State of
Karnataka Vs. The Registrar General, High
Court of Karnataka [2000] INSC 450 (27 August 2000)
R.P.Sethi,
K.T.Thomas
THOMAS,
J. Delay condoned. Leave granted. A Division Bench of Karnataka High Court went
outside the scope of the lis before it and made certain observations which are
not in tune with the perceptions of judicial exercise. Why they did so in this
case is beyond comprehension. State of Karnataka, unable to abide by the directions issued as per the order, has filed
this appeal by special leave. For disposal of this appeal we did not find any
necessity to issue notice to the sole respondent (Registrar General of the High
Court of Karnataka) as he would have nothing to say about the impugned
directions. So we propose to dispose of the matter without bringing the
respondent to this Court.
How
the above situation reached can be summarized thus:
Seven
persons were prosecuted in a sessions court for various offences, the
serious-most among which was the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. After
the trial the Sessions Judge acquitted all the accused. The testimony of the
eye witnesses examined by the prosecution was not believed by the Sessions
Judge. At the same time he frowned at the investigation, as is being done in
many of the judgments ending in acquittal. The delay in dispatching the FIR to
the magistrate was also highlighted in the judgment of the Sessions Court.
The
State of Karnataka filed a petition for leave to
appeal against the said order of acquittal. The Division Bench of the High
Court, while refusing leave, made a departure from the precedents and issued an
unusual direction to the State Public Prosecutor like this: "We direct the
learned SPP to forward a copy of this order to the Secretary to Government
(Home) as also to the Honourable Home Minister both of whom shall acknowledge
the receipt of the same and shall report back to this Court within a period of
two months as to what precisely is the reaction of the Government to the
observations of this High Court." The Home Secretary and the Home Minister
of the State are now compelled to react openly to the observations made in the
judgment and to report to the High Court on such reactions. It is necessary to
extract the observations made by M.F. Saldhana, J, who spoke for the Division
Bench. The first facet of the observations is the following:
"This
Court has had occasion to deal with a large number of appeals filed against
orders of acquittals. In case after case, it is noticed that it is principally
because of poor investigation followed up by a total lack of interest in the
conduct of the prosecution that has resulted in the accused being acquitted.
Murders are committed with impunity and the other set of cases of which we need
to take very serious note relating to atrocities against women where even the
reported number of cases has sharply increased. We have come across a series of
horrifying incidents where young married women were harassed, tortured and set
on fire, another line of cases where girls and women have been molested,
sexually attacked and raped. String of acquittals in all these cases which are
as high as 96.4% only because the requisite evidence and the evidence of the
quality that the court expects has not been forthcoming. The investigating
agencies namely the Police Department are responsible to a very large extent
for this deplorable state of affairs." Learned counsel for the State made
a scathing onslaught on those observations, particularly the disparaging
remarks made against the police department of the State as a whole and
contended that they are absolutely unnecessary in the present case, apart from
being unsupported by any material whatsoever. He submitted that there was no
material available on record for the court to reach such omnibus findings.
Learned Judge went on to observe further as follows:
"Time
is of the essence as far as investigation of criminal cases are concerned and
consequently, it is equally important that apart from the speed with which the
Police act, that the investigation has got to be done with a high degree of
efficiency and professionalism. All these factors are lacking in the majority
of investigations. There is something seriously wrong and we put it down to the
fact that obviously on all sorts of political considerations, the recruitment
process has been diluted to point of induction into the force of persons who
should not have been there at all. It goes without saying that when this
happens, one can never expect efficiency. The manner in which the recruitments
are done and more importantly the considerations leave much to be desired and
if the law and order machinery on which crores of rupees of tax payers many is
being spent is at all to justify its existence, the Government will have to
take serious note of the observations and rectify the state of affairs."
After making some more sweeping remarks on the present system of criminal law
administration the Bench said the following also: "Similarly, the
principal disease that has infected the criminal justice system in the State is
the cheerful manner in which the Court is informed that the vital witnesses are
hostile who is responsible for this is not difficult for the court to infer,
the moment the question is asked as to who is the beneficiary. The
investigating Agency also owes a duty to ensure that the vital witnesses are
present and that they produce the type of evidence which is expected of them.
This aspect of the matter will require very serious attention if at all the
State is concerned about rectifying the present state of affairs which is
assuming disastrous proportion." Learned counsel for the State was quite
right in contending that it was not the occasion for learned Judges of the High
Court for giving vent to their general apathy towards the present system of administration
of criminal justice. The direction that the Home Minister and the Home
Secretary of the State shall report to the High Court regarding their reaction
towards the observations made in the judgment is nothing but an exercise in
redundancy, for, their reaction cannot be different from the views expressed by
the Judges themselves. How could they be different, as it is unexceptional that
the system should improve. The problems posed by the Judges have already
engaged the attention of the Law Commission. On more than one occasions the
Commission has submitted its report for consideration by Parliament. But
putting the blame largely on the police force of the State for all the ills
pointed out by the learned Judges, without data or material or evidence in this
case, is not a course which can meet with our approval.
Learned
Judges pointed to subjects which are unfortunately not connected with this
case. Those are- (1) murders committed with impunity, (2) the increase in cases
involving atrocities against women, (3) harassment inflicted on young married
women including "bride burning", (4) molestation and rape of girls
and young women. We have already extracted a gist of the facts of this case.
None of the fields to which learned Judges pointed their fingers would cover
the facts of this case. Hence learned Judges dealt with subjects which are
totally ungermane and far beyond the scope of this case as though it was
presentation of a paper in a seminar. Why should the Home Minister and the Home
Secretary react to the observations which are absolutely uncalled for on the
facts of this case.
Judicial
disposition is definitely different from a paper presented for seminar
discussion. Nor can it be equated with a dissertation. Judicial decorum
requires that judgments and orders should confine to the facts and legal points
involved in the particular cases which Judges deal with. May be, sometimes
Judges would, perhaps wittingly or even unwittingly, jut outside the contours
of the litigation, but even such overlappings should be within bounds of
propriety and sobriety. But there is no justification for traversing so far
beyond the convass as was done by the High Court in this case or to cover areas
which are grossly extraneous to the subject matter of the case. If the subordinate
courts are also to be tempted and encouraged to follow suit by travelling far
outside the scope of the lis the consequences would be far too many.
Demoralisation
of departments would badly erode the already impaired efficiency of our forces.
It is time to remind ourselves once again that judgment should confine to the
scope of the case.
In the
State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammad Naim {AIR 1964 SC 703 = 1964 (2) SCR 363} a
four Judge Bench of this Court heard the grievance of a State regarding certain
sweeping remarks made by a learned Judge of the High Court who dealt with the
case of a police officer. The judge of the High Court had stated in his
Judgment that "(a) If I had felt that with my lone efforts I could have
cleaned this augean stable, which is the police force, I would not have
hesitated to wage this war single handed. (b) That there is not a single
lawless group in the whole of the country whose record of crime comes anywhere
near the record of that organised unit which is known as the Indian Police
Force.
(c)
Where every fish barring perhaps a few stinks, it is idle to pick out one or
two and say that it stinks." S.K. Das, J. (as he then was) speaking for
the four Judge Bench expressed complete disapproval of those impugned
observations and reminded thus:
"It
is not infrequent that sweeping generalisations defeat the very purpose for
which they are made. It has been judicially recognised that in the matter of
making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes
into consideration before a courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is
relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is
before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b)
whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the
remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an
integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised
that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not
normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve." During the 36
years which elapsed thereafter this Court has reiterated those words on
different occasions.
{R.K. Lakshmanan
vs. A.K. Srinivasan & anr., 1976 (1) SCR 204 = AIR 1975 SC 1741, Niranjan Patnaik
vs.
Sashibhushan
Kar & anr., 1986(2) SCC 569 = AIR 1986 SC 819, S.K. Viswambaran vs. E. Koyakunju & ors., 1987 (2) SCC 109 = AIR
1987 SC 1436}.
It
would have been very appropriate if learned Judges of the Division Bench who
rendered the impugned order would have reminded themselves of the above
equation administered by the apex court more than three decades ago.
For
the aforesaid reasons we have to interfere with the impugned order. We hereby
set aside the directions issued to the State Public Prosecutor as well as to
the Home Minister and Home Secretary of the State.
Appeal
is disposed of accordingly.
.................................................................J
[ K.T. Thomas ] ................................................................J.
[ R.P.Sethi
] New Delhi;
August
10, 2000.
Regularised.
Now the High Court is to dispose of the appeal in accordance with law. As this
is an old matter we direct the Registrar of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh to
include the appeal in the hearing list, as expeditiously as possible.
Parties
are directed to appear before the High Court on 4-9-2000 and no fresh notice need be issued for this purpose.
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