A.P.Aggarwal
Vs. Govt. of N.C.T. of Delhi & ANR [1999] INSC 396 (16 November 1999)
M.Srinivasan,
R.C.Laboti SRINIVASAN.J.
Leave
granted. Heard both sides and perused the records. 2. In November 1996,
applications were invited tor appointment to the post of Member, Appellate
Tribunal, Sales-tax. The qualifications, classification and scale of pay, dis-qualifications,
medical fitness, retirement age and retirement benefits were all set out in the
advertisement.
The
appellant had the requisite qualifications and applied tor the post. The post
was to be filled up by the Central Government as per Section 13 of the Delhi
Sales Tax Act 1975. The Selection Committee .constituted for the", purpose
recommended a panel of two names for consideration for appointment by the
Central Government.
One
Mr. M.L. Sahni who was a Member of the Delhi Higher Judicial Service at that
time and the present appellant who was Addl. Legal Advisor, Ministry of Law,
Justice and Company Affairs were on the panel. The Central Government appointed
Shri M.L. Sahni as Member, Appellate Tribunal, Sales-tax 'for a period of three
years or till such time as his successor joins, whichever is earlier'. Pursuant
thereto Shri M.L. Sahni joined the post on 14.9.1997. Even by that time, he had
been selected for the post of Member, Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. He was
appointed as such in December 1997, and he relinquished the post of Member,
Sales-tax Appellate Tribunal on 4.1.1998.
3. The
Central Government instead of appointing the appellant as the Member, chose to
cause a fresh advertisement to be issued calling for fresh applications.
Admittedly;
a note .was submitted for filling up the vacancy either by inviting,
applications through, press advertisements or by appointing the appellant whose
name;
was
recommended earlier along with the name of Shri M.L. Sahni and to avoid delay
in filling up the post, the latter course was suggested. But that was not
accepted by the Government and it was decided to invite fresh applications for
a wider choice. 4. In the meanwhile, the appellant had been making
representations repeatedly to the concerned authorities for appointing him as
Member, Sales-tax Appellate Tribunal. As there was no response to any
representation and the Government proceeded to process the applications
received pursuant to the fresh advertisements, the appellant filed 0.A. No .630
of 1998 on the file of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench. New Delhi for quashing the fresh
advertisement and the process of selection pursuant thereto and for a direction
to appoint the appellant as Member, Sales- tax Appellate Tribunal. It should be
mentioned here, that the provisions of Section 13 of the Delhi Sales-tax Act
were amended with effect from 28.1.98 whereby the words 'Central Government"
appearing in the Section were substituted by the words 'Lt. Governor'.
Thus
the power of appointment vested thereafter with the Lt.
Governor
of Delhi. The appellant liad therefore impleaded
the Oovcrnmcnt of N.C.T. of Delhi through
the Lt. Governor and the Secretary" (Finance), Government of N.C.T. as
respondents in his application. The application was contested by the
respondents on the ground that the appellant did not get any right bv the
inclusion of his name in the panel. Before tlie Tribunal, reliance was placed bv
the appellant on Office Memorandum No.39021/18/84-Estt. (B) dated 14.5..1987,
Govt. of India, Ministry of Personnel., P.O. and Pensions (Department of
Personnel and Training).
It was
stated on behalf of the appellant that the provisions in the Office Memorandum
were mandatory and the vacancy in the post having occurred within a period of
six months from the date of joining of Shri M.L Sahni, it should be filled up
by appointing tlie appellant. Reliance was also placed on the provisions of Section
13 of the Delhi Sales-tax Act 1975. -- - . . 5. The
Tribunal opined that the Government Office Memorandum was not mandatory and it
was open to the Government to resort to fresh selection process.
'The
Tribunal had also placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in which it
has been laid down that a person in the waiting list does not get any right to
be appointed lo the post if vacancy arises subsequently. Ultimately, tlie
Tribunal. dismissed the application tiled by the appellant.
6. The
appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court Delhi which was dismissed in limine
by a non -speaking orde the High Court observed that it found no reason to
interfere with the impugned decision of the Tribunal.
Aggrieved
thereby, the appellant has approached this Court.
When
the matter was pending before the Tribunal, there was a stay of the process of
selection pursuant to the fresh advertisement. When notice was ordered by this
Court in the petition for Special Leave, similar interim order was granted
slaying fresh selection.
7. The
appointment of Member. Sales-tax Appellate Tribunal is governed by Section 13
of the Delhi Sales-tax Act 1975. Sub- section
(4) of Section 13 reads as follows:
Any vacency
in the membership of the Appellate tribunal Shall be lilled up by the Central
Govt. as soon as practicable.
It is
significant to notice use of the word 'shall' in the sub-section . There is no
doubt that the statute has cast a duty on the Government to fill up the vacancy
as early as practicable.
8. The
Central Government issued an Office Memorandum on 14.5.1987 containing the
instructions which would apply in respect of vacancies arising on or after
1.1.1986. The Memorandum is in the following terms:
The
undersigned is directed to refer to this Department's O.M. No.
39021/18/84-Estt.(B) dated 6th February 1985, 13^ June 1985 and 20th November
1985 (copies enclosed) and to say that according to the existing procedure, the
reserve lists prepared with effect from I th January 1985 were to be operated
only to fill replacement vacancies. Earlier to this the reserve lists were
being used both for replacement vacancies and fresh vacancies of identical
nature. Some of the Ministries have reported difficulties in filling up of
vacancies caused in a situation where the recommended candidate joined the post
for a short period and then resigned or where the vacancy occurred on account
of the death of the candidate, It was pointed out that the posts could not be
kept vacant for a long time till the next recruitment took place.
""*2.
The matter has been examined in consultation with U.P.S.C. and it has been
decided that the reserve lists may be operated in cases where a vacancy is
created by a candidate resigning the post or in the event of his death, within
a period of six months from the date of his Joining the post subject to the
condition that such an operation of the lists should be limited in respect of stetutory
posts and those of scientific, technical, academic or medical nature or other
similar nature where it may not be possible to keep the post vacant till the
completion of fresh recruitment or to make local arrangements.
3. In
other types of cases also where the post could be manned normally on
officiating basis or bv internal arrangements, requests of the Ministnes/Departments
for operation of reserve lists will be considered by the Commission but only
when it is apparent that making of such arrangements would not be feasible and
the posts also cannot be kept vacant till the candidates from next recruitment
process are available.
4.
These instructions would apply in respect of vacancies arising on or after I. 1 .86.'
9.
While it is the contention of learned senior counsel for the appellant that the
instructions contained in the office memorandum are mandatory', the learned
Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondents has contended that
they are only directory and there is absolutely no necessity for the government
to strictly comply with the same. He places reliance on the words 'may be
operated' appearing in Paragraph 2.
10. A
reading of Section 13(4) of the Delhi Sales-tax Act and the Office Memorandum
together shows that the latter was issued with a view to fill up the vacancy as
soon as practicable. The statutory provision is expressed in mandatory language
and in order to give effect to the same, executive instructions were issued in
die office memorandum.
The
first paragraph of the office memorandum shows that the position prevailing
prior to 14.5.1987 lead to some difficulties and the memorandum in question was
being issued in order to get over such difficulties and achieve the objective
of early fulfillment of the vacancy contemplated in the Act. If the office
memorandum is read in the light of the provisions in Section 13 (4), there is
no doubt whatever that a public duty is cast on the concerned authorities to
fill up the vacancy within as short time as possible provided the conditions
set out in the memorandum arc present. There is no dispule in this case that
the vacancy was created by the resigning of the post by M.L. Sahni within a
period of six months of the date of Joining the same. The list recommended by
the Select Committee and accepted by the Government contained a panel of two
names and the post is such it is not possible to make local arrangements to
fill up the vacancy. Nor is it desirable to keep it vacant for a long time or
till the completion of fresh recruitment.
11. In
our opinion, this is a case of confirment of power together with a discretion
which goes with it to enable proper exercise of the power and therefore it is
coupled with a duty to shun arbitrariness in its exercise and to promote the
object for which the power is conferred which undoubtedly is public interest
and not individual or private gain, whim or caprice of any individual. Even if
it is to be said, that the instructions contained in the Office Memorandum
dated 14.5.87 are discretionary and not mandatory, such discretion is coupled
with the duty to act in a manner which will promote the object tor which the
power is conferred and also satisfy the mandatory' 'requirement of the Statute.
It is not therefore open to the Government .to ignore .the panel .which, was
already-approved and accepted by it and resort to a fresh, selection process
without giving any proper reason for resorting to the same. It is not the case
of the Government at any stage that the appellant is not fit to occupy the
post. No attempt was made before the Tribunal or betore this Court to place any
valid reason for ignoring the appellant and launching a fresh process of
selection.
12. It
is well settled that every State action, in order to survive, must not be
susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness which is the crux of Article 14 of the
Constitution and basic to the rule of law, the system which governs ns. (vide Shrilekha
Vtdyarthi versus_State.of U.P. ((1991) I S.C.C. 212).
13.
Learned Additional Solicitor General referred to the judgment of this Court in Madan
Lal and Others versus State of J -& K and Others ( (1995) 3 S.C.C. 486 )
and placed reliance on Paragraph 23 of the judgment at Page 502.
That
ruling has no relevance in the present case. The advertisement was for
applications to the post of Munsif.
According
to the advertisement, there were 11 vacancies to be filled up and the
requisition to the Public Service Commission was to select II persons for
filling up the said seven vacancies. While sending the list of selected
candidates, die Public Service Commission sent a list containing more names
than I I. That was obviously with a view to fill up the vacancies, if any of
the 11 candidates according to their merit did not join., from among the 11
candidates in the waiting list according to their merit.
The
Bench held that once the 11 candidates who were selected joined the post, the
list got exhausted and the waiting list could not be used for any purpose
thereafter. That principle will not apply in the present case in view of the
facts already set out by us.
14. In
R.S. Mittid versus Union of India (1995 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 230) the question
arose with regard to selection of candidates to the post of Judicial Member,
income-tax Appellate Tribunal. The selection was made by a Selection Board
consisting of a sitting Judge of this Court. The Selection Board prepared a.
panel of selected candidates which included the name of the appellant before
this Court and sent its recommendations. The candidates who were at numbers I
and 2 in the panel did not accept the appointment.
The
Bench observed that though a person on the select panel has no vested right to
be appointed to the post for which he has been selected has a right to be
considered for appointment and at the same time the appointing authority cannot
not ignore the select panel or decline to make an appointment on its whims. The
Court said that when a person has been selected by the Selection Board and
there is a vacancy which can be offered to him, keeping in view his merit
position, ordinarily there is no justification to ignore him for appointment
and that there has to be a justifiable reason to decline to appoint a.
person
who is on the select panel. However, on the facts of the case. the Bench did
not give any relief to the appellant as he was only No.4 and no information was
available about the stand of the person who was at No.3 of the select panel. While
reversing the findings given by the Central Administrative Tribunal to the
extent indicated in the judgment the Bcnch dismissed the appeal but directed
the Government to pay cost of the proceedings to the appellant which was
quantified at Rs.30.000/-.
Vircudcr
S. Hooda and others versus State of Haryana and .another (1999 S.C.C. 696 The Haryana Service Commission advertised
12 posts of Haryana Civil Service (Executive Branch). On completion of
selection final list was published. Some of the selected candidates did not
join and the appellant contended that they should have been considered against
die vacancies so arising, depending upon the ranking obtained by the appellants
in the competitive examination. They relied on Government Circulars dated 22.3.1957
and 26.5.1972 according to which the vacancies which arose within six months
from receipt of recommendations of the Commission. should be filled lip from
the waiting list maintained by the Commission. The writ petition filed by the
appellants was dismissed by the High Court in the view that the administrative
instructions contained in the Circulars could not be enforced. Reversing the
decision of the High Court, the Division Bench of this Court observed that the
Government ought to have considered the case of the appellants as per the rank
obtained by them and the appellants had to be appointed if they came within the
range of selection. The Bench pointed out that when those vacancies arose
within a period of six months from the date of previous selection, the
Government circulars were attracted and the view of the High Court that the
vacancies arose after selection process commenced had no relevance and they are
contrary to the declared policy of the Government.
The
Bench observed that the view taken by the High Court that the administrative
instructions could not be enforced by the appellants would be looking at the
matter from a narrow and wrong angle. The Bench said, "when a policy has
been declared by the State as to the manner of filling up the post and that
policy is declared in terms of rules and instructions issued to the Public
Service Commission from time to time and so long as these instructions are not
contrary to the rules, the respondents ought to follow the same". The
ruling will apply on all fours in the present case.
16. In
the circumstances we have no hesitation in allowing the appeal and directing
the respondents to appoint the appellant as Member, Sales-tax Appellate
Tribunal as he is the only other person in the panel of names selected by the
Select Committee and as nothing has been brought out against him by the
Government.
17. On
the facts, we find that all the conditions set out in the office memorandum
issued by the Central Government dated 14.5.1987 are fulfilled in the present
case and the rejection of the appellant's name without any reason therefor is
arbitrary and unconstitutional. The initiation of fresh process of selection is
not valid and it is hereby quashed. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No
costs.
18.
IA. Nos.2 and 3 of 1999 In view of the disposal of the civil appeal, these two
applications do not survive. They are dismissed as infructuous.
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