U.P.
State Road Transport Corporation Vs. Subhash Chandra Sharma & Ors [2000] INSC
133 (15 March 2000)
S.S.Ahmad,
D.P.Wadha
S.
SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Leave granted. Respondent No.
1,
[hereinafter referred to as `Respondent'], who was a driver in the U.P. State
Road Transport Corporation (appellant), was charge-sheeted on 16.8.1989 for
disciplinary proceedings. Three charges were indicated in the charge-sheet. The
first charge related to his habitual absence from duty for the period June,
1988 to May, 1989, regarding which he also did not submit the mileage form.
The
second charge was that on 19th May, 1989,
when he reached Badaun at about 9 P.M. with Bus No. 8680, he informed the Conductor, Dinesh Kumar, that the
bus had developed some defects and, therefore, he parked the bus in Badaun
workshop. Dinesh Kumar, Conductor, went to sleep in another bus, but when he
woke up in the morning he found that the Bus was taken by Respondent to Bareilly, regarding which an information was
also given by Dinesh Kumar to the Station Incharge, Badaun. The Bus was also
seen coming back from Bareilly. It was noticed that in order to
cover up his act of taking the Bus to Bareilly, the Respondent got a remark entered in his duty form by Rampal, Vulcanizer
of Badaun Depot, about the defect in the Bus. The third and last charge against
the Respondent was that on 24th May, 1980
at about 8.30 PM, he, along with Shiv Kumar Sharma,
Conductor, went to Ramesh Chandra, Assistant Cashier, in the cash room in a
drunken state. He demanded money from Ramesh Chandra and when the latter
refused, the Respondent abused and threatened to assault him, which was treated
as an act of misconduct. The charges were enquired into by Shri S.C.
Jain,
a retired District Judge, who was appointed as the Enquiry Officer. The Enquiry
Officer submitted the Report on 21st September, 1990, in which he found that the charge about habitual absence
was not proved against the Respondent. The other charge relating to taking the
Bus to Bareilly was also not established, but it
was established that he had taken out the Bus unauthorisedly from Badaun
workshop to some place without taking the Conductor in the Bus. The third
charge of misconduct was found fully established. Thereafter, a show cause
notice was issued to the Respondent on 12th August, 1991, and by order dated 31st August, 1991, he was removed from service. On an
industrial dispute being raised by Respondent, a reference was made on 31st March, 1993 to the Labour Court for adjudication. The Labour Court, by its award dated 6th December, 1996, came to the conclusion that though
the departmental enquiry did not suffer from any infirmity, the punishment of
`removal' was excessive. It consequently set aside the order of removal and
substituted the punishment of removal by the punishment of stoppage of one wage
increment and payment of 50% of the back-wages. The award was challenged by the
appellant before the High Court in a writ petition which was dismissed
summarily on 27th
April, 1998. Learned
counsel appearing for the appellant has contended that once it was found by the
Labour Court that the departmental enquiry
conducted against the Respondent was proper and it did not suffer from any
infirmity, it was not open to it to interfere with the quantum of punishment.
It is contended that the High Court should have, on that ground, set aside the
award and maintained the order of removal passed against the Respondent.
Whether it is open to Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court or the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment
is, no longer, res integra, as the question has been answered by this Court
several times in its various decisions. In Union
of India & Anr. vs. B.C. Chaturvedi [1995] 6 SCC 750, a 3-Judge Bench of
this Court has held that Section 11-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 confers power on Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court to apply its mind on the question
of proportion of punishment or penalty. It was held that this power is also available
to High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, though it was qualified
with a limitation that while seized with this question as a writ court,
interference is permissible only when the punishment/penalty is shockingly
disproportionate.
Again,
a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Colour-Chem Ltd.
vs.
A.L. Alaspurkar & Ors. [1998] 3 SCC 192, relying upon an earlier decision
in Hind Construction & Engineering Co.
Ltd.
v. Workmen AIR 1965 SC 917 = [1965] 2 SCR 85 = [1965] 1 LLJ 462, laid down as
under : "Consequently it must be held that when looking to the nature of
charge of even major misconduct which is found proved if the punishment of
dismissal or discharge as imposed is found to be grossly disproportionate in
the light of the nature of the misconduct or the past record of the employee
concerned involved in the misconduct or is such which no reasonable employer
would ever impose in like circumstances, inflicting of such punishment itself
could be treated as legal victimisation." Section 11A of the Industrial
Disputes Act provides as under:- "11A. Powers of Labour Court,
Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of
discharge or dismissal of workmen -- Where an industrial dispute relating to
the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the
adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as
the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not
justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal
and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any,
as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award
of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances
of the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this section the
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely
only on the material on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in
relation to the matter." This Section, as interpreted by this Court, no
doubt, vests the Labour Court with discretion to substitute the order of
discharge or dismissal of a workman into an order of reinstatement of the
workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit or give such
other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in
lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. In
the present case, the following industrial dispute was referred to the Labour Court for adjudication: "Whether the
termination of the service of their workman Sh. Subhash Chandra Sharma S/o Shri
Nathimal, driver by the employer by order dt.
31.08.1991
is proper and legal? If not, what is the relief (with details) to which the
workman is entitled to?" The Labour Court, while upholding the third charge against the respondent
nevertheless interfered with the order of the appellant removing the respondent
from the service. The charge against the respondent was that he, in drunken
state, along with a conductor went to the Assistant Cashier in the cash room of
the appellant and demanded money from the Assistant Cashier. When the Assistant
Cashier refused, the respondent abused him and threatened to assault him. It
was certainly a serious charge of misconduct against the respondent. In such
circumstances, the Labour
Court was not
justified in interfering with the order of removal of respondent from the
service when the charge against him stood proved. Rather we find that the
discretion exercised by the Labour Court
in the circumstances of the present case was capricious and arbitrary and
certainly not justified.
It
could not be said that the punishment awarded to the respondent was in any way
"shockingly disproportionate" to the nature of the charge found
proved against him. In our opinion, the High Court failed to exercise its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and did not correct the
erroneous order of the Labour
Court which, if
allowed to stand, would certainly result in miscarriage of justice.
We,
therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court
and the award dated December
6, 1996 of the Labour Court. There shall, however, be no order
as to costs.
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