Lakhpat
Rai Juneja Vs. Union of India & Ors [2000] INSC 78 (23 February 2000)
S.S.Ahamad,
Y.K.Sabharwal
L.I.T.J
Sabharwal,
J.
The
dispute relates to a fairly big property situate at Palwal, District Faridabad.
It comprises of a big sarai and a dozen adjoining shops on the ground floor
besides flat on the first floor and open land. It is an evacuee property
acquired by competent authority under Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (for short `the Act'). Apart from the appellant,
there are other persons also who claim to be in possession of part of the
property.
In
April 1969, the Chief Settlement Commissioner directed the sale and transfer of
the property in favour of the appellant for a sale consideration of about Rs.17,000/-.
In May 1969, the sale deed was executed and registered in favour of the
appellant. Soon thereafter, a petition under Section 33 of the Act was filed
before the Central Government by 11 persons challenging the transfer and sale
in favour of the appellant pursuant to the order of the Chief Settlement
Commissioner. The petition though initially filed before the Central Government
was later transferred for disposal to the Commissioner and Secretary to the
Government of Haryana, Rehabilitation Department, who was exercising powers of
the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act. The property was
transferred in favour of the appellant treating it to be an indivisible single
property.
Section
34 of the Act, inter alia, stipulates that the Central Government may direct
that any of its power be also exercised by such officer or authority as may be
specified in the notification. By a notification dated 17th April, 1970, the
Government of India, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section 1 of
Section 34 of the Act directed that powers exercisable by it under sub-section
4 of Section 24, 28 and Section 33 of the Act shall be exercisable also by the
Secretary to the Government of Haryana, Rehabilitation Department, in respect
of proceedings pertaining to acquired evacuee properties and lands situate
within the State of Haryana.
By an
Order dated 8th March, 1973, the Secretary to the Government of Haryana in
exercise of powers under Section 33 of the Act cancelled the order of Chief
Settlement Commissioner of April, 1969 directing transfer and sale of the
property to the appellant at about Rs.17,000/- and consequently, sale and
conveyance deed issued in favour of the appellant in May, 1969 was also set
aside. The said order inter alia notices that the examination of whatever
record was made available throws a good deal of light on the sordid affair of
transfer. The order also notices that despite various letters and reminders,
attempts were made to withhold the record and requisite files. It further
notices that the entire mischief of transfer of property for about Rs.17,000/-
occurred because of misleading report by the Regional Settlement Commissioner.
The record showed that the property had been valued in December 1967 at about
Rs.54,000/- and earlier in October, 1967, the market value had been assessed at
about Rs.75,000/-. In this view, the order concludes that it was clear that
despite existence of evaluation assessment by competent officers of much higher
market value which must been suppressed due to ulterior motives, the Regional
Settlement Commissioner obtained a convenient low evaluation report with a view
to favour someone and misguide the Chief Settlement Commissioner and thus
misled him into passing of order approving sale for about Rs.17,000/-. It has
also been noticed that worse than the suppression of the correct market value
was the fact of suppression of the pendency of applications of others who were
claiming right of transfer of the property and were also protesting about the
efforts being made to transfer the property surreptitiously to the appellant. A
fear had been expressed by others that without taking into consideration their
rights based on occupation etc., the property was being sought to be transferred
to one person in utter disregard of their rights of occupation. The conclusion
reached was that property was ordered to be transferred at gross under
valuation and also by overlooking the claim of others. Ever since the passing
of this order, the appellant has undertaken in last about three decades
protracted litigation which we would presently notice.
The
order dated 8th March,
1973 was first
challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition in the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana. That writ petition was dismissed on 10th August, 1973 by passing the following order :-
"Dismissed, as Mr. Basu wishes to file a review application before the
authority." The review petition filed by the appellant was dismissed by Shri
D.D. Sharma on 21st
November, 1973 being
untenable.
A
second writ petition was filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
challenging the orders dated 8th March, 1973
and 21st November, 1973. The said writ petition (CWP No.881
of 1974) was dismissed by a learned single Judge of the said court on 10th
September, 1982 inter alia holding that the appellant did not seek permission
nor any such permission was granted in terms of order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of
Civil Procedure to file another petition against the same order of the
authority. The appellant ought to have obtained permission of the Court when
the earlier writ petition was dismissed on the statement of the counsel for the
appellant that he wanted to file a review petition before the authority. Even
on merits, it was found by learned single judge that the authority had given
good reasons for setting aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner
dated 19th April, 1969 allowing the transfer of the
property as one unit in favour of the appellant. In this view, the court held that
even on merits, the appellant could not impugn the order dated 8th March, 1973.
Now,
on or about 5th November, 1982, a suit for declaration and permanent injunction
was filed pleading that the orders dated 8th March, 1973 and 21st November,
1973 passed by Shri D.D. Sharma are null, void and without jurisdiction and not
binding on the plaintiff. A decree of declaration was sought that and the
plaintiff is the owner of the suit property besides seeking consequential
relief of permanent injunction. The suit was dismissed by the learned
subordinate Judge on 11th
June, 1987. The first
appeal was dismissed by Addl. District Judge, Faridabad on 31st
July, 1987 and second
appeal by the High Court on 4th March, 1992.
It was
inter alia held that in view of the dismissal of Writ Petition No. 881 of 1974,
the suit had been rightly dismissed. The judgment of the High Court dismissing
the second appeal of the appellant is under challenge before us.
The
first contention urged by Shri Sachar, learned counsel for the appellant is
that Shri D.D. Sharma, Secretary, Government of Haryana, had no jurisdiction to
set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and the consequential
conveyance deed in favour of the appellant.
The
order of cancellation passed by Shri Sharma was on a petition filed under
Section 33 of the Act by 11 persons.
The
said petition had been initially filed before Central Government but was
transferred to be dealt by the Secretary to Government of Haryana,
Rehabilitation Department after the powers had been delegated in terms of
notification dated 17th
April, 1970. The
contention of Shri Sachar, however, is that the delegation was not in respect
of all powers exercisable under Section 33 of the Act. The delegation, learned
counsel contends, was only in respect of proceedings pertaining to acquired
evacuee properties and land situate in the State of Haryana. It is not in dispute that the
property is situate in the State of Haryana but the contention of learned
counsel is that the proceedings before Shri Sharma were not in respect of
acquired evacuee property. The property in question ceased to be acquired
evacuee property after the execution of the conveyance deed in favour of the
appellant, is the contention of Shri Sachar. We are unable to accept the
construction sought to be placed by learned counsel on the notification dated 17th April, 1970. Reference in the notification to
proceedings pertaining to acquired evacuee properties and land, it is evident
from a plain reading, includes the proceedings to challenge the orders
directing the transfer of an acquired property. Shri Sharma was exercising
powers of the Central Government under Section 33 of the Act while considering
the petition which ultimately led to the passing of the order dated 8th March, 1973. Shri Sachar placed strong reliance
on decision of this court in Gurbax Singh V. Financial Commissioner and Anr.
([1991] Suppl. 1 SCC 167), in particular, to the observations made in paras 12
to 14 of the judgment that the sale in favour of the appellant culminating in
issue of the sale certificate in his favour has the effect of taking away the
land from the pool of evacuee properties. The said observations cannot be seen
in isolation. In fact, the decision relied upon is against the view point sought
to be stressed for the appellant. Para
14 of the judgment says that the rehabilitation authorities could deal with the
matter of cancellation of sale according to law. That is what has exactly
happened in the present case. The order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner
and consequential conveyance deed have been cancelled in proceedings under
Section 33 of the Act. If the contention urged on behalf of the appellant is to
be accepted, it would mean that once the sale deed is executed, the Central
Government would be divested of its statutory power under Section 33 of the Act
despite illegality of the order.
Section
33 vests in Central Government wide residuary power to call for the record of
any proceedings under the Act and pass such order in relation thereto as in its
opinion the circumstances and the case may require and as is not inconsistent
with any of the provisions of the Act or rules made thereunder. The acceptance
of the contention of learned counsel would make the provision nugatory.
We are
also unable to accept the alternative contention that directions be issued to
rehabilitation authorities to transfer the property jointly with other persons
who may be found entitled thereto at the market value of the year 1969 or at
best of 1973 in view of the fact that the appellant has been in possession of
the property for nearly half a century. In view of the conduct of the appellant
in the manner in which he tried to get the property transferred in his favour,
we do not find any equities in his favour so as to issue the directions sought
for. We find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. The appeal is
accordingly dismissed with costs.
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