State of
Madhya Pradesh & Ors Vs. Shri Ram Singh [2000]
INSC 35 (1 February 2000)
Special Leave Petition (crl.) 1603 of 1997
K.T.
Thomas & R.P. Sethi.
SETHI,J.
L.I.T.J
Heard. Leave granted.
Relying
upon the judgment of this Court in State of Haryana & Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal
& Ors. [1992 (1) Suppl.
SCC
335] and exercising powers under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code,
the High Court of Madhya Pradesh vide the judgment impugned in these appeals
quashed the investigations and consequent proceedings against the respondents
initiated, conducted and concluded by the police under Sections 13(1)(e) and
Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred
to as the Act). The Court found that for the offence punishable under Section
13(1)(e) of the Act the investigation had not been conducted by an authorised
officer in terms of Section 17 of the Act. It was observed: It is of utmost
importance that investigation into criminal offence must always be free from
any objectionable features or infirmities which may legitimately lead to the
grievance of the accused that the work of investigation is carried on unfairly
and with any ulterior motive. The prosecution of the accused on the basis of
investigation by a person who had no legal authority to investigate cannot be
allowed:
In
order to appreciate the legal controversy, it is proper to refer to some of the
facts regarding which there does not appear to be any dispute at this stage in
these appeals.
Regarding
Ram Singh respondent, a secret information is stated to have been received on
4.7.1992 alleging that when he was a Sub Inspector, Excise and District Excise
Officer, he had acquired properties disproportionate to his known sources of income.
On verification it was found that he had earned movable and immovable
properties allegedly much more disproportionate to his known sources of income
during the check period commencing from 1.1.1982 to 4.8.1992.
Resultantly
Crime No.103/92 under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act was registered
against him. On 4.8.1992 a raid was conducted by Shri B.N. Bhatia, Dy.Superintendent
of Police, SPE, Lokayukt Office, Gwalior after obtaining a search warrant from
the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior and a seizure memo was prepared with
respect to recovery of movable articles from the possession of his son, namely,
Pratap Singh, Advocate. On 7.8.1992 another raid was conducted by Shri C.P.S. Chaturvedi,
Dy.Supdt. of Police, Lokayukt Office, Gwalior at the Government Quarter allotted to the said respondent at Vikas Nagar,
Betul, under a search warrant dated 3.8.1992. Some documents, one transistor,
one pistol and diaries were recovered in the raid. The respondent Shri Ram
Singh moved Criminal Misc.No.143 of 1993 before the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh at Gwalior praying for anticipatory bail which
was allowed. Vide letter dated 14.12.1993, the Additional Excise Commissioner,
Madhya Pradesh, Gwalior directed the respondent to submit the statement on the
prescribed form Nos.1, 2 and 3 to the Lokayukt Gwalior. The statements were
submitted to Shri P.S. Sisodia, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lokayukt
Office, Moti Mahal, Gwalior on 16.5.1994. It was mentioned in
the statement that the total income of the respondent from all sources was Rs.4,19,000/-
and expenditure was Rs.2,58,700/- which show the savings of Rs.1,60,300/-. He
declared that his assets were not disproportionate to the known sources of his
income. After further information was submitted by the respondent, a further
enquiry was made on 5.6.1995 with respect to his bank account. In May, 1996 the
respondent filed the Petition No.2481/96 under Section 482 of the Criminal
Procedure Code praying for quashing the proceedings relating to Crime No.143/93
and charge-sheet thereof filed against him. He contended that the entire search
and seizure made by Special Police Establishment was illegal, malafide and
without any basis. It was further contended that the search was conducted
without jurisdiction and was in contravention of the provisions of Section 17
of the Act. He alleged that the investigation was malicious inasmuch as the
accounts of his family members had illegally been freezed. The State in its
reply filed in the High Court alleged that after investigation it had
transpired that during the check period, the respondent had a total income of
Rs.3,13,470.68 from all known sources and his expenditure being
Rs.16,25,723.49. Thus the disproportionate amount came to Rs.13,12,252.81 which
was stated to be 350 times more than the known sources of his income. After
investigation sanction was obtained and charge-sheet was filed. The initial
investigation was conducted by Shri B.N. Bhatia, Dy.Superintendent of Police,
Special Police Establishment, Gwalior and thereafter by Shri D.S. Rana,
Inspector SPE, Gwalior who was stated to have been duly authorised by the
Superintendent of Police, SPE, Gwalior vide order No.SPE/2766/94 dated
12.12.1994. The order of the Supteintendent of Police was claimed to be
strictly under Section 17 of the Act. Respondent Jagdish Prasad was appointed
as a Sub-Inspector and was also holding the post of A.D.E.O. On 16.11.1984
Preliminary Enquiry No.120/84 was registered against him. On 7.5.1985 one Shri
Tara Chand, resident of Dahimandi, Gwalior filed a complaint against the said respondent whereupon another
Preliminary Enquiry No.5/85 was registered which was taken for investigation.
On the basis of Preliminary Enquiry No.5/85 Crime No.132/92 under Sections 13(1)(e)
and 13(2) of the Act was registered against him on 7.10.1992. After
investigation it transpired that during check period commencing from 1.2.1964
to 31.1.1984 the respondent had earned a sum of Rs.1,12,380.54 from his known
sources of income and incurred an expenses of Rs.2,14,608.84. In this way he
was found to be possessing disproportionate property worth Rs.1,02,228.30.
After obtaining the sanction for prosecution by the competent authority a
charge-sheet was submitted in the Court on 5.8.1986. The respondent moved the
High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for
quashing the investigation and consequent proceedings against him in the light
of the judgment in Bhajan Lals case (supra) which was allowed vide the order
impugned. Respondent Kedarilal Vaishya had joined the service in the Government
on 15.7.1978 as Sub-Engineer and was promoted to the post of Assistant Engineer
on 8.3.1990.
An
information was received in the office of the Superintendent of Police, SPE
Regional Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior that
the aforesaid respondent had immovable properties much more disproportionate to
known sources of his income. After verification Crime No.17/94 was registered
under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. A
search warrant was received by Inspector Ram Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria from the
Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Gwalior. The Superintendent of Police SPE Regional Lokayukta Karyalaya, Gwalior issued order No.454 dated 8.2.1994 authorising
the investigation of the case by Shri Ram Lakhan Singh Bhadhouria. On
investigation it was found that during the check period from 7.7.1978 to
2.9.1994 the respondent had earned a total amount of Rs.3,86,966.75 and
incurred an expenditure of Rs.7,95,243.98. In this way he was found to be
possessing Rs.4,08,277.23 more than his earnings which was found to be
disproportionate to his known sources of income, punishable under Section
13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act. The sanction for prosecution was obtained on
26th October, 1996 whereafter a charge-sheet was filed against the respondent
in the Court of Sub-Judge Shivpuri which was registered as Special Session Case
No.4/1996. Not satisfied with the investigation the respondent filed a petition
under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code praying for quashing of the
investigation and consequent proceedings in Crime No.17/94 which was allowed
vide the order impugned in these appeals. Corruption in a civilised society is
a disease like cancer, which if not detected in time is sure to maliganise the
polity of country leading to disastrous consequences. It is termed as plague
which is not only contagious but if not controlled spreads like a fire in a
jungle. Its virus is compared with HIV leading to AIDS, being incurable. It has
also been termed as Royal thievery.
The
socio-political system exposed to such a dreaded communicable disease is likely
to crumble under its own weight. Corruption is opposed to democracy and social
order, being not only anti people, but aimed and targeted against them. It
affects the economy and destroys the cultural heritage. Unless nipped in the
bud at the earliest, it is likely to cause turbulence shaking of the
socio-economic-political system in an otherwise healthy, wealthy, effective and
vibrating society. The menace of corruption was found to have enormously
increased by first and second world war conditions. The corruption, at the
initial stages, was considered confined to the bureaucracy who had the
opportunities to deal with a variety of State largesse in the form of
contracts, licences and grants.
Even
after the war the opportunities for corruption continued as large amounts of
Government surplus stores were required to be disposed of by the public
servants. As consequence of the wars the shortage of various goods necessitated
the imposition of controls and extensive schemes of post-war reconstruction
involving the disbursement of huge sums of money which lay in the control of
the public servants giving them wide discretion with the result of luring them
to the glittering shine of the wealth and property. In order to consolidate and
amend the laws relating to prevention of corruption and matters connected
thereto, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was enacted which was amended
from time to time. In the year 1988 a new Act on the subject being Act No.49 of
1988 was enacted with the object of dealing with the circumstances,
contingencies and shortcomings which were noticed in the working and
implementation of 1947 Act. The law relating to prevention of corruption was
essentially made to deal with the public servants, as understood in the common
parlance but specifically defined in the Act. The Act was intended to make
effective provision for the prevention of bribe and corruption rampant amongst
the public servants. It is a social legislation defined to curb illegal
activities of the public servants and is designed to be liberally construed so
as to advance its object. Dealing with the object underlying the Act this Court
in R.S. Nayak vs. A.R.
Antulay
[1984 (2) SCC 183] held: The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long ltitle shows, to
make more effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption.
Indisputably, therefore, the provisions of the Act must receive such
construction at the hands of the Court as would advance the object and purpose
underlying the Act and at any rate not defeat it. If the words of the Statute
are clear and unambiguous, it is the plainest duty of the court to give effect
to the natural meaning of the words used in the provision. The question of
construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plain meaning of
the words used in the statute would be self-defeating. The court is entitled to
ascertain the intention of the Legislature to remove the ambiguity by
construing the provision of the Statute as a whole keeping in view what was the
mischief when the Statute was enacted and to remove which the Legislature
enacted the Statute. The rule of construction is so universally accepted that
it need not be supported by precedents. Adopting this rule of construction,
whenever a question of construction arises upon ambiguity or where two views
are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of the Court to adopt that
construction which would advance the object underlying the Act, namely, to make
effective provision for the prevention of bribery and corruption and at any
rate not defeat it.
Procedural
delays and technicalities of law should not be permitted to defeat the object
sought to be achieved by the Act. The overall public interest and the social
object is required to be kept in mind while interpreting various provisions of
the Act and decided cases under it.
For
the purposes of deciding these appeals reference to Sections 13 and 17 of the
Act is necessary. Section 13 deals with the criminal misconduct of the public
servants and prescribes the punishment for the commission of offence of
criminal misconduct. A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal
misconduct:
(a) if
he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from
any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than
legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or
(b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to
obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without
consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any
person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in
any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or
having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public
servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be
interested in or related to the person so concerned;
or (c)
if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his
own use any property entrusted to@@
JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ him or under his control as
a public servant or allows any@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ other person so to do; or
(d) if he,-- (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any
other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his
position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any
valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a
public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary
advantage without any public interest; or (e) if he or any person on his
behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office,
been in@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ possession for
which the public servant cannot@@ JJJJJJJJJJJJJJJJ satisfactorily account, of
pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of
income.
ExplanationFor
the purposes of this section, known sources of income means income received
from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with
the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a
public servant (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year
but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
Section
17 deals with investigation into cases under the Act and provides:
17.
Persons authorised to investigateNotwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank,--
(a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of
Police;
(b) in
the metropolitan area of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any
other metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant Commissioner
of Police;
(c) elsewhere,
of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank.
shall
investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the order of a
Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be,
or make any arrest therefore without a warrant;
Provided
that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised
by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, he may also
investigate any such offence without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or
a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefore
without a warrant;
Provided
further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub- section (1) of
section 13 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not
below the rank of a Superintendent of Police.
This
Section provides that no police officer below the rank of an Inspector in the
case of Delhi Special Police Establishment, an Assistant Commissioner of Police
in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and any
other metropolitan area notified as such and Dy.Superintendent of Police or a
police officer of the equivalent rank shall investigate an offence punishable
under the Act without prior order of the metropolitan Magistrate or a
Magistrate of the First Class, as the case may be, or make any arrest thereof
without warrant.
According
to the first proviso if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of
Police is authorised by the Government in this behalf by general or special
order, he can also investigate in such offences without the order of
Metropolitan Magistrate or the Magistrate of First Class, as the case may be,
or make arrest thereof without a warrant.
Regarding
compliance of this part of the section there is no controversy in the present
appeals. However, the second proviso provides that where an offence referred to
in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 is sought to be investigated,
such an investigation shall not be conducted without the order of a Police
Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. The interpretation of
this proviso is involved in the present controversy. The investigation
conducted and the consequent proceedings are stated to have been quashed on
similar grounds in Bhajan Lals case(supra). The facts of that case were, one Dharam
Pal presented a complaint against Ch.Bhajan Lal, the former Chief Minister of Haryana
making certain serious allegations against him which prima facie showed
commission of offence punishable under the Act. The complaint was presented in
the Chief Ministers Secretariat on 12.1.1987 when said Shri Bhajan Lal had
ceased to be the Chief Minister. An endorsement was made by the Officer on
Special Duty in the Chief Ministers Secretariat to the effect: C.M. has seen.
For appropriate action and was marked to the Director General of Police who in
turn made endorsement on the same day which read, Please look into this; take
necessary action and report and marked it to the Superintendent of Police, Hissar.
The complaint alongwith the above endorsement of OSD and DGP was put up before
the SP on 21.11.1987 on which date the SP made his endorsement reading Please
register a case and investigate. The Station House Officer of the Police
Station registered a case on the basis of the allegations in the complaint
under Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 5(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. After forwarding the copy of the First
Information Report to the Magistrate and other officers concerned, the SHO took
up the investigation and proceeded to the spot accompanied by his staff. At
this stage Shri Bhajan Lal filed Writ Petition No.9172/87 under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the First Information
Report and issuance of directions restraining the police from further
proceeding with the investigation. The High Court held that allegations made in
the complaint do not constitute a cognizable offence for commencing a lawful
investigation and granted relief as prayed for by the petitioner therein.
Aggrieved
by the aforesaid judgment the State of Haryana preferred an appeal in this
Court which was disposed of as under:- We set aside the judgment of the High
Court quashing the First Information Report as not being legally and factually
sustainable in law for the reasons aforementioned; but, however, we quash the
commencement as well as the entire investigation, if any, so far done for the
reasons given by us in the instant judgment on the ground that the third
appellant (SHO) is not clothed with valid legal authority to take up the
investigation and proceed with the same within the meaning of Section 5A(1) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, as indicated in this judgment. Further we set
aside the order of the High Court awarding costs with a direction that the said
costs is payable to the first respondent (Ch.Bhajan Lal) by the second
respondent (Dharam Pal).
In the
result, the appeal is disposed of accordingly but at the same time giving
liberty to the State Government to direct an investigation afresh, if it so
desires, through a competent Police Officer empowered with valid legal
authority in strict compliance with S.5A(1) of the Act as indicated supra. No
order as to costs.
In the
facts and circumstances of that case this Court posed a question to itself in
the following terms:
Now
what remains for consideration is whether there is any valid order of the S.P.
permitting the third appellant to investigate the offence falling under clause
(e) of sub-section (1) of Section 5. As we have already mentioned in the
earlier part of this judgment, the S.P. (the second appellant) has given the
one word direction on 21.11.1987 investigate. The question is whether the one
word direction investigate would amount to an order within the meaning of
second proviso of Section 5A(1).
The
Court found on facts that as there was absolutely no reason given by the SP in
directing the SHO to investigate, the order of the SP was directly in violation
of the dictum of law. The SHO was, therefore, found not clothed with the
requisite legal authority within the meaning of second proviso to Section 5A(1)
of 1947 Act to investigate the offences under clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the
Act. This Court held that (1) as the salutary legal requirement of disclosing
the reason for according the permission is not complied with; (2) as the
prosecution is not satisfactorily explaining the circumstances which impelled
the SP to pass the order directing the SHO to investigate the case; (3) as the
said direction manifestly seems to have been granted mechanically and in a very
casual manner, regardless of the principles of law enunciated by this Court and
(4) as the SHO had got neither any order from the Magistrate to investigate the
offences under Sections 161 and 165 IPC nor any order from the SP for
investigation of the offences under Section 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act in the manner known to law, the order of direction reading only
investigate suffered from legal infirmity. The Court found that despite
quashing the direction of the SP and the investigation thereupon would not, in
any manner, deter the State of Haryana to pursue the matter and direct the
investigation afresh in pursuance of the FIR, if the State so desire.
It may
be noticed at this stage that a three Judge Bench of this Court in H.N. Rishbud
& Anr.vs. State of Delhi [AIR 1955 SC 196] had held that a defect or
illegality in investigation, however, serious, has no direct bearing on the
competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. Referring to the
provisions of Section 190, 193, 195 to 199 and 537 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (1898) in the context of an offence under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1947, the Court held:
A
defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing
on the competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial. No doubt a
police report which results from an investigation is provided in Section 190, Cr.P.C.
as the material on which cognizance is taken. But it cannot be maintained that
a valid and legal police report is the foundation of the jurisdiction of the
Court to take cognizance. Section 190, Cr.P.C. is one out of a group of
sections under the heading Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings.
The language of this section is in marked contrast with that of the other
sections of the group under the same heading, i.e., Sections 193 and 195 to
199.
These
latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction
in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith. But Section 190 does not.
While no doubt, in one sense, clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 190(1) are
conditions requisite for taking of cognizance, it is not possible to say that
cognizance on an invalid police report is prohibited and is therefore a
nullity. Such an invalid report may still fall either under Clause (a) or (b)
of Section 190(1), (whether it is the one or the other we need not pause to
consider) and in any case cognizance so taken is only in the nature of error in
a proceeding antecedent to the trial. To such a situation Section 537, Cr.P.C.
which is in the following terms is attracted:
Subject
to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed
by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered on appeal or
revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint,
summons, warrant, charge, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings
before or during trial or in any enquiry or other proceedings under this Code,
unless such error, omission or irregularity, has in fact occasioned a failure
of justice.
If,
therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the
breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no
doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless
the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a
miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course of
investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court
for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Prabhu v. Emperor, AIR
1944 PC 73 (C) and Lumbhardar Zutshi v.
The
King, AIR 1950 PC 26(D).
It
further held:
In our
opinion, therefore, when such a breach is brought to the notice of the Court at
an early stage of the trial, the court will have to consider the nature and
extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such investigation as
may be called for, wholly or partly, and by such officer as it considers
appropriate with reference to the requirements of Section 5-A of the Act. It is
in the light of the above considerations that the validity or otherwise of the
objection as to the violation of Section 5(4) of the Act has to be decided and
the course to be adopted in these proceedings, determined.
In Bhajan
Lals case this Court had found on facts that the SP had passed the order
mechanically and in a very casual manner regardless of the settled principles
of law.
The
provisions of Section 17 of the Act had not been complied with. As earlier
noticed the SP while authorising the SHO to investigate had made only
endorsement to the effect please register the case and investigate. The SP was
shown to be not aware either of allegations or the nature of the offences and
the pressure of work-load requiring investigation by an Inspector. There is no
denial of the fact that in cases against the respondents in these appeals, even
in the absence of the authority of the SP the Investigating Officer was in law authorised
to investigate the offence falling under Section 13 of the Act with the
exception of one as is described under sub-section (1)(e) of the Act. After
registration of the FIR the Superintendent of Police in the instant appeals is
shown to be aware and conscious of the allegations made against the
respondents, the FIR registered against them and pending investigations.
The
order passed by the SP in case of Ram Singh on 12.12.1994 with respect to a
Crime registered in 1992 was to the effect: In exercise of powers conferred by
the provisions on me, under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, I P.K. RUNWAL, Superintendent of Police, Special Police Establishment,
Division-I Lokayukt Karyalaya, Gwalior Division Gwalior (M.P.), authorised Shri
D.S. RANA INSP-(SPE) LAK-GWL (M.P.) to investigate Crime No.103/92 U/s
13(1)(E), 23(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against Shri RAM
SINGH D.O. EXCISE BATUL (M.P.).
Similar
orders have been passed in the other two cases as well. The reasons for
entrustment of investigation to the Inspector can be discerned from the order
itself. The appellant-State is, therefore, justified in submitting that the
facts of Bhajan Lals case were distinguishable as in the instant case the
Superintendent of Police appears to have applied his mind and passed the order authorising
the investigation by an Inspector under the peculiar circumstances of the case.
The reason for entrustment of investigation were obvious. The High Court should
not have liberally construed the provisions of the Act in favour of the accused
resulting in closure of the trial of the serious charges made against the
respondents in relation to commission of offences punishable under an Act
legislated to curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the public officers. It
is brought to our notice that under similar circumstances the High Court had
quashed the investigation and consequent proceedings in a case registered
against Shri Ram Babu Gupta against which Criminal Appeal No.1754 of 1986 was
filed in this Court which was allowed on 27th September, 1986 by setting aside
the order of the High Court with a direction to the trial court to proceed with
the case in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made
therein.
We are
not satisfied with the finding of the High Court that merely because the order
of the Superintendent of Police was in typed proforma, that showed the
non-application of the mind or could be held to have been passed in a
mechanical and casual manner. As noticed earlier the order clearly indicates
the name of the accused, the number of FIR, nature of the offence and power of
Superintendent of Police permitting him to authorise a junior officer to
investigate. The time between the registration of the FIR and authorisation in
terms of second proviso to Section 17 shows further the application of mind and
the circumstances which weighed with the Superintendent of Police to direct authorisation
to order the investigation.
Under
these circumstances the appeals are allowed and the judgments of the High Court
impugned in these appeals regarding the interpretation of Section 17 and
holding the investigation to have not been investigated by an authorised
officer being not sustainable in law are hereby set aside with the direction to
the Trial Court to proceed with the trial in accordance with the provisions of
law. The respondents would be at liberty to defend their cases on all such
contentions on facts and law as are available to them which have not been
adjudicated upon against them by the High Court and this Court.
Back
