Molar
Mal Vs. M/S. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. [2000] INSC 128 (14 March 2000)
N.S.Hegde,
S.S.M.Quadri SANTOSH HEGDE, J.
Respondent-landlord
had filed an eviction petition before the Court of Rent Controller, Jagadhri in
the year 1979 seeking eviction of the appellant herein from the petition
scheduled land situated on Jagadhri Road, Yamuna Nagar under Section 13 of the Haryana
Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act) claiming that the petition scheduled land is required by it for its
personal use and occupation. As required under that Act it also contended that
it is not occupying in the urban area of Yamuna Nagar any other rented land for
the purpose of its business nor it has vacated any such rented land without sufficient
cause after the commencement of the Act. It also alleged in the said petition
that the premises already in its possession are not sufficient for its
requirement. Appellant-tenant opposed the said petition on a number of grounds,
primarily on the ground that the petition scheduled premises was not a rented
land but was a building as contemplated under the Act and he also alleged that
the landlord had not given material particulars in regard to its requirement of
additional space. By an amendment of his objection, the tenant further pleaded
that the landlord had filed several other applications against other tenants
alleging personal requirement and during the pendency of the eviction petition
in question, it had obtained possession of building and land from three other
tenants, hence, the landlords claim for his eviction is not bona fide. In its
rejoinder petition, the landlord admitted that it had obtained possession of
three premises through eviction proceedings and the same along with petition scheduled
land was required for its extension of coal yard, the foundry and for storage
of foundry material like sand, earth, fire wood, fire-bricks etc. The trial
court framed the following issues for its consideration: - 1. Whether the
applicant Company is a private limited company and whether Ram Avtar is a
competent to file the present application for ejectment ? OPA. 2. Whether the
property in dispute is a rented land and if so its effect ? OPA. 3.
If
issues No.2 is proved in the affirmative whether the applicant company requires
the premises in dispute for its bonafide use and occupation ? OPA. 4. Whether
the suit land is a non-residential building and as such the ground of ejectment
for personal use is not available to the applicant ? OPP. 5. Relief. Additional
issues framed on 15.10.1986 :- 4A. Whether the personal necessity of the
applicant stands satisfied during the pendency of the present petition ? OPP.
Trial
Court accepted the case of the landlord and ordered eviction of the appellant.
In appeal, the Appellate Authority remanded the matter back to the Rent
Controller for a fresh decision. This order of remand came to be challenged
before the High Court and the High Court was pleased to accept this challenge
and directed the appellate court to re-hear and decide the appeal itself. It,
however, restricted the scope of re-hearing to be confined to Issue Nos. 3 and
4A only. On remand the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the tenant and
decided the said issues in favour of the tenant. Being aggrieved by the order
of the Appellate Authority, the landlord preferred a revision petition before
the High Court which came to be allowed in favour of the landlord by the
judgment of the High Court pronounced on 26th of May, 1998. The tenant
preferred a review petition before the High Court alleging certain specific
omissions in the judgment of the High Court and the said review petition being
dismissed by an order of the High Court dated 3rd of July, 1998, the tenant has
preferred the above noted civil appeal. Before us on behalf of the tenant Shri M.L.Verma,
learned senior counsel has raised the following questions:- (i) That on the
pleading as filed before the original authority, no eviction could have been
ordered because the said pleading on behalf of the landlord did not contain
material particulars as required under Rule 4 of the Haryana Urban (Control of
Rent and Eviction) Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules); (ii) The High
Court had interfered with the findings given by the Appellate Authority on
questions of fact while deciding a revision petition filed by the landlord
which it could not have done; (iii) The courts below failed to notice the
proviso to Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Act which creates an embargo on the
landlord from seeking eviction of the appellant because of the fact the
respondent-landlord had earlier obtained eviction of other tenants under the
very same provision of law. On behalf of the landlord, Shri Parag Tripathi,
learned senior counsel pointed out that Rule 4 of the Rules is not mandatory
and is only directory even otherwise the combined reading of the eviction
petition along with the averments in the rejoinder petition, a case of the
landlord is clearly made out and necessary issues having been struck on this
point and parties having led evidence on this point, there was sufficient
material to decide the claim of the landlord and no prejudice has been caused
to the appellant. Adverting to the second question, he contended that the power
of the revisional court under the Act is much wider than the power conferred on
the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, the
court, under Section 15 of the Act, has the jurisdiction to correct any
illegality or impropriety committed by the Appellate Authority. In reply to the
third point, he contended that the proviso relied upon by the appellant did not
apply to the facts of the case. He also argued that this point of the
applicability of the proviso was not raised specifically by the tenant and no
issue has been framed in this regard. Therefore, he argues that the appellant
should not be permitted to raise this question for the first time before this
Court. We are not inclined to accept the first two points raised on behalf of
the appellant before us. It is true in the original eviction petition all the
material particulars of the requirement of the landlord were not mentioned in
detail, but then in the rejoinder application all the necessary particulars are
given by the landlord, notice of which the appellant had and the original
authority had struck a proper issue on this question and parties understood
each others case and led evidence on this issue, though Rule 4 of the Rules
does require the landlord to give material particulars, this Court has held
with reference to the same rule in the case of M/s. Rubber House vs. M/s.
Excelsior Needle Industries Pvt. Ltd. (1989 2 SCC 413) that the said rule is
not mandatory and is only directory. Therefore, the fact that the landlord did
not give all the material particulars of his requirement in the first instance
cannot be made a ground for rejection of the application. Similarly, we are of
the opinion, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the argument of the
tenant that the High Court exceeded in its jurisdiction by interfering on a
finding of fact arrived at by the Appellate Authority is also to be rejected.
It is to be noticed that under sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Act, the
High Court as a revisional authority has the power to call for and examine the records
relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the
purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order and
is entitled to pass such order as it may deem fit. The power vested in the High
Court under this provision of law is much wider than the power conferred on the
High Court under Section 115 of the C.P.C. In the process of satisfying itself
as to the legality or propriety of an impugned order, the High Court in a given
case can go into the finding of fact arrived at by the courts below and, if
found necessary, reverse such a finding of fact. Of course, this Court has in
many cases cautioned that this power is not to be used as a revisional court in
a routine manner but to be used only when the revisional court comes to the
conclusion that the last court of fact has arrived at a conclusion which is not
perverse or possible to be accepted on the materials placed before it. In other
words, if the High Court comes to the conclusion that the finding of the first
Appellate Court is based on no evidence then in a given case it is open to the
High Court to interfere with such finding of fact. In the instant case, we are
not convinced that the High Court has exceeded in its jurisdiction while
allowing the revision of the landlord on this count. Therefore, this question
urged on behalf of the appellant is also rejected. This leaves us to consider
the third point raised on behalf of the appellant. The argument is based on the
first proviso to Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Act which reads as follows :
(b) in
the case of rented land, if he requires it for his own use, is not occupying in
the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other rented land
and has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause after the
commencement of the 1949 Act;
Based
on this proviso and relying upon the fact that before the eviction was ordered
in this case, the landlord had obtained possession of three other rented lands
through eviction petitions filed under Section 13(3)(i)(b) of the Act, it is
contended, by virtue of the above proviso, that the landlord is statutorily
prevented from seeking eviction of the appellant from the tenanted land.
Opposing this contention, the landlord raised a preliminary objection that this
objection was not specifically raised before the courts below. Therefore, the
appellant-tenant should not be permitted to raise it for the first time before
this Court.
We
will first deal with the above objection of the landlord in regard to
permitting the appellant-tenants to raise this question before us. It is true
that in the written statement originally filed, the tenant did not raise this
specific contention. However, by an amendment made to the written statement the
tenant did plead that the landlord has obtained possession of three other
rented lands measuring 18 x 45 from Atma Ram Jassa Ram; 16 x 40 from Sakhuja
Trunk House and 10 x 40 from Kehar Singh and, as such, the application for ejectment
is liable to be dismissed. The landlord has filed a rejoinder to this amended
written statement wherein he contended that the three premises were got vacated
by him and one of the grounds in those petition was personal necessity. He also
contended that the premises were got vacated for extension of coal-yard as the
open space in possession of the landlord was not sufficient to meet his
requirement for stocking coal, and he has sought eviction of the tenant in the
present case for extension of its foundry and for storage of foundry material.
It is true that in spite of these pleadings, may be because of the fact that
the tenant did not specifically invoke the proviso to Section 13(3)(i)(b), no
issue was raised by the Rent Controller. Hence, the trial court did not advert
to this question. Before the appellate authority, however, the tenant raised
this specific objection which came to be rejected on the ground that these
evictions were obtained after filing of the instant eviction petition,
consequently, the proviso in question did not apply to the facts of the case.
It is also contended that since the appellate authority dismissed the eviction
petition, the tenant did not have an opportunity of challenging this finding
before the High Court, but while defending the order of the appellate
authority, a specific argument based on the said proviso was raised before the
High Court but the High Court did not consider this argument in its correct
perspective.
Further,
it was pointed out to us that in the review petition filed before the High
Court, specific grounds were raised alleging that the argument based on the
proviso was addressed and the court failed to consider the same, still the High
Court while rejecting the review petition did not consider this point. In this
background, we are convinced that the tenant did raise this question before the
courts below which ought to have been considered by the courts below.
Therefore, we deem it appropriate that the tenant be permitted to raise this
question. On behalf of the landlord, it is next contended that the proviso does
not apply to the facts of this case, since on the date of filing of the present
eviction petition, the landlord had not obtained possession of any other
tenanted premises.
Subsequent
possession obtained by it would not be an embargo for the landlord to claim
possession of the present petition scheduled premises. Elaborating this
argument on behalf of the landlord, it is contended if on the date of filing of
the eviction petition, a landlord has not by then obtained possession of any
other premises, then the proviso would not be a bar for the landlord to file an
eviction petition and obtained possession of another premises, even though
during the pendency of the petition, he obtains possession of other premises.
The landlord wants us to give a literal meaning to the words entitled to apply
again found in the proviso.
If we
give such a meaning to the words entitled to apply again without taking into
consideration the object and scheme of the Act, the proviso may give an
impression that the embargo incorporated in that proviso would be applicable
only at the stage of filing of the eviction petition. But such an
interpretation will run counter to the very scheme of the Act. It goes without
saying that the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 like any
other similar Acts in other States in India is an enactment which controls the
fixation of rent and evictions of the tenants from rented premises to which the
Act is applicable. This Act controls the right of a landlord to seek eviction
of tenanted premises, it restricts the right of a landlord to seek eviction on
those grounds mentioned in the Act. As a matter of fact, a landlord can seek
eviction only on the grounds enumerated under the Act and on no other grounds.
This
is clear from the language of Section 13(1) of the Act which in specific terms
says that a tenant in possession of a building or rented land shall not be
evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions of this Section.
Section
13 enumerates various grounds on which a landlord can seek possession. This
right is further restricted if the landlord has obtained possession of similar
premises under the same provisions of law by the proviso. Now the question is
whether the bar under the proviso is applicable only to the filing of an
application or is it a bar on the right of the landlord. If the interpretation
suggested by the landlord is accepted then the bar will be on the application
by the landlord and not on his right to evict.
This,
in our opinion, will not be the correct interpretation of the proviso. A
careful perusal of the various provisos found in sub-section (3) of Section 13
of the Act clearly shows that the Legislature intended to further restrict the
right of a landlord to seek eviction under the clauses mentioned in that
sub-section apart from the restrictions imposed in Section 13 of the Act. For
example, if the landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant on the ground that the
same is required for the use of his son then, in view of the proviso applicable
to that sub-section, he can seek eviction of the premises only once. Similarly,
if the landlord is seeking eviction for his own occupation under Section
13(3)(b) of the Act then by virtue of the proviso applicable to that
sub-section, the landlord can seek such eviction only once in regard to the
premises of the same nature. Therefore, in our opinion, the bar imposed by the
proviso is in fact a bar on the right of the landlord to seek actual eviction
and not confined to the filing of the application for eviction. On behalf of
the landlord, it is contended that while interpreting a Statute the courts
should apply the rule of literal construction and if it is so interpreted then
the wordings of the proviso would show that the restriction imposed by the
proviso is restricted to the stage of filing of the application for eviction
only.
We
agree with this contention of the landlord that normally the courts will have
to follow the rule of literal construction which rule enjoins the court to take
the words as used by the Legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally
implies. But, there is an exception to this rule.
That
exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the words
in the Statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the
legal context in which the words are used or by reading the Statute as a whole,
it requires a different meaning. In our opinion, if the expression entitled to
apply again is given its literal meaning, it would defeat the very object for
which the Legislature has incorporated that proviso in the Act inasmuch as the
object of that proviso can be defeated by a landlord who has more than one
tenanted premises by filing multiple applications simultaneously for eviction
and thereafter obtain possession of all those premises without the bar of the
proviso being applicable to him. We are of the opinion that this could not have
been the purpose for which the proviso is included in the Act. If such an
interpretation is given then the various provisos found in clause (3) of
Section 13 would become otiose and the very object of the enactment would be
defeated. Any such interpretation, in our opinion, would lead to absurdity.
Therefore,
we have no hesitation in interpreting the proviso to mean that the restriction
contemplated under that proviso extends even up to the stage when the court or
the tribunal is considering the case of the landlord for actual eviction and is
not confined to the stage of filing of eviction petition only. This takes us to
the another limb of the landlords argument in regard to the applicability of
the proviso. This argument of the landlord is based on two judgments of the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana in the cases of (i) Shri Brij Lal Puri &
Anr. v. Smt. Muni Tandon alias Urmala (1979 1 Rent Law Reporter 58) (which case
is followed by the High Court in Jagir Singh v. Jagdish Pal Sagar (1980 1 RLR
494). In Puris case (supra), rejecting the contention of the tenant based on
the said proviso, the learned Single Judge of the High Court held thus :- A
plain reading of the proviso mentioned above shows that a landlord after
getting one building vacated, which can reasonably meet his needs, cannot get
another building vacated. The proviso does not lay down that if the entire
building, which is needed by a landlord for his personal use, is occupied by
more than one tenants, he or she cannot take out eviction proceedings against
the other tenant after having evicted one. The object of this proviso is that a
landlord should not be allowed to seek unreasonable ejectments of tenants from
independent buildings if he has already succeeded in evicting a tenant from a
building which is sufficient for his personal occupation.
Based
on the above-cited two judgments of the High Court, it is contended that the
landlord in the instant case is seeking eviction of a part of the premises
owned by it which is leased to the present appellant. Eviction of the three
other tenants referred to herein above was from the premises which are parts of
the same premises, therefore, in view of the above judgment the bar under the
proviso is not applicable. We find it difficult to accept this argument of the
landlord also. From the language of the proviso we do not find any support for
this argument of the appellant or to the conclusions arrived at by the High
Court in the above-referred judgments. The proviso does not make any such
distinction between a landlord seeking possession of the premises held by more
than one tenant occupying the same building or the tenants occupying different
independent buildings under the same landlord. As we have observed, the object
of the proviso like any other provisions of the Act, is to further restrict the
right of the landlord to seek eviction, if that be so, we do not find any
justification in reading into the proviso something as conferring a larger
right on the landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are
occupying different parts of the same premises.
Therefore,
we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the High Court in the above
referred case does not lay down the correct law. Consequently, the argument of
the landlord based on the said judgment is also rejected. It is next contended
on behalf of the landlord that the decisions cited above have stood the test of
time since 1978 onwards, if not earlier, because of which the law is so
understood in that part of the country, therefore, we should not interfere with
the ratio laid down by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in those cases so
as not to create uncertainty in judicial thinking. We are unable to accept this
argument advanced on behalf of the landlord. When we find that the
interpretation of the proviso by the High Court is wholly contrary to the
object of the Statute, merely because it had remained to be the interpretation
of the High Court for a considerable length of time, the same cannot be
permitted to continue to be so when it is erroneous and it is so brought to our
notice. We will be failing in our duty if we do not declare an erroneous
interpretation of law by the High Court to be so, solely on the ground that it
has stood the test of time. Since, in our opinion, in regard to the
interpretation of the above proviso, no two views are possible, we are
constrained to hold that the law declared by the Punjab & Haryana High
Court with reference to the proviso is not the correct interpretation and hold
that the said judgment is no more a good law. On behalf of the landlord,
another argument based on equity was addressed before us giving various
examples of the hardship that could be caused to the landlords by the
interpretation we have now given to the said proviso. We do find that the
proviso, as interpreted by us, may cause some hardship to the landlords in some
cases but that is the intention of the Legislature which the courts have to
take to its logical end so long as it remains in the Statute book. Merely
because a law causes hardship, it cannot be interpreted in a manner so as to
defeat its object. We may notice at this stage that constitutional validity of
the proviso is not in challenge before us, therefore, we will have to proceed
on the footing that the proviso, as it stands, is intra vires and interpret the
same as such. This leaves us to consider the last argument of the landlord that
the applicability of this proviso being a mixed question of law and fact and
there being no issues before the courts below, the same cannot be applied in
abstract. We see force in this contention before refusing eviction based on the
ground of the bar imposed by the proviso. The Court will have to come to the
conclusion that the premises/land eviction whereof has been obtained by the
landlord, belong to the same class of building or tenanted land. This finding
of the Court will be dependent upon the facts which are not available on
records of this case. The absence of this evidence will cause prejudice to the
landlord if the said question is to be decided in these appeals. Though in the
earlier part of this judgment, we have held that the parties in this case have
pleaded the facts necessary for invoking the proviso, still since no issue has
been framed on this point, the parties have not led evidence in regard to the
nature of the building/land.
Therefore,
we agree with the argument of the landlord that in order to apply the proviso,
certain factual matrix has to be established absence of which, in appropriate
cases, might necessitate a remand to the trial court. On the peculiar facts of
this case and taking into consideration the fact that this litigation has been
going on since 1979 and there has already been one remand from the High Court
to the appellate authority, we find it just and proper that we frame the
following issue in regard to this point and remit the case to the trial court
for the purpose of recording evidence and its decision: - Does the respondent
prove that the applicant has obtained possession of other residential building
or rented land of the same class under the provisions of sub- clause (i) of
clause (b) of Section 13(3) of the Act so as to disentitle it to obtain
possession of the petition scheduled premises ? We direct the original
authority, namely, the Court of the Rent Controller, Jagadhari, to allow the
parties to adduce evidence, if necessary, to the limited extent of deciding the
above issue framed by us. The Rent Controller, Jagadhari, shall decide the case
within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this
judgment.
The
appeals are, accordingly, allowed duly modifying the orders under appeal. No
costs.
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