State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Challa
Ramkrishna Reddy & Ors [2000] INSC 264 (26 April 2000)
D.P.Wadhwa, S.S.Ahmad
S.SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Challa Chinnappa Reddy and
his son Challa Ramkrishna Reddy were involved in Criminal Case No.18/1997 of
Owk Police Station in Baganapalle Taluk of Kurnool District. They were arrested
on 25th of April, 1977 and on being remanded to judicial custody on 26th of
April, 1977, they were lodged in Cell No.7 of Sub-jail, Koilkuntla.
In the night between 5th and 6th of May,
1977, at about 3.30 A.M., some persons entered the premises of Sub-jail and
hurled bombs into Cell No.7 as a result of which Challa Chinnappa Reddy
sustained grievous injuries and died subsequently in Government hospital,
Kurnool. His son Challa Ramakrishna Reddy who was also lodged in Cell No.7,
however, escaped with some injuries. Challa Ramakrishna Reddy and his four
other brothers as also his mother filed a suit against the State of Andhra
Pradesh claiming a sum of Rs.10 lacs as damages on account of the negligence of
the defendant which had resulted in the death of Challa Chinnappa Reddy. The
suit was contested by the State of Andhra Pradesh on two principal grounds,
namely, that the suit was barred by limitation and that no damages could be
awarded in respect of sovereign functions as the establishment and maintenance
of jail was part of the sovereign functions of the State and, therefore, even
if there was any negligence on the part of the Officers of the State, the State
would not be liable in damages as it was immune from any legal action in
respect of its sovereign acts. Both the contentions were accepted by the trial
court and the suit was dismissed. On appeal, the suit was decreed by the High
Court for a sum of Rs.1,44,000/- with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from the date of the suit till realisation. It is this judgment which is
challenged in this appeal. Ms. K.Amreshwari, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh has contended that the suit was barred
by time as the period of limitation, as provided by Article 72 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, was only one year and since the act complained of took place in the
night intervening 5th and 6th of May, 1977, the suit which was instituted on
9th of June, 1980, was barred by time. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondents has, on the other hand, contended that the period of limitation
would be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which prescribed a
period of three years from the date on which the right to sue accrued. It is
contended that Article 113 was the residuary Article and since the nature of
the present suit was not covered by any other Article of the Limitation Act, it
would be governed by the residuary Article, namely, Article 113 and, therefore,
the suit, as held by the High Court, was within limitation. The other question
which was argued by the learned counsel for the parties with all the vehemence
at their command was the question relating to the immunity of the State from
legal action in respect of their sovereign acts. It was contended by the
learned counsel for the appellant that the prisons all over the country are
established and maintained either by the Central Government or by the State
Government as part of their sovereign functions in maintaining law and order in
the country and, therefore, the suit for compensation was not maintainable.
Learned counsel for the respondents, on the
contrary, has contended that the theory of immunity, professed by the appellant
in respect of sovereign acts, has since been exploded by several decisions of
this Court and damages have been awarded against the State even in respect of
custodial deaths. We will first take up the question of limitation.
Article 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is
quoted below:- "Description of suit Period of Time from which limitation
period begins to run _____________________________________________For
compensation for One year When the act or doing or for omitting omission takes
to do an act alleged place. to be in pursuance of any enactment in force for
the time being in the territories to which this Act extends.
____________________________________________________"
The above Article corresponds to Article 2 of the Limitation Act, 1908 which is
quoted below:- "__________________________________________________For
compensation for Ninety days When the act or doing or for omitting omission
takes to do an act alleged place. to be in pursuance of any enactment in force
for the time being in India."
______________________________________________" Article 113 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, upon which reliance has been placed by the respondents, is quoted
below:- "Description of suit Period of Time from which limitation period
begins to run ___________________________________________________ Any suit for
which no Three When the right period of limitation years. to sue accrues. is
provided elsewhere in this Schedule." ___________________________________________________"
These Articles, namely, Article 72 and 113 are applicable to different
situations. In order to attract Article 72, it is necessary that the suit must
be for compensation for doing or for omitting to do an act in pursuance of any
enactment in force at the relevant time. That is to say, the doing of an act or
omission to do an act for which compensation is claimed must be the act or
omission which is required by the statute to be done. If the act or omission
complained of is not alleged to be in pursuance of the statutory authority,
this Article would not apply. This Article would be attracted to meet the
situation where the public officer or public authority or, for that matter, a
private person does an act under power conferred or deemed to be conferred by
an Act of the Legislature by which injury is caused to another person who
invokes the jurisdiction of the court to claim compensation for that act. Thus,
where a public officer acting bona fide under or in pursuance of an Act of the
Legislature commits a "tort", the action complained of would be
governed by this Article which, however, would not protect a public officer
acting mala fide under colour of his office. The Article, as worded, does not
speak of "bona fide" or "mala fide" but it is obvious that
the shorter peiod of limitation, provided by this Article, cannot be claimed in
respect of an act which was malicious in nature and which the public officer or
authority could not have committed in the belief that the act was justifiable
under any enactment. In State of Punjab vs. M/s Modern Cultivators, 1964 (8)
SCR 273 = AIR 1965 SC 17, Hidayatullah, J. (as he then was) while approving the
earlier decisions in Mohammad Sadat Ali Khan vs. Administrator, Corporation of
City of Lahore, ILR (1945) Lahore 523 (FB) = AIR 1945 Lahore 324 and Secretary
of State vs. Lodna Colliery Col. Ltd., ILR 15 Patna 510 = AIR 1936 Patna 513,
observed as under:- "(25) This subject was elaborately discussed in ILR
(1945) Lah 523: (AIR 1945 Lah 324)(FB) where all ruling on the subject were
noticed.
Mahajan, J. (as he then was) pointed out that
"the act or omission must be those which are honestly believed to be
justified by a statute." The same opinion was expressed by Courtney
Terrell C.J. in Secretary of State v. Lodna Colliery Co. Ltd., ILR 15 Pat 510:
(AIR 1936 Pat 513) in these words:- "The object of the article is the
protection of public officials, who, while bona fide purporting to act in the
exercise of a staturory power, have exceeded that power and have committed a
tortious act; it resembles in this respect the English Public Authorities
Protection Act.
If the act compalined of is within the terms
of the statute, no protection is needed, for the plaintiff has suffered no
legal wrong. The protection is needed when an actionable wrong has been
committed and to secure the protection there must be in the first place a bona
fide belief by the official that the act complained of was justified by the
statute, secondly the act must have been performed under colour of a statutory
duty, and thirdly, the act must be in itself a tort in order to give rise to
the cause of action.
It is against such actions for tort that the
statute gives protection." (26) These cases have rightly decided that Art.2
cannot apply to cases where the act or omission complained of is not alleged to
be in pursuance of statutory authority." In Jailal vs. The Punjab State
& Anr., AIR 1967 Delhi 118, it was held by the Delhi High Court that
protection under Article 72 could be claimed only when the act was done under
the colour of statutory duty but if the person acted with the full knowledge
that it was not done under the authority of law, he could not claim the benefit
of the shorter period of limitation prescribed under this Article. In Jaques
& Ors. vs. Narendra Lal Das, AIR 1936 Calcutta 653, it was held that this
Article would not protect the public officer acting mala fide under the colour
of his office. To the same effect is the decision of the Punjab High Court in
The State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Lalchand Sabharwal, AIR 1975 Punjab 294 = 77
Punjab LR 396.
In Punjab Cotton Press Co. Ltd. vs. Secretary
of State AIR 1927 PC 72, where the canal authorities cut the bank of a canal to
avoid accident to the adjoining railway track and not to the canal and
plaintiff's adjacent mills were damaged, it was held that Article 2 was not
applicable as the act alleged was not done in pursuance of any enactment.
A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in
Pt. Shiam Lal vs. Abdul Raof AIR 1935 Allahabad 538 held that if a police
officer concocts and reports a false story, he is not protected by Article 2 of
the Limitation Act, which would apply only where a person honestly believing
that he is acting under some enactment does an act in respect of which
compensation is claimed. But where the officer pretends that he is so acting
and knows that he should not act, Article 2 would not apply. Keeping these
principles in view, let us examine the facts of this case. On being lodged in
jail, the deceased Challa Chinnappa Reddy and Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (P.W.1)
both informed the Inspector of Police that there was a conspiracy to kill them
and their lives were in danger. They sent a representation to that effect to
the Collector and the Home Minister. On 5th of May, 1977 they told the Circle
Inspector that they had positive information that an attack on their lives
would be made on that very night. But the Circle Inspector did not treat the
matter seriously and said that no incident would happen inside the jail and
that they need not worry. In spite of the representation made by the deceased
and Challa Ramkrishna Reddy, adequate protection was not provided to them and
extra guards were not put on duty. The deceased, therefore, asked his followers
to sleep that night near the jail itself. As pointed out earlier, that night,
which incidentally was the night between 5th and 6th of May, 1977, a bomb was
hurled in Cell No.7 where the deceased and Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (P.W.1) were
lodged and as a result of the bomb explosion, Challa Chinnappa Reddy died but
before his death, his dying declaration was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate
in which it was stated by the deceased that they had received information that
a conspiracy was hatched to kill them in the jail itself and that the
Sub-Inspector of Police (who was examined as D.W.1 in the trial court) was a
party to that conspiracy. The Magistrate also recorded the statement of Challa
Ramkrishna Reddy who stated that though the deceased and he himself had
requested the police to provide protection to them as their lives were in
danger, their requests were not heeded to. The High Court while examining the
evidence on record came to the following conclusion:- "It is thus clear
that though 9 members of the police party must stay in the sub-jail premises
during the night, only two were there on that night. The witness did not
produce his General Diary maintained in the Police Station to establish that 9
members of the guardian party were staying in the Sub-jail on that night. The
learned Magistrate who visited the jail immediately after receiving the
information and on learning of the incident, stated in his report, Ex.A-9,
submitted to the Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Kurnool, that only two
Constables were guarding the jail that night. He opined "I am inclined to
think that the alleged explosion in Cell No.7 is on the first-floor, and that
the culprits put up a ladder, tied with a rope to the wooden parapet, went up
to the first-floor and threw the bomb into Cell No.7. He also reported that
while going away, when they were challenged by three persons sleeping outside
the jail (kept there by the deceased and P.W.1 as an additional precaution)
they threw bombs at them, killing one of them and injuring the other two. It is
also evident from Ex.A-14 that both the said Constables were suspended on
23.5.1977. The report of the learned Magistrate and his notes inspection
(Ex.A-9) clearly show that the Police Constables guarding the jail were not
vigilant, and the P.C.483, whose duty it was to guard the cell, was probably
sleeping at that time. The learned Magistrate has observed in his report
"if P.C. 483 was more vigilant, perhaps the untoward incident would not
have occurred..." The very manner in which the culprits gained entry into
the jail shows that it could not have happened but for the negligence on the
part of the police to guard the jail property and to ensure the safety of
prisoners, as required by Rule 48 of the Madras Rules aforesaid. It may be
noted that Kurnool District is one of the districts in Rayalaseema area of the
State, notorious for factions and blood-feuds. Use of bombs is not a rare
occurrence in that area. In such a situation, and more so when a specific
request was made for additional precautions, the failure not only to provide
additional precautions, but the failure to provide even the normal guard duty
cannot but be termed as gross negligence. It is an omission to perform the
statutory responsibility placed upon them by Rule 48 of the Madras Prisons
Rules. It is a failure to take reasonable care. On the issue two we disagree
with the learned trial Judge." It would thus be seen from the above that
the deceased as also Challa Ramkrishna Reddy who apprehended danger to their
lives, complained to the police and requested for adequate police guards being
deployed at the jail, but their requests were not heeded to and true to their
apprehension, a bomb was thrown at them which caused the death of Challa
Chinnappa Reddy and injuries to Challa Ramkrishna Reddy (P.W.1). In this
process, one of the three persons, who was sleeping near the jail, was also
killed.
The Police Sub-Inspector was also in
conspiracy and it was for this reason that in spite of their requests, adequate
security guards were not provided. Even the normal strength of the guards who
should be on duty at night was not provided and only two Constables, instead of
nine, were put on duty. Since the Sub-Inspector of Police himself was in
conspiracy, the act in not providing adequate security at the jail cannot be
treated to be an act or omission in pursuance of a statutory duty, namely, Rule
48 of the Madras Prison Rules, referred to by the High Court. Moreover, the
action was wholly mala fide and, therefore, there was no question of the
provisions of Article 72 being invoked to defeat the claim of the respondents
as the protection of shorter period of limitation, contemplated by that
Article, is available only in respect of bona fide acts. In our opinion, the
High Court in the circumstances of this case, was justified in not applying the
provisions of Article 72 and invoking the provisions of Article 113 (the
residuary Article) to hold that the suit was within limitation. We may now
consider the next question relating to the immunity of the State Government in
respect of its sovereign acts.
The trial court relying upon the decision of
this Court in Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain vs. State of U.P.. AIR 1965 SC 1039 =
1965 (1) SCR 375, dismissed the suit on the ground that establishment and
maintenance of jail being a part of the sovereign activity of the Government, a
suit for damages would not lie as the State was immune from being proceeded
against in a court of law on that account. The High Court also relied upon the
decision in Kasturi Lal's case (supra) but it did not dismiss the appeal on
that ground. It went a step further and considered the provisions contained in
Article 21 of the Constitution and came to the conclusion that since the Right
to Life was part of the Fundamental Rights of a person and that person cannot
be deprived of his life and liberty except in accordance with the procedure
established by law, the suit was liable to be decreed as the officers of the
State in not providing adequate security to the deceased, who was lodged with
his son in the jail, had acted negligently. Immunity of State for its sovereign
acts is claimed on the basis of the old English Maxim that the King can do no
wrong. But even in England, the law relating to immunity has undergone a change
with the enactment of Crown Proceedings Act, 1947. Considering the effect of
this Act, it is stated in Rattan Lal's "Law of Torts" (23rd Edition)
as under:- "The Act provides that the Crown shall be subject to all those
liabilities in tort to which, if it were a person of full age and capacity, it
would be subject (1) in respect of torts committed by its servants or agents,
provided that the act or omission of the servant or agent would, apart from the
Act, have given rise to a cause of action in tort against that servant or agent
or against his estate; (2) in respect of any breach of those duties which a
person owes to his servants or agents at common law by reason of being their
employer; (3) in respect of any breach of the duties attaching at common law to
the ownership, occupation, possession or control of property.
Liability in tort also extends to breach by
the Crown of a statutory duty. It is also no defence for the Crown that the
tort was committed by its servants in the course of performing or purporting to
perform functions entrusted to them by any rule of the common law or by
statute. The law as to indemnity and contribution as between joint tort-feasors
shall be enforceable by or against the Crown and the Law Reform (Contributory
Negligence) Act, 1945 binds the Crown. Although the Crown Proceedings Act
preserves the immunity of the Sovereign in person and contains savings in
respect of the Crown's prerogative and statutory powers, the effect of the Act
in other respects, speaking generally, is to abolish the immunity of the Crown
in tort and to equate the Crown with a private citizen in matters of tortious
liability." Thus, the Crown in England does not now enjoy absolute
immunity and may be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts of its
officers and servants. The Maxim that King can do no wrong or that the Crown is
not answerable in tort has no place in Indian jurisprudence where the power
vests, not in the Crown, but in the people who elect their representatives to
run the Government, which has to act in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution and would be answerable to the people for any violation thereof.
Right to Life is one of the basic human
rights. It is guaranteed to every person by Article 21 of the Constitution and
not even the State has the authority to violate that Right. A prisoner, be he a
convict or under-trial or a detenu, does not cease to be a human being. Even
when lodged in the jail, he continues to enjoy all his Fundamental Rights
including the Right to Life guaranteed to him under the Constitution. On being
convicted of crime and deprived of their liberty in accordance with the
procedure established by law, prisoners still retain the residue of
constitutional rights. "Prison" has been defined in Section 3(1) of
the Prisons Act, 1894 as any jail or place used permanently or temporarily
under the general or special orders of State Government for the detention of
prisoners.
Section 3 contemplates three kinds of
prisoners. Sub- clause (2) of Section 3 defines "criminal prisoner"
as a prisoner duly committed to custody under the writ, warrant or order of any
court or authority exercising criminal jurisdiction or by order of a court
martial. "Convicted criminal prisoner" has been defined in Section
3(3) as a prisoner under sentence of a court or court martial and includes a
person detained in prison under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1882 or under the Prisoners Act, 1871. The corresponding
provision in the new Code of Criminal Procedure is not being indicated as it is
not necessary for pruposes of this case. "Civil prisoner" has been
defined in Section 3(4) as a prisoner who is not a "criminal
prisoner". Thus, according to the definition under the Prisoners Act,
there is a convict, there is an under- trial and there is a civil prisoner who
may be a detenu under preventive detention law. None of the three categories of
prisoners lose their Fundamental Rights on being placed inside a prison. The
restriction placed on their right to movement is the result of their conviction
or involvement in crime. Thus, a person (prisoner) is deprived of his personal
liberty in accordance with the procedure established by law which, as pointed
out in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 = 1978 (2) SCR 621 =
AIR 1978 SC 597, must be reasonable, fair and just. The rights of prisoners,
including their Fundamental Rights have been culled out by this Court in a
large number of decisions, all of which may not be referred to here. In State
of Maharashtra vs. Prabhakar Pandurang Sanzgiri, AIR 1966 SC 424 = 1966 (1) SCR
702, it was held that conditions of detention cannot be extended to deprivation
of other Fundamental Rights and the detenu, who had written a book in
`Marathi', could not be prohibited from sending the book outside the jail for
its publication. In D.Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR
1974 SC 2092 = (1975) 3 SCC 185 = 1975 (2) SCR 24, it was laid down that
convicts are not denuded of all the Fundamental Rights they possess.
Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) held : "The security of one's person
against an arbitrary encroachment by the police is basic to a free society and
prisoners cannot be thrown at the mercy of policemen as if it were a part of an
unwritten law of crimes. Such intrusions are against the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty." [See: (1975) 3 SCC Page 188 Para 9] In Charles
Shobraj vs.Superintendent, Central Jail, Tihar AIR 1978 SC 1514, Krishna Iyer,
J. observed as under : "True, confronted with cruel conditions of
confinement, the court has an expanded role. True, the right to life is more
than mere animal existence, or vegetable subsistence. True, the worth of the
human person and dignity and divinity of every individual inform articles 19
and 21 even in a prison setting. True constitutional provisions and municipal
laws must be interpreted in the light of the normative laws of nations,
wherever possible and a prisoner does not forfeit his part III rights."
(See: AIR 1978 Page 1517 Para 14) In Francis Coralie Mullin vs. The
Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 = AIR 1981 SC 746 =
1981 (2) SCR 516, the Court held that Right to Life means the right to live
with basic human dignity. In this case, the petitioner, who was a British
national and was detained in the Central Jail, Tihar, had approached this Court
through a petition of habeas corpus in which it was stated that she experienced
considerable difficulty in having interview with her lawyer and the members of
her family.
She stated that her daughter, who was 5 years
of age, and her sister who was looking after the daughter, were permitted to
have interview with her only once in a month.
Considering the petition, Bhagwati, J. (as he
then was) observed at Page 753 in Para 8 as under : "The same consequence
would follow even if this problem is considered from the point of view of the
right to personal liberty enshrined in Article 21, for the right to have
interviews with members of the family and friends is clearly part of personal
liberty guaranteed under that Article. The expression `personal liberty'
occurring in Article 21 has been given a broad and liberal interpretation in
Maneka Gandhi's case (AIR 1978 SC 597) (supra) and it has been held in that
case that the expression `personal liberty' used in that Article is of the
widest amplitude and it covers a variety of rights which go to constitute the
personal liberty of a man and it also includes rights which "have been
raised to the status of distinct Fundamental Rights and given additional
protection under Article 19". There can therefore be no doubt that
`personal liberty' would include the right to socialise with members of the
family and friends subject, of course, to any valid prison regulations and
under Arts. 14 and 21, such prison regulations must be reasonable and
non-arbitrary. If any prison regulation or procedure laid down by it regulating
the right to have interviews with members of the family and friends is
arbitrary or unreasonable, it would be liable to be struck down as invalid as
being violative of Articles 14 and 21." (See also :Sunil Batra (I) vs.
Delhi Administration, AIR 1978 SC 1675 = (1978) 4 SCC 494 = 1979 (1) SCR 392 ;
Sunil Batra (II) vs. Delhi Administration, AIR 1980 SC 1579 = (1980) 3 SCC 488
= 1980 (2) SCR 557). Thus, the Fundamental Rights, which also include basic
human rights, continue to be available to a prisoner and those rights cannot be
defeated by pleading the old and archaic defence of immunity in respect of
sovereign acts which has been rejected several times by this Court. In N.
Nagendra Rao & Co. vs. State of A.P., AIR 1994 SC 2663 = (1994) 6 SCC 205,
it was observed:- "But there the immunity ends. No civilised system can
permit an executive to play with the people of its country and claim that it is
entitled to act in any manner as it is soverign. The concept of public interest
has changed with structural change in the society. No legal or political system
today can place the State above law as it is unjust and unfair for a citizen to
be deprived of his property illegally by negligent act of officers of the State
without any remedy. From sincerity, efficiency and dignity of State as a
juristic person, propounded in Nineteenth Century as sound sociological basis
for State immunity the circle has gone round and the emphasis now is more on
liberty, equality and the rule of law. The modern social thinking of
progressive societies and the judicial approach is to do away with archaic
State protection and place the State or the Government at par with any other
juristic legal entity. Any watertight compartmentalisation of the functions of
the State as "soverign and non-sovereign" or "governmental or
non-governmental" is not sound. It is contrary to modern jurisprudential
thinking. The need of the State to have extraordinary powers cannot be doubted.
But with the conceptual change of statutory
power being statutory duty for sake of society and the people the claim of a
common man or ordinary citizen cannot be thrown out merely because it was done
by an officer of the State even though it was against law and negligently.
Needs of the State, duty of its officials and right of the citizens are
required to be reconciled so that the rule of law in a welfare State is not
shaken. Even in America where this doctrine of soverignty found it place either
because of the `financial instability of the infant American States rather than
to the stability of the doctrine theoretical foundation', or because of
`logical and practical ground', or that `there could be no legal right as
against the State which made the law gradually gave way to the movement from,
`State irresponsibility to State responsibility.' In welfare State, functions
of the State are not only defence of the country or administration of justice
or maintaining law and order but it extends to regulaing and controlling the
activities of people in almost every sphere, educational, commercial, social,
economic, political and even marital.
The demarcating line between soverign and
non-soverign powers for which no rational basis survives, has largely
disappeared. Therefore, barring functions such as administration of justice,
maintenance of law and order and repression of crime etc. which are among the
primary and inalienable functions of a constitutional Government, the State
cannot claim any immunity." The whole question was again examined by this
Court in Common Cause, A Registered Society vs. Union of India & Ors.,
(1999) 6 SCC 667 = AIR 1999 SC 2979, in which the entire history relating to
the institution of suits by or against the State or, to be precise, against
Government of India, beginning from the time of East India Company right up to
the stage of Constitution, was considered and the theory of immunity was
rejected. In this process of judicial advancement, Kasturi Lal`s case (supra)
has paled into insignificance and is no longer of any binding value. This
Court, through a stream of cases, has already awarded compensation to the
persons who suffered personal injuries at the hands of the officers of the
Government including Police Officers & personnel for their to tortious act.
Though most of these cases were decided under Public law domain, it would not
make any difference as in the instant case, two vital factors, namely, police
negligence as also the Sub-Inspector being in conspiracy are established as a
fact. Moreover, these decisions, as for example, Nilabti Behera vs. State of
Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 = 1993 (2) SCR 581 = AIR 1993 SC 1960; In Re: Death of
Sawinder Singh Grower, (1995) Supp.
(4) SCC 450 = JT 1992 (6) SC 271 = 1992 (3)
Scale 34; and D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 = AIR 1997
SC 610, would indicate that so far as Fundamental Rights and human rights or
human dignity are concerned, the law has marched ahead like a Pegasus but the
Government attitude continues to be conservative and it tries to defend its
action or the tortious action of its officers by raising the plea of immunity
for sovereign acts or acts of State, which must fail. For the reasons stated
above, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed.
Back
Pages: 1 2
