use of shipbuilders, ship repairers and marine engineers incurring capital
expenditure, which comprised the cost of excavating a specially shaped new
basin, having direct access to the Clyde and a floor below the level of high
tide to enable ships to float in and out could be considered to be a plant for
the purpose of trade of the Company within the meaning of Section 279 of the
Income Tax Act, 1952. Relevant part of Section 279 as applicable, which was
considered, reads thus: - where a person carrying on a trade incurs capital
expenditure on the provision of machinery or plant for the purposes of the
trade, there shall be made to him, for the year of assessment in the basis
period for which the expenditure is incurred, an allowance (in this Chapter
referred to as an initial allowance) equal to three tenths of the expenditure.
The
matter was decided by the majority view and it was held that the dry dock was a
plant. For this purpose, Lord Reid considered the definition of the word plant
given by Lindley L.J. in Yarmouth v. France [(1887) 19 Q.B.D.647,658]. This
definition reads in its ordinary sense, it includes whatever apparatus is used
by a businessman carrying on his business,--not his stock-in-trade which he
buys or makes for sale; but all goods and chattels, fixed or movable, live or
dead, which he keeps for permanent employment in his business. Thereafter it
was observed as under: The dry dock was in our view not the mere setting or
premises in which ships were repaired.
It was
different from a factory which housed machinery, for in the operation of the
dock, the dock itself played a part in the control of water and enabled the
valves, pumps and electricity generator, which were an integral part of its
construction, to perform their functions. The dock was not a mere shelter or
home but itself played an essential part in the operations which took place in
getting a ship into the dock, holding it securely and then returning it to the
river." It was further observed that plant was not defined under the
Income Tax Act and thereafter held that every part of this dry dock plays an
essential part in getting large vessels into a position where the work on the
outside of the hull can begin, and that it is wrong to regard either the
concrete or any other part of the dock as a mere setting or part of the
premises in which this operation takes place.
The whole
dock is, I think, the means by which, or the plant with which, the operation is
performed.
Lord
Guest agreed with the view taken by Lord Reid.
In the
judgment rendered by him it was observed that in order to decide whether a
particular subject is an apparatus it seems obvious that an inquiry is to be
made as to what operation it performs.
Lord
Hodson disagreed with the above view and observed: The dock as a complete unit
contained a large amount of equipment without which the dry dock could not
perform its function. This equipment admittedly qualifies for the initial
allowance appropriate to expenditure on plant. It includes a dock gate and
operating gear, cast iron keel blocks, electrical installation, pipe work
installation, pumping installation and other subsidiary equipment, expenditure
on which clearly qualifies for initial allowance as having been incurred in
paying for machinery or plant.
Further
with regard to building it was observed: A building or structure is normally to
be regarded in the context of this statute as something more durable than
machinery or plant, hence the differentiation in favour of the less durable.
The dock in question, it was found in the case stated, might last for 80-100
years if reasonable and timely repairs were carried out when requisite.
The
learned Lord disagreed with the argument based on functional test. He agreed
with the reasoning given by Finlay J. in Margrett v. Lowestoft Water & Gas
Co.
[(1887)
19 T.C. 481] wherein it was inter alia observed that: Clearly, if one takes the
case of a factory with machinery inside it, the machinery in all probability
would be plant, but equally clearly the factory, the bricks and mortar, would
not be plant.
It was
finally observed that to regard the dock as apparatus was wrong as it was
something quite different from the generally accepted conception of plant.
Lord
Upjohn also disagreed with the majority view by observing that too much
emphasis on a functional element ought not to have been given. In a modern
sophisticated factory purpose built for a particular manufacture without which
the factory would be useless, makes the walls of a factory part of the plant
and that is not intended. It was further observed that function is no more than
an element for deciding whether it is a plant or a building.
We may
mention at the stage that even in England House of Lords has repeatedly
commented that the word plant is given imprecise application because of the
artificial meaning given to it. In Cole Brothers Ltd. v. Phillips (Inspector of
Taxes), [(1982 (1) WLR 1450], House of Lords considered the question whether
expenditure incurred in electric lighting installation and conduit and cables
to socket outlets, constituted expenditure on the provision of plant so as to
qualify for capital allowance. For the expression Plant Lord Hailsham observed:
..that the word plant in the relevant sense, although admittedly not a term of
art, and therefore part of the general English tongue, is not, in this sense,
an ordinary word, but one of imprecise application, and, so far as I can see,
has been applied to industrial and commercial equipment in a highly analogical
and metaphorical sense, borrowed, unless I am mistaken, from the world of
botany.
For
this purpose, the Court quoted the words of Buckley L.J. in Benson v. Yard Arm
Club Ltd. [(1979) 1 WLR 347, 351]: as a man who speaks English and understands
English accurately but not pedantically would interpret it in [the] context,
applying it to the particular subject matter in question in the circumstances of
the particular case.
The
Court further observed:
To
this admirable precept Oliver L.J. [1981] STC 671, 682E in delivering the
leading judgment in the Court of Appeal in the instant case, warily, and
perhaps wearily, added the cautionary rider that the English speaker must, I
think, be assumed to have studied the authorities. These however, as he
cautiously admitted in an earlier passage (p.676) cannot be pretended to be at
all easy to reconcile, and, as he said in a still earlier passage, at p.675D:
it is now beyond doubt that [the word plant] is used in the relevant section in
an artificial and largely judge-made sense.
The
Court thereafter observed: if plant is to be contrasted with the place in which
the business is carried on, the line must be drawn somewhere. There must,
therefore, be a criterion (or criteria) by which the courts define the frontier
between the two..
But,
on the special facts relating to these components carrying electricity, they
held that it was an exceptional case where the Commissioners were right in
taking each component separately as each was serving a different purpose and
held that each of them was not plant.
In
Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Scottish & Newcastle Breweries Ltd. [(1982)
1 WLR 322] the question was whether the moneys spent on electrical rewiring,
installation of new electric light fittings and of various categories of décor
and murals in the hotel was on the provision of plant. Lord Wilberforce
observed that: The word plant has frequently been used in fiscal and other
legislation. It is one of a fairly large category of words as to which no
statutory definition is provided (trade, office, even income are others), so
that it is left to the court to interpret them. It naturally happens that as
case follows case, and one extension leads to another, the meaning of the word
gradually diverges from its natural or dictionary meaning. This is certainly
true of plant. No ordinary man, literate or semi- literate, would think that a
horse, a swimming pool, moveable partitions, or even a dry-dock was plantyet
each of these has been held to be so:
so why
not such equally improbable items as murals, or tapestries, or chandeliers? The
House of Lords observed that even the functional test was inconclusive.
Therefore, the Court suggested that each case must be resolved by considering
carefully the nature of the particular trade being carried on, and the relation
of the expenditure to the promotion of the trade.
Applying
that test the Court held: I do not find it impossible to attribute to
Parliament an intention to encourage by fiscal inducement the improvement of
hotel amenity.
In the
said case, Lord Lowry also considered the case of Benson v. Yard Arm Club Ltd.
[(1979) 1 WLR 347 :
(1979)
2 All ER 336], in which ship, or floating hulk, used as a restaurant was held
not to be plant and observed: the Crown relied on the case because of the fact
that the ship was used to create a shipboard feeling, in other words, a certain
kind of atmosphere, among the patrons. But the distinction is that the ship,
although a chattel, was the place in which the trade was carried on and was
therefore the equivalent of the various premises in which the present taxpayer
company carry on their trade and not of the apparatus used as an adjunct of the
trade carried on in those premises. It was further observed that the dry dock
in Barclay Curle & Co. Ltd. (supra) was a structure as well as plant.
RELEVANT
PROVISIONS UNDER THE ACT FOR GRANT OF
DEPRECIATION
Before dealing with the rival contentions, we would refer to the relevant parts
of Sections 32 and 43(3) of the Act:
Section
32. Depreciation(1) In respect of depreciation of building, machinery, plant or
furniture owned by the assessee and used for the purposes of the business or
profession, the following deductions shall, subject to the provisions of
section 34, be allowed (i) in the case of ships other than ships ordinarily
plying on inland waters, such percentage on the actual cost thereof to the
assessee as may, in any case or class of cases or in respect of any period or
periods, be prescribed:
Provided
that different percentages may be prescribed for different periods having
regard to the date of acquisition of the ship.
(ii)
in the case of buildings, machinery, plant or furniture, other than ships
covered by clause (I), such percentage on the written down value thereof as may
in any case or class of cases be prescribed:
Provided
that where the actual cost of any machinery or plant does not exceed seven
hundred and fifty rupees, the actual cost thereof shall be allowed as a
deduction in respect of the previous year in which such machinery or plant is
first put to use by the assessee for the purposes of his business or
profession:
Provided
further that no deduction shall be allowed under this clause or clause (iii) in
respect of any motor- car manufactured outside India, where such motor-car is
acquired by the assessee after the 28th day of February, 1975, and is used
otherwise than in a business of running it on hire for tourists;
(iia)
in the case of any new machinery or plant (other than ships and aircraft) which
has been installed after the 31st day of March 1980 but before the 1st day of
April, 1985, a further sum equal to one-half of the amount admissible under
clause (ii) (exclusive of extra allowance for double or multiple shift working
of the machinery or plant and the extra allowance in respect of machinery or
plant installed in any premises used as a hotel) in respect of the previous
year in which such machinery or plant is installed or, if the machinery or
plant is first put to use in the immediately succeeding previous year, then in
respect of that previous year:
Provided
that no deduction shall be allowed under this clause in respect of (a) any
machinery or plant installed in any office premises or any residential
accommodation:
(b)
any office appliances or road transport vehicles;
and
(c) any machinery or plant, the whole of the actual cost of which is allowed as
a deduction (whether by way of depreciation or otherwise) in computing the
income chargeable under the head profits and gains of business or profession of
any one previous year.
Explanation
: For the purpose of this clause,- (a) new machinery or plant shall have the
meaning assigned to it in clause (2) of the Explanation below clause (vi) of
this sub-section:
(b)
residential accommodation includes accommodation in the nature of a guest house
but does not include premises used as a hotel;
(iii)
in the case of any building, machinery, plant or furniture which is sold,
discarded, demolished or destroyed in the previous year (other than the
previous year in which it is first brought into use), the amount by which the
moneys payable in respect of such building, machinery, plant or furniture,
together with the amount of scrap value, if any, fall short of the written down
value thereof:
Provided....
Explanation
(iv) in the case of any building which has been newly erected after the 31st
day of March, 1961, where the building is used solely for the purpose of
residence of persons employed in the business and the income of each such
person chargeable under the head Salaries is ten thousand rupees or less, or
where the building is used solely or mainly for the welfare of such persons as
a hospital, creche, school, canteen, library recreational centre, shelter,
rest-room or lunch-room, a sum equal to forty percent of the actual cost of the
building to the assessee in respect of the previous year of erection of the
building; but any such sum shall not be deductible in determining the written
down value for the purposes of clause (ii) of sub-section (1);
(v) in
the case of any new building, the erection of which is completed after the 31st
day of March, 1967, where the building is owned by an Indian company and used
by such company as a hotel and such hotel is for the time being approved in
this behalf by the Central Government, a sum equal to twenty-five percent of
the actual cost of erection of the building to the assessee, in respect of the
previous year in which the erection of the building is completed or, if such
building is first brought into use as a hotel in the immediately succeeding
previous year, then in respect of that previous year; but any such sum shall
not be deductible in determining the written down value for the purposes of
clause (ii);
(vi) in
the case of new ship or a new aircraft acquired after the 31st day of May,
1974, by an assessee engaged in the business of operation of ships or aircraft
or in the case of new machinery or plant (other than office appliances or road
transport vehicles) installed after that date for the purposes of business of
generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power or of
construction, manufacture or production of any one or more of the articles or
things specified in items 1 to 24 (both inclusive) in the list in the Ninth
Schedule or in the case of new machinery or plant (other than office appliances
or road transport vehicles) installed after that date in a small-scale
industrial undertaking for the purposes of business of manufacture or production
of any other articles or things, a sum equal to twenty percent of the actual
cost of the ship, aircraft, machinery or plant to the assessee, in respect of
the previous year in which the ship or aircraft is acquired or the machinery or
plant is installed, or if the ship, aircraft, machinery or plant is first put
to use in the immediately succeeding previous year, then, in respect of that
previous year; but any such sum shall not be deductible in determining the
written down value for the purposes of clause (ii):
Provided
Provided further that no deduction shall be allowed under this clause in
respect of (a) any machinery or plant installed in any office premises or any
residential accommodation including any accommodation in the nature of a
guest-house;
(b)
(c) Explanation (1A) Where the business or profession is carried on in a
building not owned by the assessee but in respect of which the assessee holds a
lease or other right of occupancy and any capital expenditure is incurred by
the assessee for the purposes of the business or profession after the 31st day
of March, 1970, on the construction of any structure or doing of any work in or
in relation to, and by way of renovation or extension of, or improvement to,
the building, then, in respect of depreciation of such structure or work, the
following deductions shall, subject to the provisions of section 34, be allowed
(i) such percentage on the written down value of the structure or work as may
in any case or class of cases be prescribed; (ii) Provided Explanation (2)..
Section
43 In sections 28 to 41 and in this section, unless the context otherwise
requires (1) (2) (3) Plant includes ships, vehicles, books, scientific
apparatus and surgical equipment used for the purposes of the business or
profession.
Rule 5
of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 provides for calculation of depreciation at the
percentages specified in second column of the Table in Part I of Appendix I to
the Rules. Appendix I to Rule 5 is as under: - TABLE OF RATES AT WHICH
DEPRECIATION IS ADMISSIBLE Class of assets Depreciation allowance as %age of--
Remarks (i) actual cost in the case of ocean- going ships;
(ii)
written-down value in the case of any other asset. 1 2 3 I.BUILDINGS [(1)
General rate 5 Buildings include (2)Special rate in respect of factory building
roads, bridges, (excluding offices, godowns, officers and culverts, wells and
employees quarters, roads, bridges, culverts, tube-wells] wells and tube-wells]
10 (3) Purely temporary errections such as wood- en structures. 100 (4) In respect
of any structure of work in or in relatiion to a building referred to in
sub-section (1A) of section 32,-- (a) where such structure is constructed or
such The percentage work is done by way of renovation or specified against sub-
improvement to any such building.
Items
(1,2 or 3], as may be approximate to the class of building in or in relation to
which the renovation or improvement is effected.
(b)
where the structure is constructed or The percentage specified work is done by
way of extension against sub-items [1,2 or 3] to any such building. As would be
appropriate if the structure of work constituted a separate building.
II.
FURNITURE AND FITTINGS (1) General rate 10 (2) Rate for furniture and fittings
used in Hotels, restaurants and boarding houses; 15 Cinema-houses;
theatres
and III. MACHINERY AND PLANT (not being a ship) (i)General rate applicable to
machinery and plant (not being a ship) for which no special rate has been
prescribed under Item (ii) herein below.
(ii)
Special rates: 15 C(I) Cinematograph filmsMachinery used in the production and
exhibition of cinematograph films (N.E.S.A.) (a) Recording equipment,
reproducing equipment, developing machines, printing machines, synchronisers
and studio lights except bulbs. 20 (b) Projecting equipment of film exhibiting
concerns.
D.(1)
AeroplanesAircraft, Aerial photographic Apparatus (N.E.S.A.) 30 E.(1)
AeroplanesAero-engines[N.E.S.A.] 40 F.(2) Cinematograph filmsBulbs of studio
lights. 100 IV. SHIPS (1) Ocean going ships 10 (i) Fishing vessels with wooden
hull (ii) Dredgers, tugs, barges, survey launches 7 And other similar ships
used mainly for Dredging purpose. 5 (iii) Other Ships To be calculated on the
actual cost.
(2)
Vessels ordinarily operating on Inland waters (i) speed boats 20 (ii) Other
vessels 10 Aforesaid clauses of the Section 32 deal with depreciation allowance
in respect of assets of the specified description used for the purpose of
business or profession.
From a
careful scrutiny thereof what emerges is: - (1) The scheme of Section 32 is to
provide different rates of depreciation for building, machinery, plant or
furniture, ships, buildings used for hotels, aeroplanes and other items
mentioned therein. Clause (ii) of Section 32 specifically provides for grant of
depreciation for building, machinery, plant or furniture at prescribed
percentage on the written down value thereof. The Rates are prescribed under
Income Tax Rules.
(2)
Under clause (iia) of Section 32(1) specific provision is made for new
machinery or plant which has been installed and it provides for additional sum
equal to one half of the amount admissible as depreciation under clause (ii) if
the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled.
Further,
the proviso carves out an exception to the effect that no deduction shall be
allowed in respect of any machinery or plant installed in office premises or
any residential accommodation. That means the Legislature has divided building
into different categories, namely, (i) buildings used for office premises or
(ii) for residential accommodation; or (iii) premises used for other purposes.
Meaning
to the phrase residential accommodation is also given under the Explanation
which includes accommodation in the nature of a guest house and it specifically
excludes premises used as a hotel. So, the Legislature has not considered hotel
building by itself as a plant. The phrase is premises used as a hotel where
machinery or plant is installed.
(3)
Under sub-clause (v) of clause (1) of Section 32 specific provision is made for
a new building, the erection of which is completed after 31.3.1967, which is
used as a hotel. If the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied then for a
building which is used for a hotel, a sum equivalent to 25 per cent of the
actual cost of the erection of the building is granted as depreciation.
Further,
the Legislature has considered building as separate from the hotel business and
building is not considered as a plant for running the hotel. Therefore,
building and the use of such building as a hotel are considered distinct.
(4)
All throughout Section 32 for building it is specifically mentioned that
whenever it is erected, while for machinery and plant, the words used are
whenever it is installed and there is no question of installing building.
Section
32(1)(iia) uses the phrase machinery or plant installed in any premises used as
a hotel and Section 33(1)(b)(B)(ii) provides in case of machinery or plant is
installed for the purposes of business or construction etc. which indicates
that plant is to be installed and there is no question of erection.
(5)
Under the Rules as quoted above, separate rates are prescribed under the
Heading (I) Buildings, and (II) Furniture and fittings, (III) Machinery and
Plant and (IV) Ships. These headings have been further sub-divided providing different
rates. Like, Building is divided into (i) building generally, (ii) special rate
in respect of factory building and (iii) temporary erections such as wooden
structures. In the remarks column (3) it is stated that buildings include
roads, bridges, culverts, wells and tube-wells. Furniture and Fittings is also
divided into (i) general rate and (ii) rate for furniture and fittings used in
hotels, restaurants and boarding houses, cinema house theatres etc. Similarly,
Machinery and Plant are under one heading and are divided into two parts(i)
general rate applicable to machinery and plant and (ii) special rates, which
includes machinery and plant for cinematograph films, recording equipments,
reproducing equipments, developing machines, printing machines, synchronisers
and studio lights and projecting equipments of film exhibiting concerns.
Further,
special rates are provided for machinery used in production and exhibition of
cinematograph films being (a) recording equipment, reproducing equipment,
developing machines, printing machines, editing machines, synchronisers and
studio lights except bulbs and (b) projecting equipment of film exhibiting
concerns. Further different rates have been provided for machinery for
cinematograph films that includes studio lights except bulbs under the heading
C(1)(b) and for bulbs of studio lights under the heading F(2).
From
the aforesaid discussion, it is apparent that for a building used as a hotel
there is a specific provision for granting depreciation allowance at specified
rates depending upon fulfillment of the conditions mentioned therein.
Hence,
there is no question of referring to dictionary meaning of the word plant which
may or may not include building, for arriving at a conclusion that building
which is specifically designed and constructed as a hotel building would be a
plant.
Further,
in context of legislative scheme under Section 32 stated above, which provides
depreciation at different rates for building, machinery and plant, furniture
and fixtures, ships, building used for hospital, aeroplanes, cinematograph
films, machinery used in the production and exhibition of cinematograph films,
recording equipment, reproducing equipment, developing machines, printing
machines, synchronisers and studio lights except bulbs, projecting equipment of
film exhibiting concerns, even though the word plant may include building or
structure in certain set of circumstances as per the dictionary meaning, but to
say that building used for running the business of hotel or a cinema would be
plant under the Act appears, on the face of it, to be inconsistent with the
aforesaid provisions. Such meaning would be clearly against the legislative
intent.
While
interpreting the words consumption, raw material and utilised in clause (c) of
the Import Control Policy formulated by the Government of India this Court in
the case of Dy. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, New Delhi v. K.T.
Kosalram and others, [1970(3) SCC 82] observed thus: - In our opinion
dictionary meanings, however helpful in understanding the general sense of the
words cannot control where the scheme of the statute or the instrument
considered as a whole clearly conveys a somewhat different shade of meaning. It
is not always a safe way to construe a statute or a contract by dividing it by
a process of etymological dissection and after separating words from their
context to give each word some particular definition given by lexicographers
and then to reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of these definitions.
What particular meaning should be attached to words and phrases in a given
instrument is usually to be gathered from the context, the nature of the
subject matter, the purpose or the intention of the author and the effect of
giving to them one or the other permissible meaning on the object to be
achieved. Words are after all used merely as a vehicle to convey the idea of
the speaker or the writer and the words have naturally, therefore, to be so
construed as to fit in with the idea which emerges on a consideration of the
entire context.
(Emphasis
added) Applying the said test, we have to gather the meaning of words building
and plant in context of Scheme of Section 32 and it is not necessary that we
should adopt a judge sense meaning, which is artificial and imprecise in
application, given to the word plant in context of different statutory
provisions. The Scheme of Section 32 unequivocally leads to the conclusion that
building and plant are treated separately for the purpose of grant of
depreciation. Higher rate of depreciation is granted to machinery and plant as
against the building which has more durability.
In
C.I.T. v. Mir Mohammad Ali [(1964) 53 ITR 165] this Court considered the
meaning of the word machinery and observed that the word machinery is an
ordinary and not a technical word and unless there is something in the context
in the Act, the ordinary meaning would prevail.
Thereafter,
the Court observed: According to the above definition, a diesel engine is
clearly machinery. Indeed, rule 8 of the Income-tax Rules treats aero-engines
separately from aircraft. It is true that this rule cannot be used to interpret
the clauses in the Act but it does show that components of an aircraft, which
are machinery, can be treated separately.
held:
- For the words plant and installed the Court Further, when the assessee
purchased the diesel engines, they were not plant or part of a plant: because
they had not been installed in any vehicle. They were, according to the
definition given by the Privy Council, machinery. They were not yet part of a
plant, and, according to the Act, 20% of the cost thereof was allowable of the
assessee. All the conditions required by the Act are satisfied. If we look at
the point of time of purchase and installation, what was purchased and installed
was machinery.
Thereafter,
the Court considered the meaning of the expression install and held that when
an engine is fixed in a vehicle it is installed within the meaning of Section
10(2)(vi) and 10(2)(via) of the Act, 1922. Similarly, in the present case the
word plant is given meaning under Section 43(3) to include ships, vehicles,
books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment used for the purposes of the
business or profession, but this would not mean that it includes building which
is treated separately from machinery and plant. Wider meaning to word plant is
given by including specified items mentioned above, that is, it includes ships,
vehicles, books etc.
In Taj
Mahal Hotel (supra) this Court specifically observed that it is well settled
that where the definition of the word has not been given it must be construed
in its popular sense if it is a word of every day use. The Court also observed
that even books have been included in the word plant, therefore, wider meaning
should be given so as to include those things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include. Further, it is to be stated that Section 43
itself provides that unless the context otherwise requires the word plant is to
be given wider meaning as stated therein. This wider meaning does not include
building. But in any case even for the time being presuming that the judge-made
meaning of the word plant includes building in certain set of circumstances, in
context of Section 32 such wider meaning cannot be given and plant would not
include building in which hotel business is run or a theatre building in which
cinema business is carried on. Further, the Court specifically observed that:
- the
business of a hotelier is carried on by adapting a building or premises in a
suitable way to be used as a residential hotel where visitors come and stay.
These
observations clearly indicate that business of a hotelier is carried on in a
building or a premises and building is not an apparatus for running such
business. It is a shelter or a home for conduct of such business.
Learned
counsel also pointed out the decision of the Madras High Court in. CIT v. (1)
N. Sathyanathan And Sons P.
Ltd.
[(2000) 242 ITR 514] wherein the Court observed that in case of Taj Mahal Hotel
[(1971) 82 ITR 44] even after noticing the fact that the dictionary definition
of plant includes buildings, the court did not proceed to hold that the
building in which the hotel was run, and wherein the sanitary fittings were
used was itself plant, and on that ground sanitary fittings used in the hotel
were part of the plant and emphasised that Section specifically provides
buildings used as hotel would indicate hotel building cannot be construed as a
plant. We agree with this view of the Madras High Court.
Next,
it is to be stated that the judgment in the case of Barclay, Curley & Co.
would be of no assistance for holding that a building used for the purpose of a
hotel or the theatre used for carrying the business of cinema will be a plant
because in the said case majority view was that the dry dock was not the mere
setting or the premises in which ships were repaired. It was not mere shelter
or home but itself played an essential part in the operations which took place
in getting a ship into the dock, holding it securely and then returning it to
the river. It was a complete unit by itself, therefore, it was a plant.
Against
that, for a hotel premises, under the Act, building is not considered to be an
apparatus for running the hotel business but is merely a shelter or home or
setting in which business is carried out. In our view, same would be the
position with regard to a theatre in which cinema business is carried on.
Webster Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition) gives meaning to the
word theater that: (1) A building especially adapted to dramatic, operatic, or
spectacular representations; playhouse; (2) The theatrical world and everything
relating to it; (3) A room or hall arranged with seats that rise as they recede
from a platform, especially adapted to lectures, surgical demonstrations, etc.;
(4) Any place of semicircular form with seats rising by easy gradations; (5)
Any place or region that is the scene of events: a theater of operations in
war. This would mean that cinema business can be run in a premises adapted for
that purpose which may or may not be specially designed. Further, on the basis
of test laid down in the case of Barclay, Curle & Co. Ltd., such building
or premises would be the place in which operation of carrying on of business
takes place and not that they are means by which the operation is performed.
Even the House of Lords in case of Benson (supra) arrived at the conclusion
that a ship or a floating hulks used as a restaurant was not a plant, even
though the ship was used to create a shipboard feeling and certain kind of
atmosphere, among the patrons.
In our
view such buildings cannot be termed as tools for running business but are mere
shelter for carrying on such business activities. Therefore, even functional
test, which is followed and which according to us would not be conclusive in
all cases, is also not satisfied.
In
England also, there are conflicting decisions involving the question whether
structure would be a plant or not and it is stated that each case is required
to be decided on facts of that case. In Commissioners of Inland Revenue v.
Scottish & Newcastle breweries Ltd. (55 Tax Cases 252) (decided by the
House of Lords) the Court of Appeal observed that though there is no statutory
definition of plant for the purpose of Section 41 of the Finance Act, 1971,
from a series of cases decided, following principles emerge to be settled law:
(i)Something which is properly to be regarded as part of the setting in which a
business is carried on and not as part of the apparatus used for carrying on
the business is not plant: see J. Lyons and Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General
{(1944) Ch 287}.
(ii)
Something which forms part of the setting of a trade may nevertheless be plant
if it is more a part of the apparatus than part of the setting {Jarrold v. John
Good & Sons Ltd. [(1963) 1 WLR 214 : 40 TC 681]}.
(iii)
The term plant is not apt to cover the permanent structure of a building in
which a business is carried on [John Good & Sons Ltds case].
(iv)
Something which is a structure or part of a structure may nevertheless be
plant, if it fulfills the function of plant in the traders operations.
{Commissioners
of Inland Revenue v. Barclay, Curle & Co.
Ltd.
[1969 SC (HL) 30 : 45 TC 221]}.
(v)
Apparatus which has no functional purpose in the commercial process, even if it
serves to attract custom, is not plant {Dixon v. Fitchs Garage Ltd. [(1976) 1
WLR 215 : 50 TC 509], in this case the apparatus in question was a canopy
constructed over the pumps of a petrol filling station to provide shelter while
the commercial process of delivering fuel was carried on}.
In the
said case, Lord Stott adopted the distinction made by Shaw L.J. in Benson v.
Yard Arm Club Ltd., [(1979) 1 WLR 347, at p. 358 : 53 TC 67 at p.88.] and
relied upon following observation:- A characteristic of plant appears to me to
be that it is an adjunct to the carrying on of a business and not the essential
site or core of the business itself.
Applying
the aforesaid characteristic of plant, in our view, building for hotel or
cinema cannot be stated to be adjunct, that is to say, (as per the dictionary
meaning of the word adjunct) something added to another, or it is in a
subordinate, auxiliary or dependent position.
Further,
in Wimpy International Ltd. v. Warland and Associated Restaurants Ltd. v. Warland
[61 Tax Cases 51], the Court of Appeal dealt with a case where the appellants
owned and operated fast food restaurants and expended money on improving and
modernising their restaurants i.e. by spending on shop fronts, floor and wall
tiles, wall finishes and other non- decorative items which was held by the
Special Commissioners as part of setting or premises in which trades were
carried on. The appellants contended that all the items were installed to
improve the ambience of the restaurant and to attract customers and were thus
plant.
The
Court held that they were not plants. The Court took up each and every item of
decoration separately for analysing whether it constituted a plant or not. Like
for shop fronts or doors, the Court agreed with the observations of the
Chancery Division that none of the shop fronts or doors qualifies as plant by
holding that their principal function is to form a necessary part of the
premises and doors are needed for ingress and egress. None of the floor or wall
titles can be classed as plants. They are chosen so as to create an attractive
setting in which customers will be pleased to sit for the short time required
to consume a fast food meal, but their function in the trade does not go beyond
that. Fox L.J. observed: Considering the facts of this case and various
decisions In the light of the authorities the position appears to me to be
this. There is a well-established distinction, in general terms, between the
premises in which the business is carried on and the plant with which the
business is carried on. The premises are not plant. In its simplest form that
is illustrated by Lord Lowrys example of the creation of atmosphere in a hotel
by beautiful buildings and gardens on the one hand and fine china, glass and
other tableware on the other. The latter are plant; the former are not. The
former are simply the premises in which the business is conducted.
The
distinction, however, needs to be elaborated, for present purposes, by
reference to Lord Lowrys further formulation, namely that the fact that
different things may perform the same function of creating atmosphere is not
relevant: one thing may function as part of the premises and the other as part
of the plant. Thus, something which becomes part of the premises instead of merely
embellishing them is not plant except in the rare case where the premises are
themselves plant.
I do
not think that what Oliver L.J. was saying in Cole Brothers is at variance with
Lord Lowrys approach. It is proper to consider the function of the item in
dispute.
But
the question is what does it function as? If it functions as part of the
premises it is not plant. The fact that the building in which a business is
carried on is, by its construction particularly well- suited to the business,
or indeed was specially built for that business, does not make it plant. Its
suitability is simply the reason why the business is carried on there. But it
remains the place in which the business is carried on and is not something with
which the business is carried on.
Similarly,
Lord Hoffmann J. (Chancery Division) observed: the question is whether it would
be more appropriate to describe the item as part of the premises rather than as
having retained a separate identity. It seems to me that items such as fixed
floor tiles and shop fronts are more naturally to be regarded as part of the
housing of the business than as mere embellishments having a separate identity.
In
Carr (H.M. Inspector of Taxes) v. Sayer [65 Tax Cases 15], the Chancery
Division considered a case where the taxpayers carried on business of providing
quarantine kennels and transport services for dogs and cats brought into the
United Kingdom from abroad. Quarantine kennels were constructed at their
premises. Some of the kennels were movable. The permanent kennels comprised a
flat-roofed structure which consisted principally of a series of pens divided
from each other by walls and with bars and metal mesh across the front. The
Court held that those kennels were not plant; they were purpose-built permanent
buildings or structures, used as such, and were the premises in which business
was conducted; while they were specifically designed for quarantine purposes,
the particular roof and walls were building design features and no more, which
did not result in structures being characterised as anything other than
buildings or lead to the end result having the character of equipment or
apparatus. For this purpose, the Court referred to various principles in
context of Section 41(1) of the Finance Act 1971 which is applicable to
machinery or plant. In the context of that section, the Court observed that
plant carries with it a connotation of equipment or apparatus, either fixed or
unfixed. It does not convey a meaning wide enough to include buildings in
general. The Court pertinently observed that building would not normally be
regarded as a plant, do not cease to be buildings and become plant simply
because they are purpose-built for a particular trading activity. Such a
distinction would make no sense. Thus the stables of a racehorse trainer are
properly to be regarded as buildings and not plant. A hotel building remains a
building even when constructed to a luxury specification. Similarly with a
hospital for infectious diseases. This might require special layout and other
features, but this does not convert the buildings into plant. A purpose-built
building, as much as one which is not purpose-built, prima facie is no more
than the premises on which the business is conducted.
In
Gray v. Seymours Garden Centre [67 Tax Cases 401], the Court of Appeal dealt
with a case where assessee expended on the construction of planteria which was
a fixed structure designed to maintain plants of many different kinds moved
from nurseries, in an environment in which they would remain in good condition
until sale. It was designed so that an appropriate mini-climate could be
provided in different parts of the planteria suitable for different varieties
of plant, and so as to be open to the public who could walk around it and
choose from the plants on offer.
The
Court of appeal held that the true and only reasonable conclusion from the
facts found was that planteria was part of the premises in which the business
was carried on. It was a structure to which plants were brought which required special
treatment. However, the fact that planteria provided the function of nurturing
and preserving the plants while they were there could not transform it into
something other than part of the premises in which business was carried on; the
highest it could be put was that it functioned as a purpose-built structure,
but that was not enough to make the structure plant.
Hence,
to rely upon Barclay Curle and Co.s case (dealing with dry dock yard) and to
hold that hotel building or theatre would be a plant on functional test would
be unjustified and unreasonable in the context of Section 32 of the Act which
deals with grant of depreciation allowance on building, machinery, plant or
furniture and also for extra allowance in case of new machinery or plant installed
in premises other than the premises used as office or any residential
accommodation and also for new building erected and used as a hotel. As against
that, the aforesaid decisions by Courts in England are based upon Section 41 of the Finance Act, 1971 which provide for
allowance for capital expenditure incurred on the provisions of machinery or
plant for the purposes of the trade and the Courts were only dealing with
general meaning of the word plant. Even there, as quoted above, Courts have
specifically held that creation of atmosphere in a hotel by beautiful buildings
and gardens would not make such buildings as plants.
Suitability
of such building is simply the reason why the business is carried on there
which may flourish, but the premises remains as premises where business is
carried on and is not some thing with which business is carried on. In Carr v.
Sayer (supra), the Court observed that a hotel building remains a building even
when constructed to a luxury specification and also a hospital building for
infectious diseases which might require special lay-out and other features was
not held to be a plant by observing that a purpose-built building is no more
than the premises on which the business is conducted.
Further,
there are hotels of all kinds and hotel business can be carried on in all kinds
of buildings, may be pucca or kacha constructions. A building intended to be
used or in fact used earlier either as a residential accommodation or business
purpose can be converted for running hotel business. Section 32 itself
contemplates, a hotel business being carried on in a residential accommodation
including an accommodation which is in the nature of guest house. On occasions
hotel buildings may be constructed with a special design and features so as to
attract and accommodate certain class of tourist. Similarly with regard to
cinema business, it can be carried on in a specially designed and constructed
building and also in other buildings. Still, however, it would be difficult to
draw a distinction and differentiate by holding that a building which is
specially designed and constructed for running a hotel or cinema would be
covered by a plant and other buildings used for the same purpose would not get
depreciation as plant, even though such business is carried on in such
premises. In our view, the Delhi High Court has in case of R.C. Chemical
Industry (supra) rightly observed that mere fact that manufacture of saccharine
would be better carried on in a building having atmospheric controls would not
convert the building from the setting to the means for carrying the business.
Similarly, Rajasthan High Court also in Lake Palace Hotels and Motels (supra)
rightly observed that simply because some special fittings or controlling
equipments are attached for the purpose of carrying on hotel business, it will
not take it out of the category of building and make it a plant. In our view
special fittings or equipments to control atmospheric effects would be plant,
but not the building which house such equipments.
Further
for running almost all industries or for carrying on any trade or business
building is required. On occasions building may be designed and constructed to
suite the requirement of a particular industry, trade or business.
But
that would not make such building a plant. It only shelters running of such
business. For each and every business, trade or industry, building is required
to carry on such activity. That means building plays some role and in other
words, its function is to shelter the business, but it has no other function
except in some rare cases such as dry dock where it plays an essential part in
the operations which take place in getting a ship into the dock, holding it
squarely and then returning it to the river. Building is more durable. If contention
of the assessee is accepted, virtually all such buildings would be considered
to be a plant and distinction which the legislature has made between the
building and machinery or plant would be obliterated.
Learned
counsel for the assessee submitted that the words plant and building are not
mutually exclusive.
Plant
may include building in certain set of circumstances and, therefore, applying
the functional tests assessee would be entitled to depreciation under the head
it is more beneficial to it. He submitted that in the modern era, theatre
building and hotel building are integral part of operation for carrying out
such business and, therefore, such building should be considered as a plant.
As
discussed above, the aforesaid contention cannot be accepted. Firstly, it would
be difficult to draw a line between a building which is specifically
constructed for the aforesaid purposes and buildings which are used for the
aforesaid purposes by converting a residential accommodation or industrial
premises for such purposes. Secondly, the depreciation as a general principle
represents the diminution in value of capital asset when applied to the purpose
of making profit or gain. The object is to get true picture of real income of
the business. Hence, it can be inferred that the Legislature never intended to
give such benefit of depreciation to a building which is usually more durable
than machinery or plant. In CIT, Punjab, J&K, and Himachal Pradesh Patiala
v. M/s Alps Theatre, [AIR 1967 SC 1437], Court considered the questionwhether
the cost of land is entitled to depreciation under the schedule to the
Income-tax Act along with the cost of the building standing thereon? The Court
observed (in para 6) thus:- It would be noticed that the word used is
depreciation and depreciation means:
a
decrease in value of property through wear, deterioration, or obsolescence; the
allowance made for this in book-keeping, accounting, etc. (Websters New Word
Dictionary).
In
that sense land cannot depreciate. The other words to notice are such
buildings. We have noticed that in sub-clause (iv) and (v), building clearly
means structures and does not include site.
The
Court also held (in para 7 and 8) that: - One other consideration is important.
The whole object of S.10 is to arrive at the asessable income of a business
after allowing necessary expenditure and deductions.
Depreciation
is allowable as a deduction both according to accountancy principles and
according to the Indian Income Tax Act. Why? Because otherwise one would not have
a true picture of the real income of the business.
But
land does not depreciate, and if depreciation was allowed it would give a wrong
picture of the true income.
Under
the new Act also for the building and machinery or plant depreciation is
allowed probably after taking into consideration its life and decrease in the
value of the property through wear and tear.
Learned
counsel for the assessee vehemently submitted that even though the line between
the building and the plant in some cases is absolutely thin yet the legislature
or the Central Board of Direct Taxes (Revenue Board) has not clarified the same
at any point of time inspite of conflicting judgments of the High Courts on the
subject.
Learned
counsel for the assessee further submitted that even though the legislature was
alive to the issue and amended Section 43(3) of the Act by the Finance Act of
1995 by excluding tea bushes and livestock with retrospective effect from 1962,
it has not excluded the buildings which are used for running hotel or cinema
business. It has not clarified or carried out any amendment in the provision
and, therefore, it should be held that interpretation given by the High Courts
was accepted by the revenue and the legislature. We do not know that Revenue
Board was alive to the said controversy. If that was so, it would have
clarified either way and litigations could have been avoided. But that is no
ground for accepting interpretation suggested by the learned counsel for the
assessees which would be inconsistent with scheme of Section 32.
In the
result, it is held that the building used for running of a hotel or carrying on
cinema business cannot be held to be a plant because:
(1)
The scheme of Section 32, as discussed above, clearly envisages separate
depreciation for a building, machinery and plant, furniture and fittings etc..
The word plant is given inclusive meaning under Section 43(3) which nowhere
includes buildings. The Rules prescribing the rates of depreciation
specifically provide grant of depreciation on buildings, furniture and
fittings, machinery and plant and ships. Machinery and plant includes
cinematograph films and other items and the building is further given meaning
to include roads, bridges, culverts, wells and tube- wells.
(2) In
the case of Taj Mahal Hotel (supra), this Court has observed that business of a
hotelier is carried on by adopting building or premises in suitable way.
Meaning thereby building for a hotel is not apparatus or adjunct for running of
a hotel. The Court did not proceed to hold that a building in which the hotel
was run was itself a plant, otherwise the Court would not have gone into the
question whether the sanitary fittings used in bath room was plant.
(3)
For a building used for a hotel, specific provision is made granting additional
depreciation under Section 32 (1)(v) of the Act.
(4)
Barclay, Curle & Co.s case decided by the House of Lords pertains to a dry
dock yard which itself was functioning as a plant, that is to say, structure
for the plant was constructed so that dry dock can operate. It operated as an
essential part in the operations which took place in getting a ship into the
dock, holding it securely and then returning it to the river. The dock as a
complete unit contained a large amount of equipment without which the dry dock
could not perform its function.
(5)
Even in England, Courts have repeatedly held that the meaning to the word plant
given in various decisions is artificial and imprecise in application, that is
to use the words of Lord Buckley, it is now beyond doubt that the word plant is
used in the relevant section in an artificial and largely judge-made sense.
Lord Wilberforce commented by stating that no ordinary man, literate or
semi-literate, would think that a horse, a swimming pool, moveable partitions,
or even a dry-dock was plant.
(6)
For the hotel building and hospital in the case of Carr v. Sayer (supra), it
has been observed that a hotel building remains a building even when
constructed to a luxury specification and similarly, a hospital building for
infectious diseases which might require a special layout and other features
also remains a premises and is not plant. It is to be added that all these
decisions are based upon the interpretation of the phrase machinery or plant
under Section 41 of the Finance Act, 1971 which was applicable and there
appears no such distinction for grant of allowance on different heads as
provided under Section 32 of the Income Tax Act.
(7) To
differentiate a building for grant of additional depreciation by holding it to
be a plant in one case where the building is specially designed and constructed
with some special features to attract the customers and a building not so
constructed but used for the same purpose, namely, as a hotel or theatre would
be unreasonable.
Hence,
the question is answered in favour of the revenue and against the assessee by
holding that building which is used as a hotel or a cinema theatre cannot be
given depreciation as plant.
Accordingly,
the Civil Appeal Nos. 55-57 of 2000 filed by the assessee and Civil Appeals
Nos. 4758, 5198-99, 5391 of 1998, 15, 2784-86, 2787, 3690 of 1999 and Civil
Appeal Nos._________ of 2000 @ S.L.P.(C) Nos.4373-74 of 1999 filed by the
Revenue are disposed of, but in the circumstances of the case, without costs.
.....J.
(A. P. MISRA) New Delhi; .J. May 12, 2000. (M.B. SHAH) In Civil Appeal Nos.
241, 242-243, 244, 245, 246-48 of 1999, the learned counsel for the
respondents-assessee has filed additional written submissions on 4.5.2000
stating that additional question is involved in these matters and it is
required to be heard. Accordingly, in these appeals, we fix the hearing of the
said question in the Month of August 2000. If a counsel finds that any other
additional question which was raised and decided by filing proper the High Court
is left out, he may draw the attention by application within four weeks from
today.
Ordered
accordingly.
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