Shriomani
Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar Vs. Shri Som Nath Dass & Ors [2000] INSC 158 (29 March 2000)
A.P.Misra,
M.Jagannadha Rao
MISRA,
J.
The
question raised in this appeal is of far reaching consequences and is of great
significance to one of the major religious followers of this country. The
question is:
whether
the Guru Granth Sahib could be treated as a juristic person or not? If it is,
then it can hold and use the gifted properties given to it by its followers out
of their love, in charity. This is by creation of an endowment like others for
public good, for enhancing the religious fervour, including feeding the poor
etc.. Sikhism grew because of the vibrating divinity of Guru Nanakji and the 10
succeeding gurus, and the wealth of all their teachings is contained in Guru
Granth Sahib. The last of the living guru was Guru Gobind Singhji who recorded
the sanctity of Guru Granth Sahib and gave it the recognition of a living Guru.
Thereafter, it remained not only a sacred book but is reckoned as a living
guru. The deep faith of every earnest follower, when his pure conscience meets
the divine under-current emanating from their Guru, produces a feeling of
sacrifice and surrender and impels him to part with or gift out his wealth to
any charity may be for gurdwaras, dharamshalas etc.. Such parting spiritualises
such follower for his spiritual upliftment, peace, tranquility and enlightens
him with resultant love and universalism. Such donors in the past, raised
number of Gurdwaras. They gave their wealth in trust for its management to the
trustees to subserve their desire. They expected trustees to faithfully
implement the objectives for which the wealth was entrusted.
When
selfishness invades any trustee, the core of trust starts leaking out. To stop
such leakage, legislature and courts step in. This is what was happening in the
absence of any organised management of Gurudwaras, when trustees were either
mismanaging or attempting to usurp such trusts.
The
Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Act 1922 (VI of 1922) was enacted to meet the
situation. It seems, even this failed to satisfy the aspirations of the Sikhs. The
main reason being that it did not establish any permanent committee of
management for Sikh gurdwaras and did not provide for the speedy confirmation
by judicial sanction of changes already introduced by the reforming party in
the management of places of worship. This was replaced by the Sikh Gurdwaras
Act, 1925 (Punjab Act No. 8 of 1925) under which the present case arises. This
Act provided a legal procedure through which gurdwaras and shrines regarded by
Sikhs as essential places of Sikh worship to be effectively and permanently
brought under Sikh control and management, so as to make it consistent with the
religious followings of this community.
About
56 persons of villages Bilaspur, Ghodani, Dhamot, Lapran and Buani situated in
the Village Bilaspur, District Patiala moved petition under Section 7(1) of the
said Act for declartion that the disputed property is a Sikh Gurdwara. The
State Government through Notification No.
1702
G.P. dated 14th
September, 1962
published the aforesaid petition in the Gazette including the boundaries of the
said gurdwaras which were to be declared as Sikh Gurdwaras. Thereafter, a
composite petition under Sections 8 and 10 of the said Act was filed by Som
Dass son of Bhagat Ram, Sant Ram son of Narain Dass and Anant Ram son of Sham
Dass of Village Bilaspur, District Patiala, challenging the same. They claimed
it to be a dharamshala and Dera of Udasian being owned and managed by the
petitioners and their predecessors since the time of their forefathers and that
they being the holders of the same, received the said Dera in succession, in
accordance with their ancestral share.
They
also claimed to be in possession of the land attached to the said Dera. They
denied it to be a Sikh Gurdwara.
This
petition was forwarded by the Government to the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal,
hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal. In reply to the notice, the Shiromani
Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee, hereinafter referred to as the SGPC (appellant),
claimed it to be a Sikh Gurdwara, having been established by the Sikhs for
their worship, wherein Guru Granth Sahib was the only object of worship and it
was the sole owner of the gurdwara property. It denied this institution to be
an Udasi Dera. However, appellant Committee challenged the locus standi of the
respondent to file this objection to the notification. The appellants case was
under Section 8 and objection could only be filed by any hereditary office-holders
or by 20 or more worshippers of the gurdwara, which they were not. The Tribunal
held that the petitioners before it (respondents here), admitted in their
cross- examination that the disputed premises was being used by them as their
residential house that there was no object of worship in the premises, neither
they were performing any public worship nor they were managing it. So it held
they were not hereditary office holders, as they neither managed it nor
performed any public worship. Thus, their petition under Section 8 was rejected
on 9th February, 1965 by holding that they have no locus
standi. Aggrieved by this they filed first appeal being FAO No. 40 of 1965
which was also dismissed by the High Court on 24th March, 1976, which became final. Thereafter, the Tribunal took the
petition under Section 10 in which the stand of SGPC was that the land and the
buildings were the properties of Gurdwara Sahib Dharamshala Guru Granth Sahib
at Bilaspur. The respondents and their predecessors along with their family
members had all along been its managers and they had no personal rights in it.
The Tribunal framed two issues:
(1)
What right, title or interest have the petitioners in the property in dispute?
(2) What right, title or interest has the notified Sikh Gurdwara in the
property in dispute.
The
Tribunal decided both issue No. 1 and issue No.
2 in
favour of present appellants and held that the disputed property belonged to
the SGPC. Thus respondents petition under Section 10 was also rejected on 4th September 1978.
Tribunals
conclusion is reproduced hereinbelow:
The
above discussion shows that the respondent-Committee has been successful in
bringing its case rightly in Clauses 18 (1)(a) and 18(1)(d) of the Act and has
been successful in discharging its onus as regards issue no. 2 and the issue
is, iala is the owner of the property in dispute consisting of Gurdwara
building, the pla of which is given in the Notification No. 1702 G.P.
dated
14.9.68 at page 2527 and the agricultural land measuring 115 Bighas 12 Biswas
the detail of which are given in the copy of Jamabandi for the year 1955-56
A.D. attached to the above-said Notification at page 2529 and is comprised of
Khasra Nos. 456 min, 457, 451, 644 and 452 bearing Khawat No. 276 Khatauni nos.
524 to 527.
Aggrieved
by this, respondents filed first appeal being FAO No. 449 of 1978. During its
pendency, the SGPC on the basis of final order passed by the High Court in FAO
No. 40 of 1965 against the order of the Tribunal rejecting Section 8
application, filed suit No. 94 of 1979 against the respondents under Section
25-A of the Act for the possession of the building and the land. The
respondents contested the suit by raising objection about mis-description of
the property in the plaint and also raising an is e about jurisdiction since
the income from the gurdwara was more than Rs. 3,000/- per annum for which a
committee was to be constituted before any suit could be filed. On contest, the
said suit of SGPC was decreed and respondents objections were rejected, against
which the respondents filed FAO No. 2 of 1980. The High Court vide its order
dated 11th February, 1980 directed this FAO No. 2 of 1980 to be listed for
hearing along with FAO No. 449 of 1978. It is also relevant to refer to, which
was also stated by the respondents in their petition before the Tribunal, that
a notification under Section 9 of the Act was published declaring the disputed
gurdwara to be a Sikh Gurdwara.
It is
necessary to give some more facts to appreciate the contentions raised by the
respective parties. In jamabandi Ex. P-1 of 1961-62 BK, (which would be 1904
AD) Mangal Dass and Sunder Dass, Bhagat Ram sons of Gopi Ram Faqir Udasi were
mentioned as owners in possession of the land. They had also mortgaged part of
this land to some other persons. This village Bilaspur where the disputed
gurdwara exists formed part of the erstwhile Patiala Estate.
The
then ruler of the Patiala Estate issued Farman- Shahi dated 18th April, 1921. Its contents are quoted hereunder:
In
future, instructions be issued that so long the appointment of a Mahant is not
approved by Ijlas-I-khas through Deori Mulla, until the time, the Mahant is
entitled to receive turban, shawl or Bandhan or Muafi etc. from the Government,
no property or Muafi shall be entered in his name in the revenue papers.
It
should also be mentioned that the land which pertains to any Dera should not be
considered as the property of any Mahant, nor the same should be shown in the
revenue papaers as the prope y of the Mahant, but these should be entered as
belonging to the Dera under the management of the Mahant and that the Mahants
shall not be entitled to sell or mortgage the land of the Dera. Revenue
Department be also informed about it and the order be gazetted.
On
Maghar 10, 1985 BK (1920 AD) at the insta e of Rulia Singh and others the
patwari made a report in compliance with the aforesaid Farman-e- Shahi for the
change of the entries in favour of Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh.
This was based on the enquiry and evidence produced before him. In this
mutation proceeding which led to the mutation viz., Ex. P8, Narain Dass, Bhagat
Ram and Atma Ram Sadh appeared before the Revenue Officer and stated that their
ancestors got this land which was gift in charity (Punnarth) by the then proprietors
of the village. This land was given to the ancestors of the respondent for the
purpose that they should provide food and comfort to the travellers passing
through this village. In the same proceeding Kapur Singh, Inder Singh
Lambardars and other right- holders of the said village also stated that their
fore-fathers had given this land in the name of Guru Granth Sahib Barajman
Dharamshala Deh under the charge of these persons for providing food and
comfort to the travellers. But Atma Ram and otherietors of the village.
This
land was given to the ancestors of the respondent for the purpose that they
should provide food and comfort to the travellers passing through this village.
In the same proceeding Kapur Singh, Inder Singh Lambardars and other right-holders
of the said village also stated that their fore-fathers had given this land in
the name of Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh under the charge of
these persons for providing food and comfort to the travellers.
But
Atma Ram and others, ancestors of respondents were not performing their duties.
This default was for a purpose, which is revealed through the last settlement
that they got this land entered in their personal names, in the revenue records
against which a matter was pending before Deori Mualla in the mutation
proceedings. Based on the evidence, the Revenue Officer after enquiry recorded
the finding that Atma Ram and others admitted that this land had been given to
them without any compensation for providing food and shelter to the travellers
which they were not performing.
He
further held that Atma Ram and others could not controvert the aforesaid
assertion made by the villagers.
So,
based on this enquiry and evidence on record, he ordered the mutation, in the
name of Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh by deleting the name of Atma
Ram and others from the column of ownership of the land. He further observed,
so far as the question of appoinment of Manager or Mohatmim was concerned that
it was to be decided by the Deori Mualla as the case about this was pending
before the Deori Mualla. Similarly, in the other mutation No,. 693 which is Ex.
9 in 27th Maghar 1983 (1926 AD) also, mutation was ordered by removal of the
name of Narain Dass, Bhagat Ram sons of Gopi Ram in favour of Guru Granth Sahib
Barajman Dharamshala Deh. Since that date till the filing of the petitions by
the respondents under Sections 8 and 10 of the Act entries in the ownership
column of the land continued in the name of "Guru Granth Sahib Barajman
Dharamshala Deh and no objection was filed either by the ancestors of
respondents or respondents themselves.
It was
for the first time objection was raised by respondents through their counsel
before the High Court in FAO No. 449 of 1978 regarding validity of Ex. P 8-9
contending that the entry in the revenue records in the name of Guru Granth
Sahib was void as Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic person. The case of the
respondents was that the Guru Granth Sahib was only a sacred book of the Sikhs
and it would not fall within the scope of the word, juristic person. On the
other hand, with vehemence and force learned counsel for the appellant, SGPC
submits that Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person and hence it can hold
property, can sue and be sued. On this question, whether Guru Granth Sahib is a
juristic person, a difference arose between the two learned judges of the Bench
of the High Court. Mr. Justice Tiwana held, it to be a juristic person and
dismissed both the FAOs, namely, FAO No. 449 of 1978 and 2 of 1980 upholding the
judgment of the Tribunal. On the other hand Mr. Justice Punchhi, (as he then
was) recorded dissent and held, the Guru Granth Sahib not to be a juristic
person, but did not decide the issue on merits.
The
case was then referred to a third judge, namely, Mr.
Justice
Tiwatia who agreed with the view of Mr. Justice Punchhi and held the Guru
Granth Sahib not to be a juristic person. After recording this finding the
learned judge directed that the FAO may be placed before the Division Bench for
final disposal of the appeal on merits.
The
question, whether Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person is the main point
which is argued in the present appeal to which we are called upon to
adjudicate. It is relevant to mention here that after adjudication of the
question whether the Guru Granth Sahib is a juristic person, the matter again
went back to the same Bench which again gave rise to another conflict between
Justice Tiwana and Mr.
Justice
Punchhi. Justice Tiwana held on merits that mutations were valid and respondents
had no right to this property. But Mr. Justice Punchhi held to the contrary
that the mutation was invalid and this property was the private property of the
respondents. Thereafter, the said FAO No. 449 of 1978 and FAO No. 2 of 1980
were placed before the third judge, namely, Justice J.B.Gupta, who concurred
with the view taken by Mr. Justice Punchhi, as he then was. He recorded the
following conclusion:
in
view of the findings that Guru Granth Sahib is not a juristic person, and that
the notification issued under section 9 was not conclusive, in view of the Full
Bench Judgment of this Court in Mahant Lachhman Dass Chela Mahant Moti Rams
case (supra), the findings of the Tribunal are liable to be set aside. The
Tribunal mainly based its findings on the mutations, Exhibits P.8 and P.9,
which are in the name of Guru Granth Sahib, since Guru Granth Sahib is not a
juristic person, any mutation a sanctioned in its name in the present case was
of no consequence. There is no other cogent evidence except the said mutations
relied upon by the Tribunal in that behalf. Similar was the position as regards
the building. In that behalf, the Tribunal relied upon the notification issued
earlier. The same being not conclusive, there was not other reliable evidence
to conclude that the building formed part of the Sikh Gurdwara, notified under
Section. In these circumstances, I concur with the view taken by M.M.Punchhi,
J. in the order dated December
16, 1986.
The
foundation of his decision on merits is based on the finding that Guru Granth
Sahib is not a juristic person and hence Exs. P8 and P9, the mutations in its
name were not sustainable. The present appellants preferred Special Leave
Petition No. 7803 of 1988 in this Court, which was dismissed in default on 16th November, 1995 and its restoration application was
also dismissed on 19th
August, 1996. In this
petition it was specifically stated that the present Civil Appeal No. 3968 of
1987 is pending in this Court. However, it is significant as we have said
above, the judgment of Mr. Justice Gupta concurring the judgment of Mr. Justice
Punchhi, as he then was, was mainly on the basis that the mutation in the name
in favour of Guru Granth Sahib Barajman Dharamshala Deh was void in as much as
Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic person. Thus the foundation of that
decision rests on the question which we are considering.
The
crux of the litigation now rests on the question, whether Guru Granth Sahib is
a juristic person or not. Now, we proceed to consider this issue.
The
very words Juristic Person connote recognition of an entity to be in law a
person which otherwise it is not. In other words, it is not an individual
natural person but an artificially created person which is to be recognised to
be in law as such. When a person is ordinarily understood to be a natural
person, it only means a human person. Essentially, every human person is a
person. If we trace the history of a Person in the various countries we find
surprisingly it has projected differently at different times. In some countries
even human beings were not treated to be as persons in law. Under the Roman Law
a Slave was not a person. He had no right to a family. He was treated like an
animal or chattel. In French Colonies also, before slavery was abolished, the
slaves were not treated to be legal persons. They were later given recognition
as legal persons only through a statute. Similarly, in the U.S. the African-Americans had no legal rights though
they were not treated as chattel.
In
Roscoe Pounds Jurisprudence Part IV, 1959 Ed. at pages 192-193, it is stated as
follows:- In civilized lands even in the modern world it has happened that all
human beings were not legal persons. In Roman law down to the constitution of
Antoninus Pius the slave was not a person. He enjoyed neither rights of family
nor rights of patrimony. He was a thing, and as such, like animals, could be
the object of rights of property..In the French colonies, before slavery was
there abolished, slaves were put in the class of legal persons by the statute
of April 23, 1833 and obtained a somewhat extended
juridical capacity by a statute of 1845. In the United States down to the Civil War, the free negroes in many of the
states were free human beings with no legal rights.
With
the development of society, where an individuals interaction fell short, to
upsurge social developments, cooperation of a larger circle of individuals was
necessitated. Thus, institutions like corporations and companies were created,
to help the society in achieving the desired result. The very constitution of
State, municipal corporation, company etc. are all creations of the law and
these Juristic Persons arose out of necessities in the human development. In
other words, they were dressed in a cloak to be recognised in law to be a legal
unit.
Corpus
Juris Secundum, Vol. LXV, page 40 says:
Natural
person. A natural person is a human being;
a man,
woman, or child, as opposed to a corporation, which has a certain personality
impressed on it by law and is called an artificial person. In the C.J.S.
definition Person it is stated that the word person, in its primary sense,
means natural person, but that the generally accepted meaning of the word as
used in law includes natural persons and artificial, conventional, or juristic
persons.
Corpus
Juris Secundum, Vol. VI, page 778 says:
Artificial
persons. Such as are created and devised by human laws for the purposes of
society and government, which are called corporations or bodies politic.
Salmond
on Jurisprudence, 12th Edn., 305 says:
A
legal person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law
attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the
conception of personality beyond the class of human beings is one of the most
noteworthy feats of the legal imagination.
Legal
persons, being the arbitrary creations of the law, may be of as many kinds as
the law pleases. Those which are actually recognised by our own system,
however, are of comparatively few types. Corporations are undoubtedly legal
persons, and the better view is that registered trade unions and friendly
societies are also legal persons though not verbally regarded as corporations..If,
however, we take account of other systems than our own, we find that the
conception of legal personality is not so limited in its application, and that
there are several distinct varieties, of which three may be selected for
special mention.
1. The
first class of legal persons consists of corporations, as already defined,
namely, those which are constituted by the personification of groups or series
of individuals. The dividuals who thus form the corpus of the legal person are
termed its members
2. The
second class is that in which the corpus, or object selected for
personification, is not a group or series of persons, but an institution. The
law may, if it pleases, regard a church or a hospital, or a university, or a
library, as a person. That is to say, it may attribute personality, not to any
group of persons connected with the institution, but to the institution itself.
3. The
third kind of legal person is that in which the corpus is some fund or estate
devoted to special uses a charitable fund, for example or a trust estate.
Jurisprudence
by Paton, 3rd Edn., page 349 and 350 says:
It has
already been asserted that legal personality is an artificial creation of the
law. Legal persons are all entities capable of being right-and-duty- bearing
units-all entities recognised by the law as capable of being parties to a legal
relationship. Salmond said: So far as legal theory is concerned, a person is
any being whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties.
Legal
personality may be granted to entities other than individual human beings, e.g.
a group of human beings, a fund, an idol. Twenty men may form a corporation
which may sue and be sued in the corporate name. An idol may be regarded as a
legal persona in itself, or a particular fund may be incorporated. It is clear
that neither the idol nor the fund can carry out the activities incidental to
litigation or other activities incidental to the carrying on of legal
relationships, e.g., the signing of a contract;
and,
of necessity, the law recognises certain human agents as representatives of the
idol or of the fund. The acts of such agents, however (within limits set by the
law and when they are acting as such), are imputed to the legal persona of the
idol and are not the juristic acts of the human agents themselves. This is no
mere academic distinction, for it is the legal persona of the idol that is
bound to the legal relationships created, not that of the agent. Legal
personality then refers to the particular device by which the law creates or
recognizes units to which it ascribes certain powers and capacities.
Analytical
and Historical Jurisprudence, 3rd Edn. At page 357 describes person:
We
may, therefore, define a person for the purpose of jurisprudence as any entity
(not necessarily a human being) to which rights or duties may be attributed.
Thus,
it is well settled and confirmed by the authorities on jurisprudence and courts
of various countries that for a bigger thrust of socio-political-scientific
development evolution of a fictional personality to be a juristic person became
inevitable. This may be any entity, living, inanimate, objects or things. It
may be a religious institution or any such useful unit which may impel the
courts to recognise it. This recognition is for subserving the needs and faith
of the society. A juristic person, like any other natural person is in law also
conferred with rights and obligations and is dealt with in accordance with law.
In other words, the entity acts like a natural person but only through a
designated person, whose acts are processed within the ambit of law. When an
idol was recognised as a juristic person, it was known it could not act by
itself. As in the case of minor a guardian is appointed, so in the case of
idol, a Shebait or manager is appointed to act on its behalf. In that sense,
relation between an idol and Shebait is akin to that of a minor and a guardian.
As a minor cannot express himself, so the idol, but like a guardian, the
Shebait and manager have limitations under which they have to act. Similarly,
where there is any endowment for charitable purpose it can create institutions
like a church, hospital, gurudwara etc. The entrustment of an endowed fund for
a purpose can only be used by the person so entrusted for that purpose in as
much as he receives it for that purpose alone in trust. When the donor endows
for an idol or for a mosque or for any institution, it necessitates the
creation of a juristic person. The law also circumscribes the rights of any
person receiving such entrustment to use it only for the purpose of such a
juristic person. The endowment may be given for various purposes, may be for a
church, idol, gurdwara or such other things that the human faculty may conceive
of, out of faith and conscience but it gains the status of juristic person when
it is recognised by the society as such.
In
this background, we find that this Court in (dead) by legal representatives,
AIR 1966 SC 1603, held that a Mutt was the owner of the endowed property and
that like an idol the Mutt was a juristic person and thus could own, acquire or
possess any property. In Masjid Shahid Ganj & Amritsar, AIR 1938 Lahore 369,
a Full Bench of that High Court held that a mosque was a juristic person. This
decision was taken in appeal to the Privy Council which confirmed the said
judgment. Sir George Rankin observed:
In
none of these cases was a mosque party to the suit, and in none except perhaps
the last is the fictitious personality attributed to the mosque as a matter of
decision. But so far as they go these cases support the recognition as a
fictitious person of a mosque as an institution-apparently hypostatizing an
abstration. This, as the learned Chief Justice in the present case has pointed
out, is very different from conferring personality upon a building so as to
deprive it of its character as immovable property.
There
may be an endowment for a pious or religious purpose. It may be for an idol,
mosque, church etc.. Such endowed property has to be used for that purpose. The
installation and adoration of an idol or any image by a Hindu denoting any god
is merely a mode through which his faith and belief is satisfied. This has led
to the recognition of an idol as a juristic person.
this
Court held:
ILR 37
Cal 128 (F), it was held on a consideration of these and other text that a gift
to an idol was not to be judged by the rules applicable to a transfer to a
sentient being, and that dedication of properties to an idol consisted in the
abandonment by the owner of his demoinion over them for the purpoe of their
being appropriated for the purposes which he intends. Thus, it was observed by
Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. at p. 138 that the pious purpose is still the
legatee, the establishment of the image is merely the mode in which the pious
purpose is to be effected and that the dedication to a deity may be a
compendious expression of the pious purposes for which the deciation is
designed.
Vide
also the observations of Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee at p.
155. In
Hindu Relgious Endowments Board V.
Veeraraghavacharlu,
AIR 1937 Mad 750 (G), Varadachariar J.
dealing
with this question, referred to the decision in ILR 37 Cal 128 (F), and
observed:
As explained
in the case, that purpose of making a gift to a temple is not to confer a
benefit on God but to confer a benefit on those who worship in that temple, by
making it possible for them to have the worship conducted in a proper and
impressive manner. This is the sense in which a temple and its endowments are
regarded as a public trust.
(1)
SCC 449, this Court held that a legal person is any entity other than a human
being to which the law attributes personality. It was stated: Let us be clear
that the jurisprudence bearing on corporations is not myth but reality. What we
mean is that corporate personality is a reality and not an illusion or
fictitious construction of the law. It is a legal person. Indeed, a legal
person is any subject-matter other than a human being to which the law
attributes personality. This extension, for good and sufficient reasons, of the
conception of personalityis one of the most noteworthy feats of the legal
imagination.
Corporations
are one species of legal persons invented by the law and invested with a
variety of attributes so as to achieve certain purposes sanctioned by the law.
of
Income Tax, Calcutta, 1969 (1) SCC 555, held that the consecrated idol in a
Hindu temple is a juristic person and approved the observation of West J. in
the following 247;
The
Hindu Law, like the Roman Law and those dervied from it, recognises not only
incorporate bodies with rights of property vested in the Corporation apart from
its individual members but also juridical persons called foundations. A Hindu
who wishes to establish a religious or charitable institution may according to
his law express his purpose and endow it and the ruler will give effect to the
bounty or at least, protect it so far at any rate as is consistent with his own
Dharma or conception or morality. A trust is not required for the purpose; the
necessity of a trust in such a case is indeed a peculiarity and a modern
peculiarity of the English Law. In early law a gift placed as it was expressed
on the altar of God, sufficed it to convey to the Church the lands thus
dedicated. It is consistent with the grants having been made to the juridical
person symbolised or personified in the idol. {Emphasis supplied} Thus, a trust
is not necessary in Hindu Law though it may be required under English Law.
In
fact, there is a direct ruling of this Court on the Gurdwara Prabandhak
Committee, 1984 (2) SCC 600, with reference to a case under Sikh Gurdwara Act,
1925 this Court held that the central body of worship in a Gurdwara is Guru
Granth Sahib, the holy book, is a Juristic entity. It was held:
From
the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine qua non for an institution
being a Sikh gurdwara is that there should be established Guru Granth Sahib and
the worship of the same by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in
the earlier part of the judgment. There may be other rooms of the institution
meant for other purposes but the crucial test is the existence of Guru Granth
sahib and the worship thereof by the congregation and Nishan Sahib.
Tracing
the ten Sikh gurus it records:
They
were ten in number each remaining faithful to the teachings of Guru Nanak, the
first Guru and when their line was ended by a conscious decision of Guru Gobind
Singh, the last Guru, succession was invested in a collection of teachings
which was given the title of Guru Granth Sahib.
This
is now the Guru of the Sikhs.
xx xx
The holiest book of the Sikhs is Guru Granth Sahib compiled by the Fifth
Master, Guru Arjan. It is the Bible of Sikhs. After giving his followers a
central place of worship, Hari-Mandir, he wanted to give them a holy book.
So he
collected the hymns of the first four Gurus and to these he added his own. Now
this Sri Guru Granth Sahib is a living Guru of the Sikhs. Guru means the guide.
Guru Granth Sahib gives light and shows the path to the suffering humanity.
Where a believer in Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed he reads hymns from
the Granth.
When
Guru Gobind Singh felt that his wordly sojourn was near, he made the fact known
to his disciples. The disciples asked him as to who would be their Guru in
future.
The
Guru immediately placed five pies and a coconut before the holy Granth, bowed
his head before it and said:
The
Eternal Father Willed, and I raised the Panth.
All my
Sikhs are ordained to believe the Granth as their preceptor. Have faith in the
holy Granth as your Master and consider it The visible manifestation of the
Gurus. He who hath a pure heart will seek guidance from its holy words.
The
Guru repeated these words and told the disciple not to grieve at his departure.
It was true that they would not see his body in its physical manifestation but
he would be ever present among the Khalsas. Whenever the Sikhs needed guidance
or counsel, they should assemble before the Granth in all sincerity and decide
their future line of action in the light of teachings of the Master, as
embodied in the Granth. The noble ideas embodied in the Granth would live for
ever and show people the path to bliss and happiness. (Emphasis supplied) The
aforesaid conspectus visualises how Juristic Person was coined to subserve to
the needs of the society. With the passage of time and the changes in the
socio-political scenario, collective working instead of individualised working
became inevitable for the growth of the organised society. This gave
manifestation to the concept of Juristic Person as an unit in various forms and
for various purposes and this is now a well recognised phenomena. This
collective working, for a greater thrust and unity gave birth to cooperative
societies, for the success and implementation of public endowment it gave rise
to public trusts and for purpose of commercial enterprises the juristic person
of companies were created, so on and so forth. Such creations and many others
were either statutory or through recognition by the courts. Different religions
of the world have different nuclei and different institutitonalised places for
adoration, with varying conceptual beliefs and faith but all with the same end.
Each
may have differences in the perceptive conceptual recognition of god but each
religion highlights love, compassion, tolerance, sacrifice as a hallmark for
attaining divinity. When one reaches this divine empire, he is beholden,
through a feeling of universal brotherhood and love which impels him to
sacrifice his wealth and belongings, both for his own bliss and for its being
useful to a large section of the society. This sprouts charity, for public
endowment. It is really the religious faith that leads to the installation of an
idol in a temple. Once installed, it is recognised as a juristic person. The
idol may be revered in homes but its juristic personality is only when it is
installed in a public temple.
Faith
and belief cannot be judged through any judicial scrutiny. It is a fact
accomplished and accepted by its followers. This faith necessitated the
creation of a unit to be recognised as a Juristic Person. All this shows that a
Juristic Person is not roped in any defined circle.
With
the changing thoughts, changing needs of the society, fresh juristic
personalities were created from time to time.
It is
submitted for the respondent that decisions of courts recognised an idol to be a
as juristic person but they did not recognise a temple to be so. So, on the
same parity, a gurdwara cannot be a juristic person and Guru Granth Sahib can
only a sacred book. It cannot be equated with an idol nor does Sikhism believe
in worshiping any idol. Hence Guru Granth Sahib cannot be treated as a juristic
person. This submission in our view is based on a misconception. It is not
necessary for Guru Granth Sahib to be declared as a juristic person that it
should be equated with an idol. When belief and faith of two different
religions are different, there is no question of equating one with the other.
If Guru Granth Sahib by itself could stand the test of its being declared as
such, it can be declared to be so.
An
idol is a Juristic Person because it is adored after its consecration, in a
temple. The offerings are made to an idol. The followers recognise an idol to
be symbol for God. Without the idol, the temple is only a building of mortar,
cement and bricks which has no sacredness or sanctity for adoration. Once
recognised as a Juristic Person, the idol can hold property and gainfully
enlarge its coffers to maintain itself and use it for the benefit of its
followers. On the other hand in the case of mosque there can be no idol or any
images of worship, yet the mosque itself is conferred with the same sacredness
as temples with idol, based on faith and belief of its followers. Thus the case
of a temple without idol may be only brick, mortar and cement but not the
mosque. Similar is the case with the Chruch. As we have said, each religion have
different nuclei, as per their faith and belief for treating any entity as a
unit.
Now
returning to the question, whether Guru Granth Sahib could be a Juristic Person
or not, or whether it could be placed on the same pedestal, we may first have a
glance at the Sikh religion. To comprehend any religion fully may indeed be
beyond the comprehension of any one and also beyond any judicial scrutiny for
it has its own limitations. But its silver lining could easily be picked up. In
the Sikh religion, Guru is revered as the highest reverential person. The first
of such most revered Gurus was Guru Nanak Dev, followed by succeeding Gurus,
the Tenth being the last living, viz., Guru Gobind Singh Ji. It is said that
Adi Granth or Guru Granth Sahib was compiled by the Fifth Guru Arjun and it is
this book that is worshiped in all the gurudwaras. While it is being read,
people go down their knees to make reverential obeisance and place their
offerings of cash and kind on it, as it is treated and equated to a living
Guru. In the Book A History of the Sikhs by Kushwant Singh, Vol. I, page 307:
The
compositions of the gurus were always considered sacred by their followers.
Guru Nanak said that in his hymns the true Guru manifested Himself, because
they were composed at His orders and heard by Him (Var Asa). The fourth guru,
Ram Das said: Look upon the words of the True Guru as the supreme truth, for
God and the Creator hath made him utter the words: (Var Gauri). When Arjun
formally installed the Granth in the Harimandir, he ordered his followers to
treat it with the same reverence as they treated their gurus. By the time of
Guru Gobind Singh, copies of the Granth had been installed in most Gurdwaras.
Quite
naturally, when he declared the line of succession of gurus ended, he asked his
followers to turn to the Granth for guidance and look upon it as the symbolic
representation of the ten gurus.
The
Grant Sahib is the central object of worship in all Gurdwaras.
It is
usually draped in silks and placed on a cot. It has an awning over it and,
while it is being read, one of the congregations stands behind and waves a
flywhisk made of Yaks hair. Worshippers go down on their knees to make
obeisance and place offerings of cash or kind before it as they would before a
king: for the Granth is to them what the gurus were to their ancestors the Saca
Padsah (the true Emperor).
The
very first verse of the Guru Granth Sahib reveals the infinite wisdom and
wealth that it contains, as to its legitimacy for being revered as guru:- The
First verse states: The creator of all is One, the only One. Truth is his name.
He is doer of everything.
He is
without fear and without enmity. His form is immortal. He is unborn and
self-illumined. He is realized by Gurus grace.
The
last living guru, Guru Gobind Singh, expressed in no uncertain terms that
henceforth there would not be any living guru. The Guru Granth Sahib would be
the vibrating Guru. He declared that henceforth it would be your Guru from
which you will get all your guidance and answer. It is with this faith that it
is worshiped like a living guru.
It is
with this faith and conviction, when it is installed in any gurudwara it
becomes a sacred place of worship.
Sacredness
of Gurudwara is only because of placement of Guru Granth Sahib in it. This
reverential recognition of Guru Granth Sahib also opens the hearts of its
followers to pour their money and wealth for it. It is not that it needs it,
but when it is installed, it grows for its followers, who through their
obeisance to it, sanctify themselves and also for running the langer which is
an inherent part of a Gurdwara.
In
this background, and on over all considerations, we have no hesitation to hold
that Guru Granth Sahib is a Juristic Person. It cannot be equated with an Idol
as idol worship is contrary to Sikhism. As a concept or a visionary for
obeisance, the two religions are different.
Yet,
for its legal recognition as a juristic person, the followers of both the
religions give them respectively the same reverential value. Thus the Guru
Granth Sahib it has all the qualities to be recognised as such. Holding
otherwise would mean giving too restrictive a meaning of a juristic person, and
that would erase the very jurisprudence which gave birth to it.
Now,
we proceed to examine the judgment of the High Court which had held to the
contrary. There was difference of opinion between the two Judges and finally
the third Judge agreed with one of the differing Judges, who held Guru Granth
Sahib to be not a Juristic Person. Now, we proceed to examine the reasonings
for their holding so. They first erred, in holding that such an endowment is
void as there could not be such a juristic person without appointment of a
Manager. In other words, they held that a juristic person could only act
through some one, a human agency and as in the case of an Idol, the Guru Granth
Sahib also could not act without a manager. In our view, no endowment or a
juristic person depends on the appointment of a Manager. It may be proper or
advisable to appoint such a manager while making any endowment but in its
absence, it may be done either by the trustees or courts in accordance with
law.
Mere
absence of a manager negative the existence of a Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Bom 247,
(approved in Yogendra Nath Naskars case, 1969 (1) SCC 555) referred to above,
if no manager is appointed by the founder, the ruler would give effect to the
bounty. As pointed in Vidyapurna Tirtha swami 457), by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J.
(approved in Yogendra Nath Naskars case, 1969 (1) SCC 555) the property given
in trust becomes irrevocable and is none was appointed to manage, it will be
managed by the court as representing the sovereign. This can be done by the
Court in several ways under Section 92, CPC or by handing over management to
any specific body recognised by law. But the trust will not be allowed by the
Court to fail. Endowment is when donor parts with his property for it being
used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a person or group of person
in trust for carrying out the objective of such entrustment. Once endowment is
made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the onerous duty of the persons
entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment.
They
may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in the trust or get it
appointed through Court. So, if entrustment is to any juristic person, mere
absence of manager would not negate the existence a juristic person.
We,
therefore, disagree with the High Court on this crucial aspect.
In
Words and Phrases Permanent Edition, Vol. 14A, at page 167:- Endowment means
property or pecuniary means bestowed as a permanent fund, as endowment of a
college, hospital or library, and is understood in common acceptance as a fund
yielding income for support of an institution.
The
further difficulty the learned Judges of the High Court felt was that there
could not be two Juristic Persons in the same building. This they considered
would lead to two juristic persons in one place viz., gurudwara and Guru Grant
Sahib. This again, in our opinion, is a misconceived notion. They are no two
Juristic Persons at all. In fact both are so interwoven that they cannot be
separated as pointed by Tiwana, J. in his separate judgment. The installation
of Guru Granth Sahib is the nucleus or nectar of any gurudwara. If there is no
Guru Granth Sahib in a Gurdwara it cannot be termed as gurudwara.
When
one refers a building to be a gurudwara, he refers it so only because Guru
Granth Sahib is installed therein.
Even
if one holds a Gurdwara to be a juristic person, it is because it holds the
Guru Granth Sahib. So, there do not exist two separate juristic persons, they
are one integrated State of Bihar and Ors., 1999 [5] SCC 50, this Court while
considering two separate deities, of Ram Jankijee and Thakur Raja they were
held to be separate Juristic Persons. So, in the same precincts, as a matter of
law, existence of two separate juristic persons were held to be valid.
Next
it was the reason of the learned Judges that, if Guru Granth Sahib is a
Juristic Person then every copy of Guru Granth Sahib would be a Juristic
Person. This again in our considered opinion is based on erroneous approach.
On
this reasoning it could be argued that every idol at private places, or
carrying it with one self each would become a Juristic Person. This is a
misconception. An idol becomes a juristic person only when it is consecrated
and installed at a public place for public at large. Every idol is not a
juristic person. So every Guru Granth Sahib cannot be a juristic person unless
it takes juristic role through its installation in a gurudwara or at such other
recognised public place.
Next
submission for the respondent is that Guru Grant Sahib is like any other sacred
book, like Bible for Christians, Bhagwat Geeta and Ramayana for Hindus and
Quran for Islamic followers and cannot be a Juristic Person.
This
submission also has no merit. Though it is true Guru Granth Sahib is a sacred
book like others but it cannot be equated with these other sacred books in that
sense. As we have said above, Guru Granth Sahib is revered in gurudwara, like a
Guru which projects a different perception. It is the very heart and spirit of
gurudwara. The reverence of Guru Granth on the one hand and other sacred books
on the other hand is based on different conceptual faith, belief and
application.
One
other reason given by the High Court is that Sikh religion does not accept
idolatry and hence Guru Granth Sahib cannot be a juristic person. It is true
that the Sikh religion does not accept idolatry but, at the same time when the
tenth guru declared that after him, the Guru Granth will be the Guru, that does
not amount to idolatry. The Granth replaces the guru henceforward, after the
tenth Guru.
For
all these reasons, we do not find any strength in the reasoning of High Court
in recording a finding that the Guru Grant Sahib not a Juristic Person. The
said finding is not sustainable both on fact and law.
Thus,
we unhesitantly hold Guru Granth Sahib to be a Juristic Person.
Next
challenge is that the basis for mutating of the name of Guru Granth Sahib
Birajman Dharamshala Deh, by deleting the name of the ancestors of the
respondents, based on Faraman-I-shahi issued by the then ruler of the Patiala
State dated 18.4.1921 is liable to be set aside, as this Faraman-i-Shahi did
not direct the recording of the name of Guru Granth Sahib. For ready reference
the said Faraman-i-Shahi is again quoted hereunder:- In future, instructions be
issued that so long the appointment of a Mahant is not approved by Ijlas-I-Khas
through Deori Mualla, until the time, the Mahant is entitled to receive turban,
shawl or Bandhan or Muafi etc. from the Government, no property or Muafi shall
be entered in his name in the revenue papers.
It
should also be mentioned that the land which pertains to any Dera should not be
considered as the property of any Mahant, nor the same should be shown in the
revenue papers as the property of the Mahant, but these should be entered as
belonging to the Dera under the management of the Mahant and that the Mahants
shall not be entitled to sell or mortgage the land of the Dera. Revenue
Department be also informed about it and the order be gazetted.
It was
also submitted that it was not known whether this Faraman-i- Shahi was
administrative in nature or was issued as a sovereign. If it was administrative
it could not have the same force of law.
We
have examined this Faraman-i-Shahi. It does not direct the authorities to
mutate the name of Guru Granth Sahib. It merely directed, the revenue authority
that till Mahants appointment is approved by Deors Mulla, no property or Muafi
received by a Mahant should be entered in his name, in the revenue papers.
Further the land of any Dera should not be considered to be that of Mahant.
This was only a directive which is protective in nature. In other words it only
directed that they should be done after ascertaining the fact and if the land
was of the Dera it should not be put in the name of Mahant. In other words, it
stated - enquire, find out the facts and do the needful.
The
mutation in the case before us was not on account of this Farman-I-Shahi but
was made because of the application made by one Rulia Singh and others of
village Bilaspur to the Patwari, and mutation was done only after a detailed
enquiry, after examining witnesses and other evidence on the record, which
resulted into Ex.8 and Ex. 9. In the said proceedings number of witnesses
appeared before the Revenue Officer and stated that their ancestors gifted this
disputed land for charity (Punnarth) for the benefit of public, who were the
proprietors and was merely entrusted to the ancestors of the respondents for
management. The claimants had no rights over it. Admittedly they did not
receive this land for any payment nor for any service rendered by them to such
donors. Their statement was that this land was given to them with clear direction
that they should use it for providing food and comfort to the travellers
(Musafran) passing through the village. They further gave evidence that their
forefathers gave it in the name of Guru Granth Sahib Birajman Dharamshala Deh.
In spite of this, Atma Ram and others and their predecessors did not perform
their obligations. On the contrary, with oblique motives they got this disputed
land entered in their name in the revenue records which was an attempt to usurp
the property. The Revenue Officer after enquiry held that Atma Ram and other
ancestors of respondents admitted that this land was given without making any
payment and was specifically meant for providing food and shelter to the
travellers which function they were not performing. It was only after such an
enquiry, he ordered the mutation by ordering deleting of the name of Atma Ram
and others. With reference to the question of appointment of a manager, he
recorded that this had to be decided by Deori Mualla, where such a case about
this was pending. Similar was the position in the other mutation proceedings
about which an application was also made to the Revenue Officer, where the
names of Narain Dass, Bhagat Ram sons of Gopi Ram were deleted and aforesaid
name was mutated resulting into Ex. 9. So, the mutation of name was not because
of direction issued by the Farman-I-Shahi. So no error could be said to have
been committed, when Ex.8 and Ex.9, viz., mutations were recorded.
Faraman-I-Shahi if at all may be said to have led to the enquiry but it was not
the basis.
This
takes us to the last point for our consideration.
After
the said difference of opinion between two learned Judges, Mr. Justice M.M.
Punchhi did not decide the case on merits though the other Judge Mr. Justice
Tiwana, held on merits in favour of the appellants, i.e., that the property
belonged to Gurdwara. When the case again returned to the same bench for
decision on merits there was again difference of opinion. It was again referred
to the third judge who concurred with Mr. Justice Punchhi. Against this the
appellants filed special leave petition in this court which was dismissed for
default as aforesaid. However, we find that the third Judge who concurred with
Mr. Justice Punchhi based his finding on the ground that Guru Granth Sahib was
not a juristic person hence entry Ex. 8 and 9 was invalid. But once the very
foundation falls, and Guru Granth Sahib is held to be a juristic person, the
said finding cannot stand. Thus, in our considered opinion there would not be
any useful purpose to remand the case. That apart since this litigation stood
for a long time, we think it proper to examine it ourself.
Learned
senior counsel for the respondents who argued with ability and fairness said
that in fact the only question which arises in this case is whether Guru Granth
Sahib is a juristic person. Examining the merits we find that the mutation in
the revenue papers in the name of Guru Granth Sahib was made as far back as in
the year 1928, in the presence of the ancestors of respondents and no objection
was raised by anybody till the filing of the present objection by the
respondents as aforesaid under Section 8/10 of the 1925 Act. This is after a
long gap of about forty years. Further, this property was given in trust to the
ancestors of respondents for a specified purpose but they did not perform their
obligation. It is also settled, once an endowment, it never reverts even to the
donor. Then no part of these rights could be claimed or usurped by the respondents
ancestors who in fact were trustees. Hence for these reasons and for the
reasons recorded by Mr. Justice Tiwana, even on merits, any claim to the
disputed land by the respondents has no merit. Thus any, claim over this
disputed property by the respondents fails and is hereby rejected. We uphold
the findings and orders passed by the Tribunal against which FAO No. 449 of
1978 and FAO No. 2 of 1980 was filed.
For
the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings which we have recorded, we
hold that High Court committed a serious mistake of law in holding that the
Guru Granth Sahib was not a juristic person and in allowing the claim over this
property in favour of respondents. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the
judgment and decree passed by the High Court dated 19-4-1985 and in FAO No. 449 of 1978 and FAO No. 2 of 1980 are hereby
set aside. We uphold the orders passed by the Tribunal both under Section 10 of
the said Act in Suit No. 449 of 1978. Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. Costs on
the parties.
S.L.P.
(Civil) Nos. 2735-36 of 1989:
The
main question raised in these special leave petitions is the same as has been
raised in Civil Appeal No.3968 of 1987, which we have disposed of today. In
view of this, the point raised by the petitioners in this petition is
unsustainable for the same reasons and is therefore dismissed.
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