Bir
Singh & Ors Vs. Pyare Singh & Ors [2000] INSC 104 (6 March 2000)
S.S.Ahmad,
D.P.Mohapatro
D.P.MOHAPATRA,J.
On
analysis of the case of the parties and the contentions raised on their behalf
the question which arises for determination is whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case the appellants can be said to be khatedar tenants of
the land in dispute. If this question is answered in the affirmative then the
further question for consideration will be whether the right of the appellants
in the land in dispute was extinguished under section 12 of the Rajasthan
Tenancy Act, 1955 (for short the Tenancy Act).
The
High Court of Rajasthan having answered the first question in the negative and
dismissed the suit , the plaintiffs are in appeal against the judgment.
The
factual matrix of the case relevant for appreciation of the question for
determination, may be stated thus : - Late Chet Singh held zamindari rights in
respect of the disputed land situated in Village Mohammadpur, of Tehsil-Dholpur
in the State of Rajasthan.
As he
was serving in the army he had engaged Sohan Singh for cultivation of the land.
Since Sohan Singh got his name recorded in the revenue records as the owner of
the land Chet Singh filed a suit, against him before the Assistant Collector, Dholpur.
In the said suit a compromise was entered into between the parties and
possession of the property was delivered by Sohan Singh to Chet Singh. In the
said compromise it was averred that Chet Singh was the Khudkasht Kashatkar of
the disputed land and that Sohan Singh voluntarily handed over possession of
the land to Chet Singh.
Chet
Singh mortgaged the land with Charan Singh for a period of ten years for
satisfaction of the loan amounting to Rs.300/- vide the registered mortgage
deed dated 22.9.1956. Chet Singh expired in 1965 leaving the appellants as his
legal heirs. As Charan Singh did not hand over possession of the land even
after expiry of the period of mortgage the appellants filed a suit, under
Section 43(3) read with Section 183 of the Tenancy Act against Charan Singh
seeking recovery of possession of the land. The Additional District Collector,
by the order dated 12.5.1983 in case no. 142/82 decreed the suit and directed Charan
Singh to hand over vacant possession of the land in dispute to the appellants
declaring them as Khatedar kashtkar.
Charan
Singh was further directed to pay to the appellants a sum of Rs.3400/- as
penalty for illegal occupation of the land during the seventeen agricultural
years after expiry of the mortgage period. In the appeal, Appeal no.253 of
1983, filed by Charan Singh the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bharatpur by the
order dated 15.7.1985 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of the
Additional District Collector. The second appeal, RTA no.144/85, filed by Charan
Singh before the Rajasthan Revenue Appellate Board, was dismissed by the order
dated 22.6.1993. Charan Singh expired on 25.2.1991 during pendency of the
appeal and the respondents herein were substituted as his legal heirs. The
respondents challenged the order of the Revenue Appellate Board in CWP
No.4159/93 before the Rajasthan High Court.
The
High Court by the Jugdment dated 24.2.1994 allowed the writ petition, quashed
the concurrent orders of the statutory authorities and dismissed the suit. The
said judgment is under challenge in the present appeal.
The
thrust of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants is
that the High Court erred in reversing the concurrent decisions of the
statutory authorities on the erroneous finding that they are not entitled to
recover possession of land in dispute. The learned counsel contends that after
abolition of the Zamindari right of the appellants under the Rajasthan Zamindari
and Biswedari Abolition Act, 1959 [for short the Zamindari Abolition Act] the
appellants were entitled to retain the land in dispute which was a part of
their khudkasht land as recorded in the revenue records.
The
learned counsel for the respondents supporting the impugned judgment submitted
that in view of the undisputed factual position that the appellants were not in
occupation of the land in dispute on the date the Zamindari Abolition Act came
into force they could not retain possession of the land, notwithstanding the
entry in the revenue records showing the land as khudkasht. He placed reliance
on the [1991 Supp.(2) SCC 41].
Undisputedly,
the plaintiff had lost possession over the land in dispute by 22 September, 1956 when the mortgage deed was
registered. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff was seeking recovery of
possession from the mortgagee Charan Singh in the suit filed in September,
1967.
It is
also an accepted position that the land in dispute was shown in the revenue
record as khudkasht land. It is also accepted position that Chet Singh, the
predecessor in the interest of the appellants, held Zamindari right over land
in dispute. In this backdrop the question for consideration is whether after
enforcement of the Zamindari Abolition Act the plaintiffs could claim right of
possession over the land in dispute. From the orders passed by the statutory
authorities it appears that this question was not specifically adverted to by
the authorities. They proceeded to determine the controversy on the basis of
the provisions in Sections 10 and 12 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act.
In
section 2(3) of the Zamindari Abolition Act land means every class or category
of land forming part of an estate and includes (a) benefits to arise out of
such land, (b) things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything
attached to the earth, (c) sites of villages or towns, (d) beds of tanks,
ponds, embankments, rivers and water channels, and (e) surface of hills Under
sub-section(5) of the said section the term Zamindar has the meaning assigned
to it by clause (46) of section 5 of the Tenancy Act and includes a malik
(landowner) in the Gang Canal area. Sub-section(6) of section 2 provides that
words and expressions defined in the Tenancy Act and in the Rajasthan Land
Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act 15 of 1956) but not defined in this Act shall,
wherever used herein, be construed to have the meaning assigned to them by
those Acts.
In
sub-section(7) of section 2 it is laid down that the words and expression used
to denote the person in possession of any right, title or interest shall be
deemed to include the predecessors and successors in right, title or interest
of such person.
Section
3 which is the provision regarding overriding effect of this Act over other
laws provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the provisions
of this Act, and of the rules and orders made thereunder shall have effect
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law and
rules for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of
any law or usage, agreement, settlement, grant sanad or any decree or order of
any court of other authority.
Chapter
II of the Act comprises of the provisions regarding Abolition of Zamindari and Biswedari
Estates.
In
section 5 which is included in the said chapter provisions are made regarding
consequences of abolition.
The
relevant portions of the section are quoted hereunder :
5.
Consequences of abolition (1) XXX XXX XXX (2) As from the date of vesting of
any Zamindari or Biswedari estate in the State Government, notwithstanding
anything contained in any contract, grant or other document or in any law for
the time being in force but save as otherwise provided in this Act- (a)such
estate shall stand transferred to, and vest in, the State Government free from
all encumbrances.
(b)the
right, title and interest of the Zamindar or Biswedar and of every person
claiming through him, in such estate, including land (cultivable, waste or
barren) grove-land, grass land or birs, scrub jungle, forests, trees,
fisheries, hills, wells tanks, ponds, water courses and channels, ferries,
pathways, village sites, abadi sites, hats, bazars, means and mela grounds, and
in all sub soil therein, including rights, if any, in quarries and mines
whether being worked or not and in all mineral and mineral products, shall
cease and be vested in the State Government, free from all encumbrances, for
the purposes of the State, and every mortgage, debt or charge on any such
right, title or interest shall be a charge on the amount of compensation
payable to the Zamindar or Biswedar under this Act;
XXX XXX
XXX (d) every right, title or interest created in or over such estate by the Zamindar
or Biswedar or his predecessor-in-interest shall, as against the State
Government, cease and determine; all rents and cesses in respect of any
holdings in such estate for any period after the date of vesting, which, but
for such vesting, would have been payable to the Zamindar or Biswedar, shall
vest in and be payable to the State Government, and any payment made in contravention
of this clause shall not be a valid discharge of the person liable to pay the
same;
XXX XXX
XXX (j) every mortgage with possession existing on such estate or part thereof
on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent of
the amount secured on such estate or part, be deemed, without prejudice to the
rights of the State Government under this section, to have been substituted by
a simple mortgage;
(k) no
claim or liability enforceable or incurred before the date of vesting against
or by the Zamindar or Biswedar for any money which is charged on or in secured
by a mortgage of such estate or part thereof shall, except as provided in
section 73 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act IV of 1882), be
enforceable against his right, title or interest in such estate or part;
(l)
Subject to any rules made in this behalf, all suits and proceedings affecting
such estate, in which, because of the same having vesting in the State
Government, the latter will be a neessary part, pending in any court, civil or
revenue, at the date of vesting and all proceeding consequent upon any decree
or orders passed in any such suit or proceeding before such date, shall not be
proceeded with till, on an application made in that behalf, the State
Government is made a party thereto;
XXX XXX
XXX (4)Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) the Zamindar or Biswedar
shall, subject to the provisions of section 29, continue to retain the
possession of his Khudkasht, recorded as such in the annual registers before
the date of vesting. (emphasis supplied) Section 29 of the Act which is
included in Chapter V- Miscellaneous contains provision regarding Khatedari
rights in Khudkasht land. In sub-section (1) thereof it is provided that as
from the date of vesting of an estate, the Zamindar or Biswedar thereof shall
be a Malik of any khudkasht land in his occupation on such date and shall, as
such Malik, be entitled to all the rights conferred and be subject to all the
liabilities imposed on a khatedar tenant by or under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,
1955. Sub-section (2) of the section is not relevant for the present purpose.
(emphasis
supplied) Section 30 contains the provisions regarding rights of tenants in
estate. Sub-section(1) thereof provides that subject to the provisions of
sections 15, 15A, 15B and 16 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, every tenant in an
estate, other than a tenant of Khudkasht or a sub-tenant, shall, as from the
date of vesting, be the khatedar tenant of the land comprised in his holding,
unless he has acquired Khatedari rights therein before such date, and shall, as
from the date of vesting, pay to the State Government, until rents are settled
in accordance with the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956
(Rajasthan Act No.15 of 1956), by way of rent therefor the same amount as he
had been paying to the Zamindar or Biswedar immediately before such date but
not exceeding twice the land revenue payable in respect thereof.
Sub-section(2)
of the said section lays down that upon a Zamindar or Biswedar becoming a Malik
of his Khudkasht land under section 29, every tenant of such Khudkasht shall be
the sub-tenant of the land in his occupation holding under and from such Malik.
The
expression Khudkasht is defined in section 5(23) of the Act to mean land in any
part of the State cultivated personally by an estate-holder and shall include (i)
land recorded as khudkasht, sir, havala, niji- jot, gharkhed in settlement
records at the commencement of this Act in accordance with law in force at the
time when such record was made, and (ii) land allotted after such commencement
as khudkasht under any law for the time being in force in any part of the
State.
In
Section 5(46) Zamindar is defined to mean a person on whom a village or portion
of a village in any part of the State is settled on the Zamindari system and
who is recorded as such in the record of rights and shall include a proprietor
as defined in clause(a) of section 2 of the Madhya Bharat Zamindari Abolition
Act, Samvat 2008 (Madhya Bharat Act of 1951), if any, in the Sunel area.
Section
43 contains the provisions regarding mortgage.
The
portions of the said section relevant for the purpose of the case are extracted
below : 43. XXXXX XXXXX XXXX (3)A usufructuary mortgage under sub- section(2)
shall, upon the expiry of the period mentioned hereinbefore, be deemed to have
been satisfied in full without any payment whatsoever by the mortgagor, and the
mortgage debt shall be deemed to have been extinguished and the mortgaged land
redeemed and the possession thereof shall be delivered by the mortgagee to the
mortgagor free from all encumbrances.
(4) A usufructuary
mortgage of any land made before the commencement of this Act shall, upon the
expiry of the period mentioned in the mortgage deed or twenty years from the
date of execution thereof, whichever period is less, be deemed to have been
satisfied in full without any payment whatsoever by the mortgagor and the
mortgage debt shall accordingly be deemed to have been extinguished and thereupon
the mortgaged land shall be redeemed and possession thereof shall be delivered
to the mortgagor free from all encumbrances.
Section
183 of the Act under which the suit was filed reads as follows: 183.Ejectment
of certain trespassers (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any
provision of this Act, a tresspasser who has taken or retained possession of
any land without lawful authority shall be liable to ejectment, subject to the
provision contained in sub-section(2), on the suit of the person or persons
entitled to eject him, and shall be further liable to pay as penalty for each
agricultural year, during the whole or any part whereof he has been in such
possession, a sum which may extend to fifteen times the annual rent.
(2) In
case of land which is held directly from the State Government or to which the
State Government acting through the Tehsildar, is entitled to admit the
trespasser as tenant, the Tehsildar shall proceed in accordance with the
provisions of section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan Act
15 of 1956).
On a
reading of the provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act noted above it is
clear that a Zamindar who is in possession/occupation of Khudkasht land on the
date of vesting of the estate becomes a Khatedar tenant on abolition of the Zamindari
right under section 29 of the Zamindari Abolition Act. Under the said section a
Zamindar becomes a Malik of the Khudkasht land in his occupation and as Malik
he shall be entitled to all the rights conferred and all the liabilities
imposed on a Khatedar tenant by or under the Act. It follows as a corollary
that if the Zamindar is not in occupation of the Khudkasht land on the date of
vesting he is not entitled to claim Khatedari right in the land.
The
scheme behind this provision is that if a Zamindar or Biswedar is in actual
occupation of cultivable land on the date of abolition of his Zamindari right
then he should continue to be in possession of such land. This is in accordance
with the object of bringing about agrarian reforms by giving the land to the
person in cultivating possession of the land. If the Zamindar is not in
occupation of the Khudkasht land on the date of vesting then such land vests in
the State along with the other lands subject to the provisions in the Zamindari
Abolition Act.
In
respect of such land Zamindar is not entitled to claim any right of possession
and consequentially is not entitled to maintain a suit for recovery of
possession of the land (supra) a Division Bench of this Court interpreting the
provisions of sections 29 , 5(2)(a), (b),(j), 5(4) and 2(6) of the Zamindari
Abolition Act and sections 5(23)(I) and (25) of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act held
: Even if it is assumed that the lands in dispute have to be treated as Khudkasht
lands of the appellant by virtue of clause (I) of the inclusive part of the
definition of Khudkasht contained in Section 5(23) of the Rajasthan Tenancy
Act, the appellant cannot succeed in his claim that he has acquired Khatedari
rights in respect of those lands on the basis of the provisions contained in
sub- section (4) of Section 5 and sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Act.
Sub-section (4) of Section 5 provides that notwithstanding anything contained
in sub-section (2) of Section 5 the Zamindar or Biswedar shall subject to the
provisions of Section 29, continue to retain the possession of his Khudkasht,
recorded as such in the annual registers before the date of vesting.
The
words continue to retain the possession, imply that lands which are recorded as
Khudkasht in the annual register before the date of vesting should be in
possession of the Zamindar or Biswedar on the date of vesting. If he is in
possession of such lands he can continue to retain the possession of the same
subject to the provisions of Section
29.
Sub-section(1) of Section 29 prescribes that as from the date of vesting of an
estate, the Zamindar or Biswedar thereof shall be a malik of any Khudkasht land
in his occupation on such date and shall, as such malik, be entitled to all
rights conferred and the subject to all the liabilities imposed on a Khatedar
tenant by or under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Under this provision Khatedari
rights have been statutorily conferred on a Zamindar or Biswedar as from the
date of the vesting of the estate in respect of Khudkasht lands in the
occupation of such Zamindar or Biswedar on such date. The words in his
occupation on such date postulates that the lands, though Khudkasht, should be
in the occupation of the Zamindar or Biswedar on the date of vesting of the
estate. It would thus appear that in view of sub- section(4) of Section 5 and
sub-section(1) of Section 29 of the Act the mere fact of recording of the land
as Khudkasht in the settlement records on the date of vesting would not be
enough for a Zamindar or Biswedar to acquire Khatedari rights over the said
lands;
the Zamindar
or Biswedar should be in possession/ occupation of the said lands on the date
of vesting of the estate under the Act. The possession/occupation envisaged by
sub- section(4) of Section 5 and sub-section(1) of Section 29 of the Act is
actual possession/occupation and the possession of a mortgagor through the
mortgagee cannot be held to be in possession or occupation as postulated in
sub-section(4) of Section 5 and sub-section (1) of Section 29 of the Act.
In the
present case the appellant has come forward with a specific case in the plaint
that the defendant is in possession of the lands in dispute as a mortgagee from
the date of the two mortgagees. In other words the appellant was not in
possession/occupation of the said lands on the date of vesting of the estate of
the appellant under the Act. The appellant cannot, therefore, claim Khatedari
rights in respect of the lands in dispute.
On
consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as revealed from the
materials on record and the relevant provisions of the Zamindari Abolition Act
it is our considered view that the principles laid down and the force to the
present case. We are also in respectful agreement with the principles laid down
in the said decision. Therefore, the appellants cannot be said to be khatedar
tenants of the land in dispute. The first question formulated earlier is
answered in the negative and in view of that answer the further question does
not arise for consideration. The High Court was right in dismissing the suit.
The appeal is dismissed. No costs.
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